'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Wednesday, March 17, 2010

on certainty 347


15.3.51
347. “I know that that’s a tree.” Why does it strike me as if I did not understand the sentence? though it is after all an extremely simple sentence of the most ordinary kind? It is as if I could not focus my mind on any meaning. Simply because I don’t look for the focus where the meaning is. As soon as I think of an everyday use of the sentence instead of a philosophical one, its meaning becomes clear and ordinary.



‘I know that that’s a tree’ –

perhaps you don’t understand the sentence –

because the ‘I know’ –

which could well be seen as the focus of the sentence –

is irrelevant

the claim of knowledge is a claim of authority –

the only authority is authorship –

claiming the authorship – of your sentence –

which is just what ‘I know’ amounts to –

is irrelevant

if ‘I know’ is to be a claim of authority –

other than the claim of authorship –

it is false

perhaps it has rhetorical effect –

if so that effect –

can only be based on deception

meaning is not a ghost in the syntax –

the meaning of the non-rhetorical sentence –

‘that is a tree’ –

is the use the sentence is put to –

be that a sentence of ‘an everyday use’ –

or one of a ‘philosophical use’

and yes – just what that amounts to –

how it is interpreted –

will be uncertain –

it will be a matter open to question –

open to doubt –

and never in any final sense –

resolved


© greg t. charlton. 2010.