Philosophical Grammar 62

V

62. “That’s him” – that contains the whole problem of representation.

I make a plan: I see myself acting thus and so. “How do I know that it’s myself?” Or “How do I know that the word ‘I’ stands for me?”

The delusion that in thought the objects do what the proposition states about them.

“I meant the victor of Austerlitz” – the past tense, which looks as if it was giving a description, is deceptive.

‘ “That’s him” – that contains the whole problem of representation’?

‘What is the criterion, how is it to be verified, that this picture is the portrait of that object, i.e. that is meant to represent it? ….’

there is no problem here – and the problem is not representation

‘that’s him’ – is a proposal –

and like any proposal – open to question – open to doubt –

any proposal – any proposition is uncertain

‘I make a plan: I see myself acting thus and so. “How do I know that it’s myself?” Or “How do I know that the word ‘I’ stands for me?” ’

how do I know it’s myself?

I see myself acting thus and so –

spoken or not – what we have here is a proposal – nothing more – nothing less

I use a form of words – commonly in use and commonly understood–

yet if you care to reflect on it – questions emerge – doubts emerge

my knowledge – just is what I propose –

and that is – open to question – open to doubt –

knowledge is uncertain

how do I know the ‘I’ stands for me?

I make that the proposal – that is all

‘The delusion that in thought the objects do what the proposition states about them’?

the only person who has this delusion is the one who doesn’t think

it’s open to question – always – whether a proposition functions as intended –

the world we live in is uncertain

and indeed different description give different accounts of what objects do  -

compare an artists description of what a table does – to that of a physicist –

let alone someone sitting at it having breakfast

‘ “I meant the victor of Austerlitz” – the past tense, which looks as if it was giving a description, is deceptive.’?

‘The past tense is deceptive, because it looks as if it was giving a description of what went on “inside me” while I was uttering the sentence’

well yes – it can be interpreted that way – but that is just the point –

any proposal – any proposition – can be variously interpreted –

the question is – whether that interpretation makes sense – has function  in the context in which it is used –

I would think it does –

at the same time yes – a different proposal – one  that is not suggestive of the ‘what happens inside me’ – might do just as well – and in some contexts – be more appropriate – more useful

that’s how it goes

   

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 61

61. Every case of deriving an action from a command is the same kind of thing as the written derivation of a result.

“I write the number ‘16’ here because it says ‘x2’ there.”

It might appear that some causality was operating here, but that would be a confusion between ‘reason’ and ‘cause’.

‘every case of deriving an action from a command is the same kind of thing as the written derivation of a result’? –

this so called ‘deriving an action from a command’ –

a command is issued – and as to the action that follows –

that is a matter of interpretation – of description

and any written ‘derivation’ of a result – will be open to question – open to interpretation

‘I write the number ‘16’ here because it says ‘x2’ there’?

the ‘because’ – here  – is a result of mathematical theory –

and any review of the relevant theory will make clear that the concepts involved here are like any other concepts in any other domain – open to question

a concept of a proposal

the history of mathematics is a history of speculation –

and the power of mathematics stems from the power of uncertainty

‘it might appear that some causality was operating here, but that would be a confusion between ‘reason’ and ‘cause’’?

neither cause or reason – is operating here

what we have is speculation and decision –

open to question – open to doubt

   

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 60

60. Reading. – Deriving a translation from the original may also have a visible process.

Always what represents is the system in which a sign is used.

If ‘mental’ processes can be true or false, their descriptions must be able to as well.

reading – translation? –

we begin with a base description – e.g. – ‘activity’ –

however there is nothing essential about where you begin or what you begin with in any descriptive process or endeavour

now any such activity – will have a visible dimension –

but that is just to say that the activity can be described in so called observation language –

describing it as a mental process – as that which is not observable – not public –

is common place –

the public and non-public descriptions – have currency – are useful – have function

the ‘activity’ – or whatever you wish to call it – in the absence of any description – any proposal – is without characteristics of any kind – is unknown

when we are dealing with something unknown – we bring description to it –

that is to say we utilize terms – phrases etc. – that already have currency – in some other context – this is how we begin

and when we make description – what we are in fact doing – is describing – descriptions –

descriptions already in use –

we modify them – add to them – subtract from them –

we create new descriptive connections – new descriptive pathways –

new words – new proposals – new ways of seeing

any description – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

usage – and the necessity of usage – circumvents the logical reality of propositional uncertainty –

which is to say we have to get on with it – despite the fact that there is no foundations to our language – but language use

we proceed with what we have – we proceed in uncertainty –

and it is just this uncertainty that enables us to further modify our usage – if we see a need to

we are always in the realm of possible description –

hence the inherent flexibility of language use

‘always what represents is the system in which a sign is used’?

if a mark is interpreted – is read as a sign – a system will be assumed

actual representation is public –

and what that representation amounts to – what it is – will be proposed – is propositional

and as to the ‘system’ – really what that comes down to – is usage –

which can then be subsequently described  ‘systematically’ –

‘if ‘mental’ processes can be true or false, their descriptions must be able to as well’?

‘mental processes’ – is the description – in fact a description of other descriptions

‘true’ – is what you give you assent to – ‘false’ – is what you dissent from –

what you give your assent to  – or what you dissent from – is a proposal – a proposition

as to the ‘ground’ of you assent or dissent –

there is no ground – only speculation

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 59

59. For our studies it can never be essential that a symbolic phenomenon occurs in the mind and not on paper.

An explanation of a sign can replace the sign itself – this contrasts with casual explanation.

this will come as quite a surprise –

the ‘mind’ is a proposal – a proposition –

a proposal for what?

well that is the question of philosophy of mind?

the ‘mind’ is proposed – and its proposal is perfectly natural –

but just what that proposal comes down to –

is not at all straightforward –

with this proposal as with any other –

we face question – doubt – uncertainty

so is it essential that a symbolic phenomenon occurs in the mind?

do we need the mind proposal – the mind proposition in relation to a symbolic phenomenon

will its occurrence on paper do the job?

location might be everything in real estate –

but not in propositional logic –

the proposal – however it occurs – wherever for that matter – is not the essential matter

what is important is that what is proposed is understood to be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

an explanation of a sign is a proposal in relation to that sign – that proposal

a causal explanation is a proposal in relation to an event – a  state of affairs – a proposal

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 58

58. Even if my pencil doesn’t always do justice to the model, my intention always does.

my intention is always undercut with uncertainty – as my pencil can show

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 57

57. Someone copies a figure on the scale of 1 to 10. Is the understanding of the general rule of such mapping contained in the process of copying?

 Or was the process merely in agreement with that rule, but also in agreement with other rules?

the copying could be performed without any knowledge of the general rule of mapping –

is the general rule of mapping contained in the process of copying?

it can be described that way

and it could well be described as being in agreement with other rules

what we have here is an action – an activity – described – and one that can be described in any number of ways

an action – without description – is unknown –

what an action ‘contains’ – how it is understood –

depends entirely on how it is described

if I perform the action – how do I understand it?

however I describe it

if you are observing the action – how do you understand it?

however you describe it –

yes – we have standard forms of description

however there is no rule as to how you describe –

no rule as to how you understand

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 56

56. A gesture language used to communicate with people who have no word language in common with us. Do we feel there too the need to go outside language to explain its signs?

The correlation between objects and names is a part of the symbolism. It gives the wrong idea if you say that the connection is a psychological one.

any language – gesture – word – or other – will beg explanation –

this ‘correlation between objects and names is part of the symbolism’ – is a description – an explanation

a proposal – for how language works –

or if you like – of the relation between the word and the world –

and as with any description – any explanation – any proposition –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘it gives the wrong idea if you say that the connection is a psychological one’ –

the real question is – in what context and to what end – does this proposal –

‘that the connection is a psychological one’ –

have currency – have function?

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 55

55. “Why do you choose this colour when given this order?” – “Because this colour is opposite to the word ‘red’ in my chart.” In that case there is no sense in this question: “Why do you call ‘red’ the colour in the chart opposite the word ‘red’?”

The connection between “language and reality” is made by definitions of words – which belong to grammar.

yes – why do we call ‘red’ the colour in the chart opposite the word ‘red’? –

we just do – or – that is the accepted practice –

whether you operate with a chart – or not

logically speaking – it doesn’t matter at all – what word refers to what –

the point is we have accepted usage in varying contexts –

and as to the why and wherefore of that?

there you engage is propositional speculation

the ‘colour’ – so called – in the absence of any definition – is what? –

unknown

the logical reality is – we make known with language –

language enables us to interpret and operate in the world

there is no necessity in language – it is purely contingent

and therefore – functionally very malleable

language is – in a final sense – our response to the unknown –

and any response that we make – that we operate with – 

as a response to the unknown – is uncertain –

nevertheless this is what we have – this is what we work with –

and this is how we make our realities –

with uncertainty

the definition of words is an exercise in uncertainty –

grammar is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 54

54. “Paint from memory the colour of the door of your room” is no more unambiguous than “paint the green you see on this chart.”

I see the colour of the flower and recognize it.

Even if I say “no, this colour is brighter than the one I saw there,” there is no process of comparing two simultaneously given shades of colour.

Think of reading aloud from a written test (or writing to dictation).

‘If I tell someone “paint from memory the colour of the door of your room” that doesn’t settle what he is to do any more unambiguously than the order “paint the green you see on this chart”

the point being that an appeal to memory guarantees nothing –

there are no guarantees – logically speaking – nothing is settled

‘I see the colour of the flower and I recognize it” –

‘recognition’ – is propositional

which is to say we bring propositions to bear in any act of recognition

and immediate and forceful as recognition may be  –

its basis or ground is open to question –

open to doubt – uncertain

even if I say –‘no, this colour is brighter than the one I saw there’ –there is no process of comparing two simultaneously given shades of colour?

if I am asked – ‘which is the right colour?’

I am comparing two proposals and deciding for one –

my answer is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

the action here is propositional

think of reading aloud from a written test (or writing to dictation)

‘ … there’s no act of memory or anything else between the written sign and the sound.’

reading from a written test or writing to dictation are propositional actions

between the written sign and the sound –

is uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 53

53. Is the word “red” enough to enable one to look for something red? Does one need a memory image to do so?

An order. Is the real order “Do now what you remember doing then?”

If the colour sample appears darker than I remember it being yesterday, I need not agree with my memory.

is the word ‘red’ enough to enable me to look for something red? Does one need a memory image to do so?

‘red’ as with any other word – is an open concept – defined – or given application by practice – by use

the logic of ‘red’ – just is the class of propositional actions that we have learned in relation to the use of the word –

what we are talking about here is logical action –

a memory image may or may not accompany such action –

it’s an accessory – perhaps useful in certain circumstances – but not logically necessary

the issue is not memory – but rather the application of a propositional practise –

the matter is logical – not imaginary

‘do now what you remember doing then’ –

this statement like memory itself – is really an accessory –

let us say for example that the statement that this statement is actually referring to is –

‘go and do the shopping’ –

there is no question of memory –

and yes you could obfuscate the matter by using the first statement –

but that is really only to demonstrate your expertise in irrelevancy

if the colour sample appears darker than I remember it being yesterday, I need not agree with my memory –

if I recognize the colour sample as red – whether it agrees with a memory of yesterday or not – is irrelevant

and ‘recognition’ here – is application –

and application is a logical action

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 52

52. “There must be some sort of law for reading the chart. – Otherwise how would you know how the table was to be used?” It is part of human nature to understand pointing with the finger they in the way we do.

The chart does not compel me to use it always in the same way.

there is no ‘law’ here –

there will be conventional practice – in a context – and perhaps different conventions in different contexts

reading a chart may well be like playing a game –

and in that sense – yes you play according to the rules – if you want to play the game

the ‘rules’ – here though will be no more than a statement of conventional practice –

any so called rules – any directions for practice – will of course be  open to question – open to doubt –

hence – the chart can be read in other ways

all we are dealing with here is proposals –

the chart is a proposal –

and any ‘reading’ of the chart – is a proposal

‘otherwise how would you know how the table is to be used?’

there is no definite knowledge here – or for that matter elsewhere –

what you know – or what you can learn is propositional practice –

and you do that by engaging in that practice –

as for it being part of human nature to understand pointing with the finger the way we do

well – a fine proposal –

‘human nature’ – here – is really just short hand for saying –

‘this is what I think is the case – and everyone must agree’ –

basically an authoritarian proposal –

that really has nothing behind it –

rhetoric – in other words

© greg t. charlton. 2014.