'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Monday, November 10, 2014

Philosophical Grammar 33

33. Aren’t our sentences parts of a mechanism? As in a pianola? But suppose it is in bad condition? So it is not the effect but the purpose that is the sense of the signs (the holes in the pianola role). Their purpose within the mechanism.

We need an explanation that is part of the calculus.

“A symbol is something that produces this effect” – How do I know that it is the one I meant?”

We could use a colour chart: and then our calculus would have to get along with the visible colour sample.



the mechanism model doesn’t fit with language use

grammar is a description of language use –

and that description may seem to fit better with the mechanism model –

until you face the fact that it doesn’t really translate to language use – i.e.  so called ungrammatical use

how much of actual language use conforms to the so called rules of grammar?

a theory of grammar is interesting

but as with any account of language –

it is really just another form of language use –

you might then say – to be explained –

but there will be no explanation here

language does not account for language

their purpose within the mechanism?

there is no ghost in the machine here

any purpose expressed will function as the purpose of the language  used

we need an explanation that is part of the calculus?

if it is ‘part of the calculus’ – it won’t explain the calculus

any so called ‘explanation’ – will be a description of the calculus –

not the calculus – or any part of it

this idea that an explanation is part of the calculus –

amounts to saying that there is no explanation for language –

a view that I think has a great deal of common sense to it

language – as Wittgenstein said earlier – speaks for itself –

that’s it – language – language use –

there is nowhere else to go

a symbol is something that produces this effect – how do I know it is the one I meant?’

well even if you think it is the one you meant – you don’t know –

yes – you have an expectation –

and as to the result – you make an assessment –

any assessment you make is open to revision –

to reassessment

a colour chart – and then our calculus would have to get along with a visible colour sample?

the idea here is to fix a word like ‘red’ – to a visible colour on a chart –

to define in terms of the colour sample – and that alone

Wittgenstein thinks that if you make such an association – you will have something definite –

some certainty regarding red –

this view of language is very naïve

the fact is that we can’t fix usage –

and this not a problem – nor is it a solution to a problem –

it is the reality of language – of language use



© greg t. charlton. 2014.