Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Part 1. 301-400

301. ‘An image is not a picture, but a picture can correspond to it.’

an image is a proposal – a picture is a proposal –

two proposals can be related

a proposal of correspondence can be put

any proposal – however described – and any proposed relation – however described –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

302. ‘If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of

one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine

pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel. That

is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination

from one place of pain to another. As, from pain in the hand to pain

in the arm. For I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of

his body. (Which would also be possible.)

Pain-behaviour can point to a painful place—but the subject of pain

is the person who gives it expression.’

you can’t feel pain that you don’t feel – but you can imagine it –

to imagine is to propose what you don’t experience –

an imaginative proposal – as with any other – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

pain behaviour – is propositional behaviour –

the subject of a pain-proposal – the person who gives it expression – is logically irrelevant

what is logically relevant is the proposal – regardless of who proposes it

and the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

303. "I can only believe that someone else is in pain, but I know it

if I am."—Yes: one can make the decision to say "I believe he is in

pain" instead of "He is in pain". But that is all.——What looks like

an explanation here, or like a statement about a mental process, is in

truth an exchange of one expression for another which, while we are

doing philosophy, seems the more appropriate one.

Just try—in a real case—to doubt someone else's fear or pain.’

"I can only believe that someone else is in pain, but I know it if I am."

our ‘knowledge’ – and our ‘belief’ –  is proposal –

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

the distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ is a best seen as a rhetorical distinction

a distinction made in the service of persuasion –

it has no basis in logic

to ‘know’ that I am in pain – is to put the proposal ‘I am in pain’ –

to doubt here – is not to deny – it is to put the proposal to question –

I can affirm my claim – and still subject it to critical examination

one can put the proposal – and not put it to question –

in that case the claim is not false – rather it is held illogically –

if I put the claim ‘I am in pain’ – to question – I am likely to take myself off to a physician –

put to a physician – he or she – will subject the claim to critical examination –

again – to question is not to deny – it is to examine

and by the way – I could be making a false claim – it is still open to question

‘Just try—in a real case—to doubt someone else's fear or pain.’

to doubt someone else’s fear of pain – is to put it to question – to examine it –

this is just what we do when we try to understand another’s fear or pain

304. ‘"But you will surely admit that there is a difference between

pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any

pain?"—Admit it? What greater difference could there be?—"And yet

you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a

nothing"—Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!

The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a

something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected

the grammar which tries to force itself on us here.

The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the

idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the

same purpose: to convey thoughts—which may be about houses, pains

,good and evil, or anything else you please.’

‘"But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—

there is a difference – if a difference is proposed

‘And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a

nothing"—Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!’

it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

305. ‘"But you surely cannot deny that, for example, in remembering,

an inner process takes place."—What gives the impression that

we want to deny anything? When one says "Still, an inner process

does take place here"—one wants to go on: "After all, you see it."

And it is this inner process that one means by the word "remembering".

—The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from

our setting our faces against the picture of the 'inner process'. What

we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct

idea of the use of the word "to remember". We say that this picture

with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the

word as it is.’

"Still, an inner process does take place here"—one wants to go on: "After all, you see it." And it is this inner process that one means by the word "remembering".

to remember is to propose –

and this proposal –  this memory proposal – can remain private – or it can be made public

‘The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the 'inner process'.’

the point is the proposal –

whether put privately – or put publicly

and this ‘inner process’ – in so far as it is put as an account of the memory proposal –

 is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember".’

there is no ‘correct use’ of the words ‘to remember’ –

a memory proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

its use – is open to question

an ‘inner process account’ of the memory proposal – is open to question –

if such a proposal has a use – that use will be open to question –

‘We say that this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is.’

the word as it is – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what stands in the way of understanding propositional use – is an un-critical view of the proposition

306. ‘Why should I deny that there is a mental process? But "There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering . . . ." means nothing more than: "I have just remembered . . . .".To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that anyone ever remembers anything.’

if the proposal ‘there is a mental process’ – is useful to you – no need to deny it

however – this proposal as with any other – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

if you have no use for it – it will not figure in your propositional actions

a proposal like ‘I remember’ – can stand on its own two feet –

it doesn’t need to be bolstered with any supplementary proposals like –‘there is a mental process’

and this proposal ‘I remember’ – is open to question open to doubt – and as everyone should know – uncertain

307. ‘"Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you

at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is

a fiction?"—If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical

fiction.’

the proposal that ‘everything except human behaviour is a fiction’ –

the behaviourist proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

and you can put that this ‘fiction’ is a grammatical fiction –

this grammatical fiction proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

308. ‘How does the philosophical problem about mental processes

and states and about behaviourism arise?——The first step is the one

that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and

leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know

more about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a

particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept

of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive

movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very

one that we thought quite innocent.)—And now the analogy which

was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to

deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium.

And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally

we don't want to deny them.’

‘How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise?’

a proposal is put i.e. ‘I am in pain’

and different proposals are put in explanation of this proposal –

it’s that simple – it’s that straightforward

‘We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided.’ –

well yes – a proposal is put – and the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘their nature’ – if that is what is being proposed – is open to question

‘For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better.’

there is no definite concept –

at best what you have is a working concept-proposal –

this ‘definite concept’ – from alogical point of view – is indefinite 

‘(The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very

one that we thought quite innocent.)’

there is no ‘conjuring trick’ –

Wittgenstein here is attempting his own sleight of hand here –

and it comes about because he doesn’t see – or does not want to see the ‘un-mysterious fact’ – of proposal – and proposal put

the proposal – the proposition is not some mysterious phenomenon –

it is as plain as dirt

‘So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium.

And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally

we don't want to deny them.’

one can quite legitimately put the proposal of ‘mental process and states’– and then – as with any proposal – begin putting it to question – putting it to doubt – and exploring its uncertainty

that’s it

just because the proposal is put – and the nature of mental processes and states – is left undecided – does not  mean that the proposal can only be denied

yes – you can take your bat and ball and go home –

but if you regard the matter as one of genuine philosophical concern –

then you will start the hard work of critical investigation –

and see where that takes you

309. ‘What is your aim in philosophy?—To shew the fly the way out

of the fly-bottle.’

my aim in philosophy is to put any and all proposals / propositions to question  –  to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty –

I think the fly in the fly bottle metaphor – represents being trapped – by dogmatism prejudice and ignorance

I say smash the bottle

310. ‘I tell someone I am in pain. His attitude to me will then be

that of belief; disbelief; suspicion; and so on.

Let us assume he says: "It's not so bad."—Doesn't that prove that

he believes in something behind the outward expression of pain?——

His attitude is a proof of his attitude. Imagine not merely the words

"I am in pain" but also the answer "It's not so bad" replaced by

instinctive noises and gestures.’

‘Let us assume he says: "It's not so bad."—Doesn't that prove that he believes in something behind the outward expression of pain?’

it might be the case that he believes in something behind the outward expression of pain

but it could also be that he makes his assessment on the basis of his observation of the speakers physical state – his facial expressions etc.

in any case ‘It’s not so bad’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

there is no ‘proof’ here – only proposal

‘Imagine not merely the words "I am in pain" but also the answer "It's not so bad" replaced by instinctive noises and gestures.’

the instinctive noises and gestures – are proposals –

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

311. ‘"What difference could be greater?"—In the case of pain I

believe that I can give myself a private exhibition of the difference.

But I can give anyone an exhibition of the difference between a broken

and an unbroken tooth.—But for the private exhibition you don't

have to give yourself actual pain; it is enough to imagine it—for

instance, you screw up your face a bit. And do you know that what you

are giving yourself this exhibition of is pain and not, for example, a

facial expression? And how do you know what you are to give

yourself an exhibition of before you do it? This private exhibition is an

illusion.’

no – it’s not – it’s a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

312. ‘But again, aren't the cases of the tooth and the pain similar?

For the visual sensation in the one corresponds to the sensation of

pain in the other. 1 can exhibit the visual sensation to myself as little

or as well as the sensation of pain.

Let us imagine the following: The surfaces of the things around us

(stones, plants, etc.) have patches and regions which produce pain

in our skin when we touch them. (Perhaps through the chemical

composition of these surfaces. But we need not know that.) In this

case we should speak of pain-patches on the leaf of a particular plant

just as at present we speak of red patches. I am supposing that it is

useful to us to notice these patches and their shapes; that we can infer

important properties of the objects from them.’

pain is a proposal –

and this proposal can take different forms –

any one of these propositional forms –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to ‘pain patches’ –

an unusual proposal – but as valid as any –

and Wittgenstein for one – has a use for it

it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

313. ‘I can exhibit pain, as I exhibit red, and as I exhibit straight

and crooked and trees and stones.—That is what we call "exhibiting".’

that is what we call proposing

314. ‘It shews a fundamental misunderstanding, if I am inclined to

study the headache I have now in order to get clear about the

philosophical problem of sensation.’

if I study ‘the headache I now have’  -

I evaluate the proposal – ‘I have a headache now’ – in relation to the problem of sensation

I think this proposal could be used as a means of focusing on the problem – as a way in to it –

Wittgenstein makes clear that he would not begin any critical discussion with such a proposal –

but that is not to say that someone wouldn’t see some value in doing so –

it is not how I would come at the problem

as to ‘getting clear’ about the philosophical problem of sensation

any claim of ‘clarity’ – is probably not going to last long – if you have genuine critical discussion – in an open minded fashion

and it could well be that the philosophical problem of sensation –

becomes a headache

315. ‘Could someone understand the word "pain", who had never

felt pain?—Is experience to teach me whether this is so or not?—

And if we say "A man could not imagine pain without having

sometime felt it"—how do we know? How can it be decided

whether it is true?’

‘Could someone understand the word "pain", who had never felt pain?’

I’ve never experienced what mystics call a ‘beatific vision’ –

but I can understand what the proposal of ‘beatific vision’ amounts to – by reading the relevant theology

and of course my understanding of this proposal – as with my understanding of any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

‘A man could not imagine pain without having sometime felt it’

is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘How can it be decided whether it is true?’

it is true – if you give your assent to it – and false if you dissent from it

and any reason you have for assent or dissent – is open to question

how do you decide the question?

firstly – you may not come to a decision – you may leave the matter open – leave it undecided

(the un-excluded middle)

but if you decide – how do you decide?

there is no objective – as in universal – decision procedure –

a procedure that applies to anyone – in any circumstance –

and any decision procedure proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

how does someone decide?

the best you can do is ask them

316. ‘In order to get clear about the meaning of the word "think"

we watch ourselves while we think; what we observe will be what the

word means! —But this concept is not used like that. (It would be as

if without knowing how to play chess, I were to try and make out

what the word "mate" meant by close observation of the last move of

some game of chess.)’

Wittgenstein asks can you get clear about the meaning of the word ‘think’ while observing yourself while you think?

it is an interesting question –

Wittgenstein doesn’t think so – and says – ‘But this concept is not used like that’ –

what if someone has a cognitive disorder – and they have learnt that one way of determining whether they are improving or not is to do a certain test – e.g. – writing a series of numbers in a particular order?

if they can complete the task successfully – they are on the improve – if they can’t complete or even do the task – there is no improvement or a deterioration

would this not be a case of watching oneself while one thinks?

and could you not generalize this – and ask – are we not watching ourselves while we think – when we perform any action?

your answer here will depend on just how you define ‘think’ – and how you define ‘watching yourself while you think’ –

the word ‘think’ and the phrase ‘watching yourself while you think’ – are proposals

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

317. ‘Misleading parallel: the expression of pain is a cry—the

expression of thought, a proposition.

As if the purpose of the proposition were to convey to one person

how it is with another: only, so to speak, in his thinking part and not

in his stomach.’

pain is a proposal that can be put – in any number of forms

a cry – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

the purpose of a proposal – of a proposition – is open to question

and yes it is fair enough to put that the purpose of the proposition is to ‘convey to one person how it is with another’

‘thinking part’ – ‘stomach’ –?

what a proposal conveys – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

whether it is from a ‘thinking part’ – or a ‘stomach’

318. ‘Suppose we think while we talk or write—I mean, as we

normally do—we shall not in general say that we think quicker than

we talk; the thought seems not to be separate from the expression.

On the other hand, however, one does speak of the speed of thought;

of how a thought goes through one's head like lightning; how problems

become clear to us in a flash, and so on. So it is natural to ask if

the same thing happens in lightning-like thought—only extremely

accelerated—as when we talk and 'think while we talk.' So that in the

first case the clockwork runs down all at once, but in the second bit

by bit, braked by the words.’

thought is proposal –

and talk – and the written word – are proposals –

where there is a relation between a thought proposal and a spoken proposal or a written proposal – that relation is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

and here we have from Wittgenstein – a relevant question regarding that relation

319. ‘I can see or understand a whole thought in a flash in exactly

the sense in which I can make a note of it in a few words or a few

pencilled dashes.

What makes this note into an epitome of this thought?’

it’s an epitome of his thought –

if it’s proposed as an epitome of his thought

320. ‘The lightning-like thought may be connected with the

spoken thought as the algebraic formula is with the sequence of

numbers which I work out from it.

When, for example, I am given an algebraic function, I am

CERTAIN that I shall be able to work out its values for the

arguments 1, 2, 3, ... up to 10. This certainty will be called

'well-founded', for I have learned to compute such functions,

and so on. In other cases no reasons will be given for it—

but it will be justified by success.’

the relation between this ‘lightning-like thought’ and the spoken thought –

is a relation between proposals – between propositions

it is a proposed relation – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the algebraic formula – is a game proposition –

a rule-governed propositional action

the numbers ‘which I work out from it’ – are tokens in the game –

the ‘working out’ is the play of the game

it is not a question of certainty

it is matter of playing the game in accordance with its rules

the game is not ‘well founded’ – the game is rule-governed 

there is no question of justification –

games are not justified – they are rule-governed

‘success’ – if you must use this term  –  is just playing the game –

in accordance with the rules

321. ‘"What happens when a man suddenly understands?"—The

question is badly framed. If it is a question about the meaning of the

expression "sudden understanding", the answer is not to point to a

process that we give this name to.—The question might mean: what

are the tokens of sudden understanding; what are its characteristic

psychical accompaniments?

(There is no ground for assuming that a man feels the facial movements

that go with his expression, for example, or the alterations in his

breathing that are characteristic of some emotion. Even if he feels

them as soon as his attention is directed towards them.) ((Posture.))’

‘What happens when a man suddenly understands?’

there can be any number of propositional responses to this question – and such any propositional – is open to question

‘(There is no ground for assuming that a man feels the facial movements

that go with his expression, …’

this proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

322. ‘The question what the expression means is not answered by

such a description; and this misleads us into concluding that

understanding is a specific indefinable experience. But we

forget that what should interest us is the question: how do we

compare these experiences; what criterion of identity do we

fix for their occurrence?’

‘The question what the expression means is not answered by such a description;’

well it is answered – the point is that any description is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and uncertain as it is – if the description has a use in some propositional context – it most likely will be put to use –

if it doesn’t have a use – it will be dropped

‘and this misleads us into concluding that understanding is a specific indefinable experience.’

understanding as an indefinable experience?

again – there is nothing against taking the view of ‘understanding as an indefinable experience’ – it is rather a question of where it might have function – where it might be useful –

and in any case – as with any proposal – it is open to question

‘But we forget that what should interest us is the question: how do we compare these experiences; what criterion of identity do we fix for their occurrence?’

if you are about comparing these experiences – presumably you will propose criteria of identity for their occurrence

as to ‘fixing’ –

there is no logical fix – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any ‘fix’ – can only be pragmatic –

and it is will be a pragmatism operating in uncertainty

323. ‘"Now I know how to go on!" is an exclamation; it corresponds

to an instinctive sound, a glad start. Of course it does not

follow from my feeling that I shall not find I am stuck when I do

try to go on.—Here there are cases in which I should say: "When I

said I knew how to go on, I did know." One will say that if, for

example, an unforeseen interruption occurs. But what is unforeseen

must not simply be that I get stuck.

We could also imagine a case in which light was always seeming

to dawn on someone—he exclaims "Now I have it!" and then can

never justify himself in practice.—It might seem to him as if in the

twinkling of an eye he forgot again the meaning of the picture that

occurred to him.’

‘Now I know how to go on!” – is a proposal – an exclamatory proposal –

and a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

in so far as this proposal is presented as a claim of certainty – it is not logical –

rather its value is rhetorical

‘Of course it does not follow from my feeling that I shall not find I am stuck when I do try to go on’

yes – the exclamatory proposal – is no determination of what will happen –

‘But what is unforeseen must not simply be that I get stuck.’

what is unforeseen – is unforeseen

‘It might seem to him as if in the twinkling of an eye he forgot again the meaning of the picture that occurred to him.’

it is not that one forgets one’s proposal – it is rather that one comes to realise the uncertainty of one’s proposal

324. ‘Would it be correct to say that it is a matter of induction,

and that I am as certain that I shall be able to continue the series, as I

am that this book will drop on the ground when I let it go; and that

I should be no less astonished if I suddenly and for no obvious

reason got stuck in working out the series, than I should be if the book

remained hanging in the air instead of falling?—To that I will reply

that we don't need any grounds for this certainty either. What could

justify the certainty better than success?’

so called ‘success’ is an outcome – it is not a ground

it is not a ground for belief –

this is a classic case of putting the cart before the horse

as for induction – it is a proposal – a speculative one – when all is said and done –

and a proposal – clearly – open to question – to doubt – and uncertain

justifying certainty –

a nice trick here by Wittgenstein – to go with outcome – and drop the issue of the ground for certainty

I guess he was hoping that one would just fly by

what it shows is that he just doesn’t have an argument for certainty – and he knows it

and what this means is that his certainty proposal – is nothing more than pretence

what we have here is not philosophical investigation – what we have is nothing more than philosophical propaganda

philosophers are not adverse to pushing a view – not because it stakes up – but because they want it to stack up –

there are con artists and charlatans wherever you look

325. ‘"The certainty that I shall be able to go on after I have had

this experience—seen the formula, for instance,—is simply based on

induction." What does this mean?—"The certainty that the fire will

burn me is based on induction." Does that mean that I argue to

myself: "Fire has always burned me, so it will happen now too?"

Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its ground?

Whether the earlier experience is the cause of the certainty depends

on the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are

considering the phenomenon of certainty.

Is our confidence justified?—What people accept as a justification—

is shewn by how they think and live.’

having decided to ditch the idea of a ‘ground’ to certainty –

Wittgenstein is now shopping around for a replacement – presumably he has realised that his ‘outcome’ idea of 324 – is a con that won’t fly

I find it extraordinary that he is spruiking induction as a ground of certainty

really this is bottom of the barrel

ok so we don’t have a ground for certainty – let’s go with ‘cause’

any uncritical proposal can be a cause of certainty

if you don’t question – if you don’t doubt – if you just rest in ignorance –

then you will be certain

as to his ‘fire burns argument’ – well hate to say it – but that one is up for question too

if you move your fingers repeatedly through a flame – it  will not burn you –

it’ an old magic trick

hypotheses and natural laws are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the phenomenon of certainty – is the phenomenon of ignorance

how people live – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

justification is pretence –

and no one leaves home without it

326. ‘We expect this, and are surprised at that. But the chain of

reasons has an end.’

the claim of reasons does have an end – if you stop reasoning –

if you stop putting your proposals – and the proposal put to you – to question and to doubt –

and if you stop exploring propositional uncertainty

can you go through life expecting this and being surprised at that – and regard reasoning as a dead end?

this is some kind of version of irrationalism –

and yes – we are all irrational at times –

but can anyone really stop putting this life to question?

to suggest that you can – and that such is a viable approach to life –

is not worthy of anyone with a brain

327. ‘"Can one think without speaking?"—And what is thinking?—

Well, don't you ever think? Can't you observe yourself and see what

is going on? It should be quite simple. You do not have to wait for it

as for an astronomical event and then perhaps make your observation

in a hurry.’

‘Can one think without speaking?"—

one can and does think without speaking

‘And what is thinking?’

whatever it is proposed that it is –

and whatever it is proposed that it is –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘Can't you observe yourself and see what is going on?’

do we observe what is going on in ourselves?

this depends on just how you understand ‘observe’

generally the term is used to refer to what our senses deliver of the external world –

but can we not regard reflection – as a form of observation?

in any case the logical point is that –

you can question what is going on – you can doubt what is going on – you can explore the uncertainty of what is going on

328. ‘Well, what does one include in 'thinking'? What has one

learnt to use this word for?—If I say I have thought—need I always

be right?—What kind of mistake is there room for here? Are there

circumstances in which one would ask: "Was what I was doing then

really thinking; am I not making a mistake?" Suppose someone takes

a measurement in the middle of a train of thought: has he interrupted

the thought if he says nothing to himself during the measuring?’

‘Well, what does one include in 'thinking'?’

what counts as thinking – what is included in thinking – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

you will use the term where you think it is appropriate

‘Suppose someone takes a measurement in the middle of a train of thought: has he interrupted the thought if he says nothing to himself during the measuring?’

the issue is whether thinking and measuring are different propositional actions

if they are so regarded – the measuring will be an interruption to the thinking – whether anything is said or not

if they are not regarded as different propositional actions – if the measuring is seen as a form of the thinking –

then not saying anything will have no bearing on  the matter

and if something is said but the measuring is going on – it will not be an interruption

329. ‘When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through

my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is

itself the vehicle of thought.’

‘when I think in language’ –

just what this amounts to – is open to question –

‘meanings going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions’

and ‘language is itself the vehicle of thought’

these proposals may have function is some propositional context –

and these proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

330. ‘Is thinking a kind of speaking? One would like to say it is

what distinguishes speech with thought from talking without thinking.

—And so it seems to be an accompaniment of speech. A process,

which may accompany something else, or can go on by itself.

Say: "Yes, this pen is blunt. Oh well, it'll do." First, thinking it;

then without thought; then just think the thought without the words.

—Well, while doing some writing I might test the point of my pen,

make a face—and then go on with a gesture of resignation.—I might

also act in such a way while taking various measurements that an

on-looker would say I had—without words—thought: If two magnitudes

are equal to a third, they are equal to one another.—But what constitutes

thought here is not some process which has to accompany the words if

they are not to be spoken without thought.’

thought is a propositional action – speech a propositional action

is there speaking without thought?

Wittgenstein thinks so – and he thinks that thought ‘may accompany something else, or it can go on by itself’

however could it not be argued that there is always some thought accompanying speech?

your view on this matter will depend on how you understand thought – how you understand language – and how you construct the relation between thinking and language

and any such propositional construction – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

is thought a process?

clearly thought can be described as a ‘process’ – but is this always the most appropriate or most useful way of describing thought?

in the example Wittgenstein gives – from which he takes it that thought ‘is not some process’ – we are left with the question – well – if you don’t want to go with ‘process’ – how is thought to be described here?

we don’t have an answer from Wittgenstein here –

really the question is left open – and this is as it should be –

the nature of thought and its relation to language – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

331. ‘Imagine people who could only think aloud. (As there are people who can only read aloud.)’

people who could only think aloud?

would we say they think at all?

that they speak but don’t think?

or do we say that there are two kinds of thinking – one that is done privately without speech –

and one for which there is no private dimension – only a public dimension?

and it goes a little deeper too –

are these people – best described as ‘people’ – as we generally know the term – or are they more in the line of robots – machines?

really the question here is –  do you want to say that thought is public expression?

if you go down this path you deny that thought is something that goes on inside people

it is really a question in the end of how you construct your world view

radical behaviourism – has a place – has function

as do versions of the ‘ghost in the machine’ theory

any philosophical proposal – or propositional construction – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

I suspect people operate with whatever proposal – or propositional construct –

suits their purpose –

and indeed – that they use one theory one moment – another the next

we operate in uncertainty – and we know it –

what we get from philosophers is different propositional constructs –

different ways of seeing and understanding ourselves and our world

these different propositional constructs are possible because – the reality we face  – in the absence of proposal – is unknown

we propose to make known –

and our proposals – fascinating and useful as they are – are from a logical point of view – uncertain

it is this uncertainty that we live with and operate with –

it is the source of our creativity and our destructiveness

the source of our joy and of our sorrow –

it is the reality we face

332. ‘While we sometimes call it "thinking" to accompany a

sentence by a mental process, that accompaniment is not what we

mean by a "thought".——Say a sentence and think it; say it with

understanding.—And now do not say it, and just do what you accompanied

it with when you said it with understanding!—(Sing this tune with

expression. And now don't sing it, but repeat its expression!—And

here one actually might repeat something. For example, motions of

the body, slower and faster breathing, and so on.)’

‘While we sometimes call it "thinking" to accompany a sentence by a mental process, that accompaniment is not what we mean by a "thought".——

so – what do we mean by ‘thought’?

any suggestions?

‘Say a sentence and think it; say it with understanding.—And now do not say it, and just do what you accompanied it with when you said it with understanding!’

to say a sentence with understanding – is to recognise that the sentence is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

you can critically evaluate a proposal – without saying it –

and whatever accompanies that critical evaluation –

is logically irrelevant

333. "Only someone who is convinced can say that."—How does

the conviction help him when he says it?—Is it somewhere at hand by

the side of the spoken expression? (Or is it masked by it, as a soft

sound by a loud one, so that it can, as it were, no longer be heard

when one expresses it out loud?) What if someone were to say "In

order to be able to sing a tune from memory one has to hear it in

one's mind and sing from that"?’

"Only someone who is convinced can say that."—How does the conviction help him when he says it?

if you are ‘convinced’ of what you say – of what you propose –

then presumably – you don’t regard your proposition as open to question – open to doubt or uncertain

your being ‘convinced’ – is illogical –

from a logical point of view it doesn’t help at all –

it is an irrational presentation and use of the proposal

‘Is it somewhere at hand by the side of the spoken expression? (Or is it masked by it, as a soft sound by a loud one, so that it can, as it were, no longer be heard

when one expresses it out loud?)’

‘being convinced’ is about presentation – presentation to oneself – and presentation to others –

‘conviction’ is a rhetorical notion

to be convinced or to convince – is to play the persuasion game

‘What if someone were to say "In order to be able to sing a tune from memory one has to hear it in one's mind and sing from that"?

the proposal – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain’

334. ‘"So you really wanted to say . . . ."—We use this phrase

in order to lead someone from one form of expression to another.

One is tempted to use the following picture: what he really 'wanted to

say', what he 'meant' was already present somewhere in his mind even

before we gave it expression. Various kinds of thing may persuade

us to give up one expression and to adopt another in its place. To

understand this, it is useful to consider the relation in which the

solutions of mathematical problems stand to the context and ground of

their formulation. The concept 'trisection of the angle with ruler

and compass', when people are trying to do it, and, on the other hand,

when it has been proved that there is no such thing.’

‘what he 'meant' was already present somewhere in his mind even  before we gave it expression’

he may have composed his proposal – before giving it a public expression

‘Various kinds of thing may persuade us to give up one expression and to adopt another in its place.’

if one deals with proposals – with propositions logically – they will be put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored –

and this process may well involve considering other proposals –

as a result of this critical process one proposal – may be replaced by another

‘To understand this, it is useful to consider the relation in which the solutions of mathematical problems stand to the context and ground of their formulation. The concept 'trisection of the angle with ruler and compass', when people are trying to do it, and, on the other hand, when it has been proved that there is no such thing.’

.mathematics is a rule-governed propositional action

mathematical problems are game problems –

the question facing the mathematician here is which game – which set of rules will solve a game problem?

where there is no solution mathematicians will consider creating a new game to solve the problem – or they will reformulate or abandon the problem

the history of the problem of the trisection of the angle with ruler and compass is a good example of this methodology

it is possible to trisect an arbitrary angle using tools other than straightedge and compass – i.e. a neusis construction which involves the simultaneous sliding  and rotation of a straightedge –

this was a method used by ancient Greeks

other methods have been developed over time by mathematicians

the ‘proof of impossibility’ comes down to an algebraic argument –

if you accept the premises – the mathematics of this argument – then the conclusion follows –

i.e. it can be shown that a 60° cannot be trisected

the question this raises is just whether the mathematics employed here fits the task –

and indeed – whether there is a ‘real’ problem here at all –

or is it just that we have a language-game – a clever algebraic game – played in the wrong context?

335. ‘What happens when we make an effort—say in writing a

letter—to find the right expression for our thoughts?—This phrase

compares the process to one of translating or describing: the thoughts

are already there (perhaps were there in advance) and we merely

look for their expression. This picture is more or less appropriate in

different cases.—But can't all sorts of things happen here?—I surrender

to a mood and the expression comes. Or a picture occurs to me and I

try to describe it. Or an English expression occurs to me and I try

to hit on the corresponding German one. Or I make a gesture, and

ask myself: What words correspond to this gesture? And so on.

Now if it were asked: "Do you have the thought before finding

the expression?" what would one have to reply? And what, to the

question: "What did the thought consist in, as it existed before its

expression?"’

‘What happens when we make an effort—say in writing a letter—to find the right expression for our thoughts?’

any number of things can happen – and Wittgenstein mentions some of these –

the issue is – are you going to approach this matter logically or not?

the logical approach is the critical approach

the approach of question – of doubt – of exploring uncertainty

‘Now if it were asked: "Do you have the thought before finding the expression?"

the ‘thought’ here is the proposal

and the question is do we have the proposal before making it public?

I would say sometimes we do – and sometimes we don’t

sometimes we critically evaluate what we are about to express

at other times – we express the proposal – and then critically evaluate it

really – it is not relevant when a proposal is put to question –

the logical point is that it is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

336. ‘This case is similar to the one in which someone imagines

that one could not think a sentence with the remarkable word order

of German or Latin just as it stands. One first has to think it, and then

one arranges the words in that queer order. (A French politician once

wrote that it was a peculiarity of the French language that in it

words occur in the order in which one thinks them.)’

how one constructs a proposition – is neither here nor there –

the issue is the proposition as put

337.  ‘But didn't I already intend the whole construction of the

sentence (for example) at its beginning? So surely it already existed in

my mind before I said it out loud!—If it was in my mind, still it would

not normally be there in some different word order. But here we are

constructing a misleading picture of 'intending', that is, of the use of

this word. An intention is embedded in its situation, in human

customs and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did

not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess. In so far as I do

intend the construction of a sentence in advance, that is made possible

by the fact that I can speak the language in question.’

‘But didn't I already intend the whole construction of the sentence (for example) at its beginning? So surely it already existed in my mind before I said it out loud.’

an intention to propose – is not the proposal put –

i.e. you may have the intention to put a proposal – but not do so –

the intention is still there – but the proposal is not

you actually don’t know the proposal – until it is put – either privately – or publicly

and in any case – the proposal – and its construction – is nevertheless – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

338. ‘After all, one can only say something if one has learned to

talk. Therefore in order to want to say something one must also have

mastered a language; and yet it is clear that one can want to speak

without speaking. Just as one can want to dance without dancing.

And when we think about this, we grasp at the image of dancing,

speaking, etc.’

‘After all, one can only say something if one has learned to talk’

yes – but does one learn to propose?

isn’t proposing – in whatever form – basic to human beings?

I might use language – verbal – written – signed –

I might use drawings –

I might use inarticulate sounds –

in all these cases – proposals

339. ‘Thinking is not an incorporeal process which lends life and

sense to speaking, and which it would be possible to detach from

speaking, rather as the Devil took the shadow of Schlemiehl from the

ground.——But how "not an incorporeal process"? Am I acquainted

with incorporeal processes, then, only thinking is not one of them?

No; I called the expression "an incorporeal process" to my aid in my

embarrassment when I was trying to explain the meaning of the word

"thinking" in a primitive way.

One might say "Thinking is an incorporeal process", however, if

one were using this to distinguish the grammar of the word "think"

from that of, say, the word "eat". Only that makes the difference

between the meanings look too slight. (It is like saying: numerals are

actual, and numbers non-actual, objects.) An unsuitable type of

expression is a sure means of remaining in a state of confusion. It as

it were bars the way out.’

the nature of ‘thinking’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

not everyone is ‘embarrassed’ to propose that thinking is an incorporeal process –

the point here is that if ‘thinking’ as an ‘incorporeal process’ – has function – for someone – in some propositional context – then that definition of thinking will be used –

and that definition of thinking – as with any other – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘One might say "Thinking is an incorporeal process", however, if one were using this to distinguish the grammar of the word "think" from that of, say, the word "eat".’

the problem with Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘grammar’ – is that it has no critical dimension

for Wittgenstein – grammar effectively comes down to just how language is used –

without any question – without any doubt – and without the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

what Wittgenstein’s ‘grammar misses’ is the uncertainty that is essential to propositional use – that is its logic

and as a result he completely misses the creative dimension of language use

Wittgenstein’s ‘grammar’ is the grammar of a dead language

340. ‘One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look

at its use and learn from that.

But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way

of doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice.’

yes – look at its use and see how it functions –

and seeing how a word functions and looking at its use – will involve – question – doubt – and dealing with propositional uncertainty –

‘But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice.’

well does anyone just look at a word to see how it functions – that is without any notion of its use –

without any question – doubt – or uncertainty?

I don’t think so

no –‘this prejudice is not stupid’-

it just doesn’t exist – it’s not there

341. ‘Speech with and without thought is to be compared with the

playing of a piece of music with and without thought.’

it’s an interesting proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

342. ‘William James, in order to shew that thought is possible

without speech, quotes the recollection of a deaf-mute, Mr. Ballard,

who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he

had had thoughts about God and the world.—What can he have

meant?—Ballard writes: "It was during those delightful rides, some

two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of written

language, that I began to ask myself the question: how came the

world into being?"—Are you sure—one would like to ask—that this

is the correct translation of your wordless thought into words? And

why does this question—which otherwise seems not to exist—raise

its head here? Do I want to say that the writer's memory deceives

him?—I don't even know if I should say that. These recollections area

queer memory phenomenon,—and I do not know what conclusions

one can draw from them about the past of the man who recounts them.’

thought without speech?

Wittgenstein is right to call the William James / Mr Ballard’s account – to question – to doubt – and to focus on its uncertainty

however the opposing view that there can be no thought without language – is likewise open to question

perhaps there is thought without language –

if so – that thought could not be expressed in language – by those without language –

however there might be i.e.  a scientific / neurological account of thought without language –

any such an account would come with a number of philosophical issues

nevertheless such a theory might have use – and use in any number of propositional contexts

in any case – the logic of the matter is this –

any proposal put –  is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘The words with which I express my memory are my memory-reaction.’

the words with which I express my memory are my memory proposal

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

344. ‘Would it be imaginable that people should never speak an

audible language, but should still say things to themselves in the

imagination?

"If people always said things only to themselves, then they would

merely be doing always what as it is they do sometimes."—So it is quite

easy to imagine this: one need only make the easy transition from some

to all. (Like: "An infinitely long row of trees is simply one that does

not come to an end.") Our criterion for someone's saying something

to himself is what he tells us and the rest of his behaviour; and we only

say that someone speaks to himself if, in the ordinary sense of the

words, he can speak. And we do not say it of a parrot; nor of a

gramophone.’

‘Would it be imaginable that people should never speak an audible language, but should still say things to themselves in the imagination?’

yes – it is imaginable –

inaudible proposals are – as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Our criterion for someone's saying something to himself is what he tells us and the rest of his behaviour; and we only say that someone speaks to himself if, in the ordinary sense of the words, he can speak. And we do not say it of a parrot; nor of a

gramophone.’

if someone only spoke to himself – others would not know this –

unless that person communicated this fact by some other means – i.e. by writing that

he only speaks to himself

and we do not say of a parrot or of a gramophone – that these speak to themselves

reason: they are not human beings

though in a cartoon – or a piece of imaginative fiction  – this could well be said

345. ‘"What sometimes happens might always happen."—What

kind of proposition is that? It is like the following: If "F(a)" makes

sense "(x).F(x)" makes sense.

"If it is possible for someone to make a false move in some game,

then it might be possible for everybody to make nothing but false

moves in every game."—Thus we are under a temptation to

misunderstand the logic of our expressions here, to give an incorrect

account of the use of our words.

Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no

orders were ever obeyed? The concept 'order' would have lost its

purpose.’

‘"What sometimes happens might always happen."—What kind of proposition is that?’

it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘It is like the following: If "F(a)" makes sense "(x).F(x)" makes sense.’

‘(x).F(x)’ – is a generalization of F(a)" – both proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘If it is possible for someone to make a false move in some game, then it might be possible for everybody to make nothing but false moves in every game.’

another generalization – open to question

‘Thus we are under a temptation to misunderstand the logic of our expressions here, to give an incorrect account of the use of our words.’

there is no incorrect account of the use of our words – there are only different uses – and different accounts

any use – and any account – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no orders were ever obeyed? The concept 'order' would have lost its purpose.’

I don’t know that it would have lost its purpose – but where no orders are obeyed –

an order would be useless

346. ‘But couldn't we imagine God's suddenly giving a parrot

understanding, and its now saying things to itself?—But here it is an

important fact that I imagined a deity in order to imagine this.’

the proposal that a deity gives a parrot understanding – as with any proposal – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

347. ‘"But at least I know from my own case what it means 'to

say things to oneself'. And if I were deprived of the organs of speech,

I could still talk to myself.

"If I know it only from my own case, then I know only what I call

that, not what anyone else does.’

what I know – is what I propose – to myself – or to others

and what I propose to myself – or to others – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

348. ‘"These deaf-mutes have learned only a gesture-language, but

each of them talks to himself inwardly in a vocal language." Now,

don't you understand that?—But how do I know whether I understand

it?!—What can I do with this information (if it is such)? The

whole idea of understanding smells fishy here. I do not know whether

I am to say I understand it or don't understand it. I might answer

"It's an English sentence; apparently quite in order—that is, until one

wants to do something with it; it has a connexion with other sentences

which makes it difficult for us to say that nobody really knows what

it tells us; but everyone who has not become calloused by doing

philosophy notices that there is something wrong here."’

there is nothing wrong here

any proposal – in any form – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

our understanding – is uncertain

349. ‘"But this supposition surely makes good sense!"—Yes; in

ordinary circumstances these words and this picture have an application

with which we are familiar.—But if we suppose a case in which this

application falls away we become as it were conscious for the first

time of the nakedness of the words and the picture.’

an application – if it has a use – or its use ‘falls away’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

the ‘nakedness of our words and pictures’ – is a description of the essential logical characteristic of the proposal –

the essential logical characteristic of the proposal – is that it is open

we become aware – if we are not already – of the openness of our proposals – when our proposals are put to question – put to doubt – and when we explore their uncertainty

this exploration of propositional uncertainty – is what we do – it is how we live

350. ‘"But if I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply

supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had."—That

gets us no further. It is as if I were to say: "You surely know what

'It is 5 o'clock here' means; so you also know what 'It's 5 o'clock on

the sun' means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as

it is here when it is 5 o'clock."—The explanation by means of identity

does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 o'clock

here and 5 o'clock there "the same time", but what I do not know is

in what cases one is to speak of its being the same time here and there.

In exactly the same way it is no explanation to say: the supposition

that he has a pain is simply the supposition that he has the same as I.

For that part of the grammar is quite clear to me: that is, that one will

say that the stove has the same experience as I, if one says: it is in pain

and I am in pain.’

‘But if I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had.’

only if your supposition is without thought – is uncritical –

yes – you suppose he is in pain – but how would you know it is the same pain that you have experienced?

and in any case – isn’t it more likely that it is different?

he’s different to you – and the circumstance of his pain is different

also – perhaps it is more intense – perhaps it is not as localized as the pain you remember –  etc. – etc. –

‘The explanation by means of identity does not work here.’ –

because the explanation of identity – is dumb –

any critical evaluation shows it to be full of holes

this is not about generalizing ‘the grammar’ to apply to stoves –

that is plainly ridiculous and stupid –

what we have is proposals – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and any so called ‘grammar’ – is in the same boat

351. ‘Yet we go on wanting to say: "Pain is pain—whether he

has it, or I have it; and however I come to know whether he has a

pain or not."—-I might agree.—And when you ask me "Don't you

know, then, what I mean when I say that the stove is in pain?"—I

can reply: These words may lead me to have all sorts of images; but

their usefulness goes no further. And I can also imagine something

in connexion with the words: "It was just 5 o'clock in the afternoon

on the sun"—such as a grandfather clock which points to 5.—But a

still better example would be that of the application of "above" and

"below" to the earth. Here we all have a quite clear idea of what

"above" and "below" mean. I see well enough that I am on top;

the earth is surely beneath me! (And don't smile at this example.

We are indeed all taught at school that it is stupid to talk like that.

But it is much easier to bury a problem than to solve it.) And it is

only reflection that shews us that in this case "above" and "below"

cannot be used in the ordinary way. (That we might, for instance, say

that the people at the antipodes are 'below' our part of the earth, but

it must also be recognized as right for them to use the same expression

about us.)’

‘Yet we go on wanting to say: "Pain is pain—whether he has it, or I have it; and however I come to know whether he has a pain or not."

yes – but just what pain is – and how it affects those who experience it – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

‘the stove is in pain’ – really would  only functions in a context of imaginative fiction

or an as an illustration of faulty logic

"It was just 5 o'clock in the afternoon on the sun"—such as a grandfather clock which points to 5’

this proposal might work if Lewis Carroll was to put it in one of his works –

or it might be used as an introduction to the philosophy of time

‘above’ and ‘below’ – once you get beyond everyday usage – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

352. ‘Here it happens that our thinking plays us a queer trick.

We want, that is, to quote the law of excluded middle and to say:

"Either such an image is in his mind, or it is not; there is no third

possibility!"—We encounter this queer argument also in other regions

of philosophy. "In the decimal expansion of p¢either the group "7777"

occurs, or it does not—there is no third possibility." That is to say:"

God sees—but we don't know." But what does that mean?—We

use a picture; the picture of a visible series which one person sees the

whole of and another not. The law of excluded middle says here:

It must either look like this, or like that. So it really—and this is a

truism—says nothing at all, but gives us a picture. And the problem

ought now to be: does reality accord with the picture or not? And this

picture seems to determine what we have to do, what to look for, and

how—but it does not do so, just because we do not know how it is to

be applied. Here saying "There is no third possibility" or "But there

can't be a third possibility!"—expresses our inability to turn our eyes

away from this picture: a picture which looks as if it must already

contain both the problem and its solution, while all the time we feel

that it is not so.

Similarly when it is said "Either he has this experience, or not"—

what primarily occurs to us is a picture which by itself seems to make

the sense of the expressions unmistakable: "Now you know what is in

question"—we should like to say. And that is precisely what it does

not tell him.’

the law of the excluded middle is dead

it is dead once you understand that any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

this so called ‘law of the excluded middle’ – is nothing more than an attempt to hijack logic – actually to deny it – to deny the logical reality of the proposal – of the proposition – and to negate – and outlaw – critical thinking –

the best you could say for it is that it is a parlour game

353. ‘Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only

a particular way of asking "How d' you mean?" The answer is a

contribution to the grammar of the proposition.’

you can ask ‘how d’ya mean?’ – with no thought of verification –

‘how d’ya mean?’ – is to ask how someone understands the use of the proposition

if by ‘grammar’ – you mean how a proposition is used – then yes –

an answer to the question – ‘how d’ya mean?’ – you could say – is a contribution to the proposition’s grammar

however any answer here is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

any account of a proposition’s grammar / usage – is open to question

the real issue is not usage – or ‘grammar’ – if that’s how you see it

the logical concern is the critical evaluation of usage

as to verification –

a proposition is true if assented to – false if dissented from

verification – is whatever account you give for your assent

falsification – whatever account is given for dissent from the proposition

and any account of verification – or falsification – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

is your account of verification a particular way of asking ‘how d’ya mean?’? –

that is to say – is your account of verification a particular way of asking – how do you use this proposition?

I don’t think so

I think an account of verification is an account of why you have decided to proceed with the proposition –

not what use you put the proposition to

354. ‘The fluctuation in grammar between criteria and symptoms

makes it look as if there were nothing at all but symptoms. We say,

for example: "Experience teaches that there is rain when the barometer

falls, but it also teaches that there is rain when we have certain

sensations of wet and cold, or such-and-such visual impressions." In

defence of this one says that these sense-impressions can deceive us.

But here one fails to reflect that the fact that the false appearance is

precisely one of rain is founded on a definition.’

this so called ‘fluctuations between criteria and symptoms’ –

really just points to the fact that any approach to the proposition – any assessment of the proposition – occurs in the context of logical uncertainty

further – any definition – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

355. ‘The point here is not that our sense-impressions can lie,

but that we understand their language. (And this language like any

other is founded on convention.)’

the point here is that our sense impressions are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘and this language like any other’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

356. ‘One is inclined to say: "Either it is raining, or it isn't—how I

know, how the information has reached me, is another matter."

But then let us put the question like this: What do I call "information

that it is raining"? (Or have I only information of this information

too?) And what gives this 'information' the character of information

about something? Doesn't the form of our expression mislead us here?

For isn't it a misleading metaphor to say: "My eyes give me the

information that there is a chair over there"?’

‘What do I call "information that it is raining"? (Or have I only information of this information too?) And what gives this 'information' the character of information about something?’

what informs the proposal ‘it is raining’? –

is really to ask for an explanation of the proposal

and if you put forward an explanation of the explanation –

you put forward a proposal –

what we deal with is proposals – proposals open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘For isn't it a misleading metaphor to say: "My eyes give me the information that there is a chair over there"?’

no – it is not misleading at all –

all you have here is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

uncertain yes – but not misleading

357. ‘We do not say that possibly a dog talks to itself. Is that

because we are so minutely acquainted with its soul? Well, one might

say this: If one sees the behaviour of a living thing, one sees its soul.—

But do I also say in my own case that I am saying something to myself,

because I am behaving in such-and-such a way?—I do not say it

from observation of my behaviour. But it only makes sense because I do

behave in this way.—Then it is not because I mean it that it makes sense?’

if I say to myself – ‘I am saying something to myself’ – then I am putting a proposal –

a proposal I do not make public –

whether it makes sense or not has nothing to do with the fact that I am saying it to myself

as with any proposal – put privately – or made public – whether it makes sense or not – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

358. ‘But isn't it our meaning it that gives sense to the sentence?

(And here, of course, belongs the fact that one cannot mean a senseless

series of words.) And 'meaning it' is something in the sphere of the

mind. But it is also something private! It is the intangible something;

only comparable to consciousness itself.

How could this seem ludicrous? It is, as it were, a dream of our

language.’

‘But isn't it our meaning it that gives sense to the sentence?

‘meaning it’ – amounts to being uncritical regarding the sentence –

and often what ‘meaning it’ amounts to is some rhetorical show –

 the sense of a sentence is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a rational view of sense – is a critical view of sense

‘(And here, of course, belongs the fact that one cannot mean a senseless series of words.)’

you can be uncritical regarding any series of words

you can thump the table in a rhetorical gesture – and so show that you mean this series of words

again – whether they are senseless or not – is open to question

‘And 'meaning it' is something in the sphere of the mind. But it is also something private!’

you can be uncritical regarding a proposal that you don’t make public

but if made public – ‘meaning it’ – is usually accompanied by some behaviour designed to persuade others to accept your proposal

‘It is the intangible something; only comparable to consciousness itself.’

it is not an intangible something – it is the failure to critically evaluate what you propose

‘How could this seem ludicrous? It is, as it were, a dream of our language.’

it is not ludicrous – it is uncritical

‘a dream of our language’? – or – rhetorical rubbish

359. ‘Could a machine think?——Could it be in pain?—Well, is

the human body to be called such a machine? It surely comes as close

as possible to being such a machine.’

could a machine think?

the issue here is how you understand – how you define ‘machine’ and ‘think’

and the same applies to ‘pain’

and the proposal – ‘that human body comes as close as possible to being a machine’?

‘close as possible’ – doesn’t really take the issue anywhere?

what we have here is a series of proposals – all of which are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

360. ‘But a machine surely cannot think!—Is that an empirical

statement? No. We only say of a human being and what is like one

that it thinks. We also say it of dolls and no doubt of spirits too.

Look at the word "to think" as a tool.’

‘But a machine surely cannot think!—Is that an empirical statement? No.’

whether it is an empirical question or not – it is open to question

‘We only say of a human being and what is like one that it thinks. We also say it of dolls and no doubt of spirits too.’

wouldn’t you say determining customary language practise – is an empirical issue?

but the question – whether a machine can think – is not a question of customary language practise – it is a critical issue –

an issue open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

you can look at the word ‘to think’ – in many way – and yes – one of which is – as a ‘tool’ –

the point is any proposal as to how we understand ‘to think’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

361. ‘The chair is thinking to itself: .....

WHERE? In one of its parts? Or outside its body; in the air

around it? Or not anywhere at all? But then what is the difference

between this chair's saying something to itself and another one's

doing so, next to it?—But then how is it with man: where does he say

things to himself? How does it come about that this question seems

senseless; and that no specification of a place is necessary except just

that this man is saying something to himself? Whereas the question

where the chair talks to itself seems to demand an answer.—The reason

is: we want to know how the chair is supposed to be like a human

being; whether, for instance, the head is at the top of the back and so on.

What is it like to say something to oneself; what happens here?—

How am I to explain it? Well, only as you might teach someone the

meaning of the expression "to say something to oneself". And certainly

we learn the meaning of that as children.—Only no one is going to

say that the person who teaches it to us tells us 'what takes place'.’

                                                                                                                                        ‘Only no one is going to say that the person who teaches it to us tells us 'what takes place'.’

well the question – ‘what takes place’? – is fair enough – and perhaps a bright child might ask this question

likely the answer – would be – ‘I don’t know’ –

however there are other answers – philosophical and scientific

and any such answer – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in a final sense we come back to ‘I don’t know’ –

intellectual vanity will rail against this –

but the hard reality is – we don’t know

yes – we put proposals to defy this reality – and it is necessary for our survival to do just this –

our knowledge is what we propose – against the unknown

and our knowledge  – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the unknown is silent  

362. ‘Rather it seems to us as though in this case the instructor

imparted the meaning to the pupil—without telling him it directly;

but in the end the pupil is brought to the point of giving himself the

correct ostensive definition. And this is where our illusion is.’

the definition – ostensive – or not – is not an illusion – it is a proposal –

logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

363. ‘"But when 1 imagine something, something certainly happens!”

Well, something happens—and then I make a noise. What for? Presumably

in order to tell what happens.—But how is telling done? When

are we said to tell anything?—What is the language-game of telling?

I should like to say: you regard it much too much as a matter of

course that one can tell anything to anyone. That is to say: we are

so much accustomed to communication through language, in

conversation, that it looks to us as if the whole point of communication

lay in this: someone else grasps the sense of my words—which is

something mental: he as it were takes it into his own mind. If he

then does something further with it as well, that is no part of the

immediate purpose of language.

One would like to say "Telling brings it about that he knows that

I am in pain; it produces this mental phenomenon; everything else is

inessential to the telling." As for what this queer phenomenon of

knowledge is—there is time enough for that. Mental processes just

are queer. (It is as if one said: "The clock tells us the time. What

time is, is not yet settled. And as for what one tells the time for—that

doesn't come in here.")’

‘What is the language-game of telling?’

it is no game – no language-game – it is proposing

‘someone else grasps the sense of my words—which is something mental: he as it were takes it into his own mind. If he then does something further with it as well, that is no part of the immediate purpose of language.’

what happens is we assume – a grasp of our words – if a grasp is indicated –

but the logical reality is – we can’t really know

whether another understands what you say is always – open to question

generally speaking we proceed on the assumption that the other understands what we say  

this assumption is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘which is something mental’ –

this is an explanation of the ‘grasp’ – of the ‘grasping’ –

and as with any explanation – open to question

I think you can drop all this explanatory back story business – and just operate with proposal –

it is logically cleaner – and to the point

‘If he then does something further with it as well, that is no part of the immediate purpose of language.’

and really – the question of the purpose of language – is not relevant here

anything he does further with it – will be a proposal –

again what we are dealing with is proposal – proposal put – proposal received – proposal acted on

this ‘purpose of language’ – is unnecessary baggage

‘Telling brings it about that he knows that I am in pain; it produces this mental phenomenon; everything else is inessential to the telling.

telling is proposing –

I assume that when I put the proposition ‘I am in pain’ – he knows that I am in pain

I assume this – and assumption is enough here

everything else is inessential to the proposing

‘As for what this queer phenomenon of knowledge is—there is time enough for that. Mental processes just are queer.’

knowledge is not a queer phenomenon – it is proposing –

and proposing is natural to human beings

as for mental processes –

explanatory proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and – uncertain –

smoke ‘em – if you got ‘em

‘(It is as if one said: "The clock tells us the time. What time is, is not yet settled. And as for what one tells the time for—that doesn't come in here.")’

logically speaking ‘mental processes’ are a back story –

not relevant to what is going ion – just a form of packaging –

and most people are happy to have their gift wrapped

364. ‘Someone does a sum in his head. He uses the result, let's say,

for building a bridge or a machine.—Are you trying to say that he

has not really arrived at this number by calculation? That it has, say,

just 'come' to him in the manner of a kind of dream? There surely must

have been calculation going on, and there was. For he knows that,

and how, he calculated; and the correct result he got would be

inexplicable without calculation.——But what if I said: "It strikes

him as if he had calculated. And why should the correct result be

explicable? Is it not incomprehensible enough, that without saying a

word, without making a note, he was able to CALCULATE?"—

Is calculating in the imagination in some sense less real than

calculating on paper? It is real—calculation-in-the-head.—Is it like

calculation on paper?—I don't know whether to call it like. Is a bit

of white paper with black lines on it like a human body?’

calculation is a rule-governed propositional game

calculation is a game

whether this game is played privately – or publicly – is neither here nor there

‘Is calculating in the imagination in some sense less real than calculating on paper?’

no

‘Is a bit of white paper with black lines on it like a human body?’ –

cartoonists and graphic artists might say so

it’s an imaginative proposal –

open to question

365. ‘Do Adelheid and the Bishop play a real game of chess?—Of

course. They are not merely pretending—which would also be possible

as part of a play.—But, for example, the game has no beginning!—

Of course it has; otherwise it would not be a game of chess.— ’

this game of chess occurs in one of Goethe’s plays –

is it a real game? – no – but it is a reference to the real game of chess

366. ‘Is a sum in the head less real than a sum on paper?—Perhaps

one is inclined to say’ some such thing; but one can get oneself to think

the opposite as well by telling oneself: paper, ink, etc. are only logical

constructions out of our sense-data.

"I have done the multiplication ..... in my head"—do I perhaps

not believe such a statement?—But was it really a multiplication? It

was not merely 'a' multiplication, but this one—in the head. This is

the point at which I go wrong. For I now want to say: it was some

mental process corresponding to the multiplication on paper. So it

would make sense to say: "This process in the mind corresponds to

this process on paper." And it would then make sense to talk of a

method of projection according to which the image of the sign was a

representation of the sign itself.’

calculation is a game – a rule-governed propositional game

you can describe this game as a ‘mental process’ or ‘a sum on paper’ – the fact is – however described – it is still a rule-governed propositional action

where it is played – is logically irrelevant

such descriptions as ‘mental process’  and ‘a sum on paper’ are neither here nor there 

they are  propositional packaging

367. ‘The mental picture is the picture which is described when

someone describes what he imagines.’

what he imagines is what he proposes

how he describes what he proposes – i.e. ‘a mental picture’ – is not logically relevant

what is logically relevant is that the proposal – the proposition – is put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored

368. ‘I describe a room to someone, and then get him to paint an

impressionistic picture from this description to shew that he has

understood it.—Now he paints the chairs which I described as green,

dark red; where I said "yellow", he paints blue.—That is the impression

which he got of that room. And now I say: "Quite right! That's what

it's like.’

the response – "Quite right! That's what it's like.” – is open to question – it is open to doubt – and as with any proposal – uncertain

369. ‘One would like to ask: "What is it like—what happens—

when one does a sum in one's head?"—And in a particular case the

answer may be "First I add 17 and 18, then I subtract 39 .... .".

But that is not the answer to our question. What is called doing sums

in one's head is not explained by such an answer.’

the answer – "First I add 17 and 18, then I subtract 39 .... ." –  is fair enough

‘What is called doing sums in one's head is not explained by such an answer.’ –

any answer – any proposed explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

370. ‘One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when

one imagines anything, but how the word "imagination" is used.

But that does not mean that I want to talk only about words. For the

question as to the nature of the imagination is as much about the word

"imagination" as my question is. And I am only saying that this

question is not to be decided—neither for the person who does the

imagining, nor for anyone else—by pointing; nor yet by a description

of any process. The first question also asks for a word to be explained;

but it makes us expect a wrong kind of answer.’

‘One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word "imagination" is used.’

seeing how the word ‘imagination’ is used – is to explore the propositional landscape of the imagination –

it is to take a propositional tour

that is all very well – however the logical issue is not looking – the logical issue is critical evaluation

‘For the question as to the nature of the imagination is as much about the word

"imagination" as my question is.’

this question of the nature of the imagination – is a matter open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘And I am only saying that this question is not to be decided—neither for the person who does the imagining, nor for anyone else—by pointing.’

you could point to a work of the imagination – such as a painting or a sculpture – and say ‘that is imagination’ –

and yes – an unusual use of the word ‘imagination’ – and a use – as with any use – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

but would that decide the question?

logically speaking no question is ever decided

and there are no wrong answers

371. ‘Essence is expressed by grammar.’

‘Essence is expressed by grammar’ –

grammar is a proposal of propositional structure

any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

what is expressed by grammar –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘essence’ – is uncertain

372. ‘Consider: "The only correlate in language to an intrinsic

necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk

out of this intrinsic necessity into a proposition."’

‘intrinsic necessity’?

a proposal that is not open to question – not open to doubt – and is certain?

a proposal that is not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain – is not a proposal – it is a prejudice

as to an ‘arbitrary rule’ – all rules are arbitrary

a rule determines a propositional game

when you play a propositional game – you play in accordance with the rule

if you question the rule – you are not playing the game –

if you question a rule – you are engaged in a critical activity –

outside of the game mode of propositional activity –

a rule is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

373. ‘Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology

as grammar.)’

any account of what there is – of what kind of object there is – is a proposal

and any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a grammar is a proposal of propositional structure

theology is a proposal – or set of proposals regarding the nature of God – and of religious traditions

as for ‘theology as grammar’ –

I would be surprised if any theologian took this seriously –

and I imagine grammarians would think this ‘construction’ to be corrupt

be that as it may –

what we get from Wittgenstein here – is the attempt to bolster the significance of grammar with a reference to God

and this proposal of ‘grammar as theology’ – is really no different to the mysticism and essentialism of the Tractatus

374. ‘The great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if

there were something one couldn't do. As if there really were an object,

from which I derive its description, but I were unable to shew it to

anyone.———And the best that I can propose is that we should yield

to the temptation to use this picture, but then investigate how the

application of the picture goes.’

‘objects’ are proposals

a description of an object is a proposal – a proposal put in relation to the subject proposal – the object

and yes – we can use these descriptions / proposals – and critically investigate them –

which is to say – put them to question – put them to doubt – and explore their uncertainty

375. ‘How does one teach anyone to read to himself? How does

one know if he can do so? How does he himself know that he is doing

what is required of him?’

presumably you teach someone to read normally –

and then tell theme to read without speaking

how does one know if he can do it – and how does he himself know that he is doing what is required of him?

ask him to speak out what he read to himself

376. ‘When I say the ABC to myself, what is the criterion of my

doing the same as someone else who silently repeats it to himself?

It might be found that the same thing took place in my larynx and in

his. (And similarly when we both think of the same thing, wish the

same, and so on.) But then did we learn the use of the words: "to

say such-and-such to oneself" by someone's pointing to a process in

the larynx or the brain? Is it not also perfectly possible that my image

of the sound a and his correspond to different physiological processes?

The question is: How do we compare images?’

‘When I say the ABC to myself, what is the criterion of my doing the same as someone else who silently repeats it to himself?’

you could ask him what he has done –

and decide on the basis of what he says

‘But then did we learn the use of the words: "to say such-and-such to oneself" by someone's pointing to a process in the larynx or the brain?’

no –

we learnt the use of the words by someone getting us to say something – and then asking us to say it without speaking

‘Is it not also perfectly possible that my image of the sound a and his correspond to different physiological processes? The question is: How do we compare images?’

we do our best to make them public in some way –

and if we can manage this we can look to see how they are similar – and how they are different –

any comparison is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

as for whether they correspond to different physiological processes –

that would be a question for physiologists to play around with

377. ‘Perhaps a logician will think: The same is the same—-how

identity is established is a psychological question. (High is high—

it is a matter of psychology that one sometimes sees, and sometimes

hears it.)

What is the criterion for the sameness of two images?—What is

the criterion for the redness of an image? For me, when it is someone

else's image: what he says and does. For myself, when it is my image:

nothing. And what goes for "red" also goes for "same".’

‘The same is the same’ – tells us nothing –

identity is a game concept – it’s origin is mathematical – and it is a concept of formal logic

mathematics and formal logic – are propositional games

what identity amounts to is a substitution rule

outside of the propositional game context – any claim of identity – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘What is the criterion for the sameness of two images?’

how do we decide if two images are the same?

the only way is to have them made public in some fashion – and then a comparison

can be made –

and any claim of sameness or difference – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘For me, when it is someone else's image: what he says and does. For myself, when it is my image: nothing.’

when it is your image – it is not nothing – it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘And what goes for "red" also goes for "same".’

what goes for ‘red’ – and what goes for ‘same’ – whatever that is – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

378. ‘"Before I judge that two images which I have are the same,

I must recognize them as the same." And when that has happened,

how am I to know that the word "same" describes what I recognize?

Only if I can express my recognition in some other way, and if it is

possible for someone else to teach me that "same" is the correct word

here.

For if I need a justification for using a word, it must also be one for

someone else.’

‘"Before I judge that two images which I have are the same, I must recognize them as the same."

you have a criterion for determining sameness –

and then you apply it to the two images

you don’t recognise them as being the same until you apply your criterion of sameness

and as for that criterion – whatever that may be – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

you work with what you have got – and you keep an open mind

‘And when that has happened, how am I to know that the word "same" describes what I recognize?’

you propose that it does –

you might fall back on some other recognition in determining your use of the word

what someone else has told you may figure in it too

in any case – what you propose – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘For if I need a justification for using a word, it must also be one for

someone else.’

Wittgenstein may never have met a poet – and most certainly never met my mother

379. ‘First I am aware of it as this; and then I remember what it

is called.—Consider: in what cases is it right to say this?’

‘this’ – is a propositional place –

a place for proposal – for naming – for description

‘in what cases is it right to say this?’

in any case – where a proposal is looked for – is required

that could be any day to day matter –

or any creative matter in science – art – or philosophy

380. ‘How do I recognize that this is red?—"I see that it is this;

and then I know that that is what this is called." This?—What?!

What kind of answer to this question makes sense?

(You keep on steering towards the idea of the private ostensive

definition.)

I could not apply any rules to a private transition from what is seen

to words. Here the rules really would hang in the air; for the institution

of their use is lacking.’

‘How do I recognize that this is red?—"I see that it is this; and then I know that that is what this is called."’

there will be different accounts of how I recognize – and how I recognize this as red –

and any such account will be open to question

what is significant is that I propose ‘this’ – as ‘red’

‘What kind of answer to this question makes sense?’

one that is fit to purpose – whatever that purpose is

here the purpose – if you can call it that is ‘philosophical’ –

and I would say an answer that makes sense philosophically is one that is open to question – open to doubt – and one recognized as uncertain

if we have an open and critical approach to our answers on this – and indeed any other matter – we will make sense

‘I could not apply any rules to a private transition from what is seen to words. Here the rules really would hang in the air; for the institution of their use is lacking.’

it is not a matter of applying rules – it is rather whether a private definition – is held open to question – open to doubt and whether its uncertainty is explored

you can do this privately

381. ‘How do I know that this colour is red?—It would be an

answer to say: "I have learnt English".’

yes – that would be an answer – but an answer open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

382. ‘At these words I form this image. How can justify this?

Has anyone shewn me the image of the colour blue and told me

that this is the image of blue?

What is the meaning of the words: "This image"? How does one

point to an image? How does one point twice to the same image?’

‘At these words I form this image. How can justify this?’

first up – logically speaking there is no ‘justification’ –

a proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

you might enquire as to how a proposal came about – this is not justification

and any account of how a proposal came about – is open to question

what is relevant – is the proposal put

‘Has anyone shewn me the image of the colour blue and told me that this is the image of blue?’

perhaps –

again –showing and telling is not justification

justification doesn’t exist – it is not in the propositional picture

‘What is the meaning of the words: "This image"?’

any ‘meaning’ proposed – is open to question

if you settle on a meaning – fair enough – logically speaking – it is still open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘How does one point to an image?’

one doesn’t point to an image – one proposes it

‘How does one point twice to the same image?’

one proposes it twice

383. ‘We are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a

concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word. So

it may look as if what we were doing were Nominalism. Nominalists

make the mistake of interpreting all words as names, and so of not really

describing their use, but only, so to speak, giving a paper draft on

such a description.’

a concept – is a proposal – a name – is a proposal – a use – is a proposal –

and any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

this logical approach if you want to put a name to it is ‘propositionalism’

384. ‘You learned the concept 'pain' when you learned language.’

you learned the proposal ‘pain’ when you learned language

385. ‘Ask yourself: Would it be imaginable for someone to learn

to do sums in his head without ever doing written or oral ones?—

"Learning it" will mean: being made able to do it. Only the question

arises, what will count as a criterion for being able to do it?——But

is it also possible for some tribe to know only of calculation in the

head, and of no other kind? Here one has to ask oneself: "What will

that be like?"—And so one will have to depict it as a limiting case.

And the question will then arise whether we are still willing to use

the concept of 'calculating in the head' here—or whether in such

circumstances it has lost its purpose, because the phenomena gravitate

towards another paradigm.’

 ‘Ask yourself: Would it be imaginable for someone to learn to do sums in his head without ever doing written or oral ones.’

yes – I think so – if he was properly instructed – and if he was shown how it is done

‘“Learning it” – will mean: being made able to do it. Only the question arises, what will count as a criterion for being able to do it?’

doing it

‘But is it also possible for some tribe to know only of calculation in the head, and of no other kind?’

it is possible that an individual calculates in his head – but if it’s a tribal practice – it would have to have some public expression – otherwise it is not ‘tribal’  

‘And the question will then arise whether we are still willing to use the concept of 'calculating in the head' here—or whether in such circumstances it has lost its purpose, because the phenomena gravitate towards another paradigm.’

you can wrap calculation up in whatever paradigm you like – the fact remains whether an individual calculates in his head – or calculates in a public manner – the point is – it’s calculating –

it is playing the calculation game

386. ‘"But why have you so little confidence in yourself? Ordinarily

you always know well enough what it is to 'calculate.' So if you say

you have calculated in imagination, then you will have done so. If you

had not calculated, you would not have said you had. Equally, if you

say that you see something red in imagination, then it will be red.

You know what 'red' is elsewhere.—And further: you do not always

rely on the agreement of other people; for you often report that you

have seen something no one else has."——But I do have confidence in

myself—I say without hesitation that I have done this sum in my head,

have imagined this colour. The difficulty is not that I doubt whether

I really imagined anything red. But it is this: that we should be able,

just like that, to point out or describe the colour we have imagined,

that the projection of the image into reality presents no difficulty

at all. Are they then so alike that one might mix them up?—But I can

also recognize a man from a drawing straight off.—Well, but can I

ask: "What does a correct image of this colour look like?" or "What

sort of thing is it?"; can I learn this?

(I cannot accept his testimony because it is not testimony. It only

tells me what he is inclined to say.)’

‘Well, but can I ask: "What does a correct image of this colour look like?" or "What

sort of thing is it?"; can I learn this?’

as to ‘a correct image of this colour’ – any image will be a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘(I cannot accept his testimony because it is not testimony. It only tells me what he is inclined to say.)’

his ‘testimony’ or ‘what he is inclined to say’ – is what he proposes –

and what he proposes is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and if you cannot accept uncertainty – you are lost

387. ‘The deep aspect of this matter readily eludes us.’

there is no ‘deep’ – there is what is put – in whatever form it is put –  to whatever matter it is put to –

what there is – is what is proposed

we are not eluded –

whatever proposal is put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

388. ‘"I don't see anything violet here, but I can shew it you if

you give me a paint box." How can one know that one can shew it

if . . . ., in other words, that one can recognize it if one sees it?

How do I know from my image what the colour really looks like?

How do I know that I shall be able to do something? that is, that the

state I am in now is that of being able to do that thing?’

‘in other words, that one can recognize it if one sees it?’

any account of how we recognize – is open to question – open to doubt –and uncertain

the point is – we do

and recognition – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘How do I know from my image what the colour really looks like?’

my image is the proposal – of the colour

and this proposal – is open to question

‘How do I know that I shall be able to do something?

that you will be able to do something – is a proposal –

that is your knowledge –

and your knowledge – your proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

389. ‘"The image must be more like its object than any picture.

For, however like I make the picture to what it is supposed to

represent, it can always be the picture of something else as well.

But it is essential to the image that it is the image of this and of

nothing else."

Thus one might come to regard the image as a super-likeness.’

this is just rhetoric from Wittgenstein – wishful thing – fortified with a ‘must’

an image is a proposal – the picture a proposal – both proposals are open to question

as is their proposed relation

390. ‘Could one imagine a stone's having consciousness? And if

anyone can do so—why should that not merely prove that such image-

mongery is of no interest to us?’

ok –

consider this from Spinoza –

‘Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion, should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavoring, as far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious merely of its own endeavour and not at all indifferent, would believe itself to be completely free, and would think that it continued in motion solely because of its own wish. This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and which consists solely in the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been determined.’

image-mongery?

391. ‘I can perhaps even imagine (though it is not easy) that each

of the people whom I see in the street is in frightful pain, but is artfully

concealing it. And it is important that I have to imagine an artful

concealment here. That I do not simply say to myself: "Well, his soul is

in pain: but what has that to do with his body?" or "After all it need

not shew in his body!"—And if I imagine this—what do I do; what

do I say to myself; how do I look at the people? Perhaps I look at one

and think: "It must be difficult to laugh when one is in such pain",

and much else of the same kind. I as it were play a part, act as if the

others were in pain. When I do this I am said for example to be imagining ....’

‘I can perhaps even imagine (though it is not easy) that each of the people whom I see in the street is in frightful pain, but is artfully concealing it.’

yes – you can do this –

but really – is it any different from just how things are?

what I mean is this is – I see people – in the street – and wherever –

the fact is I don’t know how they feel –

I don’t have access to their private experiences –

all I have access to – is what they propose

what they propose – in whatever form they propose – verbally – behaviourally –

this is all I know

and this – what they propose – however they propose it – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

I can imagine what I like – but if I want to know I have to pay attention – to what is proposed

392. ‘"When I imagine he is in pain, all that really goes on in me

is ... ." Then someone else says: "I believe I can imagine it without

thinking '. . . .' " ("I believe I can think without words.") This leads

to nothing. The analysis oscillates between natural science and

grammar.’

‘"When I imagine he is in pain, all that really goes on in me is ... ."’

what goes on in me is – that I propose that – ‘he is in pain’

‘Then someone else says: "I believe I can imagine it without thinking '. . . .' " ("I believe I can think without words.")’

here is the point –

we propose – we make propositions – and our proposals – our propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and what this means is this –

that just what a proposal is – is itself – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The analysis oscillates between natural science and grammar.’

the ‘oscillation’ Wittgenstein mentions here – is uncertainty

393. ‘"When I imagine that someone who is laughing is really in

pain I don't imagine any pain-behaviour, for I see just the opposite.

So what do I imagine?"—I have already said what. And I do not

necessarily imagine my being in pain.——"But then what is the process

of imagining it?"——Where (outside philosophy) do we use the

words "I can imagine his being in pain" or "I imagine that . . . ."

or "Imagine that . . . ."?

We say, for example, to someone who has to play a theatrical part:

"Here you must imagine that this man is in pain and is concealing

it"—and now we give him no directions, do not tell him what he

is actually to do. For this reason the suggested analysis is not to

the point either.—We now watch the actor who is imagining this

situation.’

"But then what is the process of imagining it?" –

what this ’process of imagining it’ – is – is proposing it –

and any proposal – any proposition – wherever it occurs – is valid – is worthy of consideration – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘We now watch the actor who is imagining this situation.’

yes – and if he does nothing to indicate that he is in pain – we say he has followed the direction given

of course whether he has or not – is open to question –

it is matter of how you interpret his behaviour

394. ‘In what sort of circumstances should we ask anyone: "What

actually went on in you as you imagined this?"—And what sort of

answer do we expect?’

‘In what sort of circumstance should we ask anyone: "What actually went on in you as you imagined this?"’

well – it doesn’t matter – if the question is asked in some propositional context – it is either an appropriate question – or it is not

                                                                                                                                      

‘And what sort of answer do we expect?’

I would hope for an interesting answer because it is a tough question –

and any answer given – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

395. ‘There is a lack of clarity about the role of imaginability in our

investigation. Namely about the extent to which it ensures that a

proposition makes sense.’

there is no lack of clarity here –

with ‘imaginability’ – what we are dealing with is proposal

proposal described as ‘imaginative’

and whether a proposition – a proposal – makes sense – or not –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

396. ‘It is no more essential to the understanding of a proposition

that one should imagine anything in connexion with it, than that one

should make a sketch from it.’

yes –

and any response to a proposition – to a proposal – is a proposition – is a proposal –

a proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

397. ‘Instead of "imaginability" one can also say here: representability

by a particular method of representation. And such a representation

may indeed safely point a way to further use of a sentence. On the

other hand a picture may obtrude itself upon us and be of no use at all.’

a proposal described as ‘representative’ – may turn out to be of use

on the other hand a ‘picture proposal’ – may be of no use at all

whether a proposal – however described – will be of use – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

398. ‘"But when I imagine something, or even actually see objects,

I have got something which my neighbour has not."—I understand

you. You want to look about you and say: "At any rate only I have

got THIS."—What are these words for? They serve no purpose.—

Can one not add: "There is here no question of a 'seeing'—and therefore

none of a 'having'—nor of a subject, nor therefore of ‘I’ either"?

Might I not ask: In what sense have you got what you are talking about

and saying that only you have got it? Do you possess it? You do not

even see it. Must you not really say that no one has got it? And this too

is clear: if as a matter of logic you exclude other people's having

something, it loses its sense to say that you have it.

But what is the thing you are speaking of? It is true I said that I

knew within myself what you meant. But that meant that I knew

how one thinks to conceive this object, to see it, to make one's looking

and pointing mean it. I know how one stares ahead and looks about I

one in this case—and the rest. I think we can say: you are talking (if,

for example, you are sitting in a room) of the 'visual room'. The 'visual

room' is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as I can walk

about it, or look at it, or point to it. Inasmuch as it cannot be any one

else's it is not mine either. In other words, it does not belong to me

because I want to use the same form of expression about it as about the

material room in which I sit. The description of the latter need not

mention an owner, in fact it need not have any owner. But then the

visual room cannot have any owner. "For"—one might say—"it has

no master, outside or in.

"Think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a

house in it.—Someone asks "Whose house is that?"—The answer,

by the way, might be "It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the

bench in front of it". But then he cannot for example enter his house.’

‘"But when I imagine something, or even actually see objects, I have got something which my neighbour has not."’

what this means is that I put a proposal

as to what my neighbour has – or does not have – I don’t know – unless my neighbour puts a proposal

‘Can one not add: "There is here no question of a 'seeing'—and therefore none of a 'having'—nor of a subject, nor therefore of ‘I’ either"?

what is logically relevant here is the proposal – the rest is just packaging

‘Might I not ask: In what sense have you got what you are talking about and saying that only you have got it?’

what you have got – is what you propose –

and if what you propose – is witnessed and recognized by someone else – what they have – is what you have proposed

and the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘But what is the thing you are speaking of?’

the thing you are speaking of – is a proposal – a proposal – simple or complex – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘the visual room’ and ‘the material room’ are propositional contexts –

 they are only relevant – if proposed

"Think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it.—Someone asks "Whose house is that?"—The answer, by the way, might be "It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it". But then he cannot for example enter his house.’

the question ‘who’s house is that?’ – in this propositional context – is to ask – ‘who’s house is represented in that picture?’

and in this context the answer – ‘It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the

bench in front of it’ –  is to say – ‘it belongs to the farmer represented in the picture’

399. ‘One might also say: Surely the owner of the visual room

would have to be the same kind of thing as it is; but he is not to be

found in it, and there is no outside.’

the ‘owner of the visual room’ – is the person who puts the proposal – ‘the visual room’

the proposer and the proposal – are obviously – not one in the same

400. ‘The ‘Visual room' seemed like a discovery, but what its

discoverer really found was a new way of speaking, a new comparison;

it might even be called a new sensation.’

this ‘visual room’?

is a proposal –

a propositional discovery? – yes –

a new way of speaking?

proposing – is not a new way of speaking

a new comparison?

well a new proposal – may well result in new comparisons

a new sensation?

perhaps that’s taking the enthusiasm a bit too far

a new description of a sensation – more like it –

and let’s remember – a sensation is a proposal

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain



(c) killer press. 2020.