Feyerabend 1

1

Feyerabend begins chapter 1 with –

‘This is shown by an examination of historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the relation between idea and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress: is anything goes.’

‘The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical research. We find then, that there is not a single rule, however plausible, and however firmly grounded in epistemology, that is not violated at some time or another. It becomes evident that such violations are not accidental events, they are not results of insufficient knowledge or of inattention which might have been avoided. On the contrary, we see that they are necessary for progress. Indeed one of the most striking features of recent discussions in the philosophy of science is the realization that events and developments, such as the invention of atomism in antiquity, the Copernican revolution, the rise of modern atomism (kinetic theory; dispersion theory; stereochemistry; quantum theory), the gradual emergence of the wave theory of light, occurred only because some thinkers either decided not to be bound by certain ‘obvious’ methodological rules, or because they unwittingly broke them.’

the argument from history that Feyerabend suggests here is fair enough –

but history depends on who writes it –

and what is written depends of the assumptions of the historian

a different set of assumptions – delivers a different history

my point is that the historical argument – is really no more than a restatement of assumptions – and an elaboration of those assumptions

it really is something like the mast head for the perspective that is to be argued

as I see it the real issue here is logical – not historical

science is propositional

and any proposition – that is any proposal – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

science – as with any other propositional activity – reflects this logical reality –

the reality of question – doubt – uncertainty

where it does not – what we have is not logical behaviour – but rhetorical behaviour

the battle between logic and rhetoric in propositional life –

is the difference between a closed-minded approach to the world – and an open-minded approach

I would suggest that in science – as in all propositional activity – you will see logical behaviour and rhetorical behaviour

this seems to be the natural tension in propositional action – in propositional life

‘On the contrary, we see that they are necessary for progress.’

‘progress’ – is a value judgment –

what is ‘progress’ from one point of view – may well be considered a retrograde step from another

the reality is that propositional systems change – and people move with the change –

it is just this propositional movement – when given the sanction of those involved – that gets written up as ‘progress’

science – as with any other propositional action – is what occurs

and it is scientists – the propositional players in the propositional activity – who decide what is – and what is not to count as science – and indeed – what is and is not to count as good science

philosophers of science – are secondary players – they are at best – observers of the process –

they may have some interesting and useful insights into scientific activity – that might be of use to the practicing scientist – but they are not legislators

‘The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science’ –

who’s idea is this?

Feyerabend keeps referring to it – but does not identify its proponents

we can ask – does anyone hold to such a view – if so who?

and how relevant would their opinion be – to anyone actually working in science?

one has the suspicion that Feyerabend is putting up a ’straw man argument’ – and that this straw man argument – is central to his enterprise

‘This liberal practice, I repeat, is not just a fact of the history of science. It is both reasonable and absolutely necessary for the growth of knowledge. More specifically, one can show the following: given any rule, however ‘fundamental’ or ‘necessary’ for science, there are always circumstances where it is advisable not only to ignore the rule, but to adopt its opposite. For example, there are circumstances where it is advisable to introduce, elaborate, and defend ad hoc hypotheses, or hypotheses which contradict well-established and generally accepted experimental results, or hypotheses whose content is smaller than the content of the existing and empirically adequate alternative, or self consistent hypotheses, and so on.’

the so called ‘history of science’ – regardless of whose history you are talking about –

is no guarantee of the future of science – is no guarantee of how science will be – how it will proceed –

what we are getting here from Feyerabend – is an inductive account of scientific methodology –

I am surprised – I would never have imagined that Feyerabend would fall head first  into Hume’s trap –

science – at any time – just is what the scientists – the practitioners – say it is –

it is how they propose it

there may well be circumstances – where ad hoc hypotheses are introduced – or where scientists work with hypotheses which contradict well established experimental results etc. etc. –

whether or not science proceeds in this manner – is up to the scientists

whether or not such methods are ‘advisable’ – will be decided by the working scientist

as for the ‘growth of knowledge’ – knowledge is what is proposed –

and our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and it is this logical reality that leads to new proposals –

‘growth of knowledge’ amounts to – new proposals – new ways of understanding – new ways of seeing –

and any new proposal –  new understanding – new way of seeing –

is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘There are even circumstances – and they occur rather infrequently – when argument looses its forward-looking aspect and becomes a hindrance to progress. Nobody would claim that the teaching of small children is exclusively a matter of argument (though argument may enter into it, and should enter into it to a larger extent than is customary), and almost everyone now agrees that what looks like a result of reason – the mastery of a language, the existence of a richly articulated perceptual world, logical ability – is due partly to indoctrination and partly to a process of growth that proceeds with the force of natural law. And where arguments do seem to have an effect, this is more than often due to their physical repetition than to their semantic content.’

‘when argument looses its forward-looking aspect and becomes a hindrance to progress’

argument is argument –

whether it is forward looking – or not –  depends on who’s doing the looking

and ‘a hindrance to progress’ – again depends on who’s idea of progress we are talking about here

argument if it is logical – is critical  –

whether it is forward looking or a hindrance – has to do with the use – it is put to – and how that use is evaluated

‘the mastery of a language, the existence of a richly articulated perceptual world, logical ability’ –

how these faculties come about – and are developed – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘the force of natural law’ – is really the explanation you have – when you have no explanation at all

argument – is a means of persuasion – and not the only one

‘Having admitted this much we must also concede the possibility of non-argumentative growth in the adult as well as in (the theoretical parts of) institutions such as science, religion, prostitution, and so on. We certainly cannot take for granted that what is possible for a small child – to acquire new modes of behaviour on the slightest provocation, to slide into them without any noticeable effort – is beyond the reach of his elders. One should rather expect that catastrophic changes in the environment, wars, the breakdown of encompassing morality, political revolutions, will transform adult reaction patterns as well, including important patterns of argumentation.  Such a transformation may again be an entirely natural process and the only function of a critical argument may

lie in the fact that it increases the mental tension that precedes and causes the behavioural outburst.’

the question is how to explain growth in the adult – as well as in institutions –

any explanation offered – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘one should rather expect that catastrophic changes will transform adult reactions and patterns of argumentation’

of course you can expect change in humans who face changing circumstances –

just what that amounts to is open to question

‘an entirely natural process’ – yes – but what does this mean – beyond saying – yes – change happens?

‘the mental tension that precedes and causes the behavioural outburst’?

look this ‘mental tension’ idea – is a theory – an explanation – that Feyerabend is putting up – to account for what he calls a ‘behavioural outburst’ – whatever that amounts to

‘the only function of rational argument’ – is to put such theories – such explanations – to question – to doubt –

in short – to explore the uncertainty in any such proposal

‘Now, if there are events, not necessarily arguments which cause us to adopt new standards, including new and more complex forms of argumentation, is it then not up to the defenders of the status quo to provide, not just counter arguments, but also contrary causes? (‘Virtue without terror is ineffective’, says Robespierre.) And if the old forms of argumentation turn out to be too weak a cause, must not these defenders either give up or resort to stronger and more ‘irrational’ means? (It is very difficult and perhaps entirely impossible, to combat the effects of brainwashing by argument.) Even the most puritanical rationalist will then be forced to stop reasoning and use propaganda and coercion, not because some of his reasons have ceased to be valid, but because the psychological conditions which make them effective, and capable of influencing others, have disappeared. And what is the use of an argument that leaves people unmoved?

however new standards are put  – in whatever form they are proposed –

the adoption of new standards will not be without question – doubt – and uncertainty –

or if they are they – they are not being considered rationally

and defenders of the status quo –  if they behave rationally – will question – and doubt – the new proposals

Robespierre – was an authoritarian – whose advocacy of terror – was a statement of his impotence and ignorance

winning the argument – is a rhetorical issue

yes – you can give up – resort to force – or just step back and wait for another chance to win the day

and whatever approach is taken  – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

argument is persuasion – argument is propaganda

‘And what is the use of an argument that leaves people unmoved?’ –

exactly

‘Of course the problem never arises quite in this form. The teaching of standards and their defence never consists in merely putting them before the mind of the student and making them as clear as possible. The standards are supposed to have maximum causal efficacy as well. This makes it very difficult to distinguish between the logical force and the material effect of an argument. Just as a well trained pet will obey his master no matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and no matter how urgent the need to adopt new patterns of behaviour, so in the very same way a well trained rationalist will obey the mental image of his master, he will conform to the standards of argumentation he has learned, he will adhere to these standards no matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and he will be quite incapable of realizing that what he regards as the ‘voice of reason’ is but a causal after-effect of the training he has received. He will be quite unable to discover that the appeal to reason to which he succumbs so readily is nothing but a political manoeuvre.’

‘The teaching of standards and their defence never consists in merely putting them before the mind of the student and making them as clear as possible.’ –

making them ‘as clear as possible’ – ok –

but simply presenting so called clear proposals – is a waste of time –

what needs to be taught is question – doubt – and the exploration of logical uncertainty

‘clarity’ is a con – a logical con

‘the logical force and the material effect of an argument’ –

arguments have no logical force – the force of an argument – is rhetorical –

and the rhetorical force of an argument – is what does or does not have a material effect –

rhetoric – is persuasion –

the logical reality is that any proposal put – however it is put – and with whatever force it is put –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

logic is the only defence against rhetoric

this ‘voice of reason’ – is no more than a piece of rhetoric –

a rhetorical device – which like all rhetoric – is designed to stop question – stop doubt – and to pretend – certainty

it is pretence

‘political manoeuvre’? –

yes – you can call any rhetorical argument – any pretentious action –  a power-play

‘That interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth of science, can also be seen from an analysis of the relation between idea and action. It is often taken for granted that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes, and should precede, their formulation and institutional expression. (An investigation starts with a problem, says Popper.) First, we have an idea, or a problem, then we act. i.e. either speak, or build, or destroy. Yet this is certainly not the way in which small children develop. They use words, they combine them, they play with them, until they grasp a meaning that has so far been beyond their reach. And the initial playful activity is an essential prerequisite of the final act of understanding. There is no reason why this mechanism should cease to function in the adult. We must expect, for example, that the idea of liberty could be made clear only by means of the very same actions, which were supposed to create liberty. Creation of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated without bringing the process to a stop. The process itself is not guided by a well-defined programme, and cannot be guided by such a programme, for it contains the conditions for the realisation of all possible programmes. It is guided rather by a vague urge, by a ‘passion’; (Kierkegaard). The passion gives rise to specific behaviour which in turn creates circumstances and the ideas necessary for analysing and explaining the process, for making it ‘rational’.’

‘That interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth of science,’

yes

‘It is often taken for granted that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes, and should precede, their formulation and institutional expression.’

yes –

but those who take this for granted are falling for a myth –

‘a clear and distinct understanding’ – is a pretence

from a logical point of view – any ‘understanding’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a ‘clear understanding’ is what you have – when you regard your ‘understanding’ – as beyond question – beyond doubt –

an investigation starts with a proposal – a proposition

the proposal – the proposition – is put to question – to doubt –

a logical investigation is an exploration of propositional uncertainty

Feyerabend’s theory of how small children learn and what he draws from this theory – is all very well –

it is a proposal – open to question –

‘Creation of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated without bringing the process to a stop. The process itself is not guided by a well-defined programme, and cannot be guided by such a programme, for it contains the conditions for the realisation of all possible programmes.’

‘full understanding of a correct idea of a thing’ – is rubbish –

there is no ‘full understanding’ – there is only the pretence of a ‘full understanding’ –

and the ‘correct’ idea – is simply the idea that is no longer put to question

it may well be that  the process is guided by a ‘well defined programme’ – and the result may be what is desired –

nevertheless the ‘process’ and the ‘result’ – logically speaking – are open to question – open to doubt

there is no certainty in propositional behaviour

‘The passion gives rise to specific behaviour which in turn creates circumstances and the ideas necessary for analysing and explaining the process, for making it ‘rational’.’ –

this ‘passion’ argument is interesting but irrelevant  –

what makes any behaviour ‘rational’ – is that it is held open to question – open to doubt –  and regarded as uncertain

‘The development of the Copernican point of view from Galileo to the 20^th century is a perfect example of the situation I wish to describe. We start with a strong belief that runs counter to contemporary reason and contemporary experience. The belief spreads and finds support in other beliefs which are equally unreasonable, if not more so (law of inertia; the telescope). Research now gets deflected in new directions, new kinds of instruments are built; ‘evidence’ is related to theories in new ways until there arises an ideology that is rich enough to provide independent arguments for any particular part of it  and mobile enough to find such arguments wherever they seem to be required. We can say today that Galileo was on the right track, for his persistent pursuit of what once seemed to be a silly cosmology has by now created the material needed to defend it against all those who will accept a view only if it is told in a certain way and who will trust it only if it contains certain magical phrases, called ‘observational reports’. And this is not an exception – it is the normal case; theories become clear and reasonable only after incoherent parts of them have been used for a long time. Such unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodical foreplay thus turns out to be an unavoidable precondition of clarity and of empirical success.’

if you cut out all the rhetoric and histrionics in Feyerabend’s account – i.e. ‘strong belief’ – ‘runs counter to contemporary experience’ – ‘equally unreasonable’ – ‘rich enough to provide’ – ‘ideology’ – etc.

what you start with is a proposal – plain and simple –

the proposal gains support – for whatever reason –

critical investigation leads to other and new proposals – (law of inertia – the telescope etc.) –

the original proposal – becomes a propositional complex – and new arguments are developed

‘We can say today that Galileo was on the right track’ –

oh the benefit of retrospective 20:20 tunnel vision!

what we can say is that Galileo – was on a track –

and further that there are cosmologists – of the 21^st century – who regard Galileo’s track as the way that led to the currently accepted view of the physical world –

had Galileo’s theory and argument not found the support and acceptance that it did – at the time and over time – we would be hearing a different history and different view of the physical world –

I am surprised that Feyerabend would say that Galileo was on the ‘right’ track –

logically –  all we can say is that Galileo’s proposal – was – and is – open to question – open to doubt –

                                                                                                                                           

that it was – and is – uncertain

there is no ‘right’ propositional track –

there is only that track which is – for whatever reason supported and adopted –

and as Feyerabend said earlier –

‘That interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth of science,’

why one theory won the day – and others were not successful in the court of scientific opinion –  is not a logical issue – it is a matter of historical speculation

fascinating as such can be – we never leave the realm of speculation – with all its uncertainty

as for ‘observational reports’ –

in the end – I think – a mainstay of scientific ritual

‘Such unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodical foreplay thus turns out to be an unavoidable precondition of clarity and of empirical success.’

this ‘clarity and empirical success’ – is just rhetoric

proposals are put – reasonable / unreasonable – sensible / nonsensical –

the point is that whatever is put  and however it is put – it is open to question –

the process of evaluation may be disciplined and rigid – or messy and unmethodical –

any evaluation – is likewise – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘Now, when we attempt to describe and to understand developments of this kind in a general way, we are, of course, obliged to appeal to the existing forms of speech which do not take them into account and which must be distorted, misused, beaten into new patterns in order to fit unforseen situations (without a constant misuse of language there cannot be any discovery, any progress). ‘Moreover, since the traditional categories are the gospel of everyday thinking (including ordinary scientific thinking) and of everyday practice, [such an attempt at understanding] in effect presents rules and forms of false thinking and action – false, that is, from the standpoint of (scientific) common sense.’

{Marcuse}. This is how dialectical thinking arises as a form of thought that ‘dissolves

into nothing the determinations of the understanding’,{Hegel} formal logic included.’

‘we are, of course, obliged to appeal to the existing forms of speech which do not take them into account and which must be distorted, misused, beaten into new patterns in 34.

order to fit unforseen situations (without a constant misuse of language there cannot be any discovery, any progress).’ –

what underpins language – and language use – or what is reflected in language and language use – is propositional logic

the logic of the proposition is that any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

language – and language use – is characterized by – logical uncertainty –

‘an existing form of speech’ – is a logical / propositional uncertainty –

it is not ‘a constant misuse of language’ – but rather an instance of propositional uncertainty –

and it is this propositional uncertainty that allows language to accommodate and embrace new proposals

‘Moreover, since the traditional categories are the gospel of everyday thinking (including ordinary scientific thinking) and of everyday practice, [such an attempt at understanding] in effect presents rules and forms of false thinking and action – false, that is, from the standpoint of (scientific) common sense.’ –

this is just naïve rubbish from Feyerabend via Marcuse

there is no ‘gospel’ in propositional activity –

propositional action – propositional life is – uncertain –

and it is this uncertainty that is the source of propositional vitality – flexibility and creativity

rules and forms –

rules are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

there are no true forms of thinking and action – there are no false forms of thinking and action

any form of thinking – any form of action – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a true proposal – logically speaking – is one you affirm –

a false proposal – one you deny

and any decision on the truth value of a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

‘(Incidentally, my frequent use of such words as ‘progress’, ‘advance’, ‘improvement’ etc., does not mean that I claim special knowledge about what is good and what is bad in the sciences and that I want to impose this knowledge on my readers. Everyone can read the terms in his own way and in accordance with the tradition to which he belongs. Thus for an empiricist, ‘progress’ will mean transition to a theory that provides direct empirical tests for most of its basic assumptions. Some people believe the quantum theory to be a theory of this kind. For others ‘progress’ may mean unification and harmony, perhaps even at the expense of empirical adequacy. This is how Einstein viewed the general theory of relativity. And my theory is that anarchism helps achieve progress in any one of the senses one cares to choose. Even a law and order science will succeed if anarchistic moves are occasionally made.)’

‘progress’ – ‘advance’ – ‘improvement’? –

it is not a matter of whether everyone can read these terms in his own way and in accordance with the tradition to which he belongs – but rather that as a matter of fact everyone does –

this is just what does happens –

and yes – logically speaking – these terms – as with any term – and as with any methodology – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

‘And my theory is that anarchism helps achieve progress in any one of the senses one cares to choose. Even a law and order science will succeed if anarchistic moves are occasionally made’

the obvious question is –

if i.e. ‘a law and order science’ will succeed without them – why bother with these so called ‘anarchistic moves’?

at best are they not irrelevant? –

and at worst a distraction – basically an annoyance?

in any case I have my doubts about just whether this so called anarchist method is as complimentary as Feyerabend pretends –

isn’t Feyerabend’s point to disrupt the status quo – whatever that may be?

so do we actually have anything here from Feyerabend?

I mean he has failed to show how his proposal adds anything to existing practises –

we can say too – it hasn’t taken anything away from existing practices

the point is – it is neither a plus or a minus – rather an irrelevant distraction –

an irrelevant distraction from genuine scientific endeavour

‘It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings. To those who look at the rich material provided by history and who are not intent on impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in the form of clarity, precision, ‘objectivity’, ‘truth’, it will become clear that there is only one principle that can be defined under all circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle: anything goes.’

whatever ‘goes’ –

that is – whatever is proposed –

is open to question – open to doubt –

and is uncertain