387. Someone might ask me: “how certain are
you that that is a tree over there; that you have money in your pocket; that
that is your foot?” And the answer in one case might be “not certain”, in another “as good as certain”, in the third
“I can’t doubt it”. And these answers would make sense even without grounds. I
should not need, for example, to say: “I can’t
be certain whether that is a tree because my eyes aren’t sharp enough”.
I want to say it made sense for Moore to say “I
know that is a tree”, if he meant something quite particular by it.
[I believe it might interest a philosopher,
one who can think himself, to read my notes. For even if I have hit the mark
only rarely, he would recognize what targets I had been ceaselessly aiming at.]
consider an alternative set of questions –
‘is that a tree over there, do you have
money in your pocket, is that your foot?’
yes/no answers are all that is required
the question does ask for grounds – and the
answer(s) do not give grounds –
and both question and answer focus on the
matters at hand –
the irrelevant issues of ‘certainty’ and
‘grounds’ – do not obfuscate question or answer
further – questions of ‘certainty’ and
‘grounds’ do not arise
they are not in the picture
to introduce them is to corrupt the picture
as to Moore’s ‘I know
that is a tree’ –
if Moore was actually
interested in the tree – ‘that is a tree’ – will suffice
the tree though is a prop for Moore to hang his
pretense on
[it is a such a delight to read these notes
–
I feel so privileged to have direct access
to such a brilliant and indomitable mind
with each reading I am struck by Wittgenstein’s
unflinching integrity – and I wonder at the price he paid for this
On Certainty
is a great work of art]
