41. We can understand a mental
state, and characterize it as a hypothetical
process. Comparison between the grammar of mental processes and the grammar of
brain process.
In certain circumstances both our
picking out a red object from others on demand and our being able to give the
ostensive definition of the word “red” are regarded as signs of understanding.
We aren’t interested here in the
difference thinking out aloud (or in writing) and thinking in our imagination.
What we call “understanding” is
not the behaviour that shows us the understanding, but a state of which this
behaviour is a sign.
we begin here with ‘mental state’
–
this characterization – this
proposal – is a place to start –
but such a characterization is
not without question –
there will be those who do not
accept the description ‘mental’ – or indeed ‘state’ –
point being there is no rock
solid basis to any characterization –
we begin in uncertainty
and yes – understanding as a
hypothetical process –
which is to say – to understand
is to propose –
what we do in understanding is
put propositions
the grammar of mental processes
and the grammar of brain processes?
the brain process description in
is specific in principle – the mental process description – not so
these different proposals may well have come out of radically
different views of the nature of reality –
at any rate – different descriptions – of that which
– undescribed – is unknown
yes there are accepted cues to indicate understanding
– picking out on demand – and ostensive definition –
even so – these indicators of
understanding – can and will be under certain circumstances – put to the
question
yes – a proposal is a proposal
– a proposition is a proposition –
however it manifests
understanding as a state?
this loads up behaviour – with the unobservable –
a pretty theory – and one that
has currency – use –
however just one of a number of
possible characterizations of ‘understanding’ –
I say the more the merrier
© greg t. charlton. 2014.
