32. Describing ball games.
Perhaps one will be unwilling to call some of them ball games; but is it clear
where the boundary is to be drawn here?
We consider language from one
point of view only.
The explanation of the purpose or
effect of a word is not what we call the explanation of its meaning. It may be
that if it is to achieve its effect a particular word cannot be replaced by any
other, just as it may be that a gesture cannot be replaced by any other. – We
only bother about what’s called the explanation of meaning and not about
meaning in any other sense.
describing ball games –
is it clear where the boundary is
to be drawn?
it’s all a question of definition
–
and any definition will be no
more than a proposal
and the terms used in any
definition –
will themselves be open to
question
if you come to a final definition
–
it will not be a logical result –
rather a pragmatic decision –
or a rhetorical ploy
‘We are interested in language as
a procedure according to explicit rules, because philosophical problems are
misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of the rules according
to which we are inclined to use words.
‘We consider language from only
one point of view.’
language as a procedure according
to explicit rules?
to take this view is to already
decide the issue –
such a view is not the start of
consideration rather an end
if language is a procedure
according to explicit rules –
then it’s all over red rover –
and on this view is there a place
for other views of the nature of language?
if we are to genuinely consider
the nature of language – we
consider all perspectives offered and look for new ways of seeing
the endeavour to understand
language does not begin or end with one pat theory
explanation of language – like
language itself is an ongoing ever changing creative endeavour
and yes – argument is the engine
of this endeavour
and as to rules –
rules suggest an authority –
the only logical authority is
authorship –
and the authorship of a
proposition – of a rule –
is logically irrelevant
beyond authorship any claim to
authority is a deception –
and what you are dealing with –
with any such claim – is not logic –
but rhetoric
here argument becomes the art of
deception
philosophical problems as
misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of the rules according
to which we are inclined to use words?
yes – clarification?
clarification – or the process of
argument will only stop – when questions stop being asked
misunderstandings –
what we face is not misunderstandings
– rather uncertainty – uncertainties
any proposal – any proposition –
is open to question – open to doubt
the idea of ‘misunderstanding’ –
presupposes an understanding that is certain –
well not in this world –
any understanding – is open to
question – open to consideration –
open to thought
‘philosophical problems’ – is
really the reality of uncertainty
and to cut to the chase –
we face uncertainty – and any
proposal we put forward to deal with uncertainty – our uncertainties – will
itself be uncertain – open to question – open to doubt
or to put it another way –
as Wittgenstein himself said in
his later book the ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (#24)
‘philosophy leaves everything as
it is’
© greg t. charlton. 2014.
