597. The reply to the question “Can you be
mistaken?” gives the argument a definite weight. The answer may also be “I
don’t think so.”
the answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’ –
or ‘I don’t think so’ –
will only give the argument ‘weight’ –
definite or not –
if the question –
‘can you be mistaken?” –
makes sense in the first place
now the fact is –
if you claim certainty –
there is no place for the mistake –
your world is certain –
if on the other hand –
you see propositional reality as uncertain
–
then there will be no mistakes –
rather different conceptions –
different proposals–
different assessments –
uncertainties
mistakes – don’t enter into this matter –
the ‘mistake’-
is not in the picture
NB
Wittgenstein trades on the fact –
that ‘mistake’ – is a common notion –
interesting – that at no point –
does he even attempt –
an analysis of ‘mistake’
the reason is –
it doesn’t stand up –
to philosophical analysis –
it is not a notion –
with a any philosophical significance
I find it hard to believe –
that Wittgenstein didn’t see this –
and so I can’t but conclude –
that his argument in On Certainty –
is a fraud
© greg t. charlton. 2010.