1. ‘When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly
moved towards something. I saw this and grasped that the
thing was
called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it
out.
Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were
the
natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face,
the play of
the eyes, the movement by other parts of the body, and the
tone of voice
which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having,
rejecting, or
avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used
in their
proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to
understand
what objects they signified; and after I had trained my
mouth to form
these signs, I used them to express my own desires.’
(Augustine, Confessions, I.
8.).
in response to this Wittgenstein says –
‘These words, it seems to me, give a particular picture of
the
essence of human language. It is this: the individual words
in language
name objects – sentences are combinations of such names. –
In this
picture of language we find the roots of the following idea:
Every word
has a meaning. The meaning is correlated with the word. It
is the
object for which the word stands.’
it is fair enough for Wittgenstein to say that ‘These words,
it seems to me, give a particular picture of the essence of human language.’
but this is not Augustine’s claim – he does not propose a
theory of the essence of human language
what he does is describe – or propose – an account of how we
learn to name –
that is he puts forward an account of how we learn a
specific language function – a specific language use –
the specific language use – of naming –
Augustine does not propose that learning to name – is the
‘essence’ of language –
learning to name is a function of language use
further he just does not say that ‘the individual words in a
language name objects’
he talks about the act of naming –
Augustine is not saying that every language act is a naming
act – or that every word is a name
or that sentences ‘are combinations of such names’ –
he does not make these claims
and as to ‘every word has a meaning’ –
Augustine does not refer to ‘meaning’ – or address any
question of meaning
in explaining naming – he refers to words as signs
–
signs that signify objects
‘the object for which the word stands’ – is the object signified –
the object signified is the object named
you might want to argue that to signify is to mean –
Augustine does not say this or argue this
in the above quote Augustine puts forward a behavioural
account of how we learn to name
a behavioural account of how one learns to use words to
name objects
and it should also be noted that he thinks that language is
broader than just the use of words
in the above he refers here to bodily movement – what is
heard – what is seen – the expression of the face – the play of the eyes – the
movement of other parts of the body – the tone of voice as expressing seeking –
rejecting – and avoiding
and he says – ‘bodily movement is the natural language of
all peoples’ –
his theory of language one could say – is a theory of bodily
movement –
bodily movement performed – bodily moved – observed
and so it is a ‘bodily movement’ or a series of bodily
movements – that is the action of naming
‘Augustine does not speak of there being any difference
between
kinds of words. If you describe the learning of language in
this way
you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like
“table”, “chair”,
“bread”, and of people’s names, and only secondarily of the
names
of certain actions and properties; and of the renaming kinds of words as
something that will take care of itself.’
Augustine does not speak of their being any difference between
kinds of words – and that’s really the end of the matter –
he doesn’t address the issue of the difference between kinds
of words
Augustine is concerned here with names and naming
he does not propose a theory of language as such – or a
philosophy of language –
he gives us an account of naming
to suggest otherwise is to verbal him
‘Now think of the following use of language: I send someone
shop-
ping. I give him a slip marked “five red apples”. He takes
the slip to
the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; then
he looks
up the word “red” in a table and finds a colour sample
opposite it;
the he says the series of cardinal numbers – I assume that
he knows
them by heart – up to the word “five” and for each number he
takes an
apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. –
It is in
this and similar ways one operates with words. – “But how
does
he know where and how he is to look up the word “red” and
what is
he to with the word “five”? – Well I assume that he acts
as I have
described.
Explanations come to an end somewhere. – But what is
the meaning of the word “five”? No such thing was in
question here,
only how the word “five” is used.’
‘But what is the meaning of the word ‘five’? – no such thing
was in question here, only how the word ‘five’ is used.’
correct – no such thing was in question –
this so called question of meaning – does not arise as such –
here
and yes – we can say that all we are dealing with is the
question of how words are used
and if use is all that is in question – we can dispense with
the question meaning –
we can dispense with meaning
Wittgenstein says –
‘Explanations come to an end somewhere’ –
well do they?
if the issue is the use of words – surely any ‘explanation’
of use – any account of use – logically speaking – is open to question
and what of the ‘explanation’?
is it not a usage – and open to question?
and does usage come to an end somewhere?
only where you have nothing to say – or nothing is said to
you
2. ‘That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a
primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is
the idea of a language more primitive than ours. Let us imagine a language for
which the description given by
Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for
communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with
building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the
stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use
a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar",
"slab", "beam". A calls them out;—B brings the stone which
he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.——Conceive this as a complete
primitive language’
‘that philosophical concept of meaning’?
first up – Augustine does not refer to meaning or address
any question of meaning –
and furthermore Wittgenstein simply assumes here that we all
know what he is talking about when he says ‘that philosophical concept of
meaning’
Augustine speaks of words signifying objects in the act of
naming
now you might want to argue from this – that signification –
that naming – amounts to a theory of meaning
all very well – but this is not Augustine’s argument
Augustine advances an account of naming – and of how one
learns to name
and yes – you can construct – a primitive language – and line
it up with Augustine’s account of naming –
however Augustine is not proposing ‘the idea of a language
more primitive than ours’
he is putting forward an account of a particular language
behaviour – the act of naming – in natural languages
3. ‘Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of
communication; only not everything that we call a language is this system. And
one has to say this in many cases where the question arises “Is this an appropriate
description or not?” The answer is: “Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this
narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you are claiming to describe.”
It is as if someone where to say: “A game consists of moving
objects about on a surface according to certain rules …” – and we replied: you
seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You can make you definition
correct by restricting it to those games.’
Wittgenstein’s response here to Augustine is misdirected
Augustine in the relevant quote – outlines a behavioural
account of how we learn to name
you can call that a ‘system of communication’ – but it is better
described as an account of naming
it is Augustine who narrowly circumscribes his region of
discourse –
it is Wittgenstein who is suggesting that he doesn’t – and
that therefore he is at fault
Wittgenstein’s argument here is a straw man
Augustine was no straw man – and he was no push over
as to the game analogy –
yes – ‘you can make your definition correct by restricting
it to those games’
or – you can propose a definition of games – that
only applies to board games
and in terms of such a definition – other so called ‘games’
– are no longer regarded or described as 'games' – by those who use this definition
the point being that logically speaking – any term is open
to question – open to definition – open to different definitions
and what determines how a term will be used – is open to
question
we operate with and in contingency – with and in – uncertainty
where a use of a term is non-standard – is different – all
you can say is – so be it
we use language – and any analysis – or description of any
use – is another use of language – and as with any use – open to question
4. ‘Imagine a script in which the letters were used to stand
for sounds, and also as signs of emphasis and punctuation. (A script can be
conceived as a language for describing sound-patterns.) Now imagine someone
interpreting that script as if there were simply a correspondence of letters to
sounds and as if the letters had not also completely different functions.
Augustine's conception of language is like such an over-simple conception of the
script.’
yes you can imagine someone interpreting that script as if
there were simply a correspondence of letters to sounds – as if the letters had
not completely different functions
and relative to another interpretation – such an interpretation
may well be regarded as an over-simplification of the script
all you have here is two – different interpretations
and presumably if they are to function – they function in different
contexts – have different uses
Wittgenstein’s argument here does not bear on Augustine’s
account of naming
we can say that naming is not all there is to language use –
and I suspect Augustine would be the first to agree – and
would see Wittgenstein’s argument in relation to what he has said regarding naming
– as amateurish and misconstrued
the more general point is this –
we will have – and do have – different accounts of the
nature of language – and these different accounts serve different purposes –
have different functions – different uses
5. ‘If we look at the example in §1, we may perhaps get an
inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of a word surrounds the
working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. It
disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application
in which one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words.
A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns
to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training.’
Augustine’s account of naming –
is not a ‘primitive kind of application’ of language
it is a focus on – an account of – and description of – a particular
function of language – the function of naming
Augustine does not present his account of naming and
learning to name – as ‘primitive’
he presents it as a natural phenomenon – ‘as it were the
natural phenomenon of all peoples’
this notion of ‘primitive’ – is Wittgenstein’s – and that’s
fair enough – but it is not Augustine’s
does a child use ‘primitive forms’ when it learns to talk?
what are these forms – and what makes them ‘primitive’?
Wittgenstein doesn’t have anything to say here – he assumes
you will just accept his
pronouncement
it strikes me that Augustine’s account of learning to talk
has more going for it –
‘When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly
moved towards something. I saw this and grasped that the thing was called by
the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was
shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all
peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement by other
parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in
seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words
repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt
to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to
form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.’
the child learns to talk by observing and listening to
others and copying their behaviour
6. ‘We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole
language of A and B; even
the whole language of a tribe. The children are brought up
to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in
this way to the words of others. An important part of the training will consist
in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to
them, and at the same time uttering a word; for
instance, the word "slab" as he points to that
shape. (I do not want to call this "ostensive definition", because
the child cannot as yet ask what the name is. I will call it "ostensive
teaching of words".——I say that it will form an important part of the
training, because it is so with human beings; not because it
could not be imagined otherwise.) This ostensive teaching of words can be said
to establish an association between the word and the thing. But what does this
mean? Well, it may mean various things; but one very likely thinks first of all
that a picture of the object comes before the child's mind when it hears the
word. But now, if this does happen—is it the
purpose of the word?—Yes, it may be the purpose.—I can
imagine such a use of
words (of series of sounds). (Uttering a word is like
striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination.) But in the language of §2
it is not the purpose of the words to evoke images. (It may, of course, be
discovered that that helps to attain the actual
purpose.)
But if the ostensive teaching has this effect,—am I to say that
it effects an understanding of the word? Don't you understand the call "Slab!"
if you act upon it in such-and-such a way?—Doubtless the ostensive teaching
helped to bring this about; but only together with a particular training. With
different training the same ostensive teaching of these words would have
effected a quite different understanding.
"I set the brake up by connecting up rod and
lever."—Yes, given the whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in
conjunction with that is it a brake-lever, and separated from its support it is
not even a lever; it may be anything, or nothing.’
‘With different training the same ostensive teaching of
these words would have effected a quite different understanding’ –
not all learning to understand will be a result of ‘training’
– as such
and in any case any so called ‘training’ needs to be seen in
a broader context of observation and imitation
Augustine proposes a broader – less defined context – where
we learn from observation
‘I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the
sound …Their intention was shown by their bodily movements … Thus I heard words
used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to
understand what they signified; and after that I trained my mouth to form these
signs, I used them to express my own desires’
Augustine is not proposing here that this learning results
in a definitive or final understanding –
no doubt he would agree with Wittgenstein sentiments in –
‘With different training the same ostensive teaching of
these words would have effected a quite different understanding’
though I think Augustine would say something like – in
different circumstances – with different observations – we will have different
understandings
so there may well be training in the learning of words –
but that training is only one context – and one set of observations
we have different understandings in different contexts
and our understandings – as with our language use – is
on-going –
7. ‘In the practice of the use of language (2) one party
calls out the words, the other acts on them. In instruction in the language the
following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is, he utters
the word when the teacher points to the stone.—And there will be this still
simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the teacher——both of these
being processes resembling language. We can also think of the whole process of
using words in (2) as one of those games by means of which children learn their
native language. I will call these games "language-games" and will sometimes
speak of a primitive language as a language-game. And the processes of naming
the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called
language-games. Think of much of the use of words in games like
ring-a-ring-a-roses. I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and
the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game".’
what we have here is a characterization – an account – a
theory of language acquisition – the game theory
can you be playing a game without knowing it is a game?
can you be playing a game without knowing the rules of the
game?
apparently you can according to Wittgenstein –
I find this a bit of stretch
I would agree that some language behaviour can profitably be
termed ‘game playing’
however it strikes me that this model is way too simplistic
to account for much of our language behaviour
for one it takes no account of genuine critical language use
– where i.e. – so called ‘language-games’
– are put to question put to doubt –
or where the very idea of the language-game – is critically
evaluated
‘one party calls out the words, the other acts on them’ –
well that does fit the general notion of game playing –
however there are other ways of interpreting such behaviour
i.e. you could well regard it in terms of a stimulus
response model – or you could see it in Augustine’s terms – as learning the
language of bodily movement – the expression of the face – the play of the eyes
– the movement of other parts of the body – the tone of voice etc
or you might even say – it is just learning to give
instruction – and follow instruction
you can decide to view language acquisition in terms of
Wittgenstein’s game model –
just as you can interpret it in terms of Augustine’s
perspective
however the epistemological reality is that the phenomenon
of language behaviour –
as with any phenomenon – is open to interpretation
and any interpretation – any account – any theory – is open
to question
in the absence of interpretation – the phenomenon – is an unknown
to interpret – is to make known
the issue then – broadly speaking I think must be – which
interpretation – which account – which theory – serves which purpose?
8. ‘Let us now look at an expansion of language (2). Besides
the four words "block", "pillar", etc., let it contain a
series of words used as the shopkeeper in (i) used the numerals (it can be the
series of letters of the alphabet); further, let there be two words, which may
as well be "there" and "this" (because this roughly indicates
their purpose), that are used in connexion with a pointing gesture; and finally
a number of colour samples. A gives an order like: "d—slab—there". At
the same time he shews the assistant a colour sample, and when he says
"there" he points to a place on the building site. From the stock of
slabs B takes one for each letter of the alphabet up to "d", of the
same colour as the sample, and brings them to the place indicated by
A.—On other occasions A gives the order
"this—there". At "this" he points to a building stone. And
so on.’
what we have here is an analysis of an instruction given and
the instruction received and executed – similar to the one put in language (2)
but with the addition of the words
‘this’ and ‘there’
Wittgenstein in this model he is developing is putting the view
that to understand language behaviour we must begin with some form of so called
primitive usage – and from that build up
to more complex formulations
the problem with such an approach – such an analytical
approach – for one – is that the choice of primitive must be arbitrary
and if that is so – if it is arbitrary – and how else can it
be? – it will have no general application
which is fine – if you understand that no theoretical
construct will suit all purposes –
but I get the impression that Wittgenstein imagines he is developing
a model that will apply to all language use –
and if indeed that is what he thinks – his approach to
language is rigid and narrow minded
the idea of building up a language from scratch might suit
the purposes of a linguist – or a grammarian – but even these practitioners I
am sure would understand the limitations of such exercise as a general account
of language use
from the point of view of language use in general – it comes
off as artificial –
9. ‘When a child learns this language, it has to learn the
series, of
'numerals' a, b, c, . . . by heart. And it has to learn their
use.—Will
this training include ostensive teaching of the words?—Well,
people
will, for example, point to slabs and count: "a, b, c
slabs".—
Something more like the ostensive teaching of the words
"block",
"pillar", etc. would be the ostensive teaching of
numerals that serve
not to count but to refer to groups of objects that can be
taken in at
a glance. Children do learn the use of the first five or six
cardinal
numerals in this way.
Are "there" and "this" also taught
ostensively?—Imagine how one
might perhaps teach their use. One will point to places and
things—
but in this case the pointing occurs in the use of the words
too and not
merely in learning the use.— ’
yes – children – people – can be – and are – trained – to
use a language
what Wittgenstein outlines above is a method of
teaching and learning language
however just how people learn language – wherever and
whenever – is actually an empirical question –
we need to keep an open mind on the matter – and be prepared
to study the way language is taught and learnt –
and to consider different theories – different perspectives
I would think any worthwhile theory will be solidly based in
observation
and any empirical theory will be open to question
what we get from Augustine is a different theory to that
advanced by Wittgenstein
and Augustine puts his behavioural account as a report from his
observation – of learning by observation –
he does not mention or consider training
‘I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the
sound they uttered ….’
it’s a fair enough argument and a sensible perspective
nevertheless Augustine’s theory too – is open to question
in any case I think we can say that not all language
acquisition is a result of training
that I think is fairly obvious
as to ‘there’ and ‘this’ – and ostensive learning – where
the pointing occurs in the use of these words –
as Augustine argues we learn by observing bodily movements –
which includes both the use of the words – that is – the vocalisation and the sounds
made – and the physical act of pointing
10. ‘Now what do the words of this language signify?— What
is
supposed to shew what they signify, if not the kind of use
they have?
And we have already described that. So we are asking for the
expression
"This word signifies this" to be made a part of
the description. In
other words the description ought to take the form:
"The word ....
signifies . . . .".
Of course, one can reduce the description of the use of the word
"slab" to the statement that this word signifies
this object. This will
be done when, for example, it is merely a matter of removing
the
mistaken idea that the word "slab" refers to the
shape of building-stone
that we in fact call
a "block"—but the kind of 'referring this is, that is to
say the use of these words for the rest, is already known.
Equally one can say that the signs "a",
"b", etc. signify numbers;
when for example this removes the mistaken idea that
"a", "b", "c",
play the part actually played in language by "block",
"slab", "pillar".
And one can also say that "c" means this number
and not that one;
when for example this serves to explain that the letters are
to be used
in the order a, b, c, d, etc. and not in the order a, b, d,
c.
But assimilating the descriptions of the uses of words in
this way
cannot make the uses themselves any more like one another.
For,
as we see, they are absolutely unlike.’
‘Now what do the words of this language signify?—
logically speaking what they signify is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
‘What is supposed to shew what they signify, if not the kind
of use they have?’
well even here the ‘kind of use they have’ – is not set in
stone –
what use they have will depend on the circumstances in which
they are used
and even then – any proposal of use will be open to question
this idea that we are to understand language in terms of its
use – really tells us nothing
it is straight out obvious that language is used
well you can leave it there – and say – nothing more to say
or you can recognise that use is open to question – open to
doubt –
and logically speaking – uncertain
the task then – if there is a task – is to keep an open mind
– and not fall into the trap of dogmatism – even if it is over a word
11. ‘Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer,
pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws.—The
functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in
both cases there are similarities.)
Of course, what confuses us is
the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script
and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly.
Especially when we are doing philosophy.’
‘The functions of words are as diverse as the
functions of these objects’ –
I don’t know that we can legislate this –
might it not be the case that there is a word that
has only one function –
i.e. the conjunction ‘and’?
my point here is that use determines function – and
if a word was to have only one use – in
practise – then in practice it has
only one function
be that as it may – the issue can only be properly addressed
as an empirical matter –
and this I might add was Augustine’s view
the logical point however is just that any use – any
function – is open to question –
and we can say from this that the use or function of a term –
logically speaking – is uncertain
‘Of course, what confuses us is the uniform
appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print.
For their application is not presented to us so clearly.’
when we hear them spoken or meet them in script or
print –
we hear them and meet them in a context – a
language context
and it will be in terms of such context that their
application will be proposed –
and within this context there will be to varying
degrees – questions – and uncertainties
in any language use we operate with uncertainty –
and we proceed with uncertainty
and by the way – doing philosophy is no different to any
other propositional activity
the propositions of philosophy – are open to question –
and are logically speaking – uncertain
12. ‘It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. We
see handles
all looking more or less alike. (Naturally, since they are
all supposed to
be handled.) But one is the handle of a crank which can be
moved
continuously (it regulates the opening of a valve); another
is the
handle of a switch, which has only two effective positions,
it is either off
or on; a third is the handle of a brake-lever, the harder
one pulls on it,
the harder it brakes; a fourth, the handle of a pump: it has
an effect only
so long as it is moved to and fro.’
handles in a locomotive cabin – only look more or less alike
– until you know what they are used for –
and their use is defined – i.e. a crank is not a valve
as to words – they don’t look more or less alike – unless you
have the same word repeated –
they look different – because they are different
and furthermore they function differently – in different
contexts – different language contexts –
contexts that are ever changing
the levers in the locomotive cabin – have one function or
set of functions –
and the context of the locomotive cabin is set
language use is not ‘mechanical’ –
this mechanical analogy is really just the old Wittgenstein
– the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus – remixed and rebooted
13. ‘When we say: "Every word in language signifies something"
we have so far said nothing whatever; unless we have
explained
exactly what distinction we wish to make. (It might
be, of course, that
we wanted to distinguish the words of language (8) from words
'with-
out meaning' such as occur in Lewis Carroll’s poems, or
words like
"Lilliburlero" in songs.)’
any statement is a
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
as to –‘Every word in language signifies something’ –
this statement –
will need to be subjected to critical analysis – if it is to be functional
the kind of
questions we will ask here are i.e. –
what is to count as
a ‘language’ here?
what is it to
‘signify’?
and what is to count
as ‘something’?
unless these questions
are given some kind of answer or answers –
and the statement
can be placed in a context or contexts –
it will not be
functional
and any ‘distinctions’
to be made will be made in this critical
phase
perhaps the above
statement is meant as a philosophical proposal – the very point of which is to
initiate a critical discussion of language – signification – and ontology?
as to ‘words without
meaning’ such as occur in Lewis Carroll’s poems or a word like
‘Lilliburlero’ –
exactly the same applies – they need to be critically
examined
we need to ask what function these terms have – in the
contexts in which they appear – in the contexts in which they are used?
perhaps their value lies in the fact that they do not
conform to standard grammatical practice – and for that reason they delight?
14. ‘Imagine someone's
saying: "All tools serve to modify some-
thing. Thus the hammer modifies the position of the nail,
the saw the
shape of the board, and so on."—And what is modified by
the rule, the
glue-pot, the nails?—"Our knowledge of a thing's
length, the tempera-
ture of the glue, and the solidity of the box."——Would
anything be
gained by this assimilation of expressions?— ’
we can’t answer this question – in a propositional /
contextual void
we would need to know why the first statement was made – and
then why the supplementary statements were made –
if the point of the making of the supplementary statements –
was to show that they unnecessary – that is a philosophical point is being made
– as would seem to be the case here – then perhaps something is gained by
assimilating the expressions to make this point?
again it all depends on context
15. ‘The word
"to signify" is perhaps used in the most straight-
forward way when the object signified is marked with the
sign. Suppose
that the tools A uses in building bear certain marks. When A
shews his
assistant such a mark, he brings the tool that has that mark
on it.
It is in this and more or less similar ways that a name
means and is
given to a thing.—It will often prove useful in philosophy
to say to
ourselves: naming something is like attaching a label to a
thing.’
yes – naming as labelling –
I don’t think Augustine would argue with this – but what we
get from Augustine is a more sophisticated analysis of the naming process
it is worthwhile repeating the opening quote from Augustine
that Wittgenstein uses at the very start of this discussion
‘When they (my elders)
named some object, and accordingly
moved towards something.
I saw this and grasped that the thing was
called by the sound
they uttered when they meant to point it out.
Their intention was
shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the
natural language of
all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of
the eyes, the movement
by other parts of the body, and the tone of voice
which expresses our
state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or
avoiding something.
Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their
proper places in
various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand
what objects they
signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form
these signs, I used
them to express my own desires.’
(Augustine, Confessions,
I. 8.).
yes – naming may well be a labelling – but learning the business
of labelling involves observation – hypotheses regarding intention – analysis
of bodily movement – and imitation –
from Wittgenstein we just get the end result – labelling –
he provides no account of how we get there –
Augustine on the other hand proposes a detailed and comprehensive
account of the processes involved
16. ‘What about the colour samples that A shews to B: are
they
part of the language? Well, it is as you please. They
do not belong
among the words; yet when I say to someone: "Pronounce
the word
'the' ", you will count the second "the" as
part of the sentence. Yet it
has a role just like that of a colour-sample in
language-game (8); that is,
it is a sample of what the other is meant to say.
It is most natural, and causes least confusion, to reckon
the samples
among the instruments of the language.
((Remark on the reflexive pronoun "this sentence".))’
we are best to speak of propositions – instead of words or
sentences –
and propositional complexes – instead of languages
colour samples – as with the words in a language – are
proposals – that is propositions – in a propositional complex
and yes a proposition can function as a ‘sample’ – ‘of what
the other is meant to say’
or even be regarded as a direction – in the sense of a
command
it is not so much that the sample is an instrument of the
language –
it is rather a propositional use – within a propositional
complex
and as to the reflexive pronoun – a propositional function
17. ‘It will be possible to say: In language (8) we have different
kinds
of word. For the functions of the word
"slab" and the word "block"
are more alike than those of "slab" and
"d". But how we group
words into kinds will depend on the aim of the classification,—and
on
our own inclination.
Think of the different points of view from which one can
classify
tools or chess-men.’
the aim of the classification?
and so classification is just a game with words
language is a phenomena – and worthy of study – hence – classification –
but really all we are talking about here is different usages
–
so classification games – are no more than a generation of different
usages –
which will be relevant for different purposes –
purposes – such as the philosophical analysis of language
use
18. ‘Do not be troubled by the fact that languages (2) and
(8)
consist only of orders. If you want to say that this shews
them to be
incomplete, ask yourself whether our language is
complete;—whether
it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation
of the
infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these
are, so to speak,
suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets
does it
take before a town begins to be a town?) Our language can be
seen
as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of
old and new
houses, and of houses with additions from various periods;
and this
surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight
regular
streets and uniform houses.’
‘language’ – is proposition – and proposition – proposal
–
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
–
is this uncertainty – that is the ground and basis of the indeterminacy
of language –
the ground and basis of its complexity and it creativity
19. ‘It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of
orders and
reports in battle.—Or a language consisting only of questions
and
expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others.——
And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.
But what about this: is the call "Slab!" in
example (2) a sentence or a
word?—If a word, surely it has not the same meaning as the
like-
sounding word of our ordinary language, for in §2 it is a call.
But if a
sentence, it is surely not the elliptical sentence:
"Slab!" of our
language.——As far as the first question goes you can call
"Slab!" a
word and also a sentence; perhaps it could be appropriately
called a
'degenerate sentence' (as one speaks of a degenerate
hyperbola);
in fact it is our 'elliptical' sentence.—But that is surely
only a shortened
form of the sentence "Bring me a slab", and there
is no such sentence in
example (2).—But why should I not on the contrary have
called the
sentence "Bring me a slab" a lengthening of
the sentence "Slab!"?—
Because if you shout "Slab!" you really mean:
"Bring me a slab".—
But how do you do this: how do you mean that while you say
"Slab!"?
Do you say the unshortened sentence to yourself? And why should
I
translate the call "Slab!" into a different
expression in order to say
what someone means by it? And if they mean the same
thing—why
should I not say: "When he says 'Slab!' he means 'Slab!'"?
Again, if you
can mean "Bring me the slab", why should you not
be able to mean
"Slab!"?——But when I call "Slab!", then
what I want is, that he should
bring me a slab! ——Certainly, but does 'wanting this'
consist in thinking
in some form or other a different sentence from the one you
utter?— ’
language is proposal
– of whatever kind –
and any proposal –
any proposition – any propositional complex – is open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain
it is the logical
uncertainty of the proposal – that is the ground of its action – its flexibility
– and the creativity inherent in its use and practise
different languages
– different ‘forms of life’?
the idea of form
here – suggests a defined – even an un-changing – practice
if that is what Wittgenstein
has in mind here – he is not talking about language –
or his notion of language
– is not a form of life – rather a form of the absence of life
any so called form
of language – of life – is open to question – is open to doubt – and is essentially
– uncertain
the life of language
– rests in its uncertainty –
the life of ‘forms’
rests in their uncertainty
forms and
formulations have real function in language use –
but they are not to
be mistaken for the ground of language
forms and formulations
– are propositional utilities
the call "Slab!"
– is a logically speaking – a proposal –
and a proposal – as indeed Wittgenstein’s discussion here
demonstrates – that is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain
the point being any conception of the term – or any use of the term – any formulation of
the term – will – logically speaking be open to question
this not to say that we don’t proceed with a use –
only that we recognise that our use of this term – is open
to question
20. ‘But now it looks as if when someone says "Bring me
a slab" he
could mean this expression as one long word corresponding to
the single
word "Slabl"——Then can one mean it sometimes as
one word and
sometimes as four? And how does one usually mean it?——I think
we shall be inclined to say: we mean the sentence as four
words when we
use it in contrast with other sentences such as "Hand
me a slab",
"Bring him a slab", "Bring two
slabs", etc.; that is, in contrast with
sentences containing the separate words of our command in
other
combinations.——But what does using one sentence in contrast with
others consist in? Do the others, perhaps, hover before
one's mind?
All of them? And while one is saying the one
sentence, or before, or
afterwards?—No. Even if such an explanation rather tempts
us, we
need only think for a moment of what actually happens in
order to see
that we are going astray here. We say that we use the command
in
contrast with other sentences because our language
contains the possibility
of those other sentences. Someone who did not understand our
language, a foreigner, who had fairly often heard someone
giving the
order: "Bring me a slab!", might believe that this
whole series of
sounds was one word corresponding perhaps to the word for
"building-stone" in his language. If he himself
had then given this
order perhaps he would have pronounced it differently, and we
should
say: he pronounces it so oddly because he takes it for a single
word.——
But then, is there not also something different going on in
him when he
pronounces it,—something corresponding to the fact that he
conceives
the sentence as a single word?——Either the same thing
may go
on in him, or something different. For what goes on in you when
you
give such an order? Are you conscious of its consisting of four
words
while you are uttering it? Of course you have a mastery
of this language
—which contains those other sentences as well—but is this having
a
mastery something that happens while you are uttering
the sentence?—
And I have admitted that the foreigner will probably
pronounce a
sentence differently if he conceives it differently; but
what we call
his wrong conception need not lie in anything that
accompanies the
utterance of the command.
The sentence is 'elliptical', not because it leaves out
something that
we think when we utter it, but because it is shortened—in
comparison
with a particular paradigm of our grammar.—Of course one
might
object here: "You grant that the shortened and the
unshortened
sentence have the same sense.—What is this sense, then?
Isn't there a
verbal expression for this sense?"——But doesn't the
fact that sen-
tences have the same sense consist in their having the same use?—
(In
Russian one says "stone red" instead of "the
stone is red"; do they feel
the copula to be missing in the sense, or attach it in thought?)’
‘And I have admitted that the foreigner will probably pronounce
a
sentence differently if he conceives it differently; but what
we call
his wrong conception need not lie in anything that accompanies
the
utterance of the command.’
there is no right or wrong conception – no right or wrong
use for that matter –
there is only different conceptions – different
uses
yes – you can – as I think Wittgenstein does here – say ‘we
have the utterance – nothing to see here’
and in a sense he is right –
but he is right so long as questions are not asked – doubts
not raised – and uncertainties are not explored
"You grant that the shortened and the unshortened sentence
have the same sense.—What is this sense, then? Isn't there a verbal expression
for this sense?"——But doesn't the fact that sentences have the same sense
consist in their having the same use?’
what is this sense?
–
well there could be
any number of answers to this question
and the ‘same use’?
any language use –
is open to interpretation – open to question
you can decide – for
whatever reason – that sentences you believe have the same sense – have the
same use –
no big deal –
but as with any
proposal – this decision – is open to question
21. ‘Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports
the
number of slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colours and
shapes of the
building-stones that are stacked in such-and-such a place.—Such
a
report might run: "Five slabs". Now what is the
difference between
the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order
"Five slabs!"?—
Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the
language-
game. No doubt the tone of voice and the look with which
they are
uttered, and much else besides, will also be different. But
we could
also imagine the tone's being the same—for an order and a
report
can be spoken in a variety of tones of voice and with
various expressions
of face—the difference being only in the application. (Of
course, we
might use the words "statement" and
"command" to stand for
grammatical forms of sentence and intonations; we do in fact
call
"Isn't the weather glorious to-day?" a question, although
it is used as a
statement.) We could imagine a language in which all
statements had
the form and tone of rhetorical questions; or every command
the form
of the question "Would you like to . . .?". Perhaps
it will then be said:
"What he says has the form of a question but is really a
command",—
that is, has the function of a command in the technique of
using the
language. (Similarly one says "You will do this"
not as a prophecy
but as a command. What makes it the one or the other?)’
‘Now what is the difference between the report or statement
"Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?— Well, it is the
part which uttering these words plays in the language-game.’ –
the real issue here is that ‘five slabs’ – out of context –
has no significance –
it is only in terms of a propositional context that ‘five
slabs’ – will have significance
and only in terms of a propositional context that the two occurrences
of ‘five slabs’ will be distinguished
calling this ‘playing a language-game’ – is ok – but it is
simplistic and naïve –
and Wittgenstein uses simplistic and naïve language
behaviour to this end
the real action of any language use is critical –
we make assessments and decisions about how we understand
what is proposed
and if we operate rationally – with an open mind – we are
live to the fact that our assessments and decisions are open to question – are
provisional
‘(Similarly one says "You will do this" not as a
prophecy but as a command. What makes it the one or the other?)’ –
well the point really is that we can’t speak objectively
here –
that is to say we can’t make a pronouncement that will apply
universally – i.e. – in all circumstances
in any situation – our assessment – can only be regarded as
imperfect – as uncertain
22. ‘Frege's idea that every assertion contains an
assumption, which
is the thing that is asserted, really rests on the possibility
found in our
language of writing every statement in the form: "It is
asserted that
such-and-such is the case."—But "that
such-and-such is the case" is
not a sentence in our language—so far it is not a move in the
language-
game. And if I write, not "It is asserted that . . .
.", but "It is asserted:
such-and-such is the case", the words "It is
asserted" simply become
superfluous.
We might very well also write every statement in the form of
a
question followed by a "Yes"; for instance:
"Is it raining? Yes!"
Would this shew that every statement contained a question?
Of course we have the right to use an assertion sign in
contrast with
a question-mark, for example, or if we want to distinguish
an assertion
from a fiction or a supposition. It is only a mistake if one
thinks that
the assertion consists of two actions, entertaining and
asserting
(assigning the truth-value, or something of the kind), and
that in
performing these actions we follow the prepositional sign
roughly as
we sing from the musical score. Reading the written sentence
loud or
soft is indeed comparable with singing from a musical score,
but
'meaning (thinking) the sentence that is read is not.
Frege's assertion sign marks the beginning of the sentence.
Thus its
function is like that of the full-stop. It distinguishes the
whole period
from a clause within the period. If I hear someone say
"it's raining" but
do not know whether I have heard the beginning and end of
the
period, so far this sentence does not serve to tell me
anything.’
a proposition is a proposal – a proposal of a state of
affairs –
the state of affairs proposed – is not the ‘assumption’ of
the proposition – it is the proposal –
you may argue that a proposition is based on an assumption –
but the assumption is not the proposition
and any proposed assumption – is a separate proposal – a
proposal in relation to the subject proposal
as I see it what we deal with – what we work with is the
proposal – is the proposition
and any response to a proposition – to a proposal –
including any analysis of a proposition – is another proposal – another
proposition
‘It is asserted that’ –
you could say reports the event of the assertion – of
the proposal –
we can imagine a circumstance where among those involved –
it was not known that the assertion has been made –
and in that case ‘It is asserted that’ might well be
relevant
however if whether or not the assertion has been made – is
not at issue – where all that we are interested in is the assertion –
‘it is asserted that’ – would be superfluous – and no more
than a figure of speech
an assertion – at base is a proposal –
any proposal put is – to use Wittgenstein’s phrase – ‘entertained’
–
which is to say logically speaking – it is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
‘assigning the truth value or something of the kind’ – is to
propose in relation to the subject proposition –
it is to put a supplementary proposal
this ‘pre-positional sign’ – is logically irrelevant
and yes – the best you can say for Frege’s assertion sign –
is that it is a punctuation mark
and the question is where might it have function?
perhaps in some artificial language – not I think in any
natural language –
in any case it has no logical value
23. ‘But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say
assertion,
question, and command?—There are countless kinds:
countless different
kinds of use of what we call "symbols",
"words", "sentences". And
this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for
all; but new
types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come
into
existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We
can get a
rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)
Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring
into prominence
the fact that the speaking of language is part of an
activity, or of a form
of life.
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following
examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its
measurements-
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
Reporting an event—
Speculating about an event—
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a particular
stance. Now,
this picture can be used to tell someone how he should
stand, should
hold himself; or how he should not hold himself; or how a
particular
man did stand in such-and-such a place; and so on. One might
(using
the language of chemistry) call this picture a proposition-radical.
This will be how Frege thought of the
"assumption".
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forming and testing a hypothesis—
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables
and diagrams—
Making up a story; and reading it—
Play-acting—
Singing catches—
Guessing riddles—
Making a joke; telling it—
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
Translating from one language into another—
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools
in language
and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of
word and
sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of
language.
(Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)’
how many kinds of proposals – of propositions are there?
there are as many as are proposed – and so the question of how
many is rather pointless
I don’t think that the notion of ‘language-game’ is an apt
description of propositional reality
we may play games – with language – but game playing is of
secondary importance and significance in propositional life
the engine – if you like of propositional reality is the
critical process
propositions are proposals – open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
it is this uncertainty that drives change and creativity –
it is the logical force and power of propositional life
Wittgenstein’s example of a picture of boxer in a particular
stance – well illustrates my point –
we can interpret this picture – this proposal – it an any
number of ways –
and any proposal put in relation to this picture / proposal
– is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
Wittgenstein suggests that this is how Frege thought of ‘assumption’
from this I take it that Frege thought that all the
different interpretations that could be given to such a picture / proposition –
are assumptions of the picture / proposition –
that the proposition in some sense ‘contains’ all possible
views of it –
this is just rubbish
any view of a proposition – of a proposal – is a proposal –
a proposition put – in relation to it
we put forward interpretations – and we put forward
proposals in relation to our interpretation –
we question – we doubt – we explore propositional
uncertainty
propositional life is an on-going critical activity
what logicians have to say – about the structure of language
–
is as with what anyone has to say about anything –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
24. ‘If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games
in view
you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like:
"What is a question?"
—Is it the statement that I do not know such-and-such, or
the state-
ment that I wish the other person would tell me . . . .? Or
is it the
description of my mental state of uncertainty?—And is the
cry "Help!"
such a description?
Think how many different kinds of thing are called
"description":
description of a body's position by means of its co-ordinates;
description
of a facial expression; description of a sensation of touch;
of a mood.
Of course it is possible to substitute the form of statement
or
description for the usual form of question: "I want to
know whether
. . . ." or "I am in doubt whether . . .
."—but this does not bring the
different language-games any closer together.
The significance of such possibilities of transformation,
for example
of turning all statements into sentences beginning "I
think" or "I
believe" (and thus, as it were, into descriptions of my
inner life) will
become clearer in another place. (Solipsism.)’
to define all language activity in terms of the
language-game – is to restrict the understanding of language to one form – to
one formula –
and this approach to language is reminiscent of the approach
taken in the Tractatus
propositional activity – propositional reality – is open
–
open to question – to doubt – to interpretation
there is nothing wrong with the notion of the language-game
– but it is just one way of seeing – of interpreting language use
no doubt it has its uses – but these uses do not exhaust the
possibilities of interpretation of language behaviour – the possibilities of
understanding language use
the language-game is a proposal – and as with any proposal –
any proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
Wittgenstein in illustrating his concept of the
language-game – puts the question – ‘what is a question? – and he puts a number
of questions that can be asked – about this question
and he goes on to say
‘Think of how many different kinds of thing are called “description”.’
these questions here – are critical questions –
the point is that the question – can be looked at from a
number of different points of view – and that that there are any number of
different ways of approaching the notion of description
you don’t need the framework of ‘language-games’ to do this
– you don’t need any framework to do this –
all you need to do is put these notions to question – to
doubt – and to explore their uncertainty –
it is this exploration that opens up any issue – and leads
to new and interesting proposals
proposals – that like the subjects proposals – are open to
question
as to – ‘I want to know whether …’ – or ‘I am in doubt
whether’ – ‘I think’ – ‘I believe’
the basic point is that it is the proposition –
whatever that may be – that is put –
the proposition is open – open to question – open to doubt –
and is uncertain –
regardless of who puts the proposition
logically speaking the ‘I’ does not exist
25. ‘It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because
they lack
the mental capacity. And this means: "they do not
think, and that is
why they do not talk." But—they simply do not talk. Or
to put it
better: they do not use language—if we except the most primitive
forms
of language.—Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting,
are as
much a part of our natural history as walking, eating,
drinking, playing’
just what is to count as language – is in fact – an open
question
clearly any sounds made by non-human animals – is not human
language
do some animals communicate with us? –
yes – in very basic ways
do animals of the same species communicate with each other?
it seems so
do animals think?
I am pretty sure my cat lily does –
I see her working out cat problems – like how to get outside
– how to make known she wants food
and in solving these and other problems she will make sounds
–
which I take to be using a language – as the sounds very
according to the circumstances she finds herself in
and yes – our use of language – is as natural as anything
else we do
26. ‘One thinks that learning language consists in giving
names to
objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains,
to
moods, to numbers, etc. . To repeat—naming is something like
attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory
to the
use of a word. But what is it a preparation for?’
it is not preparatory –
it is the use of the word –
it is language usage
27. ‘"We name things and then we can talk about them:
can refer
to them in talk."—As if what we did next were given
with the mere
act of naming. As if there were only one thing called
"talking about a
thing". Whereas in fact we do the most various things
with our
sentences. Think of exclamations alone, with their
completely different
functions.
Water!
Away!
Ow!
Help!
Fine!
No!
Are you inclined still to call these words "names of objects"?
In languages (2) and (8) there was no such thing as asking
something's name. This, with its correlate, ostensive
definition, is, we
might say, a language-game on its own. That is really to say:
we are
brought up, trained, to ask: "What is that called?"—upon
which the
name is given. And there is also a language-game of
inventing a name
for something, and hence of saying, "This is ...
." and then using the
new name. (Thus, for example, children give names to their
dolls
and then talk about them and to them. Think in this
connexion how
singular is the use of a person's name to call him!)’
to name is to identify a propositional place – to which any
further proposal – is to be directed
identification here
– like the propositional place – is a proposal
and we can say that
the act of naming – gives us propositional focus
an exclamation is at
base an undefined proposal –
just how it is
interpreted is really a question of context
attaching the exclamation
mark to a word – gives us a hint at context – but only a hint
and of course any
name can be exclaimed
as to the words
Wittgenstein lists above with exclamation marks –
I really don’t think
attaching exclamation marks to them is relevant to the question of naming
the question is – could
these words be seen as names?
I think – yes –
but I am not saying
that these words are the names of objects –
I am saying they
could be regarded as – identifying propositional places – for further propositional action
naming as ‘a language-game
on its own’?
I would say naming
is a propositional action – one among many –
a propositional
action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
28. ‘Now one can ostensively define a proper name, the name
of a colour, the
name of a material, a numeral, the name of a point of the
compass and so on.
The definition of the number two, "That is called 'two'
"—pointing to two nuts—
is perfectly exact.—But how can two be defined like that?
The person one gives
the definition to doesn't know what one wants to call
"two"; he will suppose that
"two" is the name given to this group of nuts!——He
may suppose this; but
perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite mistake;
when I want to assign
a name to this group of nuts, he might understand it as a
numeral. And he might
equally well take the name of a person, of which I give an
ostensive definition,
as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a point of the
compass. That is to say: an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in
every case.’
yes – an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in
every case –
but this is not peculiar to the ostensive definition –
such is the case with any definition
the ostensive definition – as with a verbal definition is
a proposal – a proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
29. ‘Perhaps you say: two can only be ostensively defined in
this
way: "This number is called 'two'". For the word
"number" here
shews what place in language, in grammar, we assign to the
word.
But this means that the word "number" must be
explained before the
ostensive definition can be understood.—The word
"number" in the
definition does indeed shew this place; does shew the post
at which we
station the word. And we can prevent misunderstandings by
saying:
"This colour is called so-and-so", "This length
is called so-and-so",
and so on. That is to say: misunderstandings are sometimes
averted in
this way. But is there only one way of taking the word
"colour" or
"length"?—Well, they just need defining.—Defining,
then, by means
of other words! And what about the last definition in this
chain?
(Do not say: "There isn't a 'last' definition".
That is just as if you chose
to say: "There isn't a last house in this road; one can
always build an
additional one".)
Whether the word "number" is necessary in the ostensive
definition
depends on whether without it the other person takes the
definition
otherwise than I wish. And that will depend on the
circumstances
under which it is given, and on the person I give it to.
And how he 'takes' the definition is seen in the use that he
makes of
the word defined.’
‘one can always build an additional one’ –
that is the very point –
any definition – is open – open to question – open to doubt
–and is uncertain
and if a definition is not put to question – not put to doubt
– if its uncertainty is not explored –
then presumably it will be the definition you proceed with –
however whether you proceed with it or not – logically
speaking it is open to question
and as to – ‘how he takes the definition’ –
the logical reality is that however he takes the definition
– it is open to question
and ‘whatever use he makes of the word defined’ –
is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
30. ‘So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the
use—
the meaning—of the word when the overall role of the word in
language is clear. Thus if I know that someone means to explain
a
colour-word to me the ostensive definition "That is
called 'sepia' "
will help me to understand the word.—And you can say this,
so long as
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Could one define the word "red" by pointing to
something that was
not red? That would be as if one were supposed to explain
the word
"modest" to someone whose English was weak, and
one pointed to
an arrogant man and said "That man is not modest".
That
it is ambiguous is no argument against such a method of
definition.
Any definition can be misunderstood.
But it might well be asked: are we still to call this
"definition"?—
For, of course, even if it has the same practical
consequences, the same
effect on the learner, it plays a different part in the
calculus from what we
ordinarily call "ostensive definition" of the word
"red".
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
you do not forget that all sorts of problems attach to the
words "to
know" or "to be clear".
One has already to know (or be able to do) something in
order to be
capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to
know?’
we learn language practises
– like definition – like the use of words – in language communities –
it is all about
working out how to function – how to function where you are – in the
propositional world you operate in – you live in –
but what does one
have to know?
knowledge is
proposal – to know is to be able to operate with proposals in propositional complexes
– in propositional structures –
and to be able to do
this one must recognize that what is put – to us and by us – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
we operate with
uncertainty – in uncertainty
could one define the
word ‘red’ by pointing to something that is not red?
yes – it’s the
definition you have – when in fact you don’t have a definition –
I can’t see that it
would have the same effect on the learner –
seeing red – would
be quite a different experience – to not seeing red
31. ‘When one shews someone the king in chess and says:
"This is
the king", this does not tell him the use of this
piece—unless he already
knows the rules of the game up to this last point: the shape
of the king.
You could imagine his having learnt the rules of the game
without ever
having been shewn an actual piece. The shape of the chessman
cor-
responds here to the sound or shape of a word.
One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without
ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt
quite simple
board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more
and
more complicated ones. He too might be given the explanation
"This
is the king",—if, for instance, he were being shewn
chessmen of a shape
he was not used to. This explanation again only tells him
the use
of the piece because, as we might say, the place for it was
already
prepared. Or even: we shall only say that it tells him the
use, if
the place is already prepared. And in this case it is so, not
because the
person to whom we give the explanation already knows rules,
but
because in another sense he is already master of a game.
Consider this further case: I am explaining chess to
someone; and I
begin by pointing to a chessman and saying: "This is the
king; it
can move like this, .... and so on."—In this case we
shall say: the
words "This is the king" (or "This is called
the 'king' ") are a definition
only if the learner already 'knows what a piece in a game
is'. That is,
if he has already played other games, or has watched other
people
playing 'and understood'—and similar things. Further, only
under these
conditions will he be able to ask relevantly in the course
of learning the
game: "What do you call this?"—that is, this piece
in a game.
We may say: only someone who already knows how to do
something
with it can significantly ask a name.
And we can imagine the person who is asked replying:
"Settle the
name yourself"—and now the one who asked would have to
manage
everything for himself.’
‘this is the king’ –
may well be the first thing said – as introduction to the
game – to its practice – to its rules
‘One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game
without ever learning or formulating rules’ –
if you were to ‘learn the game’ – by i.e. watching games in
play –
you learn what does and does not count as a move in the game
for the different pieces in play
here you are learning the rules
and this learning of the rules is a consequence of learning
the practise –
the point being the practice is rule-governed
if you have learnt other board games – you have learnt that
such games are rule- governed –
you have learnt propositional game playing
‘We may say: only someone who already knows how to do
something with it can significantly ask a name.’ –
well yes – but what if the piece that is the king – comes
from a set that is of radically different
design – one the chess player has not come across –
he might ask – what is that piece called? – and when told –
he then knows what to do with it
‘settle the matter yourself’ – is giving someone the
brush-off –
if you are going to play the game – you need to be introduced
to its language
for here – the name determines the function –
and the name is a rule
32. ‘Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes
learn
the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions
that they
give him; and he will often have to guess the meaning of
these
definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes
wrong.
And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the
learning
of human language as if the child came into a strange country
and
did not understand the language of the country; that is, as
if it already
had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child
could already
think, only not yet speak. And "think"
would here mean something
like "talk to itself".’
coming into a strange country and not understanding the
language of that county?
in Augustine’s account – the country is not strange – the language
is not strange
what we get from Augustine is a view of how one learns to
name –
in whatever country – with whatever language
it is clear from Augustine’s account that the child has a language capacity –
a capacity to learn language
and in his account of how one learns naming – it is
clear that the child can think –
‘I saw this and grasped that the thing was called by the
sound they uttered when they meant to point it out.’ –
and it is because he can think – he can learn to name –
being able to think – for Augustine – is a far more complex and interesting affair than
Wittgenstein’s – ‘something like ‘talk to itself’ –
in Augustine’s account to ‘think’ means to be able to
interpret bodily movements –
i.e. – the expression of the face – the play of the eyes –
the movement of other parts of the body – the tone of voice –
and to understand that these movements express a state of mind
–
in the actions of seeking – having – rejecting – or avoiding
–
in short it means being able to understand the logical
action of naming –
and being able to replicate it –
‘I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified;
and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my
own desires.’
33. ‘Suppose, however, someone were to object: "It is
not true
that you must already be master of a language in order to
understand
an ostensive definition: all you need—of course!—is to know
or
guess what the person giving the explanation is pointing to.
That is,
whether for example to the shape of the object, or to its
colour, or to its
number, and so on."——And what does 'pointing to the shape',
'pointing to the colour' consist in? Point to a piece of
paper.—And now
point to its shape—now to its colour—now to its number (that
sounds
queer).—How did you do it?—You will say that you 'meant' a different
thing each time you pointed. And if I ask how that is done,
you will
say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the
shape, etc.
But I ask again: how is that done?
Suppose someone points to a vase and says "Look at that
marvellous
blue—the shape isn't the point."—Or: "Look at the
marvellous shape—
the colour doesn't matter." Without doubt you will do something
different when you act upon these two
invitations. But do you always
do the same thing when you direct your attention to the
colour?
Imagine various different cases. To indicate a few:
"Is this blue the same as the blue over there? Do you
see any
difference?"—
You are mixing paint and you say "It's hard to get the
blue of this
sky."
"It's turning fine, you can already see blue sky
again."
"Look what different effects these two blues have."
"Do you see the blue book over there? Bring it
here."
"This blue signal-light means . . . ."
"What's this blue called?—Is it 'indigo'?"
You sometimes attend to the colour by putting your hand up
to keep
the outline from view; or by not looking at the outline of
the thing;
sometimes by staring at the object and trying to remember
where you
saw that colour before.
You attend to the shape, sometimes by tracing it, sometimes
by
screwing up your eyes so as not to see the colour clearly,
and in many
other ways. I want to say: This is the sort of thing that
happens while
one 'directs one's attention to this or that'. But it isn't
these things by
themselves that make us say someone is attending to the
shape, the
colour, and so on. Just as a move in chess doesn't consist
simply in
moving a piece in such-and-such a way on the board—nor yet
in one's
thoughts and feelings as one makes the move: but in the circumstances
that we call "playing a game of chess",
"solving a chess problem",
and so on.’
the question – how is that done?
well the ‘answer’ – if you can call it that – is whatever is
proposed in explanation –
and of course there may be any number of proposals put –
any such proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt
– and is uncertain
perhaps you walk away from this and say ‘well – we don’t
know how it is done – all we know is that it is done’
and yes it is interesting to speculate on how – but there
will be no final resolution here
there will only be proposals – which will be of use – if
they serve some proposed purpose –
and even then – they can be put to question – to doubt – and
their uncertainty explored
on the other hand – where we are dealing with propositional
games – i.e. chess – the question ‘how is it done’ – effectively doesn’t arise
games are rule-governed propositional actions
if you play a game – you play in accordance with the
rules –
it is as simple as that
the rules – are not put to question – to doubt – or regarded
as uncertain – if you play the game
if you question the rules – you are not playing the
game – you are engaged in a logical
exercise
in our propositional lives – we play propositional games – that
is rule-governed propositional actions
however much of what we deal with in our propositional lives
is not rule-governed
and in our non-rule-governed propositional lives – the
logical and rational response to propositions put – is to put them to question
– put them to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty
this is the logical reality – it is our reality – it is how
we live –
uncertainty is the engine of our propositional reality
it strikes me that propositional game playing – in whatever
form that it takes – provides something of a relief from the uncertainty we
deal with in most of our propositional activities
and – with too much game playing – you might be relieved to
get back to question – to doubt – to uncertainty – and to creativity
the problem with using the idea of the game in philosophical
discussions – is just that there are no rules –
and any rules proposed will fail – because philosophical issues
demand to be explored
and there is no logical end to their exploration
34. ‘But suppose someone said:
"I always do the same thing when
I attend to the shape: my eye follows the outline and I feel
. . . .".
And suppose this person to give someone else the ostensive
definition
"That is called a 'circle' ", pointing to a
circular object and having all
these experiences——cannot his hearer still interpret the
definition
differently, even though he sees the other's eyes following
the outline,
and even though he feels what the other feels? That is to say:
this
'interpretation' may also consist in how he now makes use of
the
word; in what he points to, for example, when told: "Point
to a
circle".—For neither the expression "to intend the
definition in such-
and-such a way" nor the expression "to interpret the
definition in
such-and-such a way" stands for a process which accompanies
the
giving and hearing of the definition.’
the ostensive definition as such – is quite straightforward
it is a standard propositional practise –
you either understand that – or you don’t –
you might question the value of such a definition – i.e. –
does pointing and naming – give us a good enough definition? –
or indeed you might take
a hard line – and argue that such definitions – are of no use
this though is not to put to question the fact of the
propositional practise of ostensive definition
intention – is neither here nor there – as far as the ostensive
action is concerned –
you can argue the point there – but it is a different
argument –
the same applies to ‘having all these experiences’
as to interpretation – it is not the ostensive act that is
interpreted – if you understand this propositional practice
rather any questioning will be in regard to what is
proposed in the action
the proposal ‘that is called a brick’ – can be put to
question – to doubt – and as with any proposal – logically speaking – is
uncertain –
in that someone could say – ‘I wouldn’t call that a brick’ –
etc
35. ‘There are, of course, what can be called
"characteristic
experiences" of pointing to (e.g.) the shape. For
example, following
the outline with one's finger or with one's eyes as one points.—
But this
does not happen in all
cases in which I 'mean the shape', and no more
does any other one characteristic process occur in all these
cases.—
Besides, even if something of the sort did recur in all cases,
it would
still depend on the circumstances—that is, on what happened before
and after the pointing—whether we should say "He
pointed to the
shape and not to the colour".
For the words "to point to the shape", "to
mean the shape", and
so on, are not used in the same way as these',
"to point to this book
(not to that one), "to point to the chair, not to the
table", and so on.—
Only think how differently we learn the use of the words
"to point
to this thing", "to point to that thing", and
on the other hand "to
point to the colour, not the shape", "to mean the
colour", and so on.
To repeat: in certain cases, especially when one points 'to
the shape'
or 'to the number' there are characteristic experiences and
ways of
pointing—'characteristic' because they recur often (not
always) when
shape or number are 'meant'. But do you also know of an
experience
characteristic of pointing to a piece in a game as a
piece in a game?
All the same one can say: "I mean that this piece is
called the 'king',
not this particular bit of wood I am pointing to".
(Recognizing,
wishing, remembering, etc. .)’
we can and do propose in relation to our propositional
actions –
Wittgenstein in his discussion of pointing to shape –
describes a characteristic process
but makes the point that –
‘But this does not happen in all cases in which I 'mean the shape',
and no more does any other one characteristic process occur in all these cases’
in so doing he gives an illustration of the logic of
propositional use – the exploration of propositional uncertainty
any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
–
and this is the case whatever propositional activity is
being discussed –
it is the critical process that reveals difference – be that
different contexts – different understandings – different explanations –
the reality of rational propositional activity – is the
reality of question – of doubt – of uncertainty –
and the point of analysis – of any analysis is not reduction
– or atomization – rather propositional exploration – and propositional diversity
36. ‘And we do here what we do in a host of similar cases: because
we cannot specify any one bodily action which we call
pointing to the
shape (as opposed, for example, to the colour), we say that
a spiritual
[mental, intellectual] activity corresponds to these words.
Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there,
we should like to say, is a spirit.’
we can put whatever proposal suits our purpose –
and if we are rational about the matter – we recognize that
our proposal / explanation – or any other proposal / explanation – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
this is what we deal with – this is how we go about our propositional
lives
37. ‘What is the relation between name and thing
named?—Well,
what is it? Look at language-game (2) or at another one:
there you
can see the sort of thing this relation consists in. This
relation may
also consist, among many other things, in the fact that
hearing the
name calls before our mind the picture of what is named; and
it also
consists, among other things, in the name's being written on
the thing
named or being pronounced when that thing is pointed at.’
the relation is a propositional relation –
that is a relation between proposals
it is a proposed relation between – the proposed thing
(un-named) – and a proposed name of the thing – a proposed identification of
the thing
these proposals – the thing in question – the name given –
the proposed relation –
logically speaking are open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
the hearing of the name – what this calls to mind of what is
named – the name being written on the
thing – or being pronounced when that thing is pointed out – are expressions
of the relation
38. ‘But what, for example, is the word "this" the
name of in
language-game (8) or the word "that" in the
ostensive definition
"that is called . . . ."?—If you do not want to
produce confusion you
will do best not to call these words names at all.—Yet,
strange to say,
the word "this" has been called the only genuine
name; so that anything
else we call a name was one only in an inexact, approximate
sense.
This queer conception springs from a tendency to sublime the
logic
of our language—as one might put it. The proper answer to it
is: we
call very different things "names"; the word
"name" is used to
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
What is it to mean the words "That is blue" at one
time as a statement
about the object one is pointing to—at another as an explanation
of
the word "blue"? Well, in the second case one
really means "That is
called 'blue' ".—Then can one at one time mean the word
"is" as "is
called" and the word "blue" as "
'blue' ", and another time mean "is"
really as "is"?
It is also possible for someone to get an explanation of the
words
out of what was intended as a piece of information.
[Marginal note:
Here lurks a crucial superstition.]
Can I say "bububu" and mean "If it doesn't
rain I shall go for a
walk"?—It is only in a language that I can mean
something by some-
thing. This shews clearly that the grammar of "to
mean" is not like
that of the expression "to imagine" and the like
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
characterize many different kinds of use of a word, related
to one
another in many different ways;—but the kind of use that
"this" has
is not among them.
It is quite true that, in giving an ostensive definition for
instance,
we often point to the object named and say the name. And similarly,
in giving an ostensive definition for instance, we say the word
"this"
while pointing to a thing. And also the word "this"
and a name
often occupy the same position in a sentence. But it is
precisely
characteristic of a name that it is defined by means of the
demonstrative
expression "That is N" (or "That is called 'N'
"). But do we also
give the definitions: "That is called 'this' ", or
"This is called 'this' "?
This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to
speak,
an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a
word
with an object.—And you really get such a queer connexion
when the
philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and
thing by
staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or
even the
word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical
problems arise
when language goes on holiday. And here we may
indeed fancy naming
to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of
an object.
And we can also say the word "this" to the object,
as it were
address the object as "this"—a
queer use of this word, which doubtless
only occurs in doing philosophy.’
‘That is called “this” ’ –
I could imagine a character in a Lewis Carroll poem or story
– saying this – or is it ‘that’? (joke)
the point being it comes down to a question of context
we understand the action of naming – and we tend to stick to
standard contexts – when we speak of naming – but non-standard contexts are possible
–
and the propositional action of naming is not determined by context
– it is a logical action
‘And you really get such a queer connexion when the
philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring
at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word
"this" innumerable times.’
if I am not mistake G. E. Moore’s whole philosophical career
was based on doing just that (or this)
repeating a name or ‘this’ innumerable times – is overdoing
it – once is enough –
and doing it once is standard practise – hardly ‘queer’
‘For philosophical problems arise when language goes on
holiday.’ –
language does not ‘go on holidays’ –
what you get from the best of the philosophers’ is critical
analysis of language use
philosophical problems don’t ‘arise’ – we face
philosophical problems at every turn –
to live is to deal with philosophical problems –
you might ‘address’ the object as “this” – when you don’t
yet have a more specific or useful name for it –
and I would suggest that this can occur in any propositional
context
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
‘Then can one at one time mean the word "is" as
"is called" and the word "blue" as
“ 'blue' ", and another time mean "is" really
as "is"?’
yes – any word – from a logical point of view is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and for this reason it can have any number of functions in
any number of propositional contexts – in any number of uses
‘It is also possible for someone to get an explanation of the
words out of what was intended as a piece of information.’
why not?
logically speaking – any explanation – is as good as any
other
as to the grammar of ‘to mean’ – or this so called ‘grammar’
of any word or phrase –
grammar is a theory or description of language use –
and as with any theory or description – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
39. ‘But why does it occur to one to want to make precisely
this
word into a name, when it evidently is not a name?—That is
just the
reason. For one is tempted to make an objection against what
is
ordinarily called a name. It can be put like this: a name
ought really to
signify a simple. And for this one might
perhaps give the following
reasons: The word "Excalibur", say, is a proper name
in the ordinary
sense. The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a
particular
way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not
exist. But
it is clear that the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp
blade" makes sense
whether Excalibur is still whole or is broken up. But if
"Excalibur" is
the name of an object, this object no longer exists when
Excalibur is
broken in pieces; and as no object would then correspond to
the name
it would have no meaning. But then the sentence "Excalibur
has a
sharp blade" would contain a word that had no meaning,
and hence
the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so
there
must always be something corresponding to the words of which
it
consists. So the word "Excalibur" must disappear
when the sense is
analysed and its place be taken by words which name simples.
It will
be reasonable to call these words the real names.’
‘But why does it occur to one to want to make precisely this
word into a name, when it evidently is not a name?—
well the point is you can’t say in advance how any word is
going to be used – or is going to function
there just may be a context – where is seems useful – and
sensible to ‘make precisely this word into a name’
‘For one is tempted to make an objection against what is
ordinarily called a name. It can be put like this: a name ought really to
signify a simple.’
why? – if you go with this notion of ‘simple’ – and it’s
counterpart ‘complex’ –
you make no distinction when it comes to naming
we give names to so called ‘simples’ – and to so called
‘complexes’ – and to simples in named complexes
‘The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular
way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. …But then the
sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" would contain a word that had
no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense;
so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it
consists.’
that it can be said that the sword ‘Excalibur’ – does not
exist – does not make the sentence
nonsense –
the reality is we refer to and name things that it can be
said do not exist
basically what happens here is that we propose existence
– and we name that proposed
the real point here is that what a name signifies – is open
to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
nevertheless – and despite the uncertainties involved – the
practice of naming is essential to our propositional practises – and we use it
in all facets of our propositional lives
40. ‘Let us first discuss this point of the argument: that a
word has
no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.—It is important to
note
that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if
it is used to signify
the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound
the
meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N.
N. dies
one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning
dies.
And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name
ceased to
have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N. N.
is dead."’
‘that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it’?
if ‘something’ corresponds to a word –
what you have is a proposed relation between – the
word / proposal – and the proposed correspondent –
and once this is stated – you have a proposed correspondence
– between words – between proposals
the proposed relation – is – as with the proposals involved
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
there are words too – that have no correspondent – but have propositional
function
the bearer of a name may ‘exist’ – in the normal sense of
that term –
and where the bearer of the name does not so exist – the name
functions as a proposal of existence
and just what that proposal amounts to – is open to question
– open to doubt – is uncertain
41. ‘In §15 we introduced proper names into language (8).
Now
suppose that the tool with the name "N" is broken.
Not knowing
this, A gives B the sign "N". Has this sign
meaning now or not?—
What is B to do when he is given it?—We have not settled
anything
about this. One might ask: what will he do? Well,
perhaps he will
stand there at a loss, or shew A the pieces. Here one might
say: "N"
has become meaningless; and this expression would mean that
the
sign "N" no longer had a use in our language-game
(unless we gave it a
new one). "N" might also become meaningless
because, for whatever
reason, the tool was given another name and the sign
"N" no longer
used in the language-game.—But we could also imagine a
convention
whereby B has to shake his head in reply if A gives him the
sign
belonging to a tool that is broken.—In this way the command
"N"
might be said to be given a place in the language-game even
when the
tool no longer exists, and the sign "N" to have
meaning even when
its bearer ceases to exist.’
if we were to ask for ‘N’ – and the object that corresponds
to N – is broken – or no longer functions – or there is no ‘N’ in the tool box
–
what we are dealing with is a proposal – ‘N’ – that
is in question – that is in doubt
the proposal ‘N’ – is logically speaking – uncertain
42. ‘But has for instance a name which has never been used
for a
tool also got a meaning in that game?——Let us assume that
"X" is
such a sign and that A gives this sign to B—well, even such
signs could
be given a place in the language-game, and B might have,
say, to
answer them too with a shake of the head. (One could imagine
this
as a sort of joke between them.)’
yes – a shake of the head –
the proposal ‘X’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and
is uncertain
43. ‘For a large class of cases—though not for all—in
which we
employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus:
the meaning of a
word is its use in the language.
And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by
pointing to its
bearer.’
as to the word ‘meaning’ – how it can be defined –
how it is defined – is how it can be used – how it is used
this word – as with any – is open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain –
yes – we can and do sometimes explain a name – by pointing
to its bearer –
but even this action – this proposal – of pointing is
to a bearer – as an explanation of the meaning of a name – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
44. ‘We said that the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade"
made
sense even when Excalibur was broken in pieces. Now this is
so
because in this language-game a name is also used in the
absence of
its bearer. But we can imagine a language-game with names
(that is,
with signs which we should certainly include among names) in
which
they are used only in the presence of the bearer; and so
could always
be replaced by a demonstrative pronoun and the gesture of
pointing.’
yes – such may be – or become a common propositional
practice –
but it will only be so as long as it is –
any language practice is a contingency – and logically
speaking –
never fixed
45. ‘The demonstrative "this" can never be without
a bearer. It
might be said: "so long as there is a this, the word
'this' has a meaning
too, whether this is simple or complex."——But that does
not make
the word into a name. On the contrary: for a name is not used
with,
but only explained by means of, the gesture of pointing.’
‘so long as there is a this, the word 'this' has a meaning
too, whether this is simple or complex.’
so long as there is a this?
there is only a this – if a ‘this’ is proposed
and if it is proposed – it will be open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘but that does not make the word into a name’
well it could be a name – i.e. – ‘this is what I am talking
about’ –
and here ‘this’ – functions as the name – of a subject in
discussion –
a name is not used with the gesture of pointing?
what if a name is used with a gesture of pointing?
someone asks ‘where is George?’
and in reply – another points to a man – saying ‘George’
‘but only explained by means of, the gesture of pointing.’ –
is a name explained by the gesture of pointing?
I wouldn’t use the term ‘explain’ here – I would say the gesture
proposes a reference point for the name
and say that this gesture / proposal – as with the name /
proposal –
is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
46. ‘What lies behind the idea that names really signify
simples?—
Socrates says in the Theaetetus: "If I make no mistake,
I have heard
some people say this: there is no definition of the primary
elements—
so to speak—out of which we and everything else are composed;
for
everything that exists in its own right can only be named,
no other
determination is possible, neither that it is nor that it is
not . . . . . But
what exists in its own right has to be ..... named without
any other
determination. In consequence it is impossible to give an
account of
any primary element; for it, nothing is possible but the
bare name;
its name is all it has. But just as what consists of these
primary elements
is itself complex, so the names of the elements become descriptive
language by being compounded together. For the essence of speech
is the composition of names.”
Both Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (Tractates
Logico-
Philosophicus) were such primary elements.’
logically speaking that which is ‘primary’– is the proposal – the proposition
and the proposal – the proposition – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
as to ‘primary elements’ – any such proposal is open to
question –
the notion of a ‘primary element’ – is at best the decision
– perhaps pragmatic –
to stop the action of question – of doubt – and to stop the exploration
of propositional uncertainty
‘everything that exists in its own right’ – is what is proposed
and what is proposed can be named – that is propositions can
be / are named –
and the naming here is a propositional act
naming anything – that is naming a proposition – is to give
it identification –
identification in some propositional construct – or context
a name / proposal can identify a proposed ‘simple’ – a proposed
‘complex’ –
any such identification – that is any such name – as with
the proposal identified –
simple / complex –
is open to question – open to doubt – and from a logical
point of view – uncertain
the ‘essence of speech’ – if you want to use this terminology
– is the proposal
both Russell’s ‘individuals’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘objects’ –
are proposals –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if they are regarded – as not open to question – not open
to doubt – and certain –
they are not proposals – not propositions – but prejudices –
philosophical prejudices
47. ‘But what are the simple constituent parts of which
reality is
composed?—What are the simple constituent parts of a
chair?—The
bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the
atoms?—
"Simple" means: not composite. And here the point
is: in what sense
composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of
the 'simple
parts of a chair'.
Again: Does my visual image of this tree, of this chair,
consist of
parts? And what are its simple component parts? Multi-colouredness
is one kind of complexity; another is, for example, that of
a broken
outline composed of straight bits. And a curve can be said
to be com-
posed of an ascending and a descending segment.
If I tell someone without any further explanation: "What
I see before
me now is composite", he will have the right to ask:
"What do you
mean by 'composite'? For there are all sorts of things that
that can
mean!"—The question "Is what you see composite?"
makes good
sense if it is already established what kind of complexity—that
is,
which particular use of the word—is in question. If it had
been laid
down that the visual image of a tree was to be called
"composite" if
one saw not just a single trunk, but also branches, then the
question
"Is the visual image of this tree simple or composite?",
and the
question "What are its simple component parts?",
would have a clear
sense—a clear use. And of course the answer to the second
question
is not "The branches" (that would be an answer to
the grammatical
question: "What are here called 'simple component
parts'?") but rather
a description of the individual branches.
But isn't a chessboard, for instance, obviously, and
absolutely,
composite?—You are probably thinking of the composition out
of thirty-two white and thirty-two black squares. But could
we not also
say, for instance, that it was composed of the colours black
and white
and the schema of squares? And if there are quite different
ways of
looking at it, do you still want to say that the chessboard is
absolutely
'composite'?—Asking "Is this object composite?"
outside a particular
language-game is like what a boy once did, who had to say
whether
the verbs in certain sentences were in the active or passive
voice, and
who racked his brains over the question whether the verb "to
sleep"
meant something active or passive.
We use the word "composite" (and therefore the word
"simple")
in an enormous number of different and differently related
ways.
(Is the colour of a square on a chessboard simple, or does
it consist
of pure white and pure yellow? And is white simple, or does
it consist
of the colours of the rainbow?—Is this length of 2 cm.
simple, or does
it consist of two parts, each 1 cm. long? But why not of one
bit
3 cm. long, and one bit 1 cm. long measured in the opposite
direction?)
To the philosophical question: "Is the visual image of
this tree
composite, and what are its component parts?" the
correct answer is:
"That depends on
what you understand by 'composite'." (And that is
of course not an answer but a rejection of the question.)’
‘It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple
parts of a chair'.’
the point here is that it is illogical to ‘speak absolutely’
– in any propositional context
any proposal is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
the propositional categories of ‘simple’ and ‘composite’ –
can be and are functional in terms of propositional organization
however use of these propositional categories – is open to question
– open to doubt and uncertain
‘"What do you mean by 'composite'? For there are all
sorts of things that that can
mean!"—’
that is the logical point in a nutshell
‘And of course the answer to the second question is not
"The branches" (that would be an answer to the grammatical question: "What are here called 'simple component
parts'?") but rather a description of the individual branches.’
and any description – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
the chessboard is a proposal – and as with any proposal
– of any form – open to interpretation –
you will use whatever interpretation suits your purpose
‘We use the word "composite" (and therefore the
word "simple") in an enormous number of different and differently
related ways. –’
yes – the propositional categories of ‘simple’ and
‘composite’ have proven to be useful in any number of propositional contexts
‘To the philosophical question: "Is the visual image of
this tree composite, and what are its component parts?" the correct answer
is: "That depends on what you understand by 'composite'." (And that
is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question.)’
it is not a rejection of the question –
how you understand ‘composite’ – will lead to further
proposals – to further questions
at some point you will decide on an answer – and this decision
will be pragmatic –
you will decide to get on with it –
however this decision – as with any decision – from a
logical point of view –
is open to question
48. ‘Let us apply the method of §2 to the account in the
Theaetetus. Let us consider a language-game for which this account is really
valid. The language serves to describe combinations of coloured squares on a
surface. The squares form a complex like a chessboard. There are red, green,
white and black squares. The words of the language are(correspondingly)
"R", "G", "W", "B", and a sentence is a
series of these words. They describe an arrangement of squares in the order:
And so for instance the sentence "RRBGGGRWW" describes
an arrangement of this sort:
Here the sentence is a complex of names, to which
corresponds a complex of elements. The primary elements are the coloured squares.
"But are these simple?"—I do not know what else you would have me
call "the simples", what would be more natural in this language-game.
But under other circumstances I should call a monochrome square "composite",
consisting perhaps of two rectangles, or of the elements colour and shape. But
the concept of complexity might also be so extended that a smaller area was
said to be 'composed' of a greater area and another one subtracted from it. Compare
the 'composition of forces', the 'division' of a line by a point outside it; these
expressions shew that we are sometimes even inclined to conceive the smaller as
the result of a composition of greater parts, and the greater as the result of
a division of the smaller.
But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by
our sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence consist
of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the types of letter, or
the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings
in any particular case?’
‘But I do not know whether to say that the figure described
by our sentence consists of four or of nine elements!’ –
what we ‘know’ is what is proposed –
and any proposal is open to question –
our knowledge – is uncertain
and the reason for the question – four or nine elements? –
is primarily logical –
the figure – as with any figure – is a proposal – a
proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid
misunderstandings in any particular case?’ –
if you are to have a successful propositional action – you
need to be clear on your interpretation –
you here have to make a decision –
this is to be pragmatic
and if you are to have a rational approach here – you
understand that any decision you make is open
to question –
it is not so much that we proceed with clarity – it is
rather that we proceed in uncertainty
49. ‘But what does it mean to say that we cannot define
(that is, describe) these elements, but only name them? This might mean, for
instance, that when in a limiting case a complex consists of only one
square, its description is simply the name of the coloured square.
Here we might say—though this easily leads to all kinds of
philosophical superstition—that a sign "R" or "B", etc. may
be sometimes a word and sometimes a proposition. But whether it 'is a word or a
proposition' depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written. For
instance, if A has to describe complexes of coloured squares to B and he uses
the word "R" alone, we shall be able to say that the word is a
description—a proposition. But if he is memorizing the words and their
meanings, or if he is teaching someone else the use of the words and uttering
them in the course of ostensive teaching, we shall not say that they are
propositions. In this situation the word "R", for instance, is not a
description; it names an element——but it would be queer to make that a
reason for saying that an element can only be named! For naming and
describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for description.
Naming is so far not a move in the language-game—any more than putting a piece
in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so
far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except
in the language-game. This was what Frege meant too, when he said that a word
had meaning only as part of a sentence.’
we can define and we can name –
any definition – any name – is a proposal – open to question
‘when in a limiting case a complex consists of only one
square, its description is simply the name of the coloured square.’
it may well be that for whatever purpose it is decided that
the description is the name
however the description / name – is a proposal – and
logically speaking – open to question
and if no question is raised – the description / name will
for practical purposes hold
words – are proposals – propositions – are proposals
regardless of context and use – the word ‘R’ – is a proposal
– is a proposition
names are proposals – propositions –
names are identifying proposals – identifying propositions
‘For naming and describing do not stand on the same level:
naming is a preparation for description.’
I would say the name is a description – to which other
descriptions are put
any proposal – can be regarded as a description
‘Naming is so far not a move in the language-game—any more
than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing
has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name
except in the language-game.’
this ‘language-game’ notion – is more of an obstacle than a
help to understanding the logic of language – and the practice of language use
–
we don’t need this notion of ‘language-game’ to understand
language
to say that nothing has been done when a thing is named – makes
no sense
of course something as been done – a name / proposal has been
put –
naming really has nothing to do with this artificial notion
of the language-game
we put name / proposals – in our natural use of language –
or as Augustine put it – what we are dealing with here is
‘the natural language of all peoples’
and as for Frege’s view that – ‘a word had meaning only as
part of a sentence.’ –
a word is a proposal – open to question – open doubt – and
uncertain –
whether it is in a sentence or not
50. ‘What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither
being nor
non-being to elements?—One might say: if everything that we
call
"being" and "non-being" consists in the
existence and non-existence of
connexions between elements, it makes no sense to speak of
an element's
being (non-being); just as when everything that we call "destruction"
lies in the separation of elements, it makes no sense to
speak of the
destruction of an element.
One would, however, like to say: existence cannot be attributed
to
an element, for if it did not exist, one could not even name
it and so
one could say nothing at all of it.—But let us consider an
analogous
case. There is one thing of which one can say neither that
it is one
metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is
the standard
metre in Paris.—But this is, of course, not to ascribe any
extraordinary
property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game
of measuring with a metre-rule.—Let us imagine samples of
colour
being preserved in Paris
like the standard metre. We define: "sepia"
means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept
hermetically
sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample
either that
it is of this colour or that it is not.
We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the
language
used in ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is
not some-
thing that is represented, but is a means of representation.—And
just this goes for an element in language-game (48) when we
name it
by uttering the word "R": this gives this object a
role in our language-
game; it is now a means of representation. And to say
"If it did not
exist, it could have no name" is to say as much
and as little as: if this
thing did not exist, we could not use it in our
language-game.—What
looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language.
It is a paradigm in our
language-game; something with which comparison is made. And
this
may be an important observation; but it is none the less an observation
concerning our language-game—our method of representation’
if the element is proposed – the element exists – has being
that which is proposed – is that which exists – that which
has being
that which is not proposed – does not exist – is ‘non-being’
–
we have to tolerate this phrase ‘non-being’ – for there are
those fools who have proposed that what is not proposed – has being –
but straight thinking should result in the elimination of
the phrase – as a matter of basic logic
if the element is proposed – it is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
existence – being – is open to question – open to doubt –
and is uncertain
as to the destruction of an element –
here the proposal is that what once was – is no longer –
and this proposal – as with any proposal – is open to
question
‘for if it did not exist, one could not even name it and so
one could say nothing at all of it.’
correct – if it is not proposed – in some manner – it does
not exist –
to name – is to propose existence –
naming is an existential proposal –
‘We define: "sepia" means the colour of the standard
sepia which is there kept hermetically sealed. Then it will make no sense to say
of this sample either that it is of this colour or that it is not.’
if it is proposed that by ‘sepia’ we mean the colour of the
proposed standard sepia –
then we are proposing that the standard is the
colour –
and – the standard is proposed as ‘something with which
comparison is made’
the important thing to understand here is that we are
talking about proposals – different – though related proposals – not language-games
the notion of the ‘language-game’ – is here irrelevant
51. ‘In describing language-game (48) I said that the words
"R",
"B", etc. corresponded to the colours of the
squares. But what does
this correspondence consist in; in what sense can one say
that certain
colours of squares correspond to these signs? For the
account in (48)
merely set up a connexion between those signs and certain
words of
our language (the names of colours).—Well, it was
presupposed that
the use of the signs in the language-game would be taught in
a different
way, in particular by pointing to paradigms. Very well; but what
does it mean to say that in the technique of using the
language certain
elements correspond to the signs?—Is it that the person who
is describing
the complexes of coloured squares always says "R"
where there is a
red square; "B" when there is a black one, and so
on? But what if he
goes wrong in the description and mistakenly says
"R" where he sees a
black square——what is the criterion by which this is a mistake?—
Or does "R"s standing for a red square consist in
this, that when the
people whose language it is use the sign "R" a red
square always comes
before their minds?
In order to see more clearly, here as in countless similar
cases, we
must focus on the details of what goes on; must look at them
from
close to.’
‘But what does this correspondence consist in; in what sense
can one say that certain
colours of squares correspond to these signs?’
we have the proposal of signs – and the proposal of the
coloured squares
to propose that they correspond – is to propose a relation
between these proposals –
it is to put a relational proposal
how we explain what the correspondence consists in – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
however this relational proposal – is a natural
propositional action –
and there is a sense in which ‘what it consists in’ – is
irrelevant
what it consists in is an analytical issue – which though of
interest – does not bear on the use of this relational proposal –
we make these relational proposals – and work we with them
‘But what if he goes wrong in the description and mistakenly
says "R" where he sees a black square——what is the criterion by which
this is a mistake?—’
all we are dealing with ultimately here – is accepted practise
–
‘Or does "R’s standing for a red square consist in this,
that when the people whose language it is use the sign "R" a red
square always comes before their minds?’
‘comes before their minds’ – would be an explanation
– but again it makes no difference to
the action – how it is explained
explanation here – interesting – and fascinating as it is –
is an ancillary propositional activity
‘In order to see more clearly, here as in countless similar
cases, we must focus on the details of what goes on; must look at them from
close to.’
this sounds good but it doesn’t amount to much –
‘focusing on details’ – and ‘looking at them from close to’
– might give you an idea of
how correspondence can be explained –
however – any proposal put – that is the outcome of this
action of focusing and looking – will be open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
52. ‘If I am inclined to suppose that a mouse has come into
being
by spontaneous generation out of grey rags and dust, I shall
do well
to examine those rags very closely to see how a mouse may
have
hidden in them, how it may have got there and so on. But if
I am
convinced that a mouse cannot come into being from these things,
then this investigation will perhaps be superfluous.
But first we must learn to understand what it is that
opposes such
an examination of details in philosophy.’
there is nothing to oppose such an ‘examination’ – but
prejudice
‘philosophy’ – is proposal
philosophical proposals – are propositions – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
any philosophical proposition – is open – open to critical
examination
‘philosophical details’ – are proposals – open to critical
examination
53. ‘Our language-game (48) has various possibilities; there
is a
variety of cases in which we should say that a sign in the
game was
the name of a square of such-and-such a colour. We should say
so
if, for instance, we knew that the people who used the language
were
taught the use of the signs in such-and-such a way. Or if it
were set
down in writing, say in the form of a table, that this
element corresponded
to this sign, and if the table were used in teaching the
language
and were appealed to in certain disputed cases.
We can also imagine such a table's being a tool in the use
of the
language. Describing a complex is then done like this: the
person who
describes the complex has a table with him and looks up each
element
of the complex in it and passes from this to the sign (and
the one who
is given the description may also use a table to translate
it into a
picture of coloured squares). This table might be said to
take over here
the role of memory and association in other cases. (We do
not usually
carry out the order "Bring me a red flower" by
looking up the colour
red in a table of colours and then bringing a flower of the
colour that
we find in the table; but when it is a question of choosing
or mixing
a particular shade of red, we do sometimes make use of a sample
or
table.)
If we call such a table the expression of a rule of the
language-game,
it can be said that what we call a rule of a language-game
may have
very different roles in the game.’
the table is a proposal –
and as a proposal it is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
it is this logical uncertainty of the proposal – that is
reason that it can be said that this proposal – or for that matter any proposal
– may have very different roles in language use
54. ‘Let us recall the kinds of case where we say that a
game is
played according to a definite rule.
The rule may be an aid in teaching the game. The learner is
told it
and given practice in applying it.—Or it is an instrument of
the game
itself.—Or a rule is employed neither in the teaching nor in
the game
itself; nor is it set down in a list of rules. One learns
the game by
watching how others play. But we say that it is played
according to
such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules
off from
the practice of the game—like a natural law governing the
play.——
But how does the observer distinguish in this case between
players'
mistakes and correct play?—There are characteristic signs of
it in the
players' behaviour. Think of the behaviour characteristic of
correcting
a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that
someone
was doing so even without knowing his language.’
Wittgenstein here gives examples of where a game is played
according to a definite rule
in a genuine game – if the there is to be a game – the rules
are adhered to – without question
as applied to language – to propositional behaviour – this
model has no value
any so called rule in propositional action – is a proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the point being that propositional behaviour is a critical
activity
and this applies to the learning of language – through
instruction – or through observation
any instruction / proposal should introduce the learner to
the fact that any so called ‘rule’ – will have exceptions – and is open to
question –
if the learner is not shown the critical dimension of language
use – they are not learning a language – they are just learning a propositional
game
learning through observation –
if there is no question of what is observed – no doubt
regarding what is observed – or no recognition of the uncertainty of what is
observed –
the learner will not learn anything about language – though
they might learn to play a simple language-game
what we have above from Wittgenstein is an attempt to strip
propositional action of its critical dimension – and reduce all language
behaviour to a quasi-mechanical model –
a useful model for robotics – but of no use in understanding
the propositional lives of human beings
and Wittgenstein gives his ‘game’ away in the last two
sentences above –
‘Think of the behaviour characteristic of correcting a slip
of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even
without knowing his language.’
that it is possible to recognize someone correcting a slip
of the tongue – requires a critical assessment of that action –
Wittgenstein’s so called ‘rule’ doesn’t tell you what’s
going on
55. ‘"What the names in language signify must be
indestructible; for it must be possible to describe the state of affairs in
which everything destructible is destroyed. And this description will contain words;
and what corresponds to these cannot then be destroyed, for otherwise the words
would have no meaning." I must not saw off the branch on which I am
sitting.
One might, of course, object at once that this description
would have to except itself from the destruction.—But what corresponds to the
separate words of the description and so cannot be destroyed if it is true, is what
gives the words their meaning—is that without which they would have no
meaning.——In a sense, however, this man is surely what corresponds to his name.
But he is destructible, and his name does not lose its meaning when the bearer
is destroyed.—An example of something corresponding to the name, and without
which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with
the name in the language-game.’
names are proposals – words are proposals
proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
language use is not a matter of destructible vs.
indestructible –
such a characterization might work for a computer game –
it has no baring at all on language use
a name or a word may fall out of use – or fall into use –
and whether a name or a word has a use – will be open to
question – open to doubt –
and will be uncertain
‘In a sense, however, this man is surely what
corresponds to his name. But he is destructible, and his name does not lose its
meaning when the bearer is destroyed.’
taking this destruction idea a step further – to the end of
days no less –
if there is no one to propose a name – there is no name
again it is not a matter of destructibility vs. indestructibility
–
rather it is matter of proposal – or the absence of proposal
and where we have proposal – be it a name or a word – or a language
use of any other form – the proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and
is uncertain
56. ‘But what if no such sample is part of
the language, and we
bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word stands
for?——"And
if we bear it in mind then it comes before our mind's eye
when we
utter the word. So, if it is always supposed to be possible
for us to
remember it, it must be in itself indestructible."——But
what do we
regard as the criterion for remembering it right?—When we
work
with a sample instead of our memory there are circumstances
in which
we say that the sample has changed colour and we judge of
this by
memory. But can we not sometimes speak of a darkening (for
example) of our memory-image? Aren't we as much at the mercy
of
memory as of a sample? (For someone might feel like saying:
"If we
had no memory we should be at the mercy of a sample".)—Or
perhaps
of some chemical reaction. Imagine that you were supposed to
paint
a particular colour "C", which was the colour that
appeared when the
chemical substances X and Y combined.—Suppose that the
colour
struck you as brighter on one day than on another; would you
not
sometimes say: "I must be wrong, the colour is certainly
the same as
yesterday"? This shews that we do not always resort to what
memory
tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.’
‘But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we
bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word stands for?’
what we have is a usage that functions – and where
and when it does not function – the usage changes or is dropped –
‘and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word
stands for?’
this ‘bearing in mind’ – is an explanation of usage –
and as with any explanation – is a proposal – open to
question
‘But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it
right?—
we have whatever criterion we propose – and whatever
criterion we believe functions
and any such criterion adopted will be open to question
‘Suppose that the colour struck you as brighter on one day
than on another; would you not sometimes say: "I must be wrong, the colour
is certainly the same as yesterday"? This shews that we do not always
resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.’
what this shows – is that the propositions we work with –
and the propositions we use to explain those we work with – are open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
57. ‘"Something red can be destroyed, but
red cannot be destroyed,
and that is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent
of the
existence of a red thing."—Certainly it makes no sense
to say that the
colour red is torn up or pounded to bits. But don't we say
"The red is
vanishing"? And don't clutch at the idea of our always
being able to
bring red before our mind's eye even when there is nothing
red any
more. That is just as if you chose to say that there would
still always
be a chemical reaction producing a red flame.—For suppose
you cannot
remember the colour any more?—When we forget which colour
this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is,
we are no longer
able to play a particular language-game with it. And the
situation then
is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which
was an
instrument of our language.’
‘"Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be
destroyed, and that is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the
existence of a red thing."—
the word ‘red’ – the proposal ‘red’ – does not exist independent
of use
if it is not put – not proposed – it is not there
‘For suppose you cannot remember the colour any more?’
the colour ‘red’ – is a proposal –
if you cannot remember the use of this proposal –
and the proposal is put to you – you will not be able to use
it
‘And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have
lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language.’
a paradigm – is not lost or found – it is either in use – or
it is not –
a paradigm – is a proposal
58. ‘"I want to restrict the term 'name’ to what cannot
occur in
the combination 'X exists'.—Thus one cannot say 'Red
exists', because
if there were no red it could not be spoken of at all."—Better:
If "X
exists" is meant simply to say: "X" has a meaning,—then
it is not a
proposition which treats of X, but a proposition about our use
of
language, that is, about the use of the word "X".
It looks to us as if we were saying something about the
nature of
red in saying that the words "Red exists" do not yield
a sense. Namely
that red does exist 'in its own right'. The same idea—that this
is a
metaphysical statement about red—finds expression again when
we say
such a thing as that red is timeless, and perhaps still more
strongly
in the word "indestructible".
But what we really want is simply to take "Red exists"
as the statement:
the word "red" has a meaning. Or perhaps better:
"Red does
not exist" as " 'Red' has no meaning". Only
we do not want to say
that that expression says this, but that this is what it
would have to be
saying if it meant anything. But that it contradicts itself
in the attempt
to say it—just because red exists 'in its own right'.
Whereas the only
contradiction lies in something like this: the proposition
looks as if it
were about the colour, while it is supposed to be saying
something
about the use of the word "red".—In reality,
however, we quite
readily say that a particular colour exists; and that is as
much as to say
that something exists that has that colour. And the first
expression is
no less accurate than the second; particularly where 'what has
the
colour' is not a physical object.’
‘red’ – is all you need – for ‘red exists’ –
in saying that ‘X exists’ – ‘exists’ – is logically
unnecessary – if ‘X’ is proposed
saying ‘X does not exist’ – is simply making the point that
the proposal ‘X’ has not been put
one might have occasion to say ‘X exists’ – as in the ‘proposition
has been put’ – i.e. if in an argument – the fact that proposition has been put
– has been lost in the discussion – and its currency needs to be reaffirmed
and the opposite might apply with ‘X does not exist’ – that
is to say – the proposal was not put – and therefore is not relevant to the
current discussion
the meaning of any proposition put – is open to question – is open to doubt –
and is uncertain
red – is a proposal – red exists – if ‘red’ is proposed –
and any explanation of ‘red’ – any philosophical account of
‘red’ – i.e. an explanation in terms of an idealist propositional construct –
or an explanation in terms of realist propositional construct – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
no proposal – no proposition – is timeless – a proposal – a
proposition – is put – or it is not put –
propositional reality is a contingent reality
59. ‘"A name signifies only what is an element of
reality. What cannot
be destroyed; what remains the same in all
changes."—But what is
that?—Why, it swam before our minds as we said the sentence!
This was the very expression of a quite particular image: of
a particular
picture which we want to use. For certainly experience does
not shew
us these elements. We see component parts of something
composite (of
a chair, for instance). We say that the back is part of the
chair, but
is in turn itself composed of several bits of wood; while a
leg is as
simple component part. We also see a whole which changes (is
destroyed) while its component parts remain unchanged. These
are
the materials from which we construct that picture of
reality.’
what we see – is what we propose – and how we interpret what
we see is what we propose – what we construct – is what we propose –
our constructions are propositional constructions
and what we propose – whatever that may be – however that is
described – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
a name is proposal
60. ‘When I say: "My broom is in the corner",—is
this really a
statement about the broomstick and the brush? Well, it could
at any
rate be replaced by a statement giving the position of the
stick and the
position of the brush. And this statement is surely a
further analysed
form of the first one.—But why do I call it "further
analysed"?—
Well, if the broom is there, that surely means that the
stick and brush
must be there, and in a particular relation to one another;
and this
was as it were hidden in the sense of the first sentence,
and is expressed
in the analysed sentence. Then does someone who says that the
broom
is in the corner really mean: the broomstick is there, and
so is the brush,
and the broomstick is fixed in the brush?—If we were to ask
anyone
if he meant this he would probably say that he had not
thought
specially of the broomstick or specially of the brush at all.
And that
would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the
stick
nor of the brush in particular. Suppose that, instead of
saying "Bring
me the broom", you said "Bring me the broomstick
and the brush
which is fitted on to it."!—Isn't the answer: "Do
you want the broom?
Why do you put it so oddly?"——Is he going to understand
the further
analysed sentence better?—This sentence, one might say,
achieves
the same as the ordinary one, but in a more roundabout way.—
Imagine a language-game in which someone is ordered to bring
certain objects which are composed of several parts, to move
them
about, or something else of the kind. And two ways of
playing it:
in one (a) the composite objects (brooms, chairs, tables,
etc.) have
names, as in (15); in the other (b) only the parts are given
names and
the wholes are described by means of them.—In what sense is
an order
in the second game an analysed form of an order in the first?
Does the
former lie concealed in the latter, and is it now brought
out by analysis?—
True, the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick
and
brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom
also consists
of corresponding parts?’
‘In what sense is an order in the second game an analysed
form of an order in the first?
either order could be seen as an analysed form of the other
in practise – it’s likely to be a question of which proposal
is put first – as to which is an analysis of the other
‘Does the former lie concealed in the latter, and is it now
brought out by analysis?
no –
proposals – propositions – are not ‘concealed’ in each other
the two proposals are separate and distinct –
however they can be related to each other in such a manner
that the former proposal is represented as a construction of the latter
‘True, the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick
and brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists
of corresponding parts?’
the order like the brush can be deconstructed –
this could occur if there was a call to give the order in
terms of the parts of the broom
separate orders – for separate parts
61. ‘"But all the same you will not deny that a
particular order in
(a) means the same as one in (b); and what would you call
the second
one, if not an analysed form of the first?"—Certainly I
too should say
that an order in (a) had the same meaning as one in (b); or,
as I
expressed it earlier: they achieve the same. And this means
that if I
were shewn an order in (a) and asked: "Which order in
(b) means the
same as this?" or again "Which order in (b) does
this contradict?" I
should give such-and-such an answer. But that is not to say
that we
have come to a general agreement about the use of the
expression "to
have the same meaning" or "to achieve the
same". For it can be asked
in what cases we say: "These are merely two forms of the
same game."’
‘But that is not to say that we have come to a general
agreement about the use of the expression "to have the same meaning"
or "to achieve the same"’ –
correct
the fact is we can never be sure –
the best we can have at any time is propositional assent
and that is open to question – i.e. – just what are people
assenting to?
and can we be sure that their answers to this question – in
fact line up?
there can always be doubt here –
but this is the reality of propositional use
we don’t have – and we don’t need – certainty – to proceed –
we proceed in uncertainty
any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
as to ‘two forms of the same game’ –
well – is it
the same game?
perhaps it is two different games – that have a similar
result?
in propositional life –we don’t need 100% agreement – to get
on with it
62. ‘Suppose for instance that the person who is given the
orders in
(a) and (b) has to look up a table co-ordinating names and
pictures
before bringing what is required. Does he do the same when
he carries
out an order in (a) and the corresponding one in (b)?—Yes
and no.
You may say: "The point of the two orders is the
same". I should say
so too.—But it is not everywhere clear what should be called
the 'point'
of an order. (Similarly one may say of certain objects that
they have
this or that purpose. The essential thing is that this is a lamp,
that it
serves to give light;——that it is an ornament to the room,
fills an
empty space, etc., is not essential. But there is not always
a sharp
distinction between essential and inessential.)’
‘Does he do the same when he carries out an order in (a) and
the corresponding one in (b)?—Yes and no. You may say: "The point of the
two orders is the same". I should say so too.—
the real point here is that you don’t know –
‘But it is not everywhere clear what should be called the
'point' of an order’
well what is the point of the order?
it is quite possible that – if that question was put to the
one giving the order – and to the one receiving the order – that we would – or
at least could – get different – perhaps very different responses – even where
the order is carried out to everyone’s satisfaction
‘The essential thing is that this is a lamp, that it
serves to give light; - that it is an ornament to the room, fills an empty
space, etc., is not essential. But there is not always a sharp distinction
between essential and inessential.’
any distinction in any propositional context – is open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain –
what is to count as ‘sharp’?
and as for ‘essential’ and ‘inessential’ –
it becomes no more than a question of custom – of customary
use –
and if that doesn’t suit your purpose – you take a different
view
63. ‘To say, however, that a sentence in (b) is an 'analysed'
form
of one in (a) readily seduces us into thinking that the former
is the
more fundamental form; that it alone shews what is meant by
the other,
and so on. For example, we think: If you have only the
unanalysed
form you miss the analysis; but if you know the analysed
form that
gives you everything.—But can I not say that an aspect of the
matter is
lost on you in the latter case as well as the
former?’
what you can say is that these sentences – the sentence in
(a) and the sentence in (b) –
are proposals –
and that each of these proposals is open to question – is
open to doubt – and is uncertain
from a logical point of view – it is not that something gets
lost –
it is rather that there is always something more to
find
64. ‘Let us imagine language-game (48) altered so that names
signify
not monochrome squares but rectangles each consisting of two
such
squares. Let such a rectangle, which is half red half green,
be called
"U"; a half green half white one, "V";
and so on. Could we not
imagine people who had names for such combinations of
colour, but
not for the individual colours? Think of the cases where we
say:"
This arrangement of colours (say the French tricolour) has a
quite
special character."
In what sense do the symbols of this language-game stand in
need of
analysis? How far is it even possible to replace this language-game
by
(48)?—It is just another language-game; even though it is
related to (48).’
yes – if you go down this path what becomes clear is that
the notion of the language-game falls apart –
another language-game – even though it is related – and why not
another – and yet another – etc. etc. –
until we just face the propositional reality – that any
proposed use – is open to variation –
and realise that we are not playing a game – a rule-governed
proposition exercise –
rather what we are involved in is an on-going propositional
exploration – the engine of which – is propositional uncertainty
as for ‘analysis’ –
analysis is not an action outside of language use or in some
way separate to it – though the idea of the language-game – might suggest this
analysis is a language use –
and as with any language use – logically speaking – open
open to criticism – interpretation – variation –
our propositional reality – is uncertain – and I would say
beautifully uncertain –
for it is an ever changing masterpiece of creativity
65. ‘Here we come up against the great question that lies behind
all these considerations.—For someone might object against
me:
"You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of
language-
games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game,
and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities,
and what makes them into language or parts of language. So
you
let yourself off the very part of the investigation that
once gave you
yourself most headache, the part about the general form
of propositions
and of language."
And this is true.—Instead of producing something common to
all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena
have no
one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,—
but that they are related to one another in many different
ways. And it
is because of this relationship, or these relationships,
that we call them
all "language". I will try to explain this.’
language is proposal – proposals are propositions –
a proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain –
our reality – our living – breathing reality – in whatever
propositional context we are operating in – is the reality of propositional
uncertainty
and it is the logical uncertainty of the proposal – of the
proposition – that is the source of our possibilities as human beings
66. ‘Consider for example the proceedings that we call
"games".
I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games,
and
so on. What is common to them all?—Don't say: "There
must be
something common, or they would not be called 'games'
"—but
look and see whether there is anything common to
all.—For if you look
at them you will not see something that is common to all,
but
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at
that. To
repeat: don't think, but look!—Look for example at board-games,
with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to
card-games; here
you find many correspondences with the first group, but many
common
features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games,
much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are they
all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is
there
always winning and losing, or competition between players?
Think
of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but
when a
child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this
feature has
disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and
at the
difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think
now of
games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of
amusement,
but how many other characteristic features have disappeared!
And
we can go through the many, many other groups of games in
the same
way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated
network
of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes
overall
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.’
a game – is a rule-governed propositional exercise or
activity
what is common to games – of different kinds – is that they
are rule-governed
what is common to non-game
propositional activities – is that these propositional activities – are not rule-governed
these non-game
propositional activities – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
with propositional
games – on the other hand – if you play the game – the rules of the game are
not open to question – not open to doubt – and not uncertain
you can put the
rules of a game to question – this is a critical activity
putting the rules of
a game to question – is all very well – but it is not playing the game
67. ‘I can think of no better expression to characterize
these
similarities than "family resemblances"; for the
various resemblances
between members of a family: build, features, colour of
eyes, gait,
temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—
And I shall say: 'games' form a family.
And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same
way.
Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps
because it
has a—direct—relationship with several things that have hitherto
been called number; and this can be said to give it an
indirect relationship
to other things we call the same name. And we extend our
concept
of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre.
And
the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that
some one
fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of
many
fibres.
But if someone wished to say: "There is something
common to all
these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their
common
properties"—I should reply: Now you are only playing
with words.
One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole
thread—
namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres".’
‘similarities’ – is all you need
so called ‘family resemblances’ – just are proposed similarities
‘family resemblance’ – is redundant
and in any case – any proposed similarity – or so called
‘family resemblance’ is not – so to speak – set in concrete –
a similarity is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
and the other problem with this notion of family resemblances
– is that it is just another form of categorization –
a ‘family of games’ – a ‘family of numbers’ –
and referring to games – as a ‘family’ – or numbers as a ‘family’
– or whatever else – as a ‘family’ – is totally unnecessary –
‘games’ – will do the job – and ‘numbers’ – will do the job
– or if you want to get fancy – ‘number systems’
‘family’ is just an unnecessary overlay –
and it is hard to see how such a ‘concept’ – adds anything
at all to any matter that requires categorization
the other point here is – we are really back at square one –
for the question can always be asked – what constitutes a ‘family’?
the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and again –
is uncertain
further –
do all the different kinds of families in Wittgenstein’s
family of families – share a family resemblance?
i.e. is there a family
resemblance between the family of games – and the family of numbers?
perhaps the answer here can only be – ‘well they are all families’
–
so back to having ‘something in common’ – which if I am not
wrong – was what Wittgenstein was determined to argue against – with his idea
of ‘family resemblance’
look – we say that various things have something in common –
it is no sin
and this proposal of ‘having x in common’ – is – as with any
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
it is a proposal – nothing more
68. ‘"All right: the concept of number is defined for
you as the
logical sum of these individual interrelated concepts:
cardinal numbers,
rational numbers, real numbers, etc.; and in the same way
the concept
of a game as the logical sum of a corresponding set of
sub-concepts."——
It need not be so. For I can give the concept 'number'
rigid limits.
in this way, that is, use the word "number" for a
rigidly limited concept,
but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept
is not
closed by a frontier. And this is how we do use the word
"game".
For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts
as a
game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No.
You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that
never
troubled you before when you used the word "game".)
"But then the use of the word is unregulated, the
'game' we play
with it is unregulated."——It is not everywhere
circumscribed by
rules; but no more are there any rules for how high one
throws the
ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all
that and has
rules too.’
as to number –
the concept of number – as with any concept – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is in fact – uncertain –
the point being – there are – and can be – different accounts of ‘number’
as to ‘game’ –
yes – there are different games – and there are similarities
between different games –
and different accounts of the nature of different games –
and the use of the word ‘game’ – as with the use of any
word is ‘unregulated’ –
who or what ‘regulates’ usage?
not every aspect of every game is rule-governed
however any rule-governed propositional action is a game
that there is no rule for how high one throws the ball in
tennis – or how hard –
is because in the game as constructed – as played – there is
no need for such rules –
and further – such rules would probably make the game – as
we know it – unplayable
nevertheless – tennis is a rule-governed propositional
action –
if it was not rule-governed – it would not be a game
69. ‘How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine
that we should describe games to him, and we might add:
"This and
similar things are called 'games' ". And do we
know any more about
it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell
exactly what
a game is?—But this is not. ignorance. We do not know the
boundaries
because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a
boundary—
for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept
usable?
Not at all! (Except for that special purpose.) No more than
it took
the definition: i pace = 75 cm. to make the measure of
length 'one
pace' usable. And if you want to say "But still, before
that it wasn't
an exact measure", then I reply: very well, it was an
inexact one.—
Though you still owe me a definition of exactness.’
‘How should we explain to someone what a game is?’
what we tell them is that logically speaking there are two
propositional modes – the critical mode – and the rule-governed
mode –
in the critical mode a proposition – that is a proposal – is
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
that in the rule-governed mode – a propositional complex is rule-governed
– and is a game
if you play the game – you play in accordance with its rules
–
you can put the notion of ‘game’ to question – you can put
the rules of a game to question – but this is a critical propositional activity
– it is not playing the game
70. ‘"But if the concept 'game' is uncircumscribed like
that, you
don't really know what you mean by a 'game'."——When I
give the
description: "The ground was quite covered with
plants"—do you
want to say I don't know what I am talking about until I can
give a
definition of a plant?
My meaning would be explained by, say, a drawing and the
words
"The ground looked roughly like this". Perhaps I
even say "it looked
exactly like this."—Then were just this grass and these
leaves there,
arranged just like this? No, that is not what it means. And
I should
not accept any picture as exact, in this sense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Someone says to me: "Shew the children a game." I
teach them
gaming with dice, and the other says "I didn't mean that
sort of
game." Must the exclusion of the game with dice have
come before
his mind when he gave me the order?’
‘do you want to say I don't know what I am talking about until
I can give a
definition of a plant?’
no – you don’t need a definition of plant to see and to know
how the term ‘plant’ is used
but if you do want a definition of plant – then description
of plants misses the point
and yes – you could illustrate use by drawing a picture –
as to ‘exactness’ – the notion is more rhetorical than logical
any claim of ‘exactness’ – is open to question – and thus
shown to be uncertain –
or if you like – inexact
‘must the exclusion of dice have come before his mind when
he gave the order?’ –
it might have – it might not have
if it had – then to exclude dice from the type of games he
had in mind – and to give a clear order he would have been wise to have said –
‘show the children a game – and I don’t mean the game of dice’
71. ‘One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with
blurred
edges.—"But is a blurred concept a concept at
all?"—Is an indistinct
photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always
an advantage
to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the
indistinct one
often exactly what we need?
Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area
with
vague boundaries cannot be called an area at all. This
presumably
means that we cannot do anything with it.—But is it senseless
to say:
"Stand roughly there"? Suppose that I were
standing with someone
in a city square and said that. As I say it I do not draw
any kind of
boundary, but perhaps point with my hand—as if I were
indicating a
particular spot. And this is just how one might explain to
someone
what a game is. One gives examples and intends them to be
taken
in a particular way.—I do not, however, mean by this that he
is
supposed to see in those examples that common thing which
I—for
some reason—was unable to express; but that he is now to employ
those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is
not an
indirect means of explaining—in default of a better. For any
general
definition can be misunderstood too. The point is that
this is how we
play the game. (I mean the language-game with the word
"game".)’
it is not about blurred concepts and indistinct photographs
–
what we are dealing with is proposals – propositions
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
uncertain – that is whether the concept is blurred or not –
whether the picture is indistinct or not –
as to Frege – whether an ‘area’ is given vague boundaries –
or distinct boundaries –
the proposal – however it is put – is open to question
examples – propositional examples –
any ‘example’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – and logically speaking uncertain
playing the game – with the word ‘game’?
yes – you can point to an activity and say ‘that is a game’
– or go on give examples of games –
this is not playing a game –
a game is a rule-governed propositional exercise –
playing a game is playing according to the rules of the game
–
pointing – and giving examples – is what it is – but is
not playing a game –
it is proposing
72. ‘Seeing what is common. Suppose I shew someone
various multi-
coloured pictures, and say: "The colour you see in all
these is called
'yellow ochre' ".—This is a definition, and the other
will get to under-
stand it by looking for and seeing what is common to the
pictures.
Then he can look at., can point to, the common thing.
Compare with this a case in which I shew him figures of
different
shapes all painted the same colour, and say: "What
these have in
common is called 'yellow ochre' ".
And compare this case: I shew him samples of different
shades of
blue and say: "The colour that is common to all these
is what I call
'blue' ".’
if the question is ‘what is common to these pictures? – one
answer maybe –
the colour – yellow ochre –
this will likely not be the only answer
let us say i.e. – that in the multi-coloured pictures there
is no orange –
then the response might be – ‘all the pictures lack the colour
orange’ –
so the ‘common thing’ is up for question – up for doubt –
and is – regardless of what answer one gives – uncertain
in the case of the different shaped figures –
could not an answer to the question – ‘what is common to the
figures?’ – be –
‘they are all geometrical figures’ – or –‘they are all drawn
with black ink’ – or not mentioning yellow ochre – ‘they are all coloured’ –
again what is ‘common’ here – is open to question
and with the samples of different shades of blue –
in saying that – ‘The colour that is common to all these is
what I call 'blue' –
could it not be argued for instance that ‘blue’ is a
particular – a definite colour – that sample 1 is blue – and the others are
not?
any proposal of commonality is a propositional classification –
we put these proposals as a way of organizing different proposals
different classifications will suit different purposes –
i.e. – ‘The colour that
is common to all these is what I call 'blue'’ – might suit to explaining colour
to someone who is just learning about colour – but not be of use to an artist painting
a landscape picture
and any propositional classification – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
73. ‘But might there not be such 'general' samples? Say a schematic
leaf, or a sample of pure green?"—Certainly
there might. But for
such a schema to be understood as a schema, and not
as the shape of a
particular leaf, and for a slip of pure green to be
understood as a
sample of all that is greenish and not as a sample of pure
green—this
in turn resides in the way the samples are used.
Ask yourself: what shape must the sample of the
colour green be?
Should it be rectangular? Or would it then be the sample of
a green
rectangle?—So should it be 'irregular' in shape? And what is
to
prevent us then from regarding it—that is, from using it—only
as a
sample of irregularity of shape?’
‘to have understood the definition means to have in one's
mind an idea of the thing defined, and that is a sample or picture.’ –
understanding?
we may say that understanding a definition is having in
one’s mind the idea of the thing defined –
but as Wittgenstein points out – what exactly does this
amount to?
we might also say that understanding a definition – is
knowing how to use the word –
but this too has limits –
in understanding the definition do I know how it is used in all
contexts?
clearly not
and so we come to the basic question here – how do we define
– ‘understanding’ –
can we say with any definitiveness what understanding is –
what understanding amounts to?
I say no
this word ‘understanding’ – or the concept of understanding –
is in fact – uncertain
understanding – is open to question – whenever we propose it
it is always open to doubt
one might say that understanding this – is to understand?
74. ‘‘Here also belongs the idea that if you see this leaf
as a sample
of 'leaf shape in general' you see it differently from
someone who
regards it as, say, a sample of this particular shape. Now
this might
well be so—though it is not so—for it would only be to say
that, as a
matter of experience, if you see the leaf in a particular
way, you use it
in such-and-such a way or according to such-and-such rules.
Of course,
there is such a thing as seeing in this way or that; and
there are also
cases where whoever sees a sample like this will in general
use it in
this way, and whoever sees it otherwise in another way. For
example,
if you see the schematic drawing of a cube as a plane figure
consisting
of a square and two rhombi you will, perhaps, carry out the order
"Bring me something like this" differently from someone
who sees
the picture three-dimensionally.’
yes – how you ‘see’ what is put to you – what is proposed
– and how you propose in relation to
what is proposed –
is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
75. ‘What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it
mean, to know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge
some-
how equivalent to an unformulated definition? So that if it
were
formulated I should be able to recognize it as the
expression of my
knowledge? Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game,
completely
expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in
my
describing examples of various kinds of game; shewing how
all sorts
of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these;
saying
that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and
so on.’
‘What does it mean to know what a game is?’ –
to know what a game is – is to play it –
and to play it – is to recognise it as a rule-governed
action – a rule-governed propositional action
you can describe examples of various kinds of game – this is
all very well – but it doesn’t get to the heart of the matter
from a logical point of
view – there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode
– and the rule-governed mode –
this is to say that in our propositional lives we critically
evaluate the proposals we put and the proposals put to us –
and that we construct and play propositional games – rule-governed
propositional actions
we question – and we play
76. ‘If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not
acknow-
ledge it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had
drawn in
my mind. For I did not want to draw one at all. His concept
can then
be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it. The
kinship is
that of two pictures, one of which consists of colour
patches with
vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped
and dis-
tributed, but with clear contours. The kinship is just as undeniable
as
the difference.’
we have two different picture / proposals –
one described as having vague contours – the other described as having clear contours
Wittgenstein speaks of ‘kinship’ here – which amounts to
similarities –
and he says the ‘kinship’ is just as undeniable as the
difference
the fact is though – there is only a ‘kinship’ – a
similarity – if such is proposed
if it is not proposed – it is not there
in any case this notion of ‘kinship’ – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
as indeed are the notions – or descriptions – ‘vague’ and ‘clear’
77. ‘And if we carry this comparison still further it is
clear that the
degree to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred
one depends
on the latter's degree of vagueness. For imagine having to
sketch a
sharply defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one. In
the latter
there is a blurred red rectangle: for it you put down a
sharply defined
one. Of course—several such sharply defined rectangles can
be drawn
to correspond to the indefinite one.—But if the colours in the
original
merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a hopeless
task
to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one? Won't
you then have to say: "Here I might just as well draw a
circle or heart
as a rectangle, for all the colours merge. Anything—and nothing—is
right."——And this is the position you are in if you
look for definitions
corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics.
In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the
mean-
ing of this word ("good" for instance)? From what sort
of examples?
in what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to
see that the
word must have a family of meanings.’
the blurred picture – and the sharp picture – are different
proposals – different propositions –
so there will be no correspondence – end of story
our concepts in ethics and aesthetics – are no different to
any other concept – in any other propositional context
they are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘How did we learn the meaning of this word ("good"
for instance)?
how we learn the meaning (whatever that might be said to be)
of any word – is really an open question
different proposals will be put – and they will serve
different purposes –
but any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must
have a family of meanings.’ –
(who or what decides the boundary of this family – what’s in
– what’s out?
and if there is no boundary – sharp or vague – in what sense
do you have a ‘family’?)
a ‘family of meanings’ – is just different meanings –
different uses of a word – in different propositional contexts
different uses – and different contexts – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
78. ‘Compare knowing and saying:
how many feet high Mont Blanc
is—
how the word "game" is used—
how a clarinet sounds.
If you are surprised that one can know something and not be
able
to say it, you are perhaps thinking of a case like the
first. Certainly not
of one like the third.’
our knowledge is proposal –
to know is to propose
our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
our knowledge is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
saying is one form of proposing – saying is one form
of knowing
knowing and not be able to say it?
can you propose something and not be able to say it?
yes – there may be impediments to putting a proposal into
words – to saying it – to expressing it –
the proposal then is not made public
the knowing is not made public –
as to how may feet high Mont Blank is?
if you have an answer – why not propose it?
how the word ‘game’ is used?
really – here any example of use – might do the trick
and how the clarinet sounds?
proposals can be put here – and they will likely be poetic –
any proposal put in response to these questions – will be
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
79. ‘Consider this example. If one says "Moses did not
exist",
this may mean various things. It may mean: the Israelites
did not
have a single leader when they withdrew from Egypt——or: their
leader was not called Moses——-or: there cannot have been
anyone
who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses——or:
etc. etc.—
We may say, following Russell: the name "Moses"
can be defined by
means of various descriptions. For example, as "the man
who led the
Israelites through the wilderness", "the man who
lived at that time
and place and was then called 'Moses' ", "the man
who as a child was
taken out of the Nile by Pharaoh's
daughter" and so on. And according
as we assume one definition or another the proposition
"Moses
did not exist" acquires a different sense, and so does
every other
proposition about Moses.—And if we are told "N did not
exist", we do
ask: "What do you mean? Do you want to say ...... or
...... etc.?
"But when I make a statement about Moses,—am I always
ready to
substitute some one of these descriptions for "Moses"?
I shall perhaps
say: By "Moses" I understand the man who did what
the Bible relates
of Moses, or at any rate a good deal of it. But how much?
Have I
decided how much must be proved false for me to give up my
proposition
as false? Has the name "Moses" got a fixed and
unequivocal use
for me in all possible cases?—Is it not the case that I have,
so to speak,
a whole series of props in readiness, and am ready to lean
on one if
another should be taken from under me and vice
versa?——Consider
another case. When I say "N is dead", then
something like the following
may hold for the meaning of the name "N": I
believe that a human
being has lived, whom I (i) have seen in such-and-such
places, who
(2) looked like this (pictures), (3) has done such-and-such
things, and
(4) bore the name "N" in social life.—Asked what I
understand by
"N", I should enumerate all or some of these
points, and different ones
on different occasions. So my definition of "N"
would perhaps be
"the man of whom all this is true".—But if some point
now proves
false?—Shall I be prepared to declare the proposition
"N is dead"
false—even if it is only something which strikes me as
incidental
that has turned out false? But where are the bounds of the
incidental?—
If I had given a definition of the name in such a case, I
should now be
ready to alter it.
And this can be expressed like this: I use the name "N"
without a
fixed meaning. (But that detracts as little from its
usefulness, as it
detracts from that of a table that it stands on four legs
instead of three
and so sometimes wobbles.)
Should it be said that I am using a word whose meaning I
don't
know, and so am talking nonsense?—Say what you choose, so
long
as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts. (And when
you see
them there is a good deal that you will not say.)
(The fluctuation of scientific definitions: what to-day
counts as an
observed concomitant of a phenomenon will to-morrow be used
to
define it.)’
the statement ‘Moses did not exist’ – is a proposal –
a proposal – that as with any other – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
as Wittgenstein notes – it can mean various things – and he
gives examples of what might be proposed here
from a logical point of view this proposal – as indeed with
any proposal – if it is to be pursued – is in fact an on-going argument – and an
argument in every direction –
and Wittgenstein provides examples of such argument
any proposal put to define the original proposal – is – as with the original proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
logically speaking – this process of question – or doubt –
of the exploration of uncertainty – is on-going
which amounts to saying – we cannot be sure – of what we are
proposing – and we cannot be sure of how – what we are proposing – is received
– is understood
in practice – at some point in the argument – we assume
that we know what we are talking about –
and we assume that we are understood – or not –
we make these assumptions in order to proceed –
these are pragmatic assumptions –
and when we make these assumptions – we suspend – question –
doubt – and uncertainty
nevertheless – from a logical point of view –
we operate in and with uncertainty – and we proceed in and
with uncertainty
any notion of certainty here – or the absence of doubt – is
pretence –
and the world is full of it
80. ‘I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to
it, meaning to
fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight?——"So
it wasn't a chair,
but some kind of illusion".——But in a few moments we
see it again
and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was
there after all
and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But
suppose that
after a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What
are we
to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases—rules saying
whether one may use the word "chair" to include
this kind of thing?
But do we miss them when we use the word "chair";
and are we to
say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word,
because we
are not equipped with rules for every possible application of
it?’
‘there is a chair’ – is a proposal – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
its disappearance – or seeming disappearance – and re-appearance
– only speaks to the uncertainty of the proposal –
and any rules proposed to govern the use of the proposition
– are like the proposition itself – open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
81. ‘F. P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me
that
logic was a 'normative science'. I do not know exactly what
he had
in mind, but it was doubtless closely related to what only
dawned on
me later: namely, that in philosophy we often compare
the use of words
with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot
say
that someone who is using language must be playing
such a game.——
But if you say that our languages only approximate to
such calculi
you are standing on the very brink of a misunderstanding.
For then
it may look as if what we were talking about were an
ideal language.
As if our logic were, so to speak, a logic for a
vacuum.—Where
as logic does not treat of language—or of thought—in the sense
in which a
natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most
that can
be said is that we construct ideal languages. But
here the word "ideal"
is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages
were better, more
perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the
logician
to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like.
All this, however, can only appear in the right light when
one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of
understanding, meaning,
and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can
lead us (and
did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and
means or
understands it he is operating a calculus according
to definite rules.’
‘that in philosophy we often compare the use of words
with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who
is using language must be playing such a game. – ’
in logic what we deal with is proposals – propositions –
propositions – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
comparing the ‘use of words’ with games and calculi – may
serve some interest –
but from a logical point of view there is nothing in it
our use of words – and the games and calculi – (another use
of words) – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
games are rule-governed propositional exercises – if you play
propositional games – you play according to the rules – otherwise – there is no
game
and to play according to the rules you must recognise
– that you are doing so
you can’t play a game if you don’t know – in some sense –
the rules of the game –
and that you are playing the game
if others construct your propositional activity as game playing
–
then as with any other proposal – this game proposal – is
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘Whereas logic does not treat of language—or of thought—in the
sense in which a
natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most
that can be said is that we construct ideal languages.’
the proposals of natural science – as with any proposal –
are open to question – open to doubt and are uncertain
constructing so called ideal languages might be an
interesting exercise – that serves some kind of purpose –
but an ‘ideal language’ – as with any other language – is
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead,
for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday
language; and as if it took the logician
to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like.’
if the logician is worth his or her salt – the logician
demonstrates – through question –and through doubt – the exploration of
propositional uncertainty –
‘For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and
did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands
it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.’
if anyone puts a proposal – a proposition – that proposal /
proposition – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain –
this is what needs to become clear
if by ‘normative’ Ramsey meant ‘exhibiting a norm’ – Ramsey
failed to understand logic
any propositional behaviour can be constructed as ‘exhibiting
a norm’ –
this is what we begin with in logic
the proper logical response to any propositional norm – is
to put it to question – put it to doubt – and explore its uncertainty
logic is not a ‘normative science’ –
logic is the critical activity
the critical activity of the exploration propositional
uncertainty
82. ‘What do I call 'the rule by which he proceeds'?—The hypothesis
that
satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe;
or the rule
which he looks up when he uses signs; or the one which he gives
us in
reply if we ask him what his rule is?—But what if observation
does not
enable us to see any clear rule, and the question brings
none to light?—
For he did indeed give me a definition when I asked him what
he understood
by "N", but he was prepared to withdraw and alter
it.—So how am I to
determine the rule according to which he is playing? He does
not know it
himself.—Or, to ask a better question: What meaning is the
expression
"the rule by which he proceeds" supposed to have
left to it here?’
as with any hypothesis – ‘the rule by which he proceeds’ – may
be useful – may serve a purpose –
to be frank this notion suits Wittgenstein’s view of language
and language use – it suits his purposes –
his hypothesis here is one among many in the philosophy of
language –
and of no greater logical value than any other –
it is as with any proposal – open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain –
the problem here – with this view – and any proposed all
encompassing view of language – or for that matter – of anything at all –
is that no one view will capture all perspectives –
and any claim that one view does – limits one’s
propositional reality – one’s understanding
by all means develop a theory – be it philosophical – scientific
– or whatever – to the best of your ability – see where it goes – what it can do
– what use it has –
but bear in mind there are any number of other perspectives
that are just as valid
if you do this – you do not arrive at a definitive position
but at the same time you do not box yourself in to some
logical and epistemological illusion –
what it comes to in the end – is genuinely – keeping an open
mind –
and enjoying the logical activity of question – of doubt –
and the exploration of uncertainty
83. ‘Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw
light
here? We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a
field by
playing with a ball so as to start various existing games,
but playing
many without finishing them and in between throwing the ball
aimlessly
into the air, chasing one another with the ball and bombarding
one another for a joke and so on. And now someone says: The
whole
time they are playing a ball-game and following definite
rules at every
throw. And is there not also the case where we play and—make
up the rules
as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them—as
we go
along.’
‘Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light
here?’
yes – it throws a light on languages games
and yes – we can and do play language-games – rule-governed propositional
actions –
however not all language use is a rule-governed game – that’s
the point –
the primary activity in language use is logical – is critical
we question – doubt – and we explore propositional
uncertainty
and the reason for this is that the proposition – is a proposal
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
language-games – are in effect a relief from the critical
activity that dominates our propositional use – that dominates our lives
playing language-games – is a joyful use of language –
but it is not the main game
84. ‘I said that the application of a word is not everywhere
bounded
by rules. But what does a game look like that is everywhere
bounded
by rules? whose rules never let a doubt creep in, but stop
up all
the cracks where it might?—Can't we imagine a rule determining
the
application of a rule, and a doubt which // removes—and so
on?
But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is
possible for
us to imagine a doubt. I can easily imagine someone always doubting
before he opened his front door whether an abyss did not
yawn behind
it, and making sure about it before he went through the door
(and
he might on some occasion prove to be right)—but that does
not
make me doubt in the same case.’
‘But what does a game look like that is everywhere bounded
by rules? whose rules never let a doubt creep in, but stop up all the cracks
where it might?’
a rule is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain –
however – if you play a game – you play in accordance
with the rules
if you don’t play in accordance with the rules – there
is no game
you can put the rules to question – but this is not playing
the game –
it is subjecting the rules / proposals – to critical
analysis
85. ‘A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the
sign-post leave
no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which
direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along
the road
or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which
way I
am to follow it; whether in the direction of its ringer or
(e.g.) in the
opposite one?—And if there were, not a single sign-post, but
a chain
of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground—is there
only one
way of interpreting them?—So I can say, the sign-post does
after all
leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room
for
doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a
philosophical
proposition, but an empirical one.’
‘A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign-post
leave no doubt open about the way I have to go?’
not if you decide that you will go in the direction of the
sign post – that you will follow the rule –
if – for whatever reason – you question whether the sign
post points in the right direction – then the sign-post is a focus of doubt
‘So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for
doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now
this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one.’
call it what you will – ‘philosophical’ – ‘empirical’ – the
fact is – the matter is a logical issue –
a rule – in whatever form – is a proposal – a
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
86. ‘Imagine a language-game like (2) played with the help
of a
table. The signs given to B by A are now written ones. B has
a
table; in the first column are the signs used in the game,
in the second
pictures of building stones. A shews B such a written sign;
B looks it
up in the table, looks at the picture opposite, and so on. So
the table is a
rule which he follows in executing orders.—One learns to look
the
picture up in the table by receiving a training, and part of
this training
consists perhaps in the pupil's learning to pass with his
finger
horizontally from left to right; and so, as it were, to draw
a series of
horizontal lines on the table.
Suppose different ways of reading a table were now
introduced;
one time, as above, according to the schema:
another time like this:
or in some other way.—Such a schema is supplied with the
table as
the rule for its use.
Can we not now imagine further rules to explain this one?
And, on
the other hand, was that first table incomplete without the
schema of
arrows? And are other tables incomplete without their
schemata?’
any proposal – rule – schemata – rule for schemata – etc.
etc. – is open to question – open to doubt – and therefore logically speaking –
incomplete
what we deal with – with any proposal – any proposition – is
uncertainty –
there is no ‘logical completion’
87. ‘Suppose I give this explanation: "I take 'Moses'
to mean the
man, if there was such a man, who led the Israelites out of Egypt,
whatever he was called then and whatever he may or may not have
done besides."—But similar doubts to those about
"Moses" are
possible about the words of this explanation (what are you
calling
"Egypt",
whom the "Israelites" etc.?). Nor would these questions
come to an end when we got down to words like
"red", "dark",
"sweet".—"But then how does an explanation
help me to understand,
if after all it is not the final one? In that case the
explanation is
never completed; so I still don't understand what he means,
and never
shall!"—As though an explanation as it were hung in the
air unless
supported by another one. Whereas an explanation may indeed
rest
on another one that has been given, but none stands in need
of another—
unless we require it to prevent a misunderstanding. One
might
say: an explanation serves to remove or to avert a
misunderstanding —
one, that is, that would occur but for the explanation; not
every
one that I can imagine.
It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an
existing gap
in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible
if we
first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all
these
doubts.
The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it
fulfils
its purpose.’
‘"But then how does an explanation help me to understand,
if after all it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never
completed; so I still don't understand what he means, and never shall!"’
what you understand – is what is proposed – and what is
proposed is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to a ‘final explanation’ –
the only ‘final explanation’ – is the ‘explanation’ – that
one does not put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty not explored
‘As though an explanation as it were hung in the air unless
supported by another one. Whereas an explanation may indeed rest on another one
that has been given, but none stands in need of another—unless we require it to
prevent a misunderstanding.’
yes – any proposal – any explanation – as it were – ‘hangs
in the air’ –
whether an explanation stands in need of another – depends
on whether it is put to question – or not
there are no ‘misunderstandings’ – only different
explanations –
different proposals – proposals that work – or satisfy –
explanations that work – or don’t satisfy
‘It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an
existing gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if
we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these
doubts.’
logically speaking – there is no foundation –
any proposed foundation is a proposal – open to question
there is no ‘logically secure’ – understanding –
any proposed understanding – is open to question –
logically speaking – there is no removing of all doubt
the idea that you can is a philosophical fantasy – and illogical
we do stop putting propositions to question – to doubt – and
we do stop exploring propositional uncertainty
we may do this to pretend – we have a final explanation
– a final understanding –
this is just ignorance –
or we may stop questioning –
in order to proceed – such is a pragmatic decision –
we can make such a decision while recognizing that any such
decision is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the sign-post – is a proposal
88. ‘If I tell someone "Stand roughly here"—may
not this explanation
work perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too?
‘But isn't it an inexact explanation?—Yes; why shouldn't we
call it"
inexact"? Only let us understand what
"inexact" means. For it does
not mean "unusable". And let us consider what we call
an "exact"
explanation in contrast with this one. Perhaps something
like drawing
a chalk line round an area? Here it strikes us at once that
the line has
breadth. So a colour-edge would be more exact. But has this
exactnesss
till got a function here: isn't the engine idling? And
remember too that
we have not yet defined what is to count as overstepping
this exact
boundary; how, with what instruments, it is to be established.
And
so on.
We understand what it means to set a pocket watch to the
exact time
or to regulate it to be exact. But what if it were asked: is
this exactness
ideal exactness, or how nearly does it approach the
ideal?—Of course,
we can speak of measurements of time in which there is a
different,
and as we should say a greater, exactness than in the
measurement of
time by a pocket-watch; in which the words "to set the
clock to the
exact time" have a different, though related meaning, and
'to tell the
time' is a different process and so on.—Now, if I tell
someone: "You
should come to dinner more punctually; you know it begins at
one
o'clock exactly"—is there really no question of exactness
here? because
it is possible to say: "Think of the determination of
time in the
laboratory or the observatory; there you see what
'exactness' means"?
"Inexact" is really a reproach, and
"exact" is praise. And that is to
say that what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly
than what is more
exact. Thus the point here is what we call "the
goal". Am I inexact
when I do not give our distance from the sun to the nearest
foot, or
tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth
of an inch?
No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not
know
what we should be supposed to imagine under this head—unless
you
yourself lay down what is to be so called. But you will find
it difficult
to hit upon such a convention; at least any that satisfies
you.’
‘If I tell someone "Stand roughly here"—may not
this explanation work perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too?’
yes – you have to see what happens – the matter is uncertain
–
uncertain whether the proposal is ‘stand roughly there’ – or
‘stand exactly there’
‘But isn't it an inexact explanation?—Yes; why shouldn't we
call it" inexact"?
well it’s a proposal – and whether ‘inexact’ or ‘exact’ –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘We understand what it means to set a pocket watch to the
exact time or to regulate it to be exact. But what if it were asked: is this
exactness ideal exactness, or how nearly does it approach the ideal?’
yes the matter is open to question
‘No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not
know what we should be supposed to imagine under this head—unless you yourself
lay down what is to be so called. But you will find it difficult to hit upon
such a convention; at least any that satisfies you.’
so called ‘ideal’ or not – any proposal is open to question
– open to doubt – and logically speaking – uncertain –
you will be satisfied – as much as you can be – if what you
propose is accepted by those involved – and if what you propose – on the face
of it – works
89. ‘These considerations bring us up to the problem: In
what sense
is logic something sublime?
For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth—a
universal
significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the
sciences.—
For logical investigation explores the nature of all things.
It seeks to
see to the bottom of things and is not meant to concern
itself whether
what actually happens is this or that.——It takes its rise, not
from
an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp
causal
connexions: but from an urge to understand the basis, or
essence,, of
everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had
to hunt out
new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation
that we do
not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand
something
that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in
some sense
not to understand.
Augustine says in the Confessions "quid est ergo
tempus? si nemo
ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim,
nescio".— ("What
therefore is time? If you don't ask me, I know – if you ask me, I don't
know.") This
could not be said about a question of natural science ("What
is the specific gravity of hydrogen?" for instance).
Something that we know
when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed
to give an
account of it, is something that we need to remind
ourselves of. (And
it is obviously something of which for some reason it is
difficult to remind
oneself.)’
logic is propositional method –
a proposition is a proposal – a proposal – open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
logic is this critical method –
the method of question – of doubt – of the exploration of
propositional uncertainty
this critical methodology – can be applied to any proposal –
any proposition – in any context
‘We want to understand something that is already in
plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand.’
in the absence of proposal – what is in plain view – is what
we don’t know –
our propositional response – in whatever form that takes – to
the unknown –
is how we transform the unknown – into the known
‘("What therefore is time? If you don't ask me, I
know – if you ask me, I don't know.")’
if you ask me and I put forward a proposal in response to
your question – it can be said that I know
our knowledge is proposal –
and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and
is uncertain
if I have no proposal to put – then it cannot be said that
‘I know’
I may have a proposal
regarding the nature of time that I could put – if asked the question –
‘What therefore is time?’ –
or I may have a proposal on the matter – and decide not to
put it – for whatever reason
such proposals – as with any proposal – are open to question
– open to doubt and uncertain
90. ‘We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our
investigation,
however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one
might say,
towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena. We remind
ourselves, that
is to say, of the kind of statement that we make
about phenomena.
Thus Augustine recalls to mind the different statements that
are made
about the duration, past present or future, of events.
(These are, of
course, not philosophical statements about time, the
past, the present
and the future.)
Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an
investigation
sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings
away.
Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among
other
things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression
in different
regions of language.—Some of them can be removed by
substituting
one form of expression for another; this may be called an
"analysis"
of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes
like one of
taking a thing apart.’
‘We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our
investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say,
towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena.’
the only phenomena here are proposals – propositions –
and we don’t deal with the ‘possibilities’ of propositions –
we deal with what is proposed
‘We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement
that we make about phenomena.’
the kinds of statements we make about phenomena –
are the kinds of proposals we put in relation to – proposals
– in relation to propositions –
and any proposition – of any ‘kind’ – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one.’
the investigation is therefore a critical one
‘Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by
clearing misunderstandings away.’
there are no misunderstandings – there are only different
proposals – different propositions
and as for ‘clearing away’ –
decisions are made regarding which proposals to work with –
and these decisions are open to question
as to analysis – analysis is propositional argument – argument
as to how to interpret
subject proposals –
any argument / analysis here – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
there is no ‘taking apart’ – there is only different
proposals put – different interpretations advanced
and these different proposals – different interpretations –
are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
91. ‘But now it may come to look as if there were something
like a
final analysis of our forms of language, and so a single completely
resolved form of every expression. That is, as if our usual
forms of
expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if there were something
hidden in them that had to be brought to light. When this is
done
the expression is completely clarified and our problem
solved.
It can also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings
by
making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if
we were
moving towards a particular state, a state of complete
exactness; and
as if this were the real goal of our investigation.’
there is no final analysis of propositions –
propositions are open – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
our usual form of expression – our only form of expression –
is the proposal –
the proposal – in whatever form that takes
and there is no logical distinction between the proposal –
and analysis of the proposal
any analysis – is a proposal –
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
logically speaking – nothing is hidden
what there is – is what is proposed – if it is not proposed
– it is not there
‘making a proposal more exact’ – is putting a new proposal –
the ‘more exact’ proposal – like the less exact proposal –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
logically speaking – there is no goal
the idea that there is a goal – is really just the notion of
foundation reconfigured
or if you like – given a new direction –
a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
if we behave logically we explore propositional uncertainty
if we behave illogically – we deny it
92. ‘This finds expression in questions as to the essence of
language,
of propositions, of thought.—For if we too in these
investigations are
trying to understand the essence of language—its function, its
structure,—yet this is not what those questions have in
view. For they
see in the essence, not something that already lies open to
view and that
becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that
lies
beneath the surface. Something that lies within, which we see
when we
look into the thing, and which an analysis digs out.
'The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our
problem now
assumes. We ask: "What is language?", "What is
a proposition?"
And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all;
and
independently of any future experience.’
our reality is propositional reality
there is no essence to this reality – there is only what is proposed
– and what is proposed – is open – open to question – open to doubt
– and is uncertain –
there is no hidden reality – there is only the reality that
is put – that is proposed
‘We ask: "What is language?", "What is a proposition?"’
–
language is proposal –
a proposition is a proposal
93. ‘One person might say "A proposition is the most
ordinary
thing in the world" and another: "A proposition—that's
something
very queer!"——And the latter is unable simply to look
and see how
propositions really work. The forms that we use in expressing
ourselves about propositions and thought stand in his way.
Why do we say a proposition is something remarkable? On the
one hand, because of the enormous importance attaching to it.
(And
that is correct). On the other hand this, together with a
misunderstanding of the logic of language, seduces us into
thinking
that something extraordinary, something unique, must be
achieved
by propositions.—A misunderstanding makes it look to us as if
a
proposition did something queer.’
our world is the world of propositions –
‘ordinary’ or ‘queer’ has nothing to do with the logic of
propositions
such terms only function iN a rhetorical context
the ‘forms’ that we use to express ourselves about
propositions and thoughts – are propositions
and these propositions of form – as with the propositions they
are used in relation to –
are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
I do not say the proposition is something ‘remarkable’ – and
I do not attach ‘enormous importance’ to it
what is achieved by propositions – is proposal –
proposal is neither ‘extraordinary’ or ‘unique’ – or ‘queer’
–
to suggest such is to confuse logic with rhetoric
94. 'A proposition is a queer thing!' Here we have in germ
the
subliming of our whole account of logic. The tendency to
assume a
pure intermediary between the propositional signs and
the facts. Or
even to try to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves.—For
our forms
of expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing
that nothing
out of the ordinary is involved, by sending us in pursuit of
chimeras.’
the proposition is a proposal –
signs are proposals – facts are proposals –
our forms of expression – are proposals –
proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
95. ‘"Thought must be something unique". When we
say, and
mean, that such-and-such is the case, we—and our meaning—do
not
stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this—is—so.
But this
paradox (which has the form of a truism) can also be
expressed in this
way: Thought can be of what is not the case.’
what is not the case – is only the case – if what is the case
– is denied
96. ‘Other illusions come from various quarters to attach
themselves
to the special one spoken of here. Thought, language, now
appear to
us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world. These
concepts:
proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one
behind the
other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to
be used
for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is
missing.)’
thought – language – the world – are proposals – propositional constructions – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘But what are these words to be used for now?’ –
no great mystery here –
they are used as they are used –
and logically speaking their use is open to question
there is no ‘missing language-game’ – you can play with these words if you want to –
construct a language-game – if you want to –
but the real issue – the issue we all face – if we are not
playing games – is the critical evaluation of these words – of these proposals
–
and there is no ‘final’ evaluation here –
every proposed use – is open to question – open to doubt –
and is uncertain
97. ‘Thought is surrounded by a halo.—Its essence, logic,
presents
an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is,
the order of
possibilities, which must be common to both world and
thought.
But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It
is prior to all
experience, must run through all experience; no empirical
cloudiness
or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it——It must rather
be of the
purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction;
but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it
were the
hardest thing there is (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
No. 5.5563).
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential,
in our investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the
incomparable
essence of language. That is, the order existing between the
concepts
of proposition, word, proof, truth, experience, and so on.
This order
is a super-order between—so to speak—super-concepts.
Whereas, of
course, if the words "language",
"experience", "world", have a use, it
must be as humble a one as that of the words
"table", "lamp", "door".’
you can propose a propositional structure – and propose that
this structure is ‘the order of possibilities which must be common to both
world and thought’ – and name this propositional structure – this propositional
complex – ‘logic’ –
and you can give it a kick along – with rhetoric – dress it
up with halos and the purest crystal – and revel in its beauty – if you like –
what you have though – when the lights go down and the house
is empty – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘logic’ is not any particular proposal – or set of proposals
–
logic – is the critical action – of question – of
doubt – in the exploration of propositional uncertainty
there is no essential difference between Wittgenstein’s view
of things in the Tractatus – and his view in the Investigations
and the reason I say this is that in both the Tractatus and
the Investigations – Wittgenstein holds to the view that logic presents
order –
he drops from the heights of crystal purity to the notion of
the language-game –
but still he believes in strait-jacketing propositional
reality –
it is just that in the language-game order – there is more
room to move
I understand why Wittgenstein had the idea of publishing the
Tractatus and the Investigations together in one volume –
for the Investigations might best be seen as a
development on the central theses of the Tractatus
perhaps in the Investigations we have the development
of a philosophical framework designed to
show the application of the ideas of the Tractaus beyond logic and mathematics?
In any case the view that the Investigations is a
refutation of the Tractatus just doesn’t stack up
‘trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language’ – is
entirely misguided
you can actually forget about ‘essence’ altogether –
but if you find it too hard to renounce this ‘incomparable’
– you must face the logical fact – that any proposal of essence – any proposed
essence – is as with any other proposal – open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain –
understanding this should enable you to give up your
weakness for ‘essence’
the words – ‘language’ – ‘experience’ – ‘world’ – as with
‘table’ – ‘lamp’ and ‘door’ – are proposals
– proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
98. ‘On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our
language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving
after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite
unexceptionable
sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On
the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there
must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest
sentence.’
as to sense –
sense is not a given – sense is a proposal
any proposal of sense – is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
order is not a given – order is a proposal
any proposal of order – ‘perfect’ or otherwise – is open to question
– open to doubt – and is uncertain
a proposal – is a proposal – and any proposal can be
variously described
any description of a proposal – i.e. ‘vague’ – is – as with
the subject proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
99. ‘The sense of a sentence—one would like to say—may, of
course, leave this or that open, but the sentence must
nevertheless
have a definite sense. An indefinite sense—that would
really not be a
sense at all.—This is like: An indefinite boundary is
not really a
boundary at all. Here one thinks perhaps: if I say "I
have locked the
man up fast in the room—there is only one door left
open"—then I
simply haven't locked him in at all; his being locked in is
a sham.
One would be inclined to say here: "You haven't done
anything at all".
An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none.—But
is that true?’
there is no definite sense –
any sense is indefinite – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
but in the face of this uncertainty – we do have – we still
have – we can have –
an operational sense
a sense in short – that though – uncertain – we decide to
operate with –
this decision – is open to question –
an operational sense enables us to proceed – to proceed in
the face of propositional uncertainty
as to boundaries – definite or indefinite –
it is really a question of what you are doing –
you can proposes definite boundaries –
but these can be put to question – to doubt – can be seen as
– indefinite – uncertain –
as any escaped prisoner will testify
it is really a question of what you are doing – what kind of
propositional activity you are involved in
if you are playing a game – a rule-governed propositional
action –
the boundaries are definite – or there is no game –
or in the example given by Wittgenstein – there is no prison
‘cell’ –
for here the ‘rules’ were not applied
on the other hand – if you are involved in propositional discovery
– the boundaries – will be in question –
and here any proposed boundary will function as a proposal –
a boundary – to go beyond
100. ‘"But still, it isn't a game, if there is some
vagueness in the
rules".—But does this prevent its being a
game?—"Perhaps you'll call
it a game, but at any rate it certainly isn't a perfect game."
This means:
it has impurities, and what I am interested in at present is
the pure
article.—But I want to say: we misunderstand the role of the
ideal
in our language. That is to say: we too should call it a
game, only we
are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to see the
actual use of the
word "game" clearly.’
‘"But still, it isn't a game, if there is some vagueness
in the rules".—But does this prevent its being a game?—"’
yes –
a ‘vague’ rule – is no rule
forget ‘perfect’ – games – are rule-governed
rules – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
however if you play a game – you play in
accordance with the rules – or you are not playing a game
any so called ‘ideal’ – is a proposal – open to question
and best understood as a structural proposal – as an
organisational proposal
there is no ‘ideal of our language’ – as such –
‘ideals’ can be proposed and worked with –
but as with any proposal – they are open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
(c) killer press. 2020.
