on certainty 492

492. “Do I know or do I only believe…?” might also be expressed like this: What if it seemed to turn out that what until now has seemed immune to doubt was a false assumption? Would I react as I do when a belief has proved to be false? or would it seem to knock from under my feet the ground on which I stand in making any judgments at all? – But of course I do not intend this as a prophesy.

Would I simply say “I should never have thought it!” – or I (have to) refuse to revise my judgment – because such a ‘revision” would amount to annihilation of all yardsticks?

what seems to be the case – is what is the case

what seems to be the case –

it is all we have to go on at any time

the ground of our perception is uncertainty –

therefore nothing is immune from doubt

no belief is ever proved to be false –

a belief is false if you dissent from it –

for whatever reason

which is to say – if you decide against it –

and all decision – all judgment –

is uncertain

uncertainty is the very reason for judgment –

and all one’s yardsticks –

are uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 491

10.4

491. “Do I know or do I only believe that I am called L.W?” – Of course if the question were “Am I certain or do I only surmise…?” then my answer could be relied on.

even if you answer –

that you surmise –

i.e. that you are not certain –

that answer – that proposal –

that proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

as with any answer –

to any question –

as with any proposal –

any proposition –

you put forward

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 490

490. When I ask “Do I know or do I only believe that I am called…?’ it is no use to looking within myself.

But I could say: not only do I never have the slightest doubt that I am called that, but there is no judgement that I could be certain of if I started doubting that.

you might well assume that you are called  …

but how would you know?

that is how would you know what everyone has does or will call you?

and you can call yourself whatever you like – whenever you like

if you are saying there is no judgment that you could be certain of –

if you started doubting that you are called …

all you are saying is that if you were to question this –

you can be certain of nothing

and that I think is a fair point –

if you question – how can you be sure?

and if you don’t question –

or you are not open to question –

it’s not that you are certain –

it is rather that you are stupid

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 489

489. For what reply does one make to someone who says “I believe it merely strikes you as if you knew it”?

if you want to convince them –

that you do know –

you can attempt to persuade them –

with whatever arguments you have

in short – all you can do is –

ramp up the rhetoric

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 488

488. And so when writers enumerate all the things they know, that proves nothing whatsoever.

So the possibility of knowledge about physical objects cannot be proved by the protestations of those who believe that they have such knowledge.

people make assertions –

if they claim to know they claim an authority –

the only authority they actually have –

is the authority of authorship

beyond that any claim to authority is pretence

if you drop this pretence –

what you have – all you have –

is assertion

nothing is proved by any protestation –

and furthermore there is no proof of anything

if you claim there are physical objects –

that is all there is to it –

the assertion

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 487

487. What is the proof that I know something? Most certainly not my saying that I know it.

there is no proof

saying that you know something –

is all there is to it

at the best it’s hot air

at the worst –

vain deception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 486

9.4

486. “Do you know or do you only believe that your name is L.W? Is that a meaningful question?

Do you know or do you only believe that what you are writing down are German words? Do you only believe that ‘believe’ has this meaning? What meaning?

there may be a history to a name – but that is just usage – it is not authority

in so far as a claim to knowledge is a claim to authority –

one cannot know what one’s name is

do you only believe what your name is?

a name functions as a linguistic identification of an object or person –

this is a matter of convention – of usage –

epistemologically speaking any usage is uncertain

if we hold that to believe is to hold an assertion – in this case a name – as uncertain –

then yes – epistemologically speaking – the best you can say is that you believe your name is L.W.

here though with – knowing and believing – we are talking about epistemological underpinning –

epistemological description – of language use –

now in the context of On Certainty 486 – this epistemological question has been asked

that’s fair enough – but it here we are talking about a specialist context –

in normal – non-specialist contexts – it is most unlikely that such a set of questions would arise

in common practice a person gives his name – and that becomes the primary means by which he is identified

does any individual as a matter of course ask themselves the question – ‘do I know my name is L.W. or do I just believe it” –

I don’t think so

Wittgenstein asks ‘is that a meaningful question?’

for a philosopher or someone suffering a psychotic episode –

the answer could be ‘yes’

‘Do you know or do you only believe that what you are writing down are German words? Do you only believe that ‘believe’ has this meaning? What meaning?’

‘German words’ is a description of a particular language use

it’s the common description –

linguists for instance – may well have different terms for this usage

such a usage – or for that matter any usage – does not come with a description –

descriptions are made – they are added –

there is no definite description of any usage –

there is no definite usage

‘Do you only believe that ‘believe’ has this meaning? What meaning?’

to believe is to hold that an operating assertion – is uncertain – and therefore that whatever its meaning – its meaning is uncertain

so the question is –

is the belief that ‘an operating assertion is uncertain’ – uncertain?

yes – in that such a belief – is always open to question – as any genuine critical philosophical discussion of ‘believe’ or ‘uncertainty’ – will demonstrate

the question – what meaning?

                                                                                                                               

well there is no certainty here –

meaning in practice is no more than a decision of use –

the value of any proposed meaning will logically speaking always be in question –

however the fact of this uncertainty does not stop action –

it is indeed the energy of action

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 485

485. We can also imagine a case where someone goes through a list of propositions and as he does so asking “Do I know that or do I only believe it?” He wants to check the certainty of each individual proposition. It might be a question of making a statement as a witness before a court.

the certainty of each proposition?

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

any ‘checking’ of a proposition –

will raise questions –

will reveal – uncertainty

any statement – before a court –

or not –

is open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 484

484. In these cases, then, one says “I know” and mentions how one knows, or at least one can do so.

the claim to know is a claim to authority

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority is pretence

so any account of how you know –

is an account of the steps involved –

in the development of –

your pretence

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 483

483. The correct use of the expression “I know”. Someone with bad sight asks me “do you believe that the thing we can see there is a tree?” I reply “I know it is; I can see it clearly and am familiar with it”. – A: “Is N.N at home?” – I: “I believe he is.” – A: ‘Was he at home yesterday?” – I: “Yesterday he was – I know he was; I spoke to him.” – A: “Do you know or only believe that this part of the house is built on later than the rest?” – I: “I know it is; I got it from so and so.”

‘I can see it clearly and am familiar with it’ –

‘yesterday he was – I spoke to him’ –

‘I got it from so and so’ –

are straight out propositions –  proposals – open to question – open to doubt

the preface ‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

it is unnecessary and irrelevant to claim authorship of your assertion –

logically speaking ‘I know’ is unnecessary and irrelevant

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority is rhetorical

‘I believe he is’ –

the use of ‘believe’ here is logically correct –

if it indicates uncertainty –

however given that any proposition is open to question –

open to doubt – is uncertain –

it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

in so far as ‘believe’ is rhetorical –

it has no logical value –

and is basically hot air

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 482

482. It’s as if  “I know” did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis.

I know has an authoritative emphasis –

for which there is no metaphysical basis

and from a logical point of view –

it doesn’t figure at all

it’s only claim to fame –

is  rhetorical

 

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 481

481. When one hears Moore say “I know that that’s a tree “, one suddenly understands those who think that that has by no means been settled.

The matter strikes one all at once as being unclear and blurred. It is as if Moore had put it in the wrong light.

It is as if I were to see a painting (say pained stage-set) and recognize what it represents from a long way off at once and without the slightest doubt. But now I step nearer: and then I see a lot of patches of different colours, which are all highly ambiguous and do not provide any certainty whatever.

when Moore says ‘I know that that’s a tree’ –

the ‘I know’ functions as a claim of authority for ‘that’s a tree’

what you have here is Moore’s assertion of his authority –

his assertion does not establish his authority –

and there is no attempt by Moore to establish his authority –

so what is unclear is Moore’s claim to authority –

why he makes it at all and what it is supposed to mean –

it comes across as an irrelevant pomposity

the example of seeing something from different perspectives –

is no argument against Moore’s use of ‘I know’ –

for Moore could say ‘I know’ whatever the perspective

what this example does illustrate is –

that we are always  in a position of uncertainty –

regarding the object of perception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 480

8.4

480. A child is learning to use the word “tree”. One stands with it in front of a tree and says “Lovely tree!” Clearly no doubt as to the tree’s existence comes into the language-game. But can the child be said to know: ‘that a tree exists’? Admittedly it’s true that ‘knowing something’ doesn’t involve thinking about it –  but mustn’t anyone who knows something be capable of doubt? And doubting means thinking.

there is no doubt expressed in –

‘lovely tree’ –

but the description is open to question –

and therefore uncertain

the child learns to use descriptions –

to operate with uncertainty –

can it be said to know?

only if – ‘to know’ –

is to use descriptions

mustn’t anyone who describes –

be capable of doubt?

yes –

description is a response to –

uncertainty

and yes –

doubting means –

thinking

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 479

479. Are we to say that the knowledge that there are physical objects comes very early or very late?

we learn to operate in this world –

we learn to describe –

we learn to use descriptions – i.e. ‘physical objects’ –

and we learn to describe our descriptions –

to underwrite them i.e. ‘knowledge’ –

as to whether this comes early or late –

that is an empirical issue –

best left to developmental psychologists –

not that they will have the answer –

but they will have an answer –

one to go on with

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 478

7.4.

478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists?

a child operates with a description –

a description of ‘that’ –

which undescribed – is unknown

as for belief –

what we can say is that –

if the description functions –

i.e. the description ‘milk’ –

it will be used –

belief here is really the expectation of function –

and expectation is uncertain

as to knowledge –

if by knowledge we mean – certainty –

a description may be presented to the child as certain –

but this is to deceive the child

and in reality a good part of the business of learning –

is the unlearning of this deception

to know is to not be deceived –

to throw off the deception and pretension of certainty –

and to recognize that our descriptions –

are uncertain

does a cat know that a mouse exists?

does a cat know?

does a cat describe –

battle with pretension and its absence?

no – just the mouse

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 477

477. “So one must know that the objects whose names one teaches a child by ostensive definition exist.” – Why must one know they do? Isn’t it enough that experience doesn’t later show the opposite?

For why should the language game rest on some kind of knowledge?

‘so one must know that the objects one teaches a child by ostensive definition exist’

what you teach by ostensive definition – is description –

if you were to ask – well what is it finally that is being described?

the answer is – the unknown

‘isn’t it enough that experience doesn’t later show the opposite?’

what experience shows – is uncertainty

‘for why should the language game rest on some kind of knowledge?’-

the language-game rests on the unknown –

and the language-games we play in relation to the unknown –

are uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 476

6.4.

476. Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. etc. – they learn to fetch the books, sit in armchairs, etc. etc

Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise. “Is there such a thing as a unicorn?” and so on. But such a question is possible only because as a rule no corresponding question presents itself. For how does one know how to set about satisfying oneself of the existence of unicorns? How did one learn the method of determining whether something exists or not?

yes children act – and they learn to act in terms of descriptions given them

‘is there such a thing as a unicorn?’ –

                                                                                                                                 

is a question of the application of a description –

i.e. – do I use the term ‘unicorn’ – in the same way as I would use the term ‘book’ or ‘armchair’?

one does not set about satisfying oneself of the existence of unicorns – one learns – where the term ‘unicorns’ has function and where it does not –

‘how does one learn the method of determining whether something exists or not?’

the question is – ‘does this description have function – and if so in what context?’

to exist is to be described – to be made known

before description – all we have is ‘that’ which is not described – that which has not been made known

‘that’ is the unknown –

and any account of ‘that’ – any description of ‘that’ –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

 

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 475

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination.

outside of any characterization –

man – language – or anything else for that matter –

is an unknown

and any characterization we put forward –

any proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain –

by all means have a go –

have something to say –

but don’t regard anything you run with –

as inviolate

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 474

474. This game proves its worth. That may be the cause of it being played, but it is not the ground.

there is no ground – or need for a ground –

there is only the  action – that is the game

and however – that is described

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 473

473. Just as in writing we learn a particular basic form of letters and then vary it later, so we learn first the stability of things as the norm, which is then subject to alterations.

I would say we learn to operate with a basic form of letters –

and it doesn’t follow from that –

that we learn ‘the stability of things as the norm’

or indeed the instability of things –

we come to a view on these matters –

when the question arises or the question is put

and any view we come to –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 472

472. When a child learns a language it learns at the same time what is to be investigated and what not. When it learns that there is a cupboard in the room, it isn’t taught to doubt whether what it sees later on is still a cupboard or only a kind of stage set.

however –

latter on – the child may doubt whether what it sees is a cupboard or a stage set –

as to why?

well that is a matter of speculation –

perhaps –

at some time the child was taught the value of questioning –

of doubt –

or it might just be that doubt is a natural and primal response to reality –

and that it will occur –

regardless of how one is taught?                                                                                                              

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 471

471. It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not to try to go back further.

there is no beginning –

and there is no beginning to begin at –

we act –

be that with –

thought word or deed –

in the unknown

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 470

470. Why is there no doubt that I am called L.W? It does not seem at all like something that one could establish at once beyond doubt. One would not think that it is one of the indubitable truths.

5.4.

[Here there is still a gap in my thinking. And I doubt whether it will ever be filled now.]

he says there is no doubt that he is called L.W. –

how could he know this?

the gap in his thinking is the unknown –

and he is right to doubt that it will be filled

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 469

469. In the middle of a conversation, someone says to me out of the blue “I wish you luck.” I am astonished; but later I realize that these words connect up with his thoughts about me. And now they do not strike me as meaningless any more.                                                                                                                               

 

meaning is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 468

4.4

468. Someone says irreverently “that’s a tree”. He might say this sentence because he remembers hearing it in a similar situation; or he was suddenly struck by the tree’s beauty and the sentence was an exclamation; or he was pronouncing the sentence to himself as a grammatical example; etc., etc. And now I ask him “How did you mean that?’ and he replies ”It was a piece of information directed at you”. Shouldn’t I be at liberty to assume he doesn’t know what he is saying, if he is insane enough to want to give me this information?

you can assume –

whatever you like –

bear in mind though –

your assumption –

is uncertain –

is open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 467

467. I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again “I know that that’s a tree”, pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: “This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy.”

say whatever you like –

and whether you are doing philosophy or not –

the claim of knowledge –

is either irrelevant or deceptive

the claim of knowledge –

is a claim of authority –

the only authority is authorship –

the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant –

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority –

is rhetorical

rhetoric is the art of persuasion –

and its basis is –

a false claim to authority

the ground of rhetoric –

is deception

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 466

466. Thus it seems to me I have known something the whole time, and yet there is no meaning in saying so, in uttering this truth.

the claim of knowledge is rhetorical –

rhetoric is not without meaning

but if you are not trying to convince anyone of anything –

then there is no point to –

propagating the deception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 465

465. How would it be if we had the words “They know nowadays that there are over…species of insects” instead of “I know that that’s a tree”? If someone were to suddenly utter the first sentence out of all context one might think: he has been thinking of something else in the interim and is now saying out loud some sentence in his train of thought. Or again: he is in trance and is speaking without understanding what he is saying.

firstly –

any claim to knowledge –

is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

authorship is logically irrelevant

the claim to knowledge –

is logically irrelevant

nevertheless –

such claims are made

any such claim to an authority –

other than authorship –

is logically false and deceptive –

such claims may have rhetorical value –

that is to say –

their point is persuasion –

if so it is persuasion –

based on deception

secondly –

context is uncertain –

and whether a particular usage fits a context –

will be uncertain

in the event of a usage appearing not to fit a context –

other contexts are looked for

however any interpretation is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 464

3.4.51

464. My difficulty can also be shewn like this: I am sitting talking to a friend. Suddenly I say “I knew all along that you were so-and-so.” Is that really a superfluous, though true, remark?

I feel as if these words were like “Good morning” said to someone in the middle of a conversation.

whether the remark is superfluous or not –

really depends on the understandings of those in the conversation –

and the matter is never fully determined

i.e. what immediately strikes one as superfluous –

might on review be seen in a different light

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 463

31.3

463. This is certainly true, that the information “That is a tree”, when no one could doubt it, might be a kind of joke and as such have meaning. A joke of this kind was in fact made once by Renan.

whether it’s a joke or not –

it’s a question of interpretation –

and there is no certainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 462

30.3.

462. Why doesn’t Moore produce as one of the things he knows, for example, that in such-and such a part of England there is a village called so-and-so? In other words: why doesn’t he mention a fact that is known to him and not to every one of us?

Moore’s trick is to connect with common epistemological prejudice and ignorance –

and re-brand it as reason and  knowledge

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 461

461. Suppose that I were the doctor and a patient came to me, showed me his hand and said: “This thing that looks like a hand isn’t just a superb imitation – it really is a hand” – and went on to talk about his injury – should I really take this as a piece of information, even though a superfluous one? Shouldn’t I be more likely to consider it nonsense, which admittedly did have the form of a piece of information? For, I should say, if this information really were meaningful, how can he be certain of what he says? The background is lacking for it to be information.

                                                                                                                                   

‘how can he be certain of what he says?’

he can’t be certain –

for the ground of all propositional use

is uncertainty

‘The background is lacking for it to be information’

the doctor will need to provide a background to the statement

i.e. perhaps the patient is mentally ill?

if the doctor can’t provide a background –

he will have to say –

‘I don’t know what you are talking about’

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 460

460. I go to the doctor, shew him my hand and say “This is a hand, not…; I’ve injured it etc., etc.” Am I only giving him a piece of superfluous information? For example, mightn’t one say: supposing the words “This is a hand” were a piece of information – how could you bank on him understanding this information? Indeed, it is open to doubt ‘whether that is a hand’, why isn’t it open to doubt whether I am a human being who is informing the human being of this? – But on the other hand one can imagine cases – even if they are very rare ones – where the declaration is not superfluous, or is only superfluous but not absurd.

you cannot ‘bank on’ on him understanding –

fair enough to assume that he will –

but here we are talking about assumption –

not certainty – and assumption is uncertain –

it is open to doubt whether this is a hand –

and whether I am a human being informing another human being –

any of these matters can be the subject of doubt –

whether or not they will be –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 459

459. If the shopkeeper wanted to investigate each of his apples without any reason, for the sake of being certain about everything, why doesn’t he have to investigate the investigation? And one can talk of the belief here (I mean belief as in ‘religious belief’, not surmise)? All psychological terms merely distract us from the thing that really matters.

there is no reason why he couldn’t investigate the investigation –

but perhaps there were other things he wanted to do that were more important to him

like selling the apples

all psychological terms are a response to the unknown

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 458

458. One doubts on specific grounds. The question is this: how is doubt introduced into the language-game?

it is not that doubt is introduced into the language –

any use of language is uncertain –

the language-game is the game of doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2012.