'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Wednesday, August 18, 2010

on certainty 591


591. “I know what kind of tree that is. – It is a chestnut.”

“I know what kind of tree that is. – I know it’s a chestnut.”

The first statement sounds more general than the second. One will only say “I know” a second time if one wants especially to emphasize certainty; perhaps to anticipate being contradicted. The first “I know” means roughly: I can say.

But in the second case one might begin with the observation “That’s a…”, and then, when this is contradicted, counter by saying: “I know what sort of tree it is”, and by this means lay emphasis on being sure.



yes – I say the ‘I know’ the second time –

to emphasize –

and what that says is that ‘I know’ –

is rhetorical –

and yes – the first ‘I know’ –

means ‘roughly I can say’ –

or as I have put it – repeatedly –

(some might say ad nauseam)

‘I am the author of … ’

‘I know’ is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

the claim of authorship –

is logically irrelevant and unnecessary

any other claim to an authority –

is rhetorical –

persuasive – perhaps –

but logically false –

and deceptive


© greg t. charlton. 2010.