'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Thursday, January 29, 2015

Philosophical Grammar 142


142. Are we willing to call a series of independent signals “a language”?

Imagine a diary kept with signals. Are explanations given so that the signals are connected to another language?

A language consisting of commands. We wouldn’t say that a series of such signals alone would enable me to derive a picture of the movement of a man obeying them unless in addition to the signal there is something that might be called a general rule for translating into drawing.

The grammar explains the meaning of the signs and thus makes the language pictorial.



language interprets the world – or features of it

‘language’ – is a propositional complex

‘Are we willing to call a series of independent signals “a language”?’

independent signals – could well be regarded as a propositional complex –

that is to say – independent signals – could be proposed as a way of interpreting the world or features of it

‘Imagine a diary kept with signals. Are explanations given so that the signals are connected to another language?’

any sign or signal – if it is to be meaningful – will be interpreted – propositionally –

that is in terms of other propositions

we are not talking of different languages here – rather propositions – propositional complexes –

if you want to call propositional complexes – different languages – OK – it’s neither here nor there

the key thing is that any proposal – any proposition – any propositional complex – is open to question – open to doubt

any proposal – is uncertain

‘A language consisting of commands. We wouldn’t say that a series of such signals alone would enable me to derive a picture of the movement of a man obeying them unless in addition to the signal there is something that might be called a general rule for translating into drawing’?

a general rule for translating into drawing?

a proposal

‘The grammar explains the meaning of the signs and thus makes the language pictorial’?

grammar – a theory of the mechanics of language – a theory of how the signs work –

presumes meaning

does it explain meaning?

it might be said to put the bones to meaning – and show how the skeleton is constructed – even how it moves

pictorial?

are not all signs pictorial?



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Philosophical Grammar 141


141. Philosophy is philosophical problems. Their common element extends as far as the common element in different regions of our language.

Something that as first sight looks like a proposition and is not one. Something that looks like the design for a steamroller and is not one.



philosophy is no different to anything else –

how it is described – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a proposition – is a proposal  

and whatever form it takes – it is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a proposal – that is not held to be open to question – is a proposition – held in prejudice

a proposition held irrationally

‘something that at first sight looks like the design for a steamroller and is not one’ –

this proposal – the ‘design’ – is obviously open to question –

and the decision that it is not a design for a steamroller –

logically speaking will be open to question –

now whether or not doubt regarding that decision is expressed –

will depend on the circumstances at hand



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Philosophical Grammar 140


140. Inventing a language – inventing an instrument – inventing a game.

If we imagine a goal for chess – say entertainment – then the rules are not arbitrary. So too for the choice of a unit of measurement.

We can’t say “without language we couldn’t communicate with one another”. The concept of language is contained in the concept of communication.



any invention is a proposal – is a proposition

if you play chess – a rule governed game – you play according to the rules –

if you don’t play according to the rules – you don’t play chess

yes – you can question the rules – and the rules are open to question – but questioning the rules – is not playing the game –

as to an imagined goal for chess – say entertainment –

well you just have to wait and see if the players are ‘entertained’ by the game

and just what does being entertained amount to?

you would probably not spend too much time on this question –

and just make a quick assessment –

in the end of course – you can’t be sure

the real point here is that there is no necessary connection between playing according to non-arbitrary rules – and being entertained

as to a choice of a unit of measurement –

that will depend on what you are doing – and how you want to go about it –

your choice won’t be arbitrary – but it will be uncertain

‘We can’t say “without language we couldn’t communicate with one another”. The concept of language is contained in the concept of communication’?

the ground of communication – is the proposal – is  the proposition –

whatever form that takes




© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Philosophical Grammar 139


139. I do not scruple to invent causal connections in the mechanism of language.

To invent a keyboard might mean to invent something that had the desired effect; or else to devise new forms which were similar to the old ones in various ways.

“It is always for living beings that signs exist.”



‘inventing causal connections in the mechanism of language’?

this ‘mechanism of language’ is itself an invention – or should I say a proposal –

and yes this is what we do in the business of explaining – and accounting for –

we invent – we propose – to suit our purposes – whatever they may be

and the logical reality is that any ‘invention’ – any proposal – any proposition –

be it in the form of language – or in some other form – as in the example above – a keyboard –

is open to question – to doubt – is uncertain

it is really not as if there are old forms and new forms – just different forms –

different forms for different purposes

It is always for living beings that signs exist’?

we make signs  – we propose

we make proposals – propositions – basic and complex –

in order to describe –

that which in the absence of our proposals –

is unknown



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Wednesday, January 28, 2015

Philosophical Grammar 138


138. Grammar consists in conventions – say in a chart. This might be part of a mechanism. But it is connection and not the effect that determines the meaning.

Can one speak of grammar in the case where a language is taught to a person by mere drill?



the ‘connection’ of grammar to language – is that of proposal to proposal

you can see language as presented in a theory of grammar –

but this is just one option

language can be viewed in any number of ways –

grammar is just one proposal –

as for meaning – the same applies –

any ‘determination’ of meaning – is open to question – to doubt

meaning is uncertain

‘Can one speak of grammar in the case where a language is taught to a person by mere drill?’

I would think not –

but then the question – what is being taught here by mere drill?

how could it be language use?

‘mere drill’ teaches ignorance

language use requires a flexible intelligence –

and that ability is not fostered by rote learning –

in fact learning by rote is the complete antithesis to learning how to use language –

learning how to use language – is not leaning mindless drill –

it is learning to deal with uncertainty 



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Monday, January 26, 2015

Philosophical Grammar 137


137. Language is not defined for us as an arrangement fulfilling a definite purpose.



there is no definite purpose

language is not defined – it defines

and any definition is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Philosophical Grammar 136


136. Suppose we compare grammar to a keyboard which I can use to direct a man by
pressing different combinations of keys. What corresponds in this case to the grammar of language.

If the utterance of a ‘nonsensical’ combination of words has the effect that the other person stares at me, I don’t on that account call it the order to stare.



using a keyboard to press different combinations of keys – is a game

the grammar of language is a language-game

the game itself – its rules – its rationale – its structure – purpose and usefulness – is open to question

however if you play the game – you play it as directed

‘nonsensical’ is an interpretation  of a combination of words

the effect of any utterance – like the utterance itself – will be open to question – open to interpretation

it could be interpreted as an order to stare

there are comedians



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Sunday, January 25, 2015

Philosophical Grammar 135


135. Language considered as part of a psychological mechanism.

I do not use “this is a sign for sugar” in the same way as the sentence “if I press this button, I get a piece of sugar”.



language as a psychological mechanism –

is a proposal – a theory for understanding the nature of language –

one of many

‘this is a sign for sugar’ and ‘if I press this button, I get a piece of sugar’ –

will likely have different uses



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Philosophical Grammar 134


134. Doesn’t grammar put the primary colors together because there is a kind of similarity between them? Or colours, anyway, in contrast to shapes or notes.

The rules of grammar cannot be justified by shewing that their application makes a representation agree with reality.

The analogy between grammar and games.



grammar is a proposal – to account for – to explain – if you will – the logic of usage –

but as with any proposal – open to question – to interpretation

reality is what is proposed –

any proposal puts forward a reality –

justification is rhetoric

grammar is a proposal – a game is proposal



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Philosophical Grammar 133


X


133. Grammatical rules determine a meaning and are not answerable to any meaning that they could contradict.

When don’t I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary?

I don’t call an argument good just because it has the consequences I want.

The rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement.



‘Grammatical rules determine a meaning and are not answerable to any meaning that they could contradict’?

first up – meaning is never finally determined – it is always open to question –

grammatical rules are proposals – propositions –

open to question – open to doubt

secondly – grammar is a theory of usage

that so called ‘grammar’ – is an accepted theory of usage – only testifies to its usefulness –

it is useful especially in introducing players into the common language-game – and furthermore keeping them in it

however useful or not – as with any theory – it is open to question – open to doubt

thirdly – not all meaningful usage conforms to what is held up as grammar – i.e. poetry 

and when you get down to it – how much of speech or writing – which users regard as meaningful – is strictly speaking grammatical?

and really how technical do you want to get with any grammar – any account of usage?

grammar is not a ‘fixed’ set of rules – that usage conforms to –

rather it is an attempt to account for usage

‘When don’t I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary?’

there are no rules – if by ‘rules’ what you mean is propositions – that are not open to question –

any proposal – any proposition – held not to be open to question – open to doubt – is a prejudice –

that is a corruption of the proposition – of propositional practice

cookery rules – are methodological proposals – proposals that have been shown to work

however in cookery as in anything else – there is as they say – more than one way to skin a cat

in any activity we face methodological options –

we become creative when we develop and explore these options

‘I don’t call an argument good just because it has the consequences I want’?

any argument is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

likewise – any consequences we draw from an argument

what we call ‘good’ – is open to question

‘The rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement’?

it is a question of language context –

if you are writing a book of prose you will most likely have an eye to the standard grammatical practice of your culture

if you are having a natter over the fence – not likely

if you are writing poetry – you will in your creative effort –perhaps even in an effort to create a new language form – most likely enjoy breaking the so called ‘rules’ –

however regardless of language context – questions can always be put – doubts raised

in any language context the real issue is not arbitrariness – rather uncertainty



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Wednesday, January 21, 2015

Philosophical Grammar 132


132. Operating with written signs and operating with “imagination pictures”.

An attitude to a picture (to a thought) is what connects it with reality.



we operate with propositions

and they can  be described variously – i.e ‘written signs’ – ‘imagination pictures’ –

regardless of how they are cashed out –

a proposition is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

any proposal – any proposition – creates a reality –

any ‘attitude’ to what is proposed – is itself a proposal –

the original proposition is open to interpretation –

an attitude is an interpretation –

and like the proposition – the attitude – the secondary proposition – if you like –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Philosophical Grammar 131


131. The comparison between memory and a notebook.

How did I read off from the memory image that I stood thus at the window yesterday?
What made you so certain when you spoke those words? Nothing; I was certain.

How do I react to a memory?



‘The comparison between memory and a notebook’?

is the comparison between different propositions 

the one described in terms of memory – the other in terms of a physical object – the note book –

we have two propositions with different provenances –

different back stories –

whatever the philosophical history of a proposition –

whatever philosophical clothing it wears –

as a proposition – it is open to question – open to doubt –

any comparison between the two – will at the very least illustrate that there is no one way of approaching – of describing – our experience – our reality

we have developed different propositional forms to deal with a reality – that in the absence of proposal – is unknown

we approach the unknown with uncertainty – and in so doing create and explore possibilities –

the result – a rich and fascinating human reality

‘How did I read off from the memory image that I stood thus at the window yesterday?

it is not that ‘I read off from the memory image’ –

it might indeed seem that way – be often represented that way – I may represent it to myself that way

logically it is the other way around –

there is the initial proposal – ‘I stood thus at the window yesterday’ –

I put forward the memory proposal – to account for the initial proposal

‘What made you so certain when you spoke those words? Nothing; I was certain’?

a proposition is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

the claim of certainty has no basis in logic

it’s basis is just plain ignorance – or it is a con – a rhetorical con

does anyone seriously suggest that memory is a repository of certainty?

How do I react to a memory?

you can react logically i.e. with common sense – and  regard a ‘memory proposal’ – as open to question open to doubt – as uncertain –

or you can be ignorant and not question

we do both



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Philosophical Grammar 130


130. “ ‘ This object is familiar to me’ is like saying ‘this object is portrayed in my catalogue’.” We are making the assumption that the picture in our catalogue is itself familiar.

The sheath in my mind as a “form of imaging”. – The pattern is no longer presented as an object, which means that it didn’t make sense to talk of a pattern at all.

“Familiarity: an object’s fitting into a sheath” – that’s not quite the same as our comparing what is seen with a copy.

The question is “What do I recognize as what?” For to “recognize a thing as itself” is meaningless.



familiarity – is a question of use –

I am familiar with those propositions and propositional constructs that I use or have used

‘the sheath in my mind’ – an interesting poetic image –

which amounts to – regular propositional use

propositional use mind you that is comfortable –

that is to say that is not put to the question – not made a subject of doubt

the proposition is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

that is the logic of it

the practice of propositional use though is more often than not – non-critical

we need to proceed – and  in practice we often proceed as if there is no question – no doubt –

this is pragmatism

its ground is the denial of logic

propositional use reflects both rational and non-rational behaviour –

‘familiarity’ is a symptom of the latter

‘The pattern is no longer presented as an object, which means that it didn’t make sense to talk of a pattern at all’?

the idea here is that ‘a pattern’ in my mental catalogue becomes the ‘sheath’ in my mind and is a ‘form of imagining’ – or if you like a way of imagining –

and as such the pattern is no longer an object – an no longer a pattern

this I think is taking the poetic image of ‘a sheath in the mind’ – just a bit too far

yes – you may wish to describe use in terms of the mind

but look this is just unnecessarily dressing it up – to no logical advantage

all you end up with is arcane imagery – which complicates the picture – where it doesn’t need to be complicated

‘patterns of use’ – will do the trick – if you feel the need for an adverb –

but really it’s just ‘use’

‘Familiarity: an object’s fitting into a sheath’?

as if this ‘sheath’ – this propositional behaviour – is somehow or another stable

ignorance is the basis of stability –

if you question and doubt propositional practice – propositional behaviour – there gores the ‘sheath’

‘comparing what is seen with a copy’ –

yes – it is not the same thing as fitting an object – and by ‘object’ we mean here a description – into a sheath –

the crucial difference is that once you are involved in comparison – you are involved in critical activity –

one description as against another –

what is similar – what is not?

what is familiar in either – where and how do the two uses coincide?

how do we ‘explain’ – describe their relation?

questions of epistemology and ontology – if not metaphysics

‘The question is “What do I recognize as what?” For to “recognize a thing as itself” is meaningless.’?

what do I recognize as what?

what do I describe as what – what description do I give to that which has been proposed – i.e. – that which is already described in some fashion?

to recognize a thing as itself ?

is simply to describe it as you have already described it

might not be interesting – but it is hardly meaningless



© greg t. charlton. 2015.