Feyerabend: Introduction

In this work I will argue against Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism and argue for methodological scepticism.

Introduction

‘Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law and order alternatives’

Feyerabend begins with a reworking of a quote from Lenin –

‘‘History generally, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more many sided, more lively and subtle than even ‘the best methodologist can imagine’ –

how does Lenin or Feyerabend know history ‘is always richer in content, more varied, more many sided, more lively and subtle’ – if no methodologist can imagine such a state of affairs?

on what basis is any such claim made about the nature of history?

as against this ‘argument’ I would put that history is no more than what we make it – how we propose it

the point being if we have a history that is rich in content, varied, many sided and lively and subtle it is because we have constructed such a history

beyond our imagination the world we operate in is unknown

any response to the unknown is an attempt to give reality character –

which is to say we propose some basis from which we can operate both conceptually and practically

and any proposal here – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

Feyerabend goes on to quote Herbert Butterfield –

‘history is full of ‘accidents and conjectures and curious juxtapositions of events’ and it demonstrates to us the ‘complexity of human change and the unpredictable character of the ultimate consequences of any given act or decision of men’’

yes – what we face is uncertainty – and any proposal we make regarding the acts and decisions of men – is open to question – open to doubt

and he asks –

‘Are we really to believe that the naïve and simple-minded rules which methodologists take as their guide are capable of accounting for (what Hegel calls) such a ‘maze of interactions’?

no – but the reason is just that any proposal – any rule – is logically speaking – open to question – is uncertain – regardless of how simple-minded or comprehensive it is

‘And is it not clear that successful participation in a process of this kind is possible only for a ruthless opportunist who is not tied to any particular philosophy and who adopts whatever procedure seems to fit the occasion?’

Feyerabend presents a picture of the ‘ruthless opportunist’ – as a player who is neither ruthless or opportunistic –

he is hardly ‘ruthless’ if he adopts whatever procedure fits the occasion – he’s a mindless conformist –

and as for ‘opportunist’ – if you just fit with whatever is going on – what chances do you take – what moves do you make – that in anyway alter the status quo?

Feyerabend’s ‘ruthless opportunist’ – is just a harmless fraud – a nuisance

he gets back to Lenin –

‘Two very important practical conclusions follow from this (character of the historical process). First that in order to fulfil its task, the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without  exception….second it must be able to pass from one to the other in the quickest and most expedient manner.’

the revolutionary class must be able to master all – yes all forms or aspects of social activity –

now if this is the pre-condition for the revolutionary class to advance – there will be no advance – Lenin’s condition is not realizable – in the real world that is

no one can master all forms or aspects of social activity –

to suggest that this possible is utopian rubbish

Feyerabend goes on to quote Einstein –

‘The external conditions which are set for (the scientist) by the facts of experience do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted, in the construction of his conceptual world, by the adherence to an epistemological system. He therefore, must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist…’

here Einstein puts that experience – by its nature – does not permit ‘too much restriction’

and therefore that the scientist should in the construction of his conceptual world – not permit too much restriction

and yes – from the point of view of those who adhere to a strict conception of experience

the scientist who is not too much restricted might appear as an unscrupulous opportunist

Einstein here is recommending that the scientist – as far as the conceptual world goes – should keep an open mind

Einstein is not here claiming ‘that science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise’

Feyerabend continues –

‘A complex medium containing and unforseen developments demands complex procedures and defies analysis on the basis of rules which have been set up in advance and without regard to the ever-changing conditions of history’

if what we are facing is the ever changing conditions of history –

what then is the essential difference between basic rules – and complex procedures?

if what we face is ‘a complex medium and unforseen developments’ – then ‘complex procedures’ – will be just as inadequate to the task as simple rules

will a complex procedure account for unforseen developments?

how could you possibly know that it would?

and in any case we can’t deal with ‘unforseen developments’ – just because they are not seen

and by the way – it is not history that is ever-changing – if by history you mean the past –

you can have different theories of history – and they might change –

but accounting for ‘a complex medium’ is dealing with the present state of science –

as to the ‘unforseen developments’ –

we wait until the future becomes the present – and then we can set about dealing with it

so ‘basic rules’ or ‘complex procedures’?

what is required here is recognizing that any proposal that we put forward – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

you deal with an uncertain world – with uncertain proposals

when something occurs that is not accounted for by your theory – you think again

‘Now it is, of course, possible to simplify the medium in which a scientist works by simplifying its main actors. The history of science, after all, does not just consist of facts and conclusions drawn from the facts. It also contains ideas, interpretations of facts, problems created by conflicting interpretations, and so on. On closer analysis we find that science knows no ‘bare facts’ at all but that the ‘facts’ that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore essentially ideational. This being the case, the history of science will be complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the ideas it contains, and these ideas in turn will be complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the minds of those who invented them. Conversely, a little brainwashing will go a long way in making the history of science duller, simpler, more uniform, more ‘objective’ and more easily accessible to treatment by strict and unchangeable rules.’

firstly ‘the history of science’ – doesn’t exist

what does exist is different accounts of the history of science

secondly any so called ‘fact’ – is a proposal –

and any interpretation of a fact is a proposal –

conflicting interpretations of facts – are simply the result of different proposals in relation to the fact-proposal

yes – you can interpret / describe your proposal / fact as ‘essentially ideational’

you can survey proposals in science – and yes you can interpret the propositional landscape – as complex – chaotic – full of mistakes –

in logical terms all you have uncovered is propositional uncertainty

describing science as ‘dull’ – ‘simple’ – ‘more uniform’ – ‘more objective’ – is no great sin –

if such descriptions – fit the situation – and are useful – then they have a place

‘strict and unchangeable rules’ – is nothing more than authoritarian rhetoric

any rule – any description – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

this applies equally to Feyerabend’s proposals – as much as it does to the proposals of those who put contrasting and different views

‘Scientific education as we know it today has precisely this aim. It simplifies ‘science’ by simplifying its participants: first a domain of research is defined. The domain is separated from the rest of history (physics, for example, is separated from metaphysics and from theology) and given a ‘logic’ of its own. A thorough training in such a ‘logic’ then conditions those working in the domain: it makes their actions more uniform and it freezes large parts of the historical process as well. Stable ‘facts’ arise and persevere despite the vicissitudes of history. An essential part of the training which makes such facts appear consists in the attempt to inhibit intuitions that might lead to the blurring of boundaries. A person’s religion, for example, or his metaphysics, or his sense of humour (his natural sense of humour and not the inbred and always rather nasty kind of jocularity

one finds in specialized professions) must not have the slightest connection with his scientific activity. His imagination is restrained, and even his language ceases to be his own. This is again reflected in the nature of scientific ‘facts’ which are experienced as being independent of opinion, belief, and cultural background.’

I can understand ‘scientific education as we know it today’ – as something of an initiation rite –

learning in such a manner will get students into the intellectual discipline required in science –

and as for the historical – theological – metaphysical – issues and back stories –

I imagine most teachers of science reckon there will be time for that –

the really crucial thing in any education process is to activate a student’s critical capacity – encourage question – encourage doubt – encourage uncertainty –

a skilful teacher can do this while at the same time teaching intellectual and experimental discipline –

the sense of humour argument leaves me a little perplexed –

I don’t think you need a sense of humour to do science – and even if you have one – I would say it is irrelevant to science

nature is not a joke –

and even if it is seen as such from some metaphysical perspective –

it’s no barrel of laughs

as for ‘the nasty kind of jocularity one finds in specialized professions’ –  par for the course – and irrelevant

when I was fifteen doing elementary high school science I remember a lesson on force

the teacher was explaining the equation f = ma

I piped up and asked – “but sir, what is force?”

I remember he looked at me quite intently and said – “that is a philosophical question” – and went on with the lesson

well his answer was for me good and bad –

bad in that I concluded there and then that physics was not what I was going to be interested in

and good – in that I realized that this ‘philosophy’ – whatever it was – was where I would be heading

it was only in second year philosophy at La Trobe University –

in a class with Professor Brian Ellis –

that I got back to the question of the nature of force –

and I was delighted

‘It is thus possible to create a tradition that is held together by strict rules, and that is also successful to some extent. But is it desirable to support such a tradition to the exclusion of everything else? Should we transfer to it the sole rights for dealing in knowledge, so that any result that has been obtained by other methods is at once ruled out of court? This is the question I intend to ask in the present essay. And to this question my answer will be a firm and resounding NO’.

well a tradition held together by strict rules is only functional if those in the tradition hold to those rules –

and why would they hold to such rules ?

the only reasonable answer is that they will hold to these rules –.if they deliver the results

if they don’t deliver the results –  then clearly – the rules don’t function –

and if that is the case they will be reviewed – if not discarded – or replaced –

the real point here is that there is no one rule as to how to proceed –

the best we can do is see what happens – see what people do –

and underpin any such ‘seeing’ – with an attitude of uncertainty

as to what is and is not desirable – that is anyone’s guess

different desires will fight it out in the same way as different propositions – or different theories – or different world views – fight it out

it becomes a question of who wins the day – who is the most persuasive –

and that is not a logical issue – it is a rhetorical issue –

and in any serious matter – there is not likely to be any final agreement

should we support such a tradition to the exclusion of everything else?

no – of course not –  but if a tradition has a use – we should give it its due

and further it is logical – to look at different ways of doing things – different methods – and further to develop different approaches

and if you understand this – you realise that any result obtained by other methods – is valid –

and the reason is that any method – as with any result – in short – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘There are two reasons why such an answer seems to be appropriate. The first reason is that the world which we want to explore is a largely unknown entity. We must, therefore, keep our options open and we must not restrict ourselves in advance. Epistemological prescriptions may look splendid when compared with other epistemological prescriptions, or with general principles – but who can guarantee that they are the best way to discover, not just a few isolated facts ‘facts’ but also some deep-lying secrets of nature?”

in the absence of description what we face – is the unknown

description makes known –

any description is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

our knowledge is uncertain

keeping our options open – is recognizing propositional reality – as open to question – open to doubt – as uncertain

epistemological prescriptions – general principles – are proposals –

why one epistemological prescription is preferred to another – is ultimately a question of circumstance

there are no logical guarantees –

so called ‘guarantees’ are the province of authoritarian rhetoric –

rhetoric is all authoritarianism of any form comes to

‘facts’ – are proposals that have become the focus – of question – of doubt –

‘deep-lying secrets of nature’ –

there are no ‘deep-lying secrets’ – there is only what is proposed –

and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘The second reason is that a scientific education as described above (and practised in our schools) cannot be reconciled with a humanitarian attitude. It is in conflict ‘with the cultivation of individuality which alone produces, or can produce, well developed human beings’, [John Stuart Mill] it ‘maims by compression, like a Chinese lady’s foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to make a person markedly different in outline’ [John Stuart Mill] from the ideals of rationality that happen to be fashionable in science, or in the philosophy of science. The attempt to increase liberty, to live a full and rewarding life, and the corresponding attempt to discover the secrets of nature and of man entails, therefore, the rejection of all universal standards and of all rigid tradition. (Naturally, it also entails the rejection of a large part of contemporary science.)

‘the cultivation of individuality which alone produces, or can produce, well developed human beings’ –

a proposal – open to question – open to – uncertain –

how we increase liberty – how we live full and rewarding lives – is a matter that is always – under consideration –  open to question – always uncertain –

as for ‘discovering the secrets of nature’ – what we are talking about here is new and fruitful proposals

there is no need to reject anything – what is required is an open and critical mind

‘It is surprising to see how rarely the stultifying effect of ‘the Laws of Reason’ or of scientific practice is examined by professional anarchists. Professional anarchists oppose any kind of restriction and demand that the individual be permitted to develop freely, unhampered by laws, duties or obligations. And yet they swallow without protest all the severe standards which scientists and logicians impose upon research and upon any kind of knowledge-creating and knowledge-changing activity. Occasionally, the laws of scientific method, or what are thought to be the laws of scientific method by a particular writer are even interpreted into anarchism itself. ‘Anarchism is a world concept based upon a mechanical explanation of phenomena’ writes Kropotkin. ‘Its method of investigation is that of the exact natural sciences … the method of induction and deduction.’ It is not clear, writes a modern ‘radical’ professor at Columbia, ‘that scientific research demands an absolute freedom of speech and debate. Rather the evidence suggests that certain kinds of unfreedom place no obstacle in the way of science … [R.P. Wolff.] ’

well I would say that the laws of reason or of scientific practise have not been the focus of ‘professional’ anarchists –

probably because they haven’t recognised their relevance to the anarchist debate –

or because they haven’t had the intellectual skills to challenge them

and possibly too –  they had other matters to occupy their attention

opposing any kind of restriction – is as absolutist as endorsing any kind of restriction

these ‘professional anarchists’ – are in the same boat as the authoritarians they oppose –

 ‘Anarchism is a world concept based upon a mechanical explanation of phenomena’ –

‘a world concept’ –  what this amounts to is that anarchism is the rule – or should be

and if such a prescription is not authoritarian – what is it?

hard to see how the idea of ‘a world concept’ – is anything other than an argument for dominance

so – at the heart of such anarchism – is hypocrisy –

this so called ‘anarchist’ argues against standard authoritarian concepts and systems –

but endorses a ‘world concept’ – vague as that is – to take their place –

presumably ‘anarchist freedom’ sloshes around in the vagueness of the ‘world concept’

‘Its method of investigation is that of the exact natural sciences … the method of induction and deduction.’

it’s pretty clear from this that Kropotkin was quite happy to claim the backing of what he saw as the authority of science – for his ‘anarchism as a world concept’

as for the ‘radical professor at Columbia’ – this notion of ‘unfreedom’ – is unnecessary –

yes – we know science operates in a world of obstacles –

and if there were no obstacles to knowledge there would be no reason for science

the logical reality is that the only authority – is the authority of authorship –

and the authorship of a proposal – is logically irrelevant to the assessment of proposals –

any claim to authority – beyond authorship – is rhetorical – rhetorical and deceptive

the proposition is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

our freedom rests in propositional uncertainty

there is no place for ‘authority’ in propositional logic –

there is no place for authority in science – or indeed in any other propositional action or pursuit that human beings engage in

claims to authority beyond the claim of authorship have no logical basis –

and in so far as there are such claims what we are faced with is logical deception –

and it is this deception that is or should be the primary focus of all philosophical attack

the so called ‘anarchist’ – is the least equipped for this task – for he is a first order player in the very deception –  that is to be unmasked –

frauds abound

‘There are certainly some people for whom this is ‘not so clear.’ Let us, therefore, start with our outline of an anarchistic methodology and a corresponding anarchist science. There is no need to fear that the diminished concern for law and order in science and in society that characterizes an anarchism of this kind will lead to chaos. The human nervous system is too well organized for that. There may, of course, come a time when it will be necessary to give reason a temporary advantage and when it will be wise to defend its rules to the exclusion of everything else. I do not think that we are living in such a time today.’

‘the human organism is too well organized for that’ –

so the backstop – the authority – for avoiding chaos – is the human nervous system –

the human nervous system apparently – is inviolable –

and is not a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

rather it is a bedrock against chaos

and presumably – according to Feyerabend – the anarchist argument – proceeds from this bedrock –

great to have such a solid and incontestable basis for one’s anarchism – for one’s anti- authoritarianism!

on top of this – yes – we can play deceptive games – if necessary –

what a victory!

‘There may, of course, come a time when it will be necessary to give reason a temporary advantage and when it will be wise to defend its rules to the exclusion of everything else.’

reason is – question – doubt – uncertainty

if you give reason a rest at anytime – you give up on knowledge – and you stay stuck in prejudice

‘I do not think that we are living in such a time today.’

presumably – for the time being –  we can play a straight bat –

but the question is – what for Feyerabend is playing a straight bat?

what does this anarchist methodology amount to?

an argument against authority in science?

as I have stated you don’t have to fly the anarchist flag to argue against authority – in science – or for that matter – in any other propositional activity

all you need to do is understand propositional logic –

that is understand that the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

this logic applies equally to anarchism –

anarchism – as with any other political doctrine is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

if it is not held to be – it is held not logically – but rhetorically

the real argument against authority in science – and authority in any propositional activity or context – is the argument for propositional uncertainty

it is the argument for a positive scepticism

and by positive scepticism – I mean a scepticism that regards propositional uncertainty as the reality we face – as the reality we live in – as the reality that is

our knowledge is uncertain

for too long – really since Socrates – scepticism has been negative –

it has been the argument against – the method used for tearing down

the positive sceptic embraces reality as it is – embraces its uncertainty –   

and sees uncertainty as the engine of creativity.