on parfit

what follows are some notes on derrick parfit’s moral theory

I have focused on and borrowed extensively from professor peter singer’s introduction to his book ‘does anything really matter: essays on parfit on objectivity’ – as the basis of my consideration –

singer’s introduction is superb

what follows is not a assessment or criticism of singer’s views –

it is parfit’s ideas – as introduced by singer – that I consider here

the way I am proceeding here is I will quote from singer’s introduction – and follow that with my response to the text

‘Kantianism, contractualism, and rule consequentialism—are in fundamental agreement, identifying the same acts as wrong. Underlying and supporting this original and important argument, however, is another, more fundamental claim, also defended at considerable length: that there are objective moral truths, and other normative truths about what we have reasons to believe, and to want, and to do.’

that we have an action (a ‘wrong action’) – that is accounted for in terms of different theories is nothing remarkable

that underlying this concurrence of determination are objective moral truths – is one explanation

it is not the only one

i.e. it may be that as a matter of custom certain acts are regarded as wrong –

and all that kantianism – contractualism and rule consequentialism –  amount to is different explanations of customary behaviour

any explanation of any aspect of moral behaviour is a proposal –

and logically speaking a proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

in the absence of explanation – of any explanatory proposal – an act is without description – and from an epistemological point of view – an unknown

we propose to make known

the objective reality – the reality we propose in relation to – is the unknown

the unknown is silent

moral truths?

a true moral proposition – is one that is affirmed – for whatever reason

a false proposition is one that is denied – and for whatever reason

our affirmations – our denials – and our reasons – are from a logical point of view – 

open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

our reality – our moral reality is the reality of propositional uncertainty

and it is this propositional uncertainty – this logical uncertainty – that has given rise to different moral theories and perspectives

and it is through the many and different moral theories and perspectives that we explore moral uncertainty –

the role of the moral philosopher is to critically investigate the various theories and perspectives that have been proposed –

and in so doing perhaps even to propose new and different accounts – that are open to question – open to doubt and are uncertain

‘Hume assumes, and we commonly believe, that morality must be able to influence what we do. Otherwise, we may wonder, what is its point? But Hume also held that reason alone cannot move us to action. Our wants and desires determine our ultimate goals, and the role of reason is limited to telling us how best to achieve these goals. Reason applies to means, not ends. Hence, Hume famously held, it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger, and equally not contrary to reason to choose my own total ruin to prevent a trivial harm to a stranger. Even acting contrary to one’s own interests—preferring “my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater” is, on Hume’s view, not contrary to reason. What it is rational for me to do depends on what I want. If Hume is right both in his assumption about the relation between morality and action, and about the role of reason in action, then there is an obvious problem for those who think that moral judgments can be objectively true. Moral judgments will only be able to influence our actions if they somehow connect with our desires, and my desires may differ from yours without either of us making a mistake. Wants and desires are neither true nor false. An objectively true moral judgment would have to be true for everyone, irrespective of what he or she most desires, but what reason for acting would it offer to those whose desires are not furthered by acting on it?’

morality must be able to influence what we do – otherwise what is the point?

the way I would put it is that every action we take has a moral dimension to it –

we constantly question and decide what is right – what is wrong – what is good and what is bad

the moral question and the moral decision are entirely natural to human beings

such question – such decision is of our nature

what hume and others call ‘morality’ – is moral theory – of one kind or another

the question then is – do such theories of morality influence what we do?

what influences our moral decisions – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

for those who are exposed – in one way or another to moral theory –

it is likely that those theories will influence –

however they may not

whether they influence of not – is a purely contingent matter – a matter of circumstance –

moral theory – is one among any number of possible influences –

it is not necessary to have such an influence to make a moral decision

and whether or not – and to what extent moral theories influence people’s ethical decisions – is in fact an empirical matter

hume held that reason alone cannot move us to action?

reason here means a proposal as to how to act

any such proposal may move us to act – or it may not

the reality is that we will act – one way or another – even if action here may mean the decision not to proceed with a course of action

what underlies any action in a philosophical sense – will be open to question – open to doubt – will be uncertain

our wants and desires determine our ultimate goals?

what we want and what we desire may well determine our goals

however it is quite possible that we may decide a course of action – that is against our wants and desires

that is we may i.e. decide a course of action that is based on a moral principle that we hold to

i.e. I may want to kill my enemy – desire his demise – but decide not to murder him – because I hold to the proposal that murder is wrong

as for ‘ultimate goals’ – they can change with the wind

‘ultimate goals’ – are proposals designed to give us some sense of direction – for the moment – or perhaps longer –

 we play the ultimate goal game – or just the goal game – for direction – order – and coherence

and we are quite adept at making necessary adjustments – and even radical revision – depending on the circumstances we have to deal with

reason applies to means not ends?

reason is the logical action of question and doubt – reason is the exploration of propositional uncertainty

means and ends – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

what is rational to me is to do what I want?

what I want is what I want –

if what I want is put to question – is put to doubt – is regarded as uncertain –

then what I want is rational

if it is not – then what I want – is not rational

if hume is right then there is a problem for those who believe moral judgments to be objectively true?

if by ‘objectively true’ – you mean a proposition – that is beyond question – beyond doubt – that is certain –

such a proposal defies logical reality – and is better termed a prejudice –

if your morality is based on prejudice – it is not rational – it is irrational and pretentious

moral judgments will only be able to influence our actions if they somehow connect with our desires?

our moral judgments are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

our desires are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

the ‘connection’ is propositional uncertainty

wants and desires are neither true nor false?

a true proposition is a proposition affirmed – a false proposition – a proposition denied

if a want or a desire is expressed – that is proposed – that proposal – that proposition

can be affirmed – can be denied –

an objectively moral judgment would have to be true for everyone – irrespective of what he or she most desires?

there is no ‘have to be true’ – the truth or falsity of a proposal – of a judgment –

is a matter of affirmation or denial

which is to say – it is an empirical issue

if as a matter of empirical fact it could be demonstrated that everyone affirmed a particular moral judgment at a particular time – then you could say that in effect you have an ‘objective moral judgment’ –

I would call it a freak event – and one not beyond question – and doubt

crudely put – ‘objectivity’ is a question of numbers

but what reason for acting would ‘an objectively moral judgment’ offer to those whose desires are not furthered by acting on it?

this objectively moral judgment is an authoritarian fiction –

nevertheless – if confronted with this fiction – what reasons for acting would such a fiction offer to those whose desires are not furthered by it?

the point is you can’t give a so called objective answer here –

first up – you have a proposal – fictional or not – to be considered

and yes this proposal conflicts with my desires –

if I am to consider it rationally – and to consider my desires rationally – that is subject both to question – and to doubt

who knows – I may end up deciding for  the proposal – and against what I desire?

one’s desires are not in a logical void – beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain

desires can change – can be changed – if you have reason to change them

and – one’s reasons too – are not set in stone –

if you are to deal rationally – your desires and your reasons – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘desires’ and ‘reasons’ – are really modes of propositional expression –

a ‘desire’ may be a reason – a ‘reason’ – a desire

what we are dealing with is proposals – propositions – regardless of the terms in which they are expressed – and regardless of how they are conceptually organized

‘Parfit’s critique of the forms of subjectivism that draw on Hume’s view of the limits of practical reason begins with a discussion of the role of reason in a situation relating to self-interest rather than morality. He asks us to imagine a man who cares, as most of us do, about what pleasures or pains he will experience in future, but with this difference: if they will happen on a future Tuesday, he doesn’t care about them at all. If he is contemplating what will happen to him on a Monday, a Wednesday, or any other day, he would much rather experience slight discomfort now than agony on that day; but if the agony will be on a future Tuesday, he doesn’t care about it, and so will choose it over slight discomfort now. This man is not under any illusion that pains on future Tuesdays are less painful than pains on other days, for he knows that when that future Tuesday becomes the present day, the agony will be as terrible as it is on a Monday or Wednesday. He also knows that—since it will then not be a future Tuesday—he will not be at all indifferent to the agony he then experiences. Nor does he believe in a strange deity who will reward him for his indifference to what will happen to him on future Tuesdays. He differs from us purely in what he desires.’

‘If he is contemplating what will happen to him on a Monday, a Wednesday, or any other day, he would much rather experience slight discomfort now than agony on that day…’

he prefers a slight discomfort now – to an imagined future agony –

but isn’t this just effectively to accept the discomfort of now – supposing that things could be worse?

so all we have here is a psychological strategy for dealing with the discomfort of now

as to indifference –

can you be indifferent to the idea of a future pain?

parfit defines indifference as ‘not caring’  –

if you care about something – it must occupy thoughts

what this ‘not caring’ means here – is putting the idea of a future agony out of your mind

but if not considering it – is the argument for preferring – the discomfort of now –

then in preferring the discomfort of now – the future pain is necessarily a consideration –

either you drop the argument for preferring the discomfort of now –

and if that goes – so does the whole future tuesday scenario –

or you have to take the proposed future agony into consideration –

and there goes indifference

‘but if the agony will be on a future Tuesday, he doesn’t care about it, and so will choose it over slight discomfort now’

if he doesn’t care about it – that is doesn’t consider it – puts it out of his mind –

he can’t choose it –

if he does consider it – does care about it

he is not indifferent

so I think this notion of indifference is a pretence –

he pretends not to care – as a strategy for dealing with discomfort

perhaps for this future tuesday man – a useful pretence – but a pretence and self-deception nevertheless –

all we have here is a rather convoluted psychological strategy for dealing with discomfort –

much simpler and more straightforward to say – ‘it looks like I will have to put up with this’ –

or to ask yourself – ‘what can I do now to ease my discomfort?’

to be indifferent in a logical sense is to suspend judgment

the future tuesday man does not suspend judgment

he would prefer the discomfort of now to a future agony

this to make a judgment

‘he differs from us purely in what he desires’ –

does he really?

does anyone desire discomfort?

preferring discomfort now – to an imagined future agony –

is not desiring discomfort –

preferring a future agony – to the discomfort of now

is not desiring agony

preferring a future agony to the discomfort of now –

is an attempt to deny reality – deny the reality of the present discomfort

such an approach will have no effect at all on the discomfort of the present

it is pointless and irrelevant

‘Surely, Parfit claims, this man’s desires are irrational: “That some ordeal would be much more painful is a strong reason not to prefer it. That this ordeal would be on a future Tuesday is no reason to prefer it.” It is difficult to deny that such a man would be irrational, and the only possible source of this irrationality is his desires. But Hume’s approach leaves no room for desires to be rational or irrational. Hume’s followers may say that this a very odd set of desires to have, and that as far as we know no one has ever had this set of desires, but it remains conceivable that someone could have them, and that is enough to pose a problem for Hume’s view.’

parfit has confused desire with preference

that I would prefer to experience pain – now – or indeed in the future – is not to desire pain –

it is to say – if I am to experience pain – I have a preference for when I experience it

when it comes to the question of rationality however – desires and preferences are in the same boat

if you regard your desires – or your preferences – as open to question – open to doubt and uncertain – then you behave logically – you behave rationally

if on the other hand – you regard your desires or your preferences as beyond question – beyond doubt and certain – you behave illogically – and irrationally

in my view parfit’s future tuesday argument completely misses the point on the question of rationality

hume too fails on the issue of rationality –

he fails to see that desires – and reasons too – logically speaking – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

we behave rationally when we recognize and embrace the logic of moral uncertainty

where we operate without question and without doubt – with the pretence of certainty  – be it with regard to desires – preferences – or reasons – our moral propositions and our actions are irrational

if the future tuesday man holds his proposal – odd as it might be – open to question – open to doubt – and regards it as uncertain – he holds the proposal rationally –

if on the other hand he regards his proposal as beyond question – beyond doubt – and thus certain – he holds the proposal irrationally

‘Moreover, many people have attitudes that are somewhat like future Tuesday. Many people put off going to the dentist, for instance, even though they are well aware that doing so will mean more pain overall than if they were to go to the dentist now. At least in extreme cases, these desires also seem to be irrational. But subjectivists about reason cannot, it seems, say that they are. Similarly, subjectivists about reason cannot say that the fact that putting my hand in a flame will cause me agony is a reason not to put my hand in the flame. They must say that whether I now have a reason not to put my hand in the flame will depend on whether I now desire to avoid agony. Parfit thinks this is a mistake: desires do not give us reasons for acting. I may desire to experience agony, but that does not give me any reason to put my hand in the flame, since I have no reason to have this desire, and strong reason not to have it.’

a desire can be held rationally or irrationally – a reason can be held either rationally or irrationally

and by a ‘reason’ here – I mean a proposal – the point of which is to account for a proposed course of action –

if the ‘reason’ is held open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

it is held rationally

if it is not held open to question – it is not held rationally

the same is true of desires

as to the hand in the flame –

if the proposal to put your hand in a flame – is considered critically – put to question – put to doubt – and regarded as an uncertain proposal –

then that proposal is held rationally –

if it is not considered critically – the proposal is held irrationally

do I have reasons for my desires?

we can have accounts – explanations – that is reasons – for our desires

i.e. I may see my desire as a result of a current circumstance – I might explain it in terms of my biology – I might even explain in it terms of my upbringing –

I may have no account of why I desire a certain outcome

having reasons is about explanations – proposals to account for desires

there is no necessity here –

you can operate without having an account of what you do – or you can have an explanation

desires do not give us reasons for acting?

a desire may be  proposed as a reason for acting –

and here – as it were – the desire is becomes a reason – the desire functions as a reason

‘Parfit grants that, on his view, reasons may not motivate us. Whether something will motivate me to act in a certain way is, he says, a psychological fact, and quite distinct from the normative fact that I have a reason to act in that way. I may have a reason to do something without being motivated to do it. Since subjectivists deny that there are any objective, or object-given, reasons for acting, if Parfit is right that having a present desire for something does not give one a reason for acting, it would follow that on the subjectivist view we have no reasons for doing anything, and hence, though some things may matter to us, in a larger sense, nothing matters.’

a reason as an account of an action – and an explanation of an action –

can the way that I account for any proposed action – be a motivation for my action?

if I understand a proposed action as a good action – as the right thing to do –

might not my account of the proposed action – be a reason for doing it?

I would say it could be – that it might be –

on the other hand I don’t think it need be

I might act quite instinctively – without any reflection – without any consideration of whether the act is good – or any thought that it is the right thing to do

so I think we can be motivated by reasons – but that we are not necessarily motivated by reasons

motivation as a psychological fact?

yes – you can describe motivation as psychological

but having a reason – an account – an explanation for an act – is psychological

reasons do not exist in a non-psychological reality or dimension

yes – I may have a reason to do something – without being motivated to do it

but equally my reason may motivate me

having a present desire for acting does not give one reason for acting?

if I have a present desire for something and I think that having it would make me happy – yes – I may regard that desire as a reason to act

however it could also be said that – even though I have this reason – my happiness –

that reason may not cause me to act – that too is possible

the reality is that we cannot give a definitive – answer here

whether a reason does or does not cause me to act – will be a matter of circumstance –

it would follow that on the subjectivist view we have no reason for doing anything?

as a matter of fact people can and do give some account of their actions –

and so they have reasons for doing what they do

and by the same token – it is quite possible that someone may well say ‘I had no reason for doing it – but I did it just the same’

and hence that though some things may matter to us – in a larger sense nothing matters?

yes I suppose that ‘nothing’ by definition – does not matter

what matters to you is what you are concerned about

can anyone live without being concerned about something – about many things?

I think not

‘Hence Parfit eschews any middle ground that would allow us to accept subjectivism but go on as if nothing much had changed. For him, if there are no ethical truths, nihilism awaits and his life has been wasted…’

as for nihilism –

human beings propose ethical truths –

as long as there are human beings – there will be ethical proposals that they affirm –

that one’s life has been wasted – it’s a fair enough proposal  –

but again – if it is to be dealt with logically and rationally – it will be held open to question – open to doubt – and regarded as uncertain

‘Parfit rejects not only ethical subjectivism, but also ethical naturalism. To say that we have reason to reduce suffering, other things being equal, is to make a substantive normative claim that Parfit believes to be true, but it is not something that we can deduce from the meanings of moral terms like “good” or “ought.” Here Parfit agrees with Hume that we cannot deduce an “ought” from an “is,” meaning that no set of natural facts implies, on its own, any normative truths. We cannot identify normative truths with facts about the natural world, whether about our biological nature, about evolution, or about what we would approve of under some set of specified conditions, or any other causal or psychological fact.’

I can put the proposal – i.e. ‘I ought to do x’ – and I can also put the proposal ‘the grass is green’

yes these are different proposals –

and as hume has showed – these different proposals can be analysed in different terms

nevertheless – different as they are – they have the same logical properties – they are open to question – open to doubt – and as such – uncertain

yes – there are naturalistic and non-naturalistic accounts of moral propositions –

but any such account of propositions – as with the propositions themselves – is open to question

how we account for propositions – how we describe them – and how we explain them –  has I think to do with metaphysical preferences – if not prejudices

we develop different ways of understanding our propositions – we develop different ways of understanding the world –

and these different proposals in thought and language –  enrich us – enrich our world with propositional diversity

this diversity I would put is a natural response to propositional uncertainty

‘How then do we come to know normative truths? Like many of his objectivist predecessors—Richard Price in the eighteenth century, Henry Sidgwick in the nineteenth, and W. D. Ross in the early twentieth, Parfit is an intuitionist. “We have,” he writes, “intuitive abilities to respond to reasons and to recognize some normative truths.” But these intuitive abilities are not, for Parfit, some special quasi-sensory faculty, nor do we use them to discover some mysterious new realm of non-natural facts. Rather, we come to see that we have reasons for doing some things, in something like the way in which we come to see that two plus two equals four.’

how do we come to know normative truths?

how we come to know normative truths – is we propose them –

knowledge is proposal –

in the absence of proposal – what we face is the unknown –

we propose – to make known –

as to the ground or basis of such proposals – this too is a matter of proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

parfit goes with a version of intuitionism

which to my mind amounts to saying that there is no basis to a normative proposal – but the proposal itself –

if that is what intuitionism comes down to – I have no argument

but if intuitionism is meant as a ground to an ethical proposal – that is beyond question – beyond doubt – that is certain – then intuitionism is a pretence –

‘we have reasons for doing some things – in something like the way we come to see that 2 + 2 = 4’

2 = 2 = 4 – is a rule governed sign-game – a language game

this is not good enough – it trivializes morality –

yes we propose reasons – and these reasons emerge out of our experience of moral uncertainty –

and are in fact uncertain themselves –

morality is this exploration of uncertainty –

it is the exploration of our lived propositional experience

it is not trivial

‘This rubs against the widely held metaphysical view that the world can be fully explained by reference to the kind of facts that are open to investigation by the natural sciences. Rejecting this view seems to open the way to believing in all kinds of spooky entities, and hence many non-religious philosophers have accepted metaphysical or ontological naturalism. Parfit does not defend non-natural religious beliefs, but argues that without irreducibly normative truths, nihilists would be right, for nothing would matter. It is, for example, an irreducibly normative claim that if we establish that the premises of a valid argument are true, then we have a decisive reason for believing the conclusion of the argument.’

the widely held view that the world can be fully explained by the natural sciences?

I presume that what is meant here is that we can in principle have a complete explanation –

logically speaking – any proposal – any explanation – is open –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

to hold that any matter is fully explained – is pretentious

even when we have decided for a proposal – or settled on a course of action –

if we behave logically  – we continue to question – continue to doubt –

what we investigate and what we explore is propositional uncertainty

to hold that any proposition is beyond question – that is certain – is to hold a prejudice

there is no sin in this – a good deal of human propositional action is the assertion of prejudice

my point is that such behaviour – is not logical

the world can be explained in any number of ways

and any proposal put will be open to question – open to doubt – and will be –

uncertain

without irreducibility of normative truth – the nihilists win the day?

irreducibility – amounts to the end of question – the end of doubt – the claim of certainty

the argument for irreducibility – is the argument for prejudice

and to suggest that in the absence of prejudice – there is nothing –  nothing to be concerned about –

is for mine – plain ignorant – and quite preposterous

so called ‘normative proposals’ are made – are put in various forms – and acted upon – and this is as natural as sunshine –

this is an empirical reality –

and the logical reality is that any such proposal – or any proposal regarding its basis –

is uncertain

and it is this uncertainty that is the ground of our morality – of our freedom

the valid argument –

if we establish that the premises of a valid argument are true – then we have a decisive reason for believing the conclusion of the argument?

a proposal – a proposition – a premise is true – if it is affirmed –

and whatever argument is given – if an argument is given – for the affirmation –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the first premise

i.e. – all men are mortal

         john is a man

        ___

         john is mortal

the valid argument is a language game –

really a piece of poetry

the propositions of such an argument are open to question

we have a ‘decisive reason’ for believing the conclusion of the argument –

if we decide – to stop questioning and to suspend doubt

‘Thus Parfit challenges metaphysical naturalists: if the position you defend were true, he says, we could not have any reason to accept it, for there would be no such reasons. It still might be true, but the only position we have any reason to hold is that metaphysical naturalism is false.’

parfit’s argument – as I take it – is that moral naturalism is a form of reductionism –

and he argues that moral statements – are irreducible – therefore naturalism is false –

and so we have no reason to accept it – only reason – not to accept it

to my mind – not much of an ‘argument’ here – more in the line of an arrogant slap down

and what’s with – ‘it still might be true’?

there is no ‘might be true’ –

it is true – if it is affirmed – it is true – for whoever affirms it – when they affirm it – and for whatever reason they give

and indeed – it is false for those who reject it – when they reject it – and for whatever reason they give

and any such affirmation or rejection – and any reasons given for the affirmation or rejection – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

I think that whatever human beings do is natural – is in accordance with their nature –

and I don’t think there is any complete or final explanation of human nature –

the matter is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

as a matter of practice – I don’t hold to a non-natural – or spiritual conception of reality  –

though I like to think I keep an open mind on the matter –

my ‘naturalism’ – is a vague materialism – for me it is more in the line of a working hypothesis –

I am sceptical of any explanation of the world – even of the view that I hold –

and I have no final – knock down explanation for why I hold this view

I have held different metaphysical views at different times

I regard any proposal – metaphysical or otherwise – to be from a logical point of view – uncertain

I try not to be philosophically prejudiced – but find from time to time that I am

as for what I know – it is just and only what I propose – or what is put to me that I affirm

and I don’t believe there is any basis to the propositions I entertain – but the uncertainty that I face and deal with

outside of any proposal – the world – my world – is unknown

‘Some will object that even if we accept Parfit’s arguments, it would be a pyrrhic victory for objectivism. He can overcome Hume’s objections only by rejecting the assumption that morality must be capable of moving us to action. And what is the point of an objective morality, if we are not motivated to act in accordance with the moral truths it contains? Parfit could respond, like Kant, that insofar as we are rational beings, we will respond to the reasons that morality offers. And if we are not, well, the truths of morality would remain true even if no one were to act on them.’

by ‘morality’ here – what we are talking about is those proposals that are put in response to moral issues

these proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain

moral propositions may move us to action – or they may not

‘the reasons that morality offers’ – are just and only those reasons proposed – by those who propose them – when they propose them

we behave rationally if we put these reasons to question – to doubt – if we explore their uncertainty

whether we act on them or not – is not rationally relevant

‘the truths of morality will remain true’?

all this can mean is that moral propositions have been put – are put – and will continue to be put –

however whether or not a moral proposition or set of propositions is affirmed – and by how many – and under what circumstances – is an empirical matter

© greg t. charlton. 2017.

Notice: Feyerabend's against Method

The following 19 posts are new work on Feyerabend's Against Method.

Published in book form by Killer Press Decemeber 2017. ISBN: 978-0-9806987-3-2.

Feyerabend: Introduction

In this work I will argue against Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism and argue for methodological scepticism.

Introduction

‘Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law and order alternatives’

Feyerabend begins with a reworking of a quote from Lenin –

‘‘History generally, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more many sided, more lively and subtle than even ‘the best methodologist can imagine’ –

how does Lenin or Feyerabend know history ‘is always richer in content, more varied, more many sided, more lively and subtle’ – if no methodologist can imagine such a state of affairs?

on what basis is any such claim made about the nature of history?

as against this ‘argument’ I would put that history is no more than what we make it – how we propose it

the point being if we have a history that is rich in content, varied, many sided and lively and subtle it is because we have constructed such a history

beyond our imagination the world we operate in is unknown

any response to the unknown is an attempt to give reality character –

which is to say we propose some basis from which we can operate both conceptually and practically

and any proposal here – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

Feyerabend goes on to quote Herbert Butterfield –

‘history is full of ‘accidents and conjectures and curious juxtapositions of events’ and it demonstrates to us the ‘complexity of human change and the unpredictable character of the ultimate consequences of any given act or decision of men’’

yes – what we face is uncertainty – and any proposal we make regarding the acts and decisions of men – is open to question – open to doubt

and he asks –

‘Are we really to believe that the naïve and simple-minded rules which methodologists take as their guide are capable of accounting for (what Hegel calls) such a ‘maze of interactions’?

no – but the reason is just that any proposal – any rule – is logically speaking – open to question – is uncertain – regardless of how simple-minded or comprehensive it is

‘And is it not clear that successful participation in a process of this kind is possible only for a ruthless opportunist who is not tied to any particular philosophy and who adopts whatever procedure seems to fit the occasion?’

Feyerabend presents a picture of the ‘ruthless opportunist’ – as a player who is neither ruthless or opportunistic –

he is hardly ‘ruthless’ if he adopts whatever procedure fits the occasion – he’s a mindless conformist –

and as for ‘opportunist’ – if you just fit with whatever is going on – what chances do you take – what moves do you make – that in anyway alter the status quo?

Feyerabend’s ‘ruthless opportunist’ – is just a harmless fraud – a nuisance

he gets back to Lenin –

‘Two very important practical conclusions follow from this (character of the historical process). First that in order to fulfil its task, the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without  exception….second it must be able to pass from one to the other in the quickest and most expedient manner.’

the revolutionary class must be able to master all – yes all forms or aspects of social activity –

now if this is the pre-condition for the revolutionary class to advance – there will be no advance – Lenin’s condition is not realizable – in the real world that is

no one can master all forms or aspects of social activity –

to suggest that this possible is utopian rubbish

Feyerabend goes on to quote Einstein –

‘The external conditions which are set for (the scientist) by the facts of experience do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted, in the construction of his conceptual world, by the adherence to an epistemological system. He therefore, must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist…’

here Einstein puts that experience – by its nature – does not permit ‘too much restriction’

and therefore that the scientist should in the construction of his conceptual world – not permit too much restriction

and yes – from the point of view of those who adhere to a strict conception of experience

the scientist who is not too much restricted might appear as an unscrupulous opportunist

Einstein here is recommending that the scientist – as far as the conceptual world goes – should keep an open mind

Einstein is not here claiming ‘that science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise’

Feyerabend continues –

‘A complex medium containing and unforseen developments demands complex procedures and defies analysis on the basis of rules which have been set up in advance and without regard to the ever-changing conditions of history’

if what we are facing is the ever changing conditions of history –

what then is the essential difference between basic rules – and complex procedures?

if what we face is ‘a complex medium and unforseen developments’ – then ‘complex procedures’ – will be just as inadequate to the task as simple rules

will a complex procedure account for unforseen developments?

how could you possibly know that it would?

and in any case we can’t deal with ‘unforseen developments’ – just because they are not seen

and by the way – it is not history that is ever-changing – if by history you mean the past –

you can have different theories of history – and they might change –

but accounting for ‘a complex medium’ is dealing with the present state of science –

as to the ‘unforseen developments’ –

we wait until the future becomes the present – and then we can set about dealing with it

so ‘basic rules’ or ‘complex procedures’?

what is required here is recognizing that any proposal that we put forward – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

you deal with an uncertain world – with uncertain proposals

when something occurs that is not accounted for by your theory – you think again

‘Now it is, of course, possible to simplify the medium in which a scientist works by simplifying its main actors. The history of science, after all, does not just consist of facts and conclusions drawn from the facts. It also contains ideas, interpretations of facts, problems created by conflicting interpretations, and so on. On closer analysis we find that science knows no ‘bare facts’ at all but that the ‘facts’ that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore essentially ideational. This being the case, the history of science will be complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the ideas it contains, and these ideas in turn will be complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the minds of those who invented them. Conversely, a little brainwashing will go a long way in making the history of science duller, simpler, more uniform, more ‘objective’ and more easily accessible to treatment by strict and unchangeable rules.’

firstly ‘the history of science’ – doesn’t exist

what does exist is different accounts of the history of science

secondly any so called ‘fact’ – is a proposal –

and any interpretation of a fact is a proposal –

conflicting interpretations of facts – are simply the result of different proposals in relation to the fact-proposal

yes – you can interpret / describe your proposal / fact as ‘essentially ideational’

you can survey proposals in science – and yes you can interpret the propositional landscape – as complex – chaotic – full of mistakes –

in logical terms all you have uncovered is propositional uncertainty

describing science as ‘dull’ – ‘simple’ – ‘more uniform’ – ‘more objective’ – is no great sin –

if such descriptions – fit the situation – and are useful – then they have a place

‘strict and unchangeable rules’ – is nothing more than authoritarian rhetoric

any rule – any description – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

this applies equally to Feyerabend’s proposals – as much as it does to the proposals of those who put contrasting and different views

‘Scientific education as we know it today has precisely this aim. It simplifies ‘science’ by simplifying its participants: first a domain of research is defined. The domain is separated from the rest of history (physics, for example, is separated from metaphysics and from theology) and given a ‘logic’ of its own. A thorough training in such a ‘logic’ then conditions those working in the domain: it makes their actions more uniform and it freezes large parts of the historical process as well. Stable ‘facts’ arise and persevere despite the vicissitudes of history. An essential part of the training which makes such facts appear consists in the attempt to inhibit intuitions that might lead to the blurring of boundaries. A person’s religion, for example, or his metaphysics, or his sense of humour (his natural sense of humour and not the inbred and always rather nasty kind of jocularity

one finds in specialized professions) must not have the slightest connection with his scientific activity. His imagination is restrained, and even his language ceases to be his own. This is again reflected in the nature of scientific ‘facts’ which are experienced as being independent of opinion, belief, and cultural background.’

I can understand ‘scientific education as we know it today’ – as something of an initiation rite –

learning in such a manner will get students into the intellectual discipline required in science –

and as for the historical – theological – metaphysical – issues and back stories –

I imagine most teachers of science reckon there will be time for that –

the really crucial thing in any education process is to activate a student’s critical capacity – encourage question – encourage doubt – encourage uncertainty –

a skilful teacher can do this while at the same time teaching intellectual and experimental discipline –

the sense of humour argument leaves me a little perplexed –

I don’t think you need a sense of humour to do science – and even if you have one – I would say it is irrelevant to science

nature is not a joke –

and even if it is seen as such from some metaphysical perspective –

it’s no barrel of laughs

as for ‘the nasty kind of jocularity one finds in specialized professions’ –  par for the course – and irrelevant

when I was fifteen doing elementary high school science I remember a lesson on force

the teacher was explaining the equation f = ma

I piped up and asked – “but sir, what is force?”

I remember he looked at me quite intently and said – “that is a philosophical question” – and went on with the lesson

well his answer was for me good and bad –

bad in that I concluded there and then that physics was not what I was going to be interested in

and good – in that I realized that this ‘philosophy’ – whatever it was – was where I would be heading

it was only in second year philosophy at La Trobe University –

in a class with Professor Brian Ellis –

that I got back to the question of the nature of force –

and I was delighted

‘It is thus possible to create a tradition that is held together by strict rules, and that is also successful to some extent. But is it desirable to support such a tradition to the exclusion of everything else? Should we transfer to it the sole rights for dealing in knowledge, so that any result that has been obtained by other methods is at once ruled out of court? This is the question I intend to ask in the present essay. And to this question my answer will be a firm and resounding NO’.

well a tradition held together by strict rules is only functional if those in the tradition hold to those rules –

and why would they hold to such rules ?

the only reasonable answer is that they will hold to these rules –.if they deliver the results

if they don’t deliver the results –  then clearly – the rules don’t function –

and if that is the case they will be reviewed – if not discarded – or replaced –

the real point here is that there is no one rule as to how to proceed –

the best we can do is see what happens – see what people do –

and underpin any such ‘seeing’ – with an attitude of uncertainty

as to what is and is not desirable – that is anyone’s guess

different desires will fight it out in the same way as different propositions – or different theories – or different world views – fight it out

it becomes a question of who wins the day – who is the most persuasive –

and that is not a logical issue – it is a rhetorical issue –

and in any serious matter – there is not likely to be any final agreement

should we support such a tradition to the exclusion of everything else?

no – of course not –  but if a tradition has a use – we should give it its due

and further it is logical – to look at different ways of doing things – different methods – and further to develop different approaches

and if you understand this – you realise that any result obtained by other methods – is valid –

and the reason is that any method – as with any result – in short – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘There are two reasons why such an answer seems to be appropriate. The first reason is that the world which we want to explore is a largely unknown entity. We must, therefore, keep our options open and we must not restrict ourselves in advance. Epistemological prescriptions may look splendid when compared with other epistemological prescriptions, or with general principles – but who can guarantee that they are the best way to discover, not just a few isolated facts ‘facts’ but also some deep-lying secrets of nature?”

in the absence of description what we face – is the unknown

description makes known –

any description is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

our knowledge is uncertain

keeping our options open – is recognizing propositional reality – as open to question – open to doubt – as uncertain

epistemological prescriptions – general principles – are proposals –

why one epistemological prescription is preferred to another – is ultimately a question of circumstance

there are no logical guarantees –

so called ‘guarantees’ are the province of authoritarian rhetoric –

rhetoric is all authoritarianism of any form comes to

‘facts’ – are proposals that have become the focus – of question – of doubt –

‘deep-lying secrets of nature’ –

there are no ‘deep-lying secrets’ – there is only what is proposed –

and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘The second reason is that a scientific education as described above (and practised in our schools) cannot be reconciled with a humanitarian attitude. It is in conflict ‘with the cultivation of individuality which alone produces, or can produce, well developed human beings’, [John Stuart Mill] it ‘maims by compression, like a Chinese lady’s foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to make a person markedly different in outline’ [John Stuart Mill] from the ideals of rationality that happen to be fashionable in science, or in the philosophy of science. The attempt to increase liberty, to live a full and rewarding life, and the corresponding attempt to discover the secrets of nature and of man entails, therefore, the rejection of all universal standards and of all rigid tradition. (Naturally, it also entails the rejection of a large part of contemporary science.)

‘the cultivation of individuality which alone produces, or can produce, well developed human beings’ –

a proposal – open to question – open to – uncertain –

how we increase liberty – how we live full and rewarding lives – is a matter that is always – under consideration –  open to question – always uncertain –

as for ‘discovering the secrets of nature’ – what we are talking about here is new and fruitful proposals

there is no need to reject anything – what is required is an open and critical mind

‘It is surprising to see how rarely the stultifying effect of ‘the Laws of Reason’ or of scientific practice is examined by professional anarchists. Professional anarchists oppose any kind of restriction and demand that the individual be permitted to develop freely, unhampered by laws, duties or obligations. And yet they swallow without protest all the severe standards which scientists and logicians impose upon research and upon any kind of knowledge-creating and knowledge-changing activity. Occasionally, the laws of scientific method, or what are thought to be the laws of scientific method by a particular writer are even interpreted into anarchism itself. ‘Anarchism is a world concept based upon a mechanical explanation of phenomena’ writes Kropotkin. ‘Its method of investigation is that of the exact natural sciences … the method of induction and deduction.’ It is not clear, writes a modern ‘radical’ professor at Columbia, ‘that scientific research demands an absolute freedom of speech and debate. Rather the evidence suggests that certain kinds of unfreedom place no obstacle in the way of science … [R.P. Wolff.] ’

well I would say that the laws of reason or of scientific practise have not been the focus of ‘professional’ anarchists –

probably because they haven’t recognised their relevance to the anarchist debate –

or because they haven’t had the intellectual skills to challenge them

and possibly too –  they had other matters to occupy their attention

opposing any kind of restriction – is as absolutist as endorsing any kind of restriction

these ‘professional anarchists’ – are in the same boat as the authoritarians they oppose –

 ‘Anarchism is a world concept based upon a mechanical explanation of phenomena’ –

‘a world concept’ –  what this amounts to is that anarchism is the rule – or should be

and if such a prescription is not authoritarian – what is it?

hard to see how the idea of ‘a world concept’ – is anything other than an argument for dominance

so – at the heart of such anarchism – is hypocrisy –

this so called ‘anarchist’ argues against standard authoritarian concepts and systems –

but endorses a ‘world concept’ – vague as that is – to take their place –

presumably ‘anarchist freedom’ sloshes around in the vagueness of the ‘world concept’

‘Its method of investigation is that of the exact natural sciences … the method of induction and deduction.’

it’s pretty clear from this that Kropotkin was quite happy to claim the backing of what he saw as the authority of science – for his ‘anarchism as a world concept’

as for the ‘radical professor at Columbia’ – this notion of ‘unfreedom’ – is unnecessary –

yes – we know science operates in a world of obstacles –

and if there were no obstacles to knowledge there would be no reason for science

the logical reality is that the only authority – is the authority of authorship –

and the authorship of a proposal – is logically irrelevant to the assessment of proposals –

any claim to authority – beyond authorship – is rhetorical – rhetorical and deceptive

the proposition is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

our freedom rests in propositional uncertainty

there is no place for ‘authority’ in propositional logic –

there is no place for authority in science – or indeed in any other propositional action or pursuit that human beings engage in

claims to authority beyond the claim of authorship have no logical basis –

and in so far as there are such claims what we are faced with is logical deception –

and it is this deception that is or should be the primary focus of all philosophical attack

the so called ‘anarchist’ – is the least equipped for this task – for he is a first order player in the very deception –  that is to be unmasked –

frauds abound

‘There are certainly some people for whom this is ‘not so clear.’ Let us, therefore, start with our outline of an anarchistic methodology and a corresponding anarchist science. There is no need to fear that the diminished concern for law and order in science and in society that characterizes an anarchism of this kind will lead to chaos. The human nervous system is too well organized for that. There may, of course, come a time when it will be necessary to give reason a temporary advantage and when it will be wise to defend its rules to the exclusion of everything else. I do not think that we are living in such a time today.’

‘the human organism is too well organized for that’ –

so the backstop – the authority – for avoiding chaos – is the human nervous system –

the human nervous system apparently – is inviolable –

and is not a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

rather it is a bedrock against chaos

and presumably – according to Feyerabend – the anarchist argument – proceeds from this bedrock –

great to have such a solid and incontestable basis for one’s anarchism – for one’s anti- authoritarianism!

on top of this – yes – we can play deceptive games – if necessary –

what a victory!

‘There may, of course, come a time when it will be necessary to give reason a temporary advantage and when it will be wise to defend its rules to the exclusion of everything else.’

reason is – question – doubt – uncertainty

if you give reason a rest at anytime – you give up on knowledge – and you stay stuck in prejudice

‘I do not think that we are living in such a time today.’

presumably – for the time being –  we can play a straight bat –

but the question is – what for Feyerabend is playing a straight bat?

what does this anarchist methodology amount to?

an argument against authority in science?

as I have stated you don’t have to fly the anarchist flag to argue against authority – in science – or for that matter – in any other propositional activity

all you need to do is understand propositional logic –

that is understand that the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

this logic applies equally to anarchism –

anarchism – as with any other political doctrine is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

if it is not held to be – it is held not logically – but rhetorically

the real argument against authority in science – and authority in any propositional activity or context – is the argument for propositional uncertainty

it is the argument for a positive scepticism

and by positive scepticism – I mean a scepticism that regards propositional uncertainty as the reality we face – as the reality we live in – as the reality that is

our knowledge is uncertain

for too long – really since Socrates – scepticism has been negative –

it has been the argument against – the method used for tearing down

the positive sceptic embraces reality as it is – embraces its uncertainty –   

and sees uncertainty as the engine of creativity.

Feyerabend 1

1

Feyerabend begins chapter 1 with –

‘This is shown by an examination of historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the relation between idea and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress: is anything goes.’

‘The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical research. We find then, that there is not a single rule, however plausible, and however firmly grounded in epistemology, that is not violated at some time or another. It becomes evident that such violations are not accidental events, they are not results of insufficient knowledge or of inattention which might have been avoided. On the contrary, we see that they are necessary for progress. Indeed one of the most striking features of recent discussions in the philosophy of science is the realization that events and developments, such as the invention of atomism in antiquity, the Copernican revolution, the rise of modern atomism (kinetic theory; dispersion theory; stereochemistry; quantum theory), the gradual emergence of the wave theory of light, occurred only because some thinkers either decided not to be bound by certain ‘obvious’ methodological rules, or because they unwittingly broke them.’

the argument from history that Feyerabend suggests here is fair enough –

but history depends on who writes it –

and what is written depends of the assumptions of the historian

a different set of assumptions – delivers a different history

my point is that the historical argument – is really no more than a restatement of assumptions – and an elaboration of those assumptions

it really is something like the mast head for the perspective that is to be argued

as I see it the real issue here is logical – not historical

science is propositional

and any proposition – that is any proposal – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

science – as with any other propositional activity – reflects this logical reality –

the reality of question – doubt – uncertainty

where it does not – what we have is not logical behaviour – but rhetorical behaviour

the battle between logic and rhetoric in propositional life –

is the difference between a closed-minded approach to the world – and an open-minded approach

I would suggest that in science – as in all propositional activity – you will see logical behaviour and rhetorical behaviour

this seems to be the natural tension in propositional action – in propositional life

‘On the contrary, we see that they are necessary for progress.’

‘progress’ – is a value judgment –

what is ‘progress’ from one point of view – may well be considered a retrograde step from another

the reality is that propositional systems change – and people move with the change –

it is just this propositional movement – when given the sanction of those involved – that gets written up as ‘progress’

science – as with any other propositional action – is what occurs

and it is scientists – the propositional players in the propositional activity – who decide what is – and what is not to count as science – and indeed – what is and is not to count as good science

philosophers of science – are secondary players – they are at best – observers of the process –

they may have some interesting and useful insights into scientific activity – that might be of use to the practicing scientist – but they are not legislators

‘The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science’ –

who’s idea is this?

Feyerabend keeps referring to it – but does not identify its proponents

we can ask – does anyone hold to such a view – if so who?

and how relevant would their opinion be – to anyone actually working in science?

one has the suspicion that Feyerabend is putting up a ’straw man argument’ – and that this straw man argument – is central to his enterprise

‘This liberal practice, I repeat, is not just a fact of the history of science. It is both reasonable and absolutely necessary for the growth of knowledge. More specifically, one can show the following: given any rule, however ‘fundamental’ or ‘necessary’ for science, there are always circumstances where it is advisable not only to ignore the rule, but to adopt its opposite. For example, there are circumstances where it is advisable to introduce, elaborate, and defend ad hoc hypotheses, or hypotheses which contradict well-established and generally accepted experimental results, or hypotheses whose content is smaller than the content of the existing and empirically adequate alternative, or self consistent hypotheses, and so on.’

the so called ‘history of science’ – regardless of whose history you are talking about –

is no guarantee of the future of science – is no guarantee of how science will be – how it will proceed –

what we are getting here from Feyerabend – is an inductive account of scientific methodology –

I am surprised – I would never have imagined that Feyerabend would fall head first  into Hume’s trap –

science – at any time – just is what the scientists – the practitioners – say it is –

it is how they propose it

there may well be circumstances – where ad hoc hypotheses are introduced – or where scientists work with hypotheses which contradict well established experimental results etc. etc. –

whether or not science proceeds in this manner – is up to the scientists

whether or not such methods are ‘advisable’ – will be decided by the working scientist

as for the ‘growth of knowledge’ – knowledge is what is proposed –

and our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and it is this logical reality that leads to new proposals –

‘growth of knowledge’ amounts to – new proposals – new ways of understanding – new ways of seeing –

and any new proposal –  new understanding – new way of seeing –

is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘There are even circumstances – and they occur rather infrequently – when argument looses its forward-looking aspect and becomes a hindrance to progress. Nobody would claim that the teaching of small children is exclusively a matter of argument (though argument may enter into it, and should enter into it to a larger extent than is customary), and almost everyone now agrees that what looks like a result of reason – the mastery of a language, the existence of a richly articulated perceptual world, logical ability – is due partly to indoctrination and partly to a process of growth that proceeds with the force of natural law. And where arguments do seem to have an effect, this is more than often due to their physical repetition than to their semantic content.’

‘when argument looses its forward-looking aspect and becomes a hindrance to progress’

argument is argument –

whether it is forward looking – or not –  depends on who’s doing the looking

and ‘a hindrance to progress’ – again depends on who’s idea of progress we are talking about here

argument if it is logical – is critical  –

whether it is forward looking or a hindrance – has to do with the use – it is put to – and how that use is evaluated

‘the mastery of a language, the existence of a richly articulated perceptual world, logical ability’ –

how these faculties come about – and are developed – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘the force of natural law’ – is really the explanation you have – when you have no explanation at all

argument – is a means of persuasion – and not the only one

‘Having admitted this much we must also concede the possibility of non-argumentative growth in the adult as well as in (the theoretical parts of) institutions such as science, religion, prostitution, and so on. We certainly cannot take for granted that what is possible for a small child – to acquire new modes of behaviour on the slightest provocation, to slide into them without any noticeable effort – is beyond the reach of his elders. One should rather expect that catastrophic changes in the environment, wars, the breakdown of encompassing morality, political revolutions, will transform adult reaction patterns as well, including important patterns of argumentation.  Such a transformation may again be an entirely natural process and the only function of a critical argument may

lie in the fact that it increases the mental tension that precedes and causes the behavioural outburst.’

the question is how to explain growth in the adult – as well as in institutions –

any explanation offered – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘one should rather expect that catastrophic changes will transform adult reactions and patterns of argumentation’

of course you can expect change in humans who face changing circumstances –

just what that amounts to is open to question

‘an entirely natural process’ – yes – but what does this mean – beyond saying – yes – change happens?

‘the mental tension that precedes and causes the behavioural outburst’?

look this ‘mental tension’ idea – is a theory – an explanation – that Feyerabend is putting up – to account for what he calls a ‘behavioural outburst’ – whatever that amounts to

‘the only function of rational argument’ – is to put such theories – such explanations – to question – to doubt –

in short – to explore the uncertainty in any such proposal

‘Now, if there are events, not necessarily arguments which cause us to adopt new standards, including new and more complex forms of argumentation, is it then not up to the defenders of the status quo to provide, not just counter arguments, but also contrary causes? (‘Virtue without terror is ineffective’, says Robespierre.) And if the old forms of argumentation turn out to be too weak a cause, must not these defenders either give up or resort to stronger and more ‘irrational’ means? (It is very difficult and perhaps entirely impossible, to combat the effects of brainwashing by argument.) Even the most puritanical rationalist will then be forced to stop reasoning and use propaganda and coercion, not because some of his reasons have ceased to be valid, but because the psychological conditions which make them effective, and capable of influencing others, have disappeared. And what is the use of an argument that leaves people unmoved?

however new standards are put  – in whatever form they are proposed –

the adoption of new standards will not be without question – doubt – and uncertainty –

or if they are they – they are not being considered rationally

and defenders of the status quo –  if they behave rationally – will question – and doubt – the new proposals

Robespierre – was an authoritarian – whose advocacy of terror – was a statement of his impotence and ignorance

winning the argument – is a rhetorical issue

yes – you can give up – resort to force – or just step back and wait for another chance to win the day

and whatever approach is taken  – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

argument is persuasion – argument is propaganda

‘And what is the use of an argument that leaves people unmoved?’ –

exactly

‘Of course the problem never arises quite in this form. The teaching of standards and their defence never consists in merely putting them before the mind of the student and making them as clear as possible. The standards are supposed to have maximum causal efficacy as well. This makes it very difficult to distinguish between the logical force and the material effect of an argument. Just as a well trained pet will obey his master no matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and no matter how urgent the need to adopt new patterns of behaviour, so in the very same way a well trained rationalist will obey the mental image of his master, he will conform to the standards of argumentation he has learned, he will adhere to these standards no matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and he will be quite incapable of realizing that what he regards as the ‘voice of reason’ is but a causal after-effect of the training he has received. He will be quite unable to discover that the appeal to reason to which he succumbs so readily is nothing but a political manoeuvre.’

‘The teaching of standards and their defence never consists in merely putting them before the mind of the student and making them as clear as possible.’ –

making them ‘as clear as possible’ – ok –

but simply presenting so called clear proposals – is a waste of time –

what needs to be taught is question – doubt – and the exploration of logical uncertainty

‘clarity’ is a con – a logical con

‘the logical force and the material effect of an argument’ –

arguments have no logical force – the force of an argument – is rhetorical –

and the rhetorical force of an argument – is what does or does not have a material effect –

rhetoric – is persuasion –

the logical reality is that any proposal put – however it is put – and with whatever force it is put –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

logic is the only defence against rhetoric

this ‘voice of reason’ – is no more than a piece of rhetoric –

a rhetorical device – which like all rhetoric – is designed to stop question – stop doubt – and to pretend – certainty

it is pretence

‘political manoeuvre’? –

yes – you can call any rhetorical argument – any pretentious action –  a power-play

‘That interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth of science, can also be seen from an analysis of the relation between idea and action. It is often taken for granted that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes, and should precede, their formulation and institutional expression. (An investigation starts with a problem, says Popper.) First, we have an idea, or a problem, then we act. i.e. either speak, or build, or destroy. Yet this is certainly not the way in which small children develop. They use words, they combine them, they play with them, until they grasp a meaning that has so far been beyond their reach. And the initial playful activity is an essential prerequisite of the final act of understanding. There is no reason why this mechanism should cease to function in the adult. We must expect, for example, that the idea of liberty could be made clear only by means of the very same actions, which were supposed to create liberty. Creation of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated without bringing the process to a stop. The process itself is not guided by a well-defined programme, and cannot be guided by such a programme, for it contains the conditions for the realisation of all possible programmes. It is guided rather by a vague urge, by a ‘passion’; (Kierkegaard). The passion gives rise to specific behaviour which in turn creates circumstances and the ideas necessary for analysing and explaining the process, for making it ‘rational’.’

‘That interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth of science,’

yes

‘It is often taken for granted that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes, and should precede, their formulation and institutional expression.’

yes –

but those who take this for granted are falling for a myth –

‘a clear and distinct understanding’ – is a pretence

from a logical point of view – any ‘understanding’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a ‘clear understanding’ is what you have – when you regard your ‘understanding’ – as beyond question – beyond doubt –

an investigation starts with a proposal – a proposition

the proposal – the proposition – is put to question – to doubt –

a logical investigation is an exploration of propositional uncertainty

Feyerabend’s theory of how small children learn and what he draws from this theory – is all very well –

it is a proposal – open to question –

‘Creation of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated without bringing the process to a stop. The process itself is not guided by a well-defined programme, and cannot be guided by such a programme, for it contains the conditions for the realisation of all possible programmes.’

‘full understanding of a correct idea of a thing’ – is rubbish –

there is no ‘full understanding’ – there is only the pretence of a ‘full understanding’ –

and the ‘correct’ idea – is simply the idea that is no longer put to question

it may well be that  the process is guided by a ‘well defined programme’ – and the result may be what is desired –

nevertheless the ‘process’ and the ‘result’ – logically speaking – are open to question – open to doubt

there is no certainty in propositional behaviour

‘The passion gives rise to specific behaviour which in turn creates circumstances and the ideas necessary for analysing and explaining the process, for making it ‘rational’.’ –

this ‘passion’ argument is interesting but irrelevant  –

what makes any behaviour ‘rational’ – is that it is held open to question – open to doubt –  and regarded as uncertain

‘The development of the Copernican point of view from Galileo to the 20^th century is a perfect example of the situation I wish to describe. We start with a strong belief that runs counter to contemporary reason and contemporary experience. The belief spreads and finds support in other beliefs which are equally unreasonable, if not more so (law of inertia; the telescope). Research now gets deflected in new directions, new kinds of instruments are built; ‘evidence’ is related to theories in new ways until there arises an ideology that is rich enough to provide independent arguments for any particular part of it  and mobile enough to find such arguments wherever they seem to be required. We can say today that Galileo was on the right track, for his persistent pursuit of what once seemed to be a silly cosmology has by now created the material needed to defend it against all those who will accept a view only if it is told in a certain way and who will trust it only if it contains certain magical phrases, called ‘observational reports’. And this is not an exception – it is the normal case; theories become clear and reasonable only after incoherent parts of them have been used for a long time. Such unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodical foreplay thus turns out to be an unavoidable precondition of clarity and of empirical success.’

if you cut out all the rhetoric and histrionics in Feyerabend’s account – i.e. ‘strong belief’ – ‘runs counter to contemporary experience’ – ‘equally unreasonable’ – ‘rich enough to provide’ – ‘ideology’ – etc.

what you start with is a proposal – plain and simple –

the proposal gains support – for whatever reason –

critical investigation leads to other and new proposals – (law of inertia – the telescope etc.) –

the original proposal – becomes a propositional complex – and new arguments are developed

‘We can say today that Galileo was on the right track’ –

oh the benefit of retrospective 20:20 tunnel vision!

what we can say is that Galileo – was on a track –

and further that there are cosmologists – of the 21^st century – who regard Galileo’s track as the way that led to the currently accepted view of the physical world –

had Galileo’s theory and argument not found the support and acceptance that it did – at the time and over time – we would be hearing a different history and different view of the physical world –

I am surprised that Feyerabend would say that Galileo was on the ‘right’ track –

logically –  all we can say is that Galileo’s proposal – was – and is – open to question – open to doubt –

                                                                                                                                           

that it was – and is – uncertain

there is no ‘right’ propositional track –

there is only that track which is – for whatever reason supported and adopted –

and as Feyerabend said earlier –

‘That interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth of science,’

why one theory won the day – and others were not successful in the court of scientific opinion –  is not a logical issue – it is a matter of historical speculation

fascinating as such can be – we never leave the realm of speculation – with all its uncertainty

as for ‘observational reports’ –

in the end – I think – a mainstay of scientific ritual

‘Such unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodical foreplay thus turns out to be an unavoidable precondition of clarity and of empirical success.’

this ‘clarity and empirical success’ – is just rhetoric

proposals are put – reasonable / unreasonable – sensible / nonsensical –

the point is that whatever is put  and however it is put – it is open to question –

the process of evaluation may be disciplined and rigid – or messy and unmethodical –

any evaluation – is likewise – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘Now, when we attempt to describe and to understand developments of this kind in a general way, we are, of course, obliged to appeal to the existing forms of speech which do not take them into account and which must be distorted, misused, beaten into new patterns in order to fit unforseen situations (without a constant misuse of language there cannot be any discovery, any progress). ‘Moreover, since the traditional categories are the gospel of everyday thinking (including ordinary scientific thinking) and of everyday practice, [such an attempt at understanding] in effect presents rules and forms of false thinking and action – false, that is, from the standpoint of (scientific) common sense.’

{Marcuse}. This is how dialectical thinking arises as a form of thought that ‘dissolves

into nothing the determinations of the understanding’,{Hegel} formal logic included.’

‘we are, of course, obliged to appeal to the existing forms of speech which do not take them into account and which must be distorted, misused, beaten into new patterns in 34.

order to fit unforseen situations (without a constant misuse of language there cannot be any discovery, any progress).’ –

what underpins language – and language use – or what is reflected in language and language use – is propositional logic

the logic of the proposition is that any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

language – and language use – is characterized by – logical uncertainty –

‘an existing form of speech’ – is a logical / propositional uncertainty –

it is not ‘a constant misuse of language’ – but rather an instance of propositional uncertainty –

and it is this propositional uncertainty that allows language to accommodate and embrace new proposals

‘Moreover, since the traditional categories are the gospel of everyday thinking (including ordinary scientific thinking) and of everyday practice, [such an attempt at understanding] in effect presents rules and forms of false thinking and action – false, that is, from the standpoint of (scientific) common sense.’ –

this is just naïve rubbish from Feyerabend via Marcuse

there is no ‘gospel’ in propositional activity –

propositional action – propositional life is – uncertain –

and it is this uncertainty that is the source of propositional vitality – flexibility and creativity

rules and forms –

rules are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

there are no true forms of thinking and action – there are no false forms of thinking and action

any form of thinking – any form of action – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a true proposal – logically speaking – is one you affirm –

a false proposal – one you deny

and any decision on the truth value of a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

‘(Incidentally, my frequent use of such words as ‘progress’, ‘advance’, ‘improvement’ etc., does not mean that I claim special knowledge about what is good and what is bad in the sciences and that I want to impose this knowledge on my readers. Everyone can read the terms in his own way and in accordance with the tradition to which he belongs. Thus for an empiricist, ‘progress’ will mean transition to a theory that provides direct empirical tests for most of its basic assumptions. Some people believe the quantum theory to be a theory of this kind. For others ‘progress’ may mean unification and harmony, perhaps even at the expense of empirical adequacy. This is how Einstein viewed the general theory of relativity. And my theory is that anarchism helps achieve progress in any one of the senses one cares to choose. Even a law and order science will succeed if anarchistic moves are occasionally made.)’

‘progress’ – ‘advance’ – ‘improvement’? –

it is not a matter of whether everyone can read these terms in his own way and in accordance with the tradition to which he belongs – but rather that as a matter of fact everyone does –

this is just what does happens –

and yes – logically speaking – these terms – as with any term – and as with any methodology – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

‘And my theory is that anarchism helps achieve progress in any one of the senses one cares to choose. Even a law and order science will succeed if anarchistic moves are occasionally made’

the obvious question is –

if i.e. ‘a law and order science’ will succeed without them – why bother with these so called ‘anarchistic moves’?

at best are they not irrelevant? –

and at worst a distraction – basically an annoyance?

in any case I have my doubts about just whether this so called anarchist method is as complimentary as Feyerabend pretends –

isn’t Feyerabend’s point to disrupt the status quo – whatever that may be?

so do we actually have anything here from Feyerabend?

I mean he has failed to show how his proposal adds anything to existing practises –

we can say too – it hasn’t taken anything away from existing practices

the point is – it is neither a plus or a minus – rather an irrelevant distraction –

an irrelevant distraction from genuine scientific endeavour

‘It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings. To those who look at the rich material provided by history and who are not intent on impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in the form of clarity, precision, ‘objectivity’, ‘truth’, it will become clear that there is only one principle that can be defined under all circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle: anything goes.’

whatever ‘goes’ –

that is – whatever is proposed –

is open to question – open to doubt –

and is uncertain