'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Friday, August 20, 2010

on certainty 597


597. The reply to the question “Can you be mistaken?” gives the argument a definite weight. The answer may also be “I don’t think so.”



the answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’ –

or ‘I don’t think so’ –

will only give the argument ‘weight’ –

definite or not 

if the question –

‘can you be mistaken?” –

makes sense in the first place

now the fact is –

if you claim certainty –

there is no place for the mistake –

your world is certain –

if on the other hand –

you see propositional reality as uncertain –

then there will be no mistakes –

rather different conceptions –

different proposals–

different assessments –

uncertainties

mistakes – don’t enter into this matter –

the ‘mistake’-

is not in the picture


NB


Wittgenstein trades on the fact –

that ‘mistake’ – is a common notion –

interesting – that at no point –

does he even attempt

an analysis of ‘mistake’

the reason is –

it doesn’t stand up –

to philosophical analysis –

it is not a notion –

with a any philosophical significance

I find it hard to believe –

that Wittgenstein didn’t see this –

and so I can’t but conclude –

that his argument in On Certainty

is a fraud


© greg t. charlton. 2010.