'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Wednesday, February 25, 2015

Appendix 3: Objects


“In a certain sense, an object cannot be described” (So too Plato: “You can’t give an account of one but only name it.”) Here “object” means “reference of a not further definable word” and ‘description” or “explanation” really means: “definition”. For of course it isn’t denied that the object can be “described from outside”, that properties can be ascribed to it and so on.

So when we use the proposition above we re thinking of a calculus with signs or names that are indefinable – or more accurately, undefined – and we are saying that no account can be given of them.

“What a word means a proposition cannot tell.”


first up – ‘object’ is a description – a meta-description –

the very point of such a description – is that it is a logical place for description

‘a reference of not further definable word’ –

what it is – is a reference place for definition

‘described from the outside’? –

here we have a theory of description –

what if I don’t think in terms of inside and outside –

what if my criterion for description is utility – and thus when I set about describing I am looking for a description that I imagine will be useful?

our descriptions are open to question – open to doubt –

but so too any criteria of description

‘So when we use the proposition above we are thinking of a calculus with signs or names that are indefinable – or more accurately, undefined – and we are saying that no account can be given of them.’

if we are thinking of a calculus with signs and names – and saying no account can be given of them –

this ‘calculus’ – is meaningless –

which is to say – we are not thinking of a calculus at all

a proposition is a proposal – its terms – signs – names – are open to question –

if you have a ‘proposition’ – with no content – nothing that can be questioned

whatever it is you think you’ve got – it’s not a proposition –

“What a word means a proposition cannot tell.”

any word is open to question – open to doubt

as with any proposal in relation to it

‘What is the distinction then between blue and red?

yes – the question of distinction –

the reality is that we do distinguish –

and any account – ‘explanation’ of this action of distinguishing –

will be open to question – to doubt – will be uncertain

that we distinguish is clear –

the grounds of any distinction – are not

let’s be clear – an explanation – is not the act

an explanation of a distinction – is not the action of distinguishing

‘explanation’ is – logically speaking – after the fact

the act – the act performed – without explanation – is unknown –

we propose – put forward propositions – descriptions – in order to make known

and any ‘knowledge’ we have – that is any proposal we make –

is uncertain

Wittgenstein: ‘So what I am saying means: red can’t be described.’

red – can’t be described?

‘red’ is the description 

so – what of red – as distinct from ‘red’

in the absence of description – what you deal with is the unknown

‘red’ – is the description – ‘red’ makes known

with the use of ‘red’ – we have – red – voila

‘red’ – as with any word – as with any proposition –

is open to question – open to doubt is uncertain –

with any word – any proposal – we can ask – what does it mean?

I suggest that the meaning of a word or of a proposition is – its use –

‘this is how we use the word ‘red’ … etc’ –

but however you account for meaning – whatever proposal you put forward –

the uncertainty remains –

all you ever have – logically speaking – is a proposal –

open to question –

certainty has nothing to do with logic –

certainty is the show piece of rhetoric – of pretence

put it this – what you have with any word – any sign –

is its mark – its syntax –

its ‘meaning’ – is uncertainty – is possibility –

the uncertain use  – of syntax

the syntax is a form or a vehicle for uncertainty –

and syntax is – itself – open to question

‘ “If you call the colour green an object, you must be saying that it is an object that occurs in the symbolism. Otherwise the sense of the symbolism, and thus its very existence as a symbolism, would not be guaranteed.”

But what does that assert about green, or the word “green”?’

‘if you call the color green an object …’?

that is to say –

if you describe – one description – ‘the colour green’ – in terms of another description ‘object’ –

‘you must be saying that it is an object that occurs in the symbolism …’

what you are saying is that the description occurs in the symbolism –

even this is a little odd –

reason being – the ‘symbolism’ and the ‘description’ –

are of course – one in the same

‘But what does that assert about green, or the word “green”?’

describing green as an ‘object’ – runs the risk of taking the colour out of green –

not I think a move in the right direction –

but – it all depends on who’s doing what and for why

we deal in proposals –propositions –

the world is propositional –

this is not to say there are no objects – or  whatever else you pin your hopes on –

everything is just as it is –

it is just a question of what descriptions we use

‘object’ – is a word you might call ‘solid’ – entrenched in use

open to question – open to doubt – but it has form

what exists is what is proposed

and logically – any proposal – is open to question – to doubt – is uncertain –

and yes –

you could jump from this to saying –

existence is uncertain

(what a revelation)



© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Monday, February 23, 2015

Appendix 2. Concept and Object, Property and Substrate


‘When Frege and Russell talk of concept and object they really mean property and thing; and here I am thinking of a spatial body and its colour. Or one can say: concept and object are the same as predicate and subject.’

the concept-object view of reality is a proposal –

the subject-predicate view – is a proposal

they are not the same –

they are proposals with different histories – different ontologies – perhaps even different epistemologies –

they are different world views

and yes they can be inter-related

‘The concept of the material point in physics is an abstraction from the material objects of experience; in the same way the subject-predicate form of logic is an abstraction from the subject-predicate form of our languages.

the material point in physics – functions as an explanation of the material objects of experience

and subject predicate logic functions as an explanation of the subject-predicate form of language

in both cases what we have is an initial description – ‘material objects’ – and ‘the subject-predicate form of logic’

the material point – and subject-predicate logic – are descriptions of these initial descriptions

‘meta- descriptions’ or secondary descriptions – if you like

the essential point to keep in mind here is that any proposal – any physics – any logic – any description – is open to question – to doubt – is uncertain

that a physics or a logic gains currency –  becomes entrenched and has an ‘authoritative’ status is a function  not of logic –

rather it is a function of rhetoric

argument and persuasion

‘The pure subject-predicate form is supposed to be a e f(x), where “a” is the name of an object. Now let us look for an application of this schema. The first thing that comes to mind as “names of objects” are the names of persons and of other spatial objects (the Koh-i-Noor). Such names are given by ostensive definitions (“that / is called ‘N’”). Such a definition might be conceived as a rule substituting the word “N” for a gesture pointing to the object, with proviso that the gesture can always be used in place of the name……..’

a name identifies –

naming is recognized as an action of identification –

this is the practise – the propositional practice

a name is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

however the action of naming – is essentially pragmatic –

we name in order to proceed – to get on with it

language – you might be tempted to say – is all about motion

as to ostensive definition –

an ostensive definition may be used to identify the object of a name –

and it is used to initiate one into the naming game –

and even to activate the language-game itself

‘However, this isn’t the normal way of using a name; it is an essential feature of the normal use that I can’t fall back on to a sign of the gesture language in place of the name. That is to say, in the way in which we use the name “N”, if N goes out of the room and latter a man comes into the room it makes sense to ask whether this man is N, whether he is the same man who left the room earlier. And the sentence “N has come back into the room” only makes sense if I can decide the question. And its sense will vary with the criterion for this being the object that I earlier called ‘N’. Different kinds of criteria will make different rules hold for the sign ‘N’, will make it a ‘name’  in a different sense of the word. Thus the word ‘name’ and the corresponding word ‘object’ are each headings to countless different lists of rules.’       

if the context is such that it does make sense to ask whether this man is N –

then gesture will be of no use

we are now well and truly in the language-game –

that is – into the business of question – and doubt

‘Thus the word ‘name’ and the corresponding word ‘object’ are each headings to countless different lists of rules.’      

‘name’ and ‘object’ – are proposals –

yes open to question – open to doubt – thus – uncertain

‘rules’ – are no more than proposals – propositions –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

if they are held to be otherwise–

then they are propositions that have been corrupted

‘If we give names to spatial objects, our use of such names depends on a criterion of identity which presupposes the impenetrability of bodies and the continuity of their movement. So if I could treat two bodies A and B as I can treat shadows on the wall,
making two into one and one into two again, it would be senseless to ask which of the two after the division is A and which is B, unless I go on to introduce a totally new criterion of identity e.g. the direction of their movements.

what this illustrates is that naming is essentially just tagging –

and the value of a name – a tag – will change with the circumstances

identity – we do identify

and we use names and signs to mark the identification

any identification is open to question – open to doubt –

identification is uncertain

criteria for identity – or criteria proposals – underwrite the act of identifying –

logically speaking this underwriting occurs after the fact of identification

criteria of identity can be useful – e.g. in a debate

or they may just be propositional dressing –

after the fact

‘So it doesn’t always make sense when presented with a proposition “(Ex).fx” to ask “Which xs satisfy f? “Which red circle a centimetre across is in the middle of this square?” – One mustn’t confuse the question “which object satisfies f” with the question “What sort of object …etc?” The first question would have to be answered by a name, and so the answer would have to be able to take the form “f(a)”; the question “what sort of ..?” is answered by “(Ex).fx.ox”. So it may be senseless to ask “which red spot do you see?” and yet make sense to ask “what kind of red spot do you see (a round one, a square one, etc.)?”

we don’t begin with formal logic and then ask which propositions satisfy it –

any formalization is a translation from it’s non-formal presentation

such formal characterization of propositions may be useful in certain contexts –

but the formalization – is just a rewrite – it determines nothing

‘I would like to say: the old logic contains more convention and physics than has been realized. If a noun is the name of a body, a verb is to denote a movement, and an adjective to denote a property of a body, it is easy to see how much that logic presupposes; and it is reasonable to conjecture that those original presuppositions go still deeper into the application of the words, and the logic of propositions.’

is it logic that presupposes language –

or is it language that presupposes logic?

really you can’t run it both ways – and claim you have explained anything

this is the way to think about it –

we have proposals – propositions – that can take different forms –

and those forms can be propositionally inter-related –

if by ‘logic’ – you mean a certain body of propositions –

and if by physics you mean another body of propositions –

you can put propositions that inter-relate the two

the key point to make is that the logical process that underlies any propositional action

is questioning and doubt

‘If a table is painted brown is painted brown, then it easy to think of the wood as bearer of the property brown and you can imagine what remains the same as the colour changes. Even in the case of one particular circle which appears now red, now blue. It is thus easy to imagine what is red, but difficult to imagine what is circular. What remains in this case if form and colour alter? For position is part of the form and it is arbitrary for me to lay down that the centre should stay fixed and the only changes in form be changes in the radius.

‘what remains in this case if form and colour alter?’

what remains – is propositional uncertainty

‘We must once more adhere to ordinary language and say a patch is circular’?’

‘a patch is circular’?

‘patch’ is a proposal – a description –

if it is used – it will be used because it functions in a propositional context –

any proposal – any description – can have a place – can have function – it depends on context –

and any proposal – regardless of context – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

this ‘ordinary language  argument’ – is just a con –

it is just another attempt to impose a standard of use – where logically speaking – there just are no standards –

there is just use – and however you describe it

who’s to say what is ‘ordinary’ – and does it matter? –

in certain contexts ‘patch’ – may have a very specialized use

‘ordinary’ and ‘specialized’ – and whatever other label you want to apply – are descriptions of language use –

which like the usage they describe are anything but certain

‘If I point to a curve and say “That’s a circle” then someone can object that if it were not a circle it would no longer be that. That is to say, what I mean by the word “that” must be independent of what I assert about it.’

‘that’ – is a logical space – for description –

‘that’ – is a token for the unknown

‘that’ logically speaking – can be however you describe it –

whatever it is proposed to be

‘“Is it conceivable that two things have all their properties in common?” – If it isn’t conceivable, then neither is its opposite.’?

when we are talking about a ‘thing’ here – we are talking about a proposal –

two things – two proposals

if these proposals are distinguished at all – they are distinguished by proposal – a third proposal

if they are not distinguished propositionally –

what you have two proposals – that – as far as it goes – have their descriptions – in common

‘How are two circles of the same size distinguished? This question makes it sound as if they are pretty nearly one circle and only distinguished by a nicety.

In the technique of representations by equations what is common is expressed by the form of the equation, and the difference by the difference in the coordinates of the centres.

Couldn’t you then say, instead of “this is a circle”, “This point is the centre of a circle”? For to be the centre of a circle is the external property of the point.”

yes you could say ‘this is the centre point of a circle’ –

that would identify one circle – and of the other?

would you say again ‘this is the centre of a circle’?

not if the idea was to distinguish two circles of the same size –

perhaps you would say ‘ … and that is a centre of the other circle’ 

or it might be enough to say – ‘this is a circle and that is a circle’ –

it would depend on context

‘For to be the centre of a circle is the external property of a point’ –

yes – you could say this – but is it to the point?

aren’t you just involved in a reworking of the original question?

‘how do you distinguish two points?’

the point here is that the question can be interpreted in a number of ways –

it’s still the same question –

the reality is we make the distinction – and if we have a mind to – or are asked to –

we attempt to explain the distinction

the explanation – is not the distinction –

granted we may not know how we do what we do – how indeed we distinguish –

and yes we have a go at explaining it

the distinction made – and the explanation of it – are proposals – open to question – to doubt – uncertain

‘All that I am saying comes to this, that O(x) must be an external description of x’

an internal description – an external description – these are descriptions of description

there is no definite description – and there is definite description of description

“We do indeed talk about a circle, its diameter, etc. etc., as if we were describing a concept in complete abstraction from the objects falling under it. – But in that case ‘circle’ is not a predicate in the original sense. And in general geometry is the place where concepts from the most different regions get mixed up together.’

it is common practice to talk about a circle as if we were describing a concept in complete abstraction from the objects falling under it –

this is one way of talking about the proposal ‘circle’ –

and yes – there is a disconnect between this way of talking about a circle – and regarding ‘circle’ in terms of subject and predicate –

there is no conflict here –

what we have here is different approaches to – different interpretations of – different uses of – ‘circle’

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and it is this uncertainty that generates different propositional responses

by the way – it is not just in geometry that ‘concepts of different regions get mixed up together’ –

it’s everywhere –

and I think we are all the better for it –

however whether you agree with this value judgment or not –

it is how it is




© greg t. charlton. 2015.

Thursday, February 05, 2015

Appendix 1. Complex and Fact


a ‘fact’ is an accepted – for whatever reason – proposal

as to ‘act’ –

‘It is natural to want to use the word ‘act’ so that it only corresponds to a true proposition’

a ‘true’ proposition – is the proposition you give your assent to – a false one – you dissent from

any assent or dissent – is open to question – open to doubt –  is uncertain

‘‘That was a noble act’ must have a sense even if I am mistaken in thinking that what I call an act occurred’?

the ‘sense’ of any proposal – any proposition is uncertain –

whether the proposed act occurred or not – is open to question – open to doubt –

what we deal with here is not correct propositions or mistaken propositions – but rather uncertain propositions

if by ‘mistake’ you mean – ‘a new certainty’ –

there are no mistakes –

a so called ‘mistake’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain – is an uncertainty

if I say I have made a mistake – what I am saying is that I have withdrawn – for whatever reason – my assent –  to a proposition –

however my withdrawal of assent – is just as open to question – open to doubt – as the original assent

it is not a bad idea to see propositions as tools –

you pick one up – put it down – pick another one up –

you use whatever is at hand to get to wherever you have in mind

and that – what you have in mind – like the propositions you use – is open to question

this idea of certainty – of certain propositions – of certain methods – of certain goals – bears no relation to reality

certainty is just a useless authoritarian myth – that has done more harm than good –

we don’t need to live in delusional state –

there is the fresh logic – of uncertainty – of possibility

breathe in

a ‘complex’ – is a description – a way of describing – certain propositions

and this – ‘the complex description’ – has its uses –

however the same proposal i.e. ‘flower’ – ‘house’ – ‘constellation’ – can be described as a simple

the issue is how the proposal is to be used

you might ask what is the origin of description?

any answer to this question – and there can be any number of answers – any number of proposals will be like the answer to any question –

open to question – to doubt – uncertain –

we do what we do – and what we do – in every sense of the word – is open to question

to say that a red circle is composed of redness and circularity –

is effectively – to say nothing – to add nothing to the description ‘a red circle’

or perhaps it is meant as a nonsense statement –

which under the right circumstances – might get a laugh –

or perhaps point one to irrelevant verbiage – of philosophers perhaps?

and there might be a point to that –

it is all a question of context – and who and what rules the roost – when it comes to what ‘can’ be said –

here I am pointing not to the significance of logic – but rather the ‘fact’ – if I can use that term – of rhetoric –

that is – what goes for ‘acceptable’ –

the logic of it is that whatever is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt

the rhetoric of it is that – certain proposals – for whatever reason – are dominant –

and hold sway –

to say ‘the fact obtains’ is to say that you endorse the proposition in question

to get right to it –

‘fact’ – is logically speaking – an unnecessary concept –

we can do without it quite easily

really it’s a piece of rhetoric – and as with all rhetoric – logically unnecessary

you give your assent to a proposition – or you dissent from it –

that is all that is necessary

when enough people give their assent – they christen the proposition – a ‘fact’

that is neither here nor there

the proposition with or without this honorific – is open to question – to doubt – is uncertain

‘A chain, too, is composed of its links, not of these and their spatial relations.

The fact that these links are so concatenated, isn’t ‘composed’ of anything at all.

The root of these muddle is the confusing use of the word ‘object’?’

‘object’ is – if you like a meta-description –

which is to say it functions as a logical place for further description

that further description will be a question of use

there is only confusion if you don’t get that ‘object’ – does not have a fixed sense –

a definite meaning

‘The part is smaller than the whole: applied to fact and component par  (constituent), that would yield an absurdity’?

the part is smaller than the whole?

if what is proposed – is not described – or seen in terms of the ‘part and whole’ description –

then that description – will be out of place

the ‘fact’ is a rhetorical devise – the absurdity is to think of it has having any logical significance

‘The schema: thing-property. We say that actions have properties, like swiftness, or goodness’

yes – ‘we say’ – we propose –

the thing-property schema – is a proposed explanation – in this case – of action

any proposal has its place –

and any proposal is open to question – to doubt – is uncertain



© greg t. charlton. 2015.