Appendix 6. The Nature of Hypotheses

‘You could obviously explain an hypothesis by means of pictures. I mean, you could explain the hypothesis “there is a book lying here” with pictures showing the book in plan, elevation and various cross sections.’

a picture shows the proposition in another format –

in another proposal –

if you say that duplicating a proposition is to explain it –

then you may as well just repeat the proposition in its original form

to explain a proposition is to give some account of it –

replicating the proposition – does not account for it –

repetition is not explanation

when is an explanation required for ‘there is a book lying here’?

or more generally – when is there a question of explanation?

I don’t think ‘there is a book lying there’ – in any common usage – is likely to raise any question

if the proposition is put in a special context – questions can be raised

i.e. Wittgenstein’s context here – a philosophical context –

what is really being asserted here?

in relation to the ‘book’ – a question might be – are we really referring to sense data – and what does that amount to?

and ‘there’ – might raise questions of  how we are to understand space

these questions do not immediately present themselves with the proposition ‘there is a book lying there’

but in specialized contexts they can be asked

and furthermore – any answer will lead to further proposals – further propositions –

and any answer – any proposal will be open to question – to doubt – will be uncertain

there is no logical end to explanation –

except thin the decision to stop – asking questions

‘Such a representation gives a law. Just as the equation of a curve gives a law, by means of which you may discover the ordinates, if you cut at different abscissae.

In which case the verification of particular cases correspond to cuts that have already been made.

If our experiences yield points lying on a straight line, the proposition that these experiences are various views of a straight line is an hypothesis.

The hypothesis is a way of representing this reality, for a new experience may tally with it or not, or possibly make it necessary to modify the hypothesis.’

‘such a representation gives a law’ –

out of such a representation an hypothesis can be formed

a so called ‘law’ – is simply an hypothesis –

if an hypothesis is regarded as a law – that usually means the practitioners have been lured into a false sense of security – or just got lazy

(how’s that for an hypothesis!)

and let’s not play dumb here –

‘verification’ of an hypothesis – of a proposal – is always open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

it is never ‘done’

verifiers can be done – but not verification

an hypothesis is a proposal for a reality –

and any proposal – any reality – is open to question

‘If for instance we use a system of coordinates and the equation for a sphere to express the proposition that a sphere is located a certain distance from our eyes, this description has a greater multiplicity than that of verification by eye. The first multiplicity corresponds to not one verification but to a law obeyed by verifications.’

‘a greater multiplicity than verification by the eye’?

the system of coordinates and the equation – is a different method of verification –

than that of verification by the eye

any so called ‘verification’ –  or any method of verification – is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

what you go with – what you operate with – will be a function of circumstance and context –

it is a question of behaviour – and all the questions that go with that

a greater multiplicity – is this to suggest – greater verification?

a greater multiplicity of proposals – 

will mean a greater number of proposals – open to question – open to doubt –

quantitatively speaking – more uncertain proposals to deal with –

and logically speaking – that is a good thing –

more ways of seeing – more ways of doing –

more possibilities

‘a law obeyed by verification’?

you can have a proposal for verifications –

if it is held to be a ‘law’ – does that mean it is not questioned?

if that is the case – the proposal is corrupted –

corrupted in the way it is held –

if on the other hand –

‘law’ is just a term for a well used – and well practiced proposal –

one that is held to be open to question – and held open to doubt –

then OK

it is logic that should determine our behaviour –

everything is arse about – if it is behaviour that determines logic –

we can be open or closed –

the proposition is open – as a matter of logic –

we should follow suit

‘An hypothesis is a law for forming propositions.

You could also say: an hypothesis is a law for forming expectations.

A proposition is, so to speak, a particular cross-section of an hypothesis.’

an hypothesis is a logically transparent form or expression of the proposition

it displays the logic of the proposition – openly

it is a clear expression of uncertainty –

as for ‘law’ – there are no laws – only proposals –

the form of the proposition – is not essential – what is essential is the logic of the proposition –

the proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘According to my principle two suppositions must have the same sense if every  possible experience that confirms the one also confirms the other, if, that is, no decision between the two is conceivable on the basis of experience.’

‘every possible experience …’

you can’t know ‘every possible experience’ –

so it’s a waste of time pretending to consider the notion

you can only go on what is proposed

as for sense –

sense is a moving feast

the sense of a proposition is only revealed when it is proposed –

and then it is open to question – open to doubt

sense is uncertain

confirmation can only be a hunch in the midst of uncertainty –

‘experience’ – is logically speaking an open concept –

how it is defined will depend on who’s doing what –

and any ‘definition’ here – will be open to question

a decision is always ‘conceivable’ –

at the very least you decide to proceed – or not to proceed – with whatever it is that you have in mind

helps if there are a lot of nodding heads – one way or the other

dress it up anyway you like –

any proposal – or assessment – or decision –

logically speaking –

is open to question – open doubt

uncertain

‘The representation of a curve as a straight line with deviations. The equation of the curve includes a parameter whose course expresses the deviations from a straight line. It isn’t essential that these deviations should be “slight”. They can be so large that the curve doesn’t look like a straight line at all. “Straight line with deviations” is only one form of description. It makes it easier for me to eliminate, or neglect, a particular component of the description if I so wish. (The form “rule with exceptions”).’

yes – there is no definite description –

the object of any description – is an unknown

it becomes known – in description – in proposal

the unknown – does not determine how it is described –

the unknown is silent

the unknown is the source of possibility – possible descriptions

if you want ‘know’ to why a particular description is proposed and used –

you need to have some understanding of the circumstances involved

and here – you are still faced with uncertainty

once a description is proposed – it is open to modification – open to replacement –

open to question – open to doubt –

it is always a question of what’s going on and why

and it is this uncertainty – propositional uncertainty – ‘that makes it easier for me to eliminate, or neglect, a particular component of a description if I wish to do so’

‘rule with exceptions’ –

is really just an attempt to shut the gate after the horse has bolted –

or to be more precise –

to pretend there was a gate

‘What does it mean, to be certain that one has a toothache? (If one can’t be certain, then grammar doesn’t allow the use of the word ‘certain’ in this connection.)

The grammar of the expression ‘to be certain”.’

to be certain – is to be deluded

by all means propose that you have a toothache –

but there is no more certainty in this proposal than in any other –

what we deal with is proposals –

and a proposal is – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

to claim certainty in relation to any proposal –

is to deny – the proposal –

it is to deny the nature of the proposal –

it is essentially an act of propositional corruption

to claim certainty – is to claim an authority for your proposal –

the only authority you have – is authorship –

authorship is logically irrelevant –

therefore the claim of authority – is logically irrelevant –

if persist with such a claim – your claim is not logical –

it can only be described as rhetorical – that is to say logically false

once this is understood – it is easy to see that the grammar of ‘certainty’ –

is the grammar of rhetoric –

the grammar of persuasion –

of bullshit

‘We say “If I say that I see a chair there, I am saying more than I know for certain”. And commonly that means “But all the same, there’s one thing that I do know for certain.” But if we now try to say what it is, we find ourselves in a certain embarrassment.

“I see something brown – that is certain.” That’s meant to say that the brown colour is seen and not perhaps merely conjectured from other symptoms. And we do indeed say quite simply: “I see something brown.”

‘I do know something for certain’ But if we try to say what it is, we find ourselves in a certain embarrassment’ –

reason being we can’t say – what it is –

and really – if we can’t say what it is – we have nothing to say –

and if we persist in trying to say something that can’t be said – well we are likely to be feel confused –

and to claim certainty – is to be logically confused –

anything we say – is a proposal – and a proposal is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

point being – certainty has no place in propositional logic –

the claim of certainty – is the failure to understand propositional logic –

it is illogical

now this is not to say that the claim of certainty does not have a place or function in language use –

it does –

it basis – and it function though – is not logical – it is rhetorical

the claim of certainty is a rhetorical devise –

it’s function – is persuasion

‘I see something brown – that is certain’ –

 is a good example of this

the proposal ‘I see something brown ‘ – is a straightforward proposal

‘that is certain’ –  is no more than the attempt to persuade – either myself – or others –

of what I say

‘I see something brown’ – like any other proposal – is open to question – open to doubt

is uncertain

the embarrassment that Wittgenstein refers to – only occurs if you think you are making a logical statement

if on the other hand – you are aware that you claim to certainty – is purely rhetorical –

then should feel no embarrassment at all

‘If someone tells me “look into this telescope, and make me a sketch of what you see”, the sketch I make is the expression of a proposition, not of a hypothesis.’

the sketch I make is a proposal – is a proposition

‘If I say “here there is a chair”, I mean more – people say – than the mere description of what I perceive. This can only mean that the presupposition doesn’t have to be true, even though the description fits what is seen. Well in what circumstance would I say that that proposition wasn’t true? Apparently, if certain other propositions aren’t true that were implicit in the first. But it isn’t as if the first turns out to have been a logical product all along.’

we propose – in relation to propositions –

yes – you might propose that ‘here there is a chair’ – could be seen as presupposing another or other propositions

‘This can only mean that the presupposition doesn’t have to be true, even though the description fits what is seen’

why would you put up a presupposition that is not true – that is to say one that you don’t assent to?

‘in what circumstances would I say that the proposition wasn’t true?’

when it’s presuppositions aren’t true?

you might still assent to the proposition – and end up taking the view – that your presuppositions – are rubbish

‘But it isn’t as if the first turns out to have been a logical product all along.’

you can construct a propositional story around a subject proposition –

this is to say – play a language-game

and the game you play could be ‘logical product’ –

interesting – inventive – and useful as such a game might be –

and presumably it is these things – if you play it

it is in the end – no more than a proposal –

that as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and hey – there is no propositional story you have to subscribe to –

and no language-game you must play

‘The best comparison for every hypothesis. – something that is itself an example of  an hypothesis – is a body in relation to a systematic series of views of it from different angles.’

the ‘hypothesis’ – as in ‘an uncertain proposition’ –  one open to question – open to doubt

only has meaning in a logic that holds that that there are certain propositions –

propositions beyond question – beyond doubt

if you understand that the proposition is a proposal –

and that a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

that all propositions are proposals –

that all propositions are uncertain

then there is no need for the term ‘hypothesis’ –

or to put it another way –

every proposal is an hypothesis

every proposition is an hypothesis

‘Making a discovery in a scientific investigation (say in experimental physics) is of course not the same thing as making a discovery in ordinary life outside the laboratory; but the two are similar and a comparison with the former can throw light on the latter.’

the ground of any discovery – is propositional uncertainty –

engaging in propositional uncertainty is engaging in discovery

what proceeds from uncertainty – in a logical sense – is uncertainty –

any discovery is uncertain

when we adopt a proposal that emerges from uncertainty –

a proposal that gives us a new perspective –

we say we have made a discovery

the proposal – the proposition – is the form of discovery – it is how we discover –

we propose – and we investigate –  and this may lead to a new proposal –

a proposal which like it’s antecedent – is open to question –

open to doubt – is uncertain

our propositional life – is the life of discovery

a scientific discovery – in principle – in terms of its logic –

is no different to any other discovery

and as to the question of method –

there is no one sure way of proceeding –

there is just what people do – just how they proceed – in whatever contexts they operate in

be that in ordinary life – or in science – or any other propositional activity

perhaps scientific procedure is more disciplined than the procedures of ordinary life –

there may well be circumstances in ordinary life – where a scientific approach seems warranted

and it may well be that in science – circumstances may prevail – where unfettered speculation has a place

‘There is an essential distinction between propositions like “That is a lion”, “The sun is larger than the earth”, and propositions like “Men have two hands”. Propositions like the pair contain a “this”, “now”, “here” and thus connect immediately with reality. But if there happened to be no men around, how would I go about checking the third proposition?

there is no ‘essential distinction’ here –

the above propositions are proposals – open to question – open to doubt

‘how would I go about checking the third proposition’?

look at your own hands –

that would be a start

‘At all events, there can’t be any distinction between an hypothesis used as an expression of an immediate experience and a proposition in the stricter sense.’

there is no logical distinction between an hypothesis and a proposition

the proposition is a proposal

the hypothesis is a proposition

‘an expression of an immediate experience’ – is a proposal –

there is no ‘proposition in the stricter sense’ –

the great beauty of the proposition – of the proposal –

is that it is without strictures –

it is open – open to question – open to doubt

it’s ground is uncertainty –

and uncertainty –

is the ground of possibility

‘There is a distinction between a proposition like “Here there is a sphere in front of me” and “it looks as if there is a sphere in front of me.” The same thing shows itself also thus: one can say “there seems to be a sphere in front of me”, but it is senseless to say “it looks as if there seems to a sphere in front of me”. So too one can say “Here there is probably a sphere”, but not “Here there probably appears to be a sphere”. In such a case people would say “After all, you must know whether there appears to be”.’

yes – we have here different expressions – different proposals –

and any differences will come out because these proposals – these propositions – as with any proposal – any proposition – are open to question – open to doubt

the proposal – the proposition – is logically speaking – open –

it invites question – it invites doubt –

it is in response to this logically uncertainty that that propositions are modified for use – made context useful – made actionable –

and it is out of this – logical uncertainty – that new proposals – new ways of thinking – and doing – emerge 

it is good to have a question about the sense of proposition – no harm done having a hard look at a proposition and seeing whether and how it will function

however function here – is function in context –

and unless you have a good grasp of the context in which a proposal has been put –

you really can’t get into the business of saying whether it makes sense

just presenting a proposal – out of context – and examining it – in a so called ‘objective’ fashion – is small potatoes

neat little language game

actual language use – is flesh and blood –  gesture – face – eyes – and history – in the colours and the substance of the world – place and time

if you think understand where someone is coming from – and this is not always easy – it doesn’t always happen –

what they say and how they say it – strange as it might be –

can make sense

‘There is nothing hypothetical in what connects the proposition with the given fact.’

the  so called ‘given fact’ is nothing more than a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

a proposition – that is to say a proposal – in relation to  – another proposal – ‘the given fact’ – is likewise – open to question – open to doubt

is what connects the proposition to this ‘given fact’ – hypothetical?

that is – is the  proposal of a relation – of any sort of relation – between the two propositions –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain?

yes – of course

‘It is clear that reality – I mean immediate experience – will sometimes give an hypothesis the answer yes, and sometimes the answer no (here of course the “yes” and “no” express only confirmation and lack of confirmation); and it is clear that these affirmations and denials can be given expression.’

reality is what we propose

what we propose is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

propositional uncertainty – is the source of all questioning –

the source of all answering

it is propositional users – who ask questions –

and propositional users who give answers

‘yes’ and ‘no’ –  assent and dissent – are proposals –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

‘The hypothesis, if that face of it is laid against reality, becomes a proposition.’

the hypothesis is a proposition – is a proposal

‘laid against reality’?

propositions are laid against propositions

‘reality’ – is a proposition –

what such a proposal amounts to is a propositional question –

a propositional question that will be answered with proposals –

with propositions –

propositions – open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

‘It may be doubtful whether the body I see is a sphere, but it can’t be doubtful that from here it looks to be something like a sphere. – The mechanism of hypothesis would not function if appearance too were doubtful so that one couldn’t verify beyond doubt even a facet of the hypothesis. If there were a doubt here, what could take that doubt away? If this connection too were loose, there would be no such thing as confirming an hypothesis and it would hang entirely up in the air, quite pointless (and therefore senseless).

‘It may be doubtful whether the body I see is a sphere, but it can’t be doubtful that from here it looks to be something like a sphere.’?

‘it looks to be something like a sphere’ –

this proposition that purports to be beyond doubt – expresses a doubt –

‘something like a sphere’ – makes clear the uncertainty of the perception – of the proposition

quite apart from this though –

what we have here is a proposal –

and the proposal – the proposition – regardless of who holds it – and how they hold it – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘The mechanism of hypothesis would not function if appearance too were doubtful so that one couldn’t verify beyond doubt even a facet of the hypothesis’?

the ‘hypothesis’ – is a proposal –is a proposition

any statement of appearance – like any other proposal – any other proposition – is open to question – open to doubt

one cannot verify beyond doubt –

any verification proposal – is open to question – to doubt

‘If there were a doubt here, what would take that doubt away?’

only another doubt –

the point is we operate with an in uncertainty –

we make calls – we adopt proposals – we deal with – and indeed – we make the world we live in –

however whatever we propose – decide or make –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

‘If this connection too were loose, there would be no such thing as confirming an hypothesis and it would hang entirely up in the air, quite pointless (and therefore senseless).’?

there is no such thing as confirming an hypothesis – if by ‘confirmation’ – you mean certainty –

this is really so obvious – it shouldn’t need to said

any confirmation – logically speaking – is – up in the air

the fact that a decision is made to proceed on the basis of a so called ‘confirmation’ –

is anything but pointless

logical uncertainty – does not equal inaction

we act – the logical safety net that we have – is propositional uncertainty –

for while we adopt a proposition – run with a proposal –we always have the option to review – to reconsider –

this possibility of review is not some optional extra – it is of the nature of the proposition – of any proposition

‘If I say “I saw a chair”, that (in one sense) isn’t contradicted by the proposition “there wasn’t one there”. For I could use the first proposition in the description of a dream and then nobody would use the second to contradict me.  but the description of the dream throws a light on the sense of the words “I saw”.

Again, in the proposition “there wasn’t one there”, the word “there” may have more than one meaning?

yes but why is the question?

and the answer goes to  the heart of philosophical logic –

it is because any proposition – any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and what these examples of  ‘saw’ and ‘there’ – show –

is that from a logical point of view the terms of any proposal – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

meaning – is uncertain –

we only define meaning in terms of our proposals – in propositional terms –

and these proposals themselves – can be questioned – as it were from any angle at all

you can move forward with a proposal – and you can and do move forward in uncertainty –

but nothing you move forward with is logically stable

‘I am in agreement with the opinions of contemporary physicists when they say that signs in their equations no longer have any “meanings” and that physics cannot attain to such meanings, but must stay put at the signs. But they don’t see that signs have meaning in as much as – and only in as much as – observable phenomena do or do not correspond to them, in however circuitous a manner.’

if the ‘contemporary physicists’ are saying that the signs in their equations have no definite or certain meaning – they are right –

as to saying physics ‘cannot attain to such meanings’ –

physicists work – as indeed we all do – in uncertainty

the equations they use – are open to question to doubt – are uncertain –

the logical reality of the proposition – whatever form it takes –

is no argument against its use

physicists operate in uncertainty – with uncertainty

and if by ‘signs’ here we mean syntax – the logical reality is that syntax will be interpreted –

to ‘stay put at the signs’ – without any interpretation – is simply an argument for silence – for inactivity – it’s a recipe for nothing

if by to ‘stay put at the signs’ – one means – that one doesn’t question or doubt – a given meaning –

then to ‘stay put at the signs’ – is to come to a logical stand still –

fortunately this does not happen

‘observable phenomena do or do not correspond to them’

well this is the question isn’t it?

firstly just what counts as ‘observable phenomena’ – is open to question – to doubt –

is uncertain

and secondly –

whether a physicist’s equation – with all it’s uncertainty – applies to a proposal of ‘observable phenomena’ – will be – logically speaking – open to question – to doubt –

this is just the way of it –

this logical reality – understood or not – does not stop the business of proposal – of science

I would say that it is clear that one consequence – one among many – of propositional uncertainty – is science

‘Let us imagine that chess has been invented not as a board game, but as a game to be played with numbers and letters on paper, so that no one had ever imagined a board with 64 squares in connection with it. And now suppose someone made the discovery that the game corresponded exactly to a game which could be played on a board in such and such a way. This discovery would have been a great simplification of the game (people who would earlier could now play it.) But it is clear that this new illustration of the rules of the game would be nothing more than a new, more easily surveyable symbolism, which in other respects would be on the same level as the written game. Compare with this the talk about physics nowadays not working with mechanical models but “only with symbols”.’

a proposition of any form – of any practice – is a proposal – open to question –

open to doubt – uncertain –

any translation – any application – of a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

uncertainty is the ground of imagination –

not everyone – physicists included –

are grounded

© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Appendix 5. Is time essential to propositions? Comparison between time and truth-functions

‘If we had a grammar set out in the form of a book, it wouldn’t be a series of chapters side by side, it would have a different structure. And it is here, if I am right that we would have to see the distinction between phenomenological and non- phenomenological. There would be, say a chapter about colours, setting out the rules for the use of colour-words; but there would be nothing comparable in what the grammar had to say about the words “not”, “or”, etc (the “logical constants”).

How does the temporal character of facts manifest itself? How does it express itself, if not by certain expressions having to occur in our sentences? That means: how does the temporal character of facts express itself, if not grammatically? ”Temporal character” – that doesn’t mean that I come at 5 o’clock, but that I come at some time or other, i.e. that my proposition has the structure it has.

We are inclined to say that negation and disjunction are connected with the nature of the proposition, but that time is connected with its content rather than its nature.

But if the two are equally universal, how can it show itself in grammar that one of them is connected with the nature of the proposition and the other is not?

Or should I have said that time is not equally universal since mathematical propositions can be negated and occur in disjunctions, without being temporal. There is indeed a connection here, though this form of portraying the matter is misleading.

But that shows what I mean by “proposition” or “the nature of the proposition”.’

a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

we can further describe – the proposition – in terms of other proposals – i.e. ‘phenomenological’ – ‘non-phenomenological’ –

and we can describe the proposition in other terms –

we can put forward the proposal of form – and the proposal of content – the proposal of grammar

these are descriptive decisions –

to put forward a description of the proposition in terms of logical constants – is to put forward a structural description

and you can say it is a description of possibility –  possibilities within a structure –

possibilities of manipulation – of use –

and further we can question the relation between a proposal of form and a proposal of content – in relation to time

looking at a proposition in terms of time – is one way of considering it

i.e. – is the form non-temporal and the content temporal?

and if so how can this be?

this is the discussion Wittgenstein embarks on

there is no necessity to describe a proposal – in these terms

but by the same token – there is nothing to stop you describing the proposition in this way

the proposition – any proposition – is open to question – in any way you want to question it – it is open to any doubts you have – open to any kind of description –

it’s nature is uncertain

it strikes me that you can view the proposition – be it ‘phenomenological’ – ‘non-phenomenological – mathematical – or whatever – as temporal

I question and doubt – deal with uncertainty – in time

and yes – I can regard the action of questioning – of doubt – of uncertainty – as not being related to time –

i.e. a proposal is a proposal – regardless of when it is put forward

why you would describe a proposition in terms of either or both – depends just on what you are doing and why – it’s a question of use

Wittgenstein asks –

‘how does the temporal character of facts express itself, if not grammatically?’

firstly it is important to understand that a ‘fact’ is what is proposed – a fact is a proposal

secondly – the proposal – in whatever form – is the expression

now you may wish to explain that – grammatically –

any ‘explanation’ though will be a proposal – and as such an expression

there will be no ‘explanation’ of the proposition – that is beyond question – that is beyond doubt –

no fix on the proposition

just as the proposition itself – logically speaking is no fix – on anything

we propose – and just what that amounts to – how we describe that action – how we account for it – is logically speaking – up for grabs –

the point of a proposition is its use –

and mostly – I think we run with what is at hand – in whatever context we are operating in –

we have learnt usage –

and propositional usage is not an optional extra – it is a natural necessity –

a natural necessity if we are to be functioning human beings

however logically speaking –

any usage is open to question –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Appendix 4. Elementary Propositions

A1

‘Can a logical product be hidden in a proposition? And if so, how does one tell, and what methods do we have of bringing the hidden element of a proposition to light? If we haven’t yet got a method, then we can’t speak of something being hidden or possibly hidden. And if we do have a method of discovery then the only way in which something like a logical product can be hidden in a proposition is the way in which a quotient like 755 /3 is hidden until the division has been carried out.

The question whether a logical product is hidden in a sentence is a mathematical problem.’

‘Can a logical product be hidden in a proposition?’

no

reason being – that logically speaking nothing is hidden

so this distinction between hidden and not hidden – is not valid

what you see is what you get –

how you interpret what you see – is open to question – open to doubt –

but any proposal you make – in the way of interpretation – is – what you see

what we have – is the proposal – the proposition –

in the absence of proposal – in the absence of description – what we face is not something ‘hidden’ – what we face – as plain as day – is what we don’t know – is the unknown –

and the unknown is not hidden –

it is as they say ‘in your face’

a quotient is not ‘hidden’ in a division – it is a way of describing the propositional operation that is division

mathematics is a sign-game

the ‘rules’ of mathematics –‘determine’ –what is possible in the use of signs –

mathematics – is a game of propositional discovery

you play the game in accordance with the rules to see what the rules-play can generate

the rules – are proposals – and as with any set of proposals – are open to question – open to doubt

however when you play – when you play the game – the very point of it is to play in accordance with the rules –

questioning the rules – is not playing the game – is not doing mathematics

to question the rules – is the business of meta-mathematics – the philosophy of mathematics

‘So an elementary proposition which, in the calculus as I am now using it, is not represented as a truth-function of other sentences.

The idea of constructing elementary propositions (as e.g. Carnap has tried to do) rests on a false notion of logical analysis. It is not the task of that analysis to discover a theory of elementary propositions, like discovering principles of mechanics.

My notion in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus was wrong: 1) because I wasn’t clear about the sense of the words “a logical product is hidden in a sentence” (and suchlike), 2) because I too thought that logical analysis had to bring to light what was hidden (as chemical and physical analysis does).

the proposition “this place is now red” (or “this circle is now red) can be called an elementary proposition if this means that it is neither a truth-function of other propositions nor defined as such. (Here I am disregarding combinations such as p. : qv –q and the like.)

But from “a is now red” there follows “a is not now green” and so elementary propositions in this sense aren’t independent of each other like the elementary propositions in the calculus I once described – a calculus to which, misled as I was by a false notion of reduction. I thought that the whole use of propositions must be reducible.’

there is no elementary proposition

any so called ‘analysis’ of a proposition – is no more than the description of the proposition – in terms of other propositions

we have a proposals – and we go on to describe that proposal etc. etc. –

there is no logical end to this

when you stop – presumably it is because you have no need to proceed

presumably you have described your proposal – in a manner that suits you –

the point is your propositional description (of the proposal) – like any description – any proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt

is uncertain

the so called ‘elementary proposition’ – is not ‘a logical product’ – it is a rhetorical devise –

the point of which is to establish some propositional or philosophical ‘authority’ –

to cut right to the chase here –

the only authority is the authority of authorship –

beyond authorship – any claim to an authority – is logically false –

any such claim is simply pretentious –

more to the point –

this so called ‘elementary proposition’ – of Russell and of the Tractatus –

as with any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt –

it is a proposal – and as such – uncertain

‘elementary proposition’ –

if this term is to have any further use –

it is – I would suggest – the proposition – you start with –

and that can be any proposition

‘truth-functional analysis’ – is a logical game

yes – you can formalize a proposition –

but this is nothing but another description of the proposition

the point of a proposition is what is proposed –

restating the proposal in formal terms –

is effectively repeating or simply rewriting the proposition –

it does not bear on what is proposed

‘analysis’ is rubbish –

it’s rubbish in logic – and it’s rubbish in life

there is no going deeper – to find the ‘hidden’ truth or essence

what you have is what is proposed – and yes you can propose in relation to that

forget the ‘hidden’ – there is only surface –

and once you understand that –

the surface – goes

B1

‘If you want to use the appellation “elementary proposition” as I did in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and as Russell used “atomic proposition”, you may call the sentence “Here there is a red rose” an elementary proposition. That is to say, it doesn’t contain a truth-function and it isn’t defined by an expression that contains one.’

truth-functional analysis – is a language-game

the idea of the elementary or atomic proposition is that it refers to an elemental or atomic fact – that can’t be further analyzed – and therefore is a foundation for knowledge

so the idea is break a sentence up into it’s grammatical/logical elements – and you can discover the foundations of knowledge

yes – this logical-analysis is elegant in its simplicity –

but just plain stupid in its naivety – (or should that be – pretension?)

it is to turn the problem of knowledge into a language-game

when in fact language – and language-games – express the problem

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

this goes for atomic sentences – molecular sentences – or any other way you want to carve it up

there is no foundation to knowledge –

any proposed ‘foundation’ – is like any other proposal – open to question

this idea of a foundation – is really the result of fear –

fear of the unknown

and that has spawned deception and delusion – and the language-game – rhetoric

our proposals are uncertain –

and it’s not an epistemological crisis –

it is in fact the source of our freedom and creativity

and to be frank – the program it’s not that hard to get with

as to  analysis –

once you understand that there is no foundation –

then there is no going from the surface – to the foundation – there is no going deeper

there is no logical depth – there is no depth

no ‘hidden logical product’ – no hidden reality –

what there is – is what is proposed

we put forward proposals – propositions – and we propose – in relation to the propositions before us – etc. – etc. –

this is the action of language – propositions in relation to propositions

this is our world – this is how it is made

it is all on the surface –

                                                                      ……..

‘What gives us the idea that there is a kind of agreement between thought and reality? – instead of ‘agreement’ here one might say with a clear conscience “pictorial character”

this idea of agreement –

presumes a reality – a reality – with all the features we think it has – independent of our thinking

how could we know such a reality is there – independent of thinking it?

and if we accept that the features that it has – are features – we think it has –

then what must it be – independent of our thinking?

the answer is – unknown

and in that case there is no agreement –

all we have is a proposed reality –

what we face in the absence of any proposal – is the unknown –

we propose – to make known

attached as we might be to our propositional constructs – i.e. ‘thought’ – ‘reality’ – etc.

what we have here – what we are dealing with – is proposals – propositions

my point really  is – there is no non-propositional reality –

we never leave the proposal

here Wittgenstein has put forward a proposal for understanding reality – for dealing with the unknown

a proposal that puts that there is an independent reality – and that the proposition pictures this reality

further he looks at problems with this proposal – and comes to this conclusion –

‘So I am imagining that the difference between proposition and reality is ironed out by the lines of projection belong to the picture, the thought, and that no further room is left for a method of application, but only for agreement and disagreement’

‘only for agreement and disagreement’ –

yes – the proposal is open to question

and as with any proposal – you can assent to it – or dissent from it –

and your assent – or your dissent – like the proposition itself –

is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

some proposals have a longer half life than others

it is I think a question of circumstance and utility

be that as it may –

any proposal – we make – or operate with – regardless of whether it is entrenched or not –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2015.