425. It would not be surmise and I might
tell it to someone else with complete certainty, as something there is no doubt
about. But does that mean that it is unconditionally the truth? May not the
thing I recognize with complete certainty as the tree that I have seen here my
whole life long – may not this be disclosed as something different? May it not
confound me?
And nevertheless it was right, in the
circumstances that give this sentence meaning, to say “I know (I do not
surmise) that’s the tree”. To say that in strict truth I only believe it, would
be wrong. It would be completely misleading
to say: “I believe my name is L. W.” And this too is right: I cannot be
making a mistake about it. But that
does not mean that I am infallible about it.
‘that’s the tree’ – is all that is required
–
‘my name is …’ – is all that is required
if you preface these assertions with ‘I
know’ or ‘I believe’ – etc. –
all you do is introduce irrelevancies – and
create obfuscation
there just is no need – whatever the circumstances
claims to knowledge – claims to certainty –
are claims of authority
the only logical authority you have – is
authorship –
that’s it – that’s enough –
beyond that any claim to authority –
is nothing more than rhetoric
any proposition you put forward is a
proposal –
and is therefore – logically speaking –
uncertain
but this is no bar to use –
in fact uncertainty is the ground of use –
whether or not your proposal functions as
you expect –
you can only wait and see
whatever the case –
you make assessments – you make decisions –
you make a call
Wittgenstein says –
‘I cannot possibly be making a mistake. But
that does not mean that I am infallible about it’
this is just to say that being certain – is
not –
being certain
look either you are – or you aren’t
the reality is –
that any proposition is uncertain –
in an uncertain world –
there are no mistakes
what we have is –
different conceptions –
different descriptions –
different proposals
and furthermore –
if you hold with certainty –
if you think your propositions are certain
–
then there’s no space – for a mistake
point being –
the notion of the mistake –
has no role to play here –
it is philosophically useless
it is irrelevant –
to whatever position –
you take
it’s not in the picture
p.s.
perhaps Wittgenstein was trying to find a
way –
of maintaining certainty –
and at the same time recognizing the
skeptical position –
and the idea of the mistake –
became his compromise –
his third way
the fact is – it doesn’t work
and to even try it on –
suggests to me that Wittgenstein –
who is no fool –
and is as clever as a fox –
has simply lost –
his integrity –
or – which amounts to the same thing –
is just playing a game –
a language game –
of deception
why?
because he can –
and because it is what he thinks –
philosophy – and life –
amounts to
© greg t. charlton. 2010.
