'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Thursday, March 18, 2010

on certainty 349



349.  “I know that that’s a tree” – this may mean all sorts of things: I look at a plant that I take for a young beech and that someone else thinks is a black-currant. He says “that is a shrub”; I say it is a tree – We see something in the mist which one of us takes for a man, and the other says “I know that that’s a tree”. Someone wants to test my eyes etc. etc. –etc. etc. Each time ‘that’ which I declare to be a tree is of a different kind.

But what when we express ourselves more precisely? For example: “I know that that thing there is a tree, I can see it quite clearly.” – Let us even suppose that I made this remark in the context of a conversation (so that it was relevant when I made it); and I add “I mean these words as I did five minutes ago”. If I added, for example, that I had been thinking of my bad eyes again and it was a kind of sigh, then there would be nothing puzzling about my remark.

For how a sentence is meant can be expressed by an expansion of it and may therefore be made part of it.



‘Each time that which I declare to be a tree is of a different kind.’

what we have here is different descriptions applied to ‘that’

‘that’ – as such – without description –  is unknown
                                                                                                                                 
when we apply a description to ‘that’ –

what we do is propose a characterization –

the point of which is to enable us to act in relation to ‘that’ –

‘that’– does not determine its description –

and therefore the value of any description applied to ‘that’ –

will be a matter of its functionality –

in the circumstances to which it is applied

any so called ‘determination’ we make –

will be open to question – open to doubt –

and therefore will be uncertain

‘Let us even suppose that I made this remark in the context of a conversation (so that it was relevant when I made it); and I add “I mean these words as I did five minutes ago”.’

‘I meant these words as I did five minutes ago’ –

is really an attempt to guarantee the statement –

to give it an authority –

this underwriting is no more than – just another assertion –

the only authority is has – is its authorship

‘For how a sentence is meant can be expressed by an expansion of it and may therefore be made part of it.’

yes – you can expand a sentence –

and as interesting and as informative as that might be –

all you in fact do from a logical point of view –

is increase the domain of its uncertainty
© greg t. charlton. 2010.