Feyerabend 16

16

‘Even the ingenious attempts of Lakatos to construct a methodology that (a) does not issue orders and yet (b) puts restrictions upon our knowledge-increasing activities does not escape this conclusion. for Lakatos’ philosophy appears liberal only because it is an anarchism in disguise. And his standards which are abstracted from modern science cannot be regarded as neutral arbiters in the issue between modern science and Aristotelian science, myth, magic, religion, etc.’

Feyerabend begins –

‘My quarrel with Lakatos concerns the standards he recommends, his evaluation of modern science (in comparison with say myth or Aristotelian science), his contention that he has proceeded ‘rationally’, as well as the particular historical data he uses in his discussion of methodologies. I start with his account of the first term on the list.

When a new theory or idea enters the scene it is usually somewhat inarticulate, it contains contradictions, the relation to facts is unclear, ambiguities abound. The theory is full of faults. However it can be developed, and it may improve. The natural unit of methodological appraisal is therefore not a single theory, but a succession of theories, or a research programme, and we do not judge the state in which a research programme finds itself at a particular moment, we judge its history, preferably in comparison with

the history of other programmes.’

yes – the new theory – of for that matter any theory – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

is the natural unit of methodological appraisal – a single theory – a succession of theories – a research programme?

the logical unit of methodological appraisal – is the proposal

how the proposal is described – will depend on who does the describing – and most likely what description is in fashion –

we do judge the state in which a proposal – a ‘research programme’ – finds itself in –

at a particular moment

we are only directly connected to the particular moment –

if it is proposed that an historical perspective is relevant – such a proposal will be relevant – to the particular moment

Feyerabend here is putting that the history of a theory – of a succession of theories – of a research programme – is by fiat – his fiat – always relevant

we don’t need – any more authoritarian directives here –

if scientists investigate their proposals without reference to a history – so be it

if they use historical proposals – so be it –

whatever approach they take – their proposals – their descriptions – from a logical point of view – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘According to Lakatos the judgments are of the following kind: a research programme is said to be progressing as long as its theoretical growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is as long as it keeps predicting novel facts with some success…..’; it is stagnating if its theoretical growth lags behind its empirical growth, that is as long it gives only post hoc explanations of either chance discoveries or of facts anticipated by, and discovered in a rival programme. A stagnating programme may degenerate further until it contains nothing but ‘solemn reassertions’ of the original position coupled with a repetition, in its own terms, of (the success of) rival programmes. Judgments of this kind are central to the methodology Lakatos wishes to defend. They describe the situation in which a scientist finds himself. They do not yet advise him how to proceed.’

‘According to Lakatos the judgments are of the following kind: a research programme is said to be progressing as long as its theoretical growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is as long as it keeps predicting novel facts with some success…..’

progression – theoretical growth anticipates empirical growth?

what is to be regarded as theoretical growth – what is to be regarded as empirical growth?

and does the proposed  ‘theoretical growth’ anticipate the proposed empirical growth?

the logical reality is that any proposal of theoretical growth – any proposal of empirical growth – and any proposal of the relation between theoretical growth and empirical growth – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and dealing with proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain – is just what science is – when science is proceeded with in a logical fashion

Lakatos’ methodological proposal – is in this respect – no different to any other methodological proposal

perhaps it will suit the temperament of some scientists –

and if so – yes – they will find it useful as a description of their work –

perhaps not –

it is philosophical wrapping paper –

it is one design among many

‘it is stagnating if its theoretical growth lags behind its empirical growth, that is as long it gives only post hoc explanations of either chance discoveries or of facts anticipated by, and discovered in a rival programme. A stagnating programme may degenerate further until it contains nothing but ‘solemn reassertions’ of the original position coupled with a repetition, in its own terms, of (the success of) rival programmes.’

I could see that a theory could well be regarded as stagnating if it is held that theoretical growth is lagging behind its empirical growth

on the other hand – it may well be that the theoretical growth – though at a point in time – lags behind the empirical growth – there is reason to believe that the theoretical growth will – in the passage of time – lead to better empirical growth

solemn reassertions  of the original position – like claims of anticipated growth – are rhetorical

‘They describe the situation in which a scientist finds himself. They do not yet advise him how to proceed.’ –

yes a description – one among many –

and as for advise on how to proceed – everyone’s got advice

‘Considering a research programme in an advanced state of degeneration one will feel the urge to abandon it, and to replace it by a more progressive rival. This is an entirely legitimate move. But it is also legitimate to do the opposite and retain the programme. For any attempt to demand its removal on the basis of a rule can be criticized by arguments almost identical with the arguments that led to the ‘securing of a breathing space’ in the first place; if it is unwise to reject faulty theories the moment they are born because they might grow and improve, then it is also unwise to reject research programmes on a downward trend because they might recover and might attain unforseen splendour (the butterfly emerges when the caterpillar has reached its lowest stage of degeneration). Hence, one cannot rationally criticize a scientist who sticks to a degenerating programme and there is no rational way of showing that his actions are unreasonable.’

‘This is an entirely legitimate move.’ –

what makes it ‘legitimate’?

who decides what is and is not ‘legitimate’

where are the laws – determining what is or is not legitimate?

there are none –

yes – there are protocols and conventions – that guide scientific practice –

but these are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain

the point is – sticking with a degenerating programme – or not sticking with it – is neither legitimate or illegitimate –

scientists do what they do – how they do it –

they get peer support – the get funding – or they don’t

it seems that it is only philosophers that are stuck on this question of legitimacy

the real issue for philosophers of science is finding useful descriptions of science

it is not about legislating for science – or determining whether what occurs is legitimate or not

if a scientist or scientists decide to proceed with a theory or a research programme – that’s all there is to it

if on the other hand the scientist or scientists decide not to proceed with a theory or research programme – so be it

now these decisions are open to question – open to doubt

that is the logic of the matter –

and such decisions may produce what comes to be regarded as good science –

or they may end up being what is regarded – by whoever does the regarding – as a colossal waste of time energy and resources –

that too is science – and – that too is life

‘Hence, one cannot rationally criticize a scientist who sticks to a degenerating programme and there is no rational way of showing that his actions are unreasonable.’

any critical evaluation – any criticism – just is rational –

and if you get spooked by criticism – you need to toughen up

sure someone may say – ‘his actions are unreasonable’ –

                                                                                                                                         

if the scientist in question knows what he is on about – presumably he will argue his case

and unless his critics can surprise him with an observation – or an insight – that turns him around –

then he will most likely – proceed –

what’s ‘reasonable’ is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

that is the rationality of the matter

‘Lakatos agrees with this. He emphasises that one ‘may rationally stick to degenerative programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after ‘programmes may get out of degenerating toughs. It is true that his rhetoric often carries him much further, showing that he has not yet become accustomed to his own liberal proposals. But when the issue arises in explicit form, then the answer is clear: the methodology of research programmes provides standards that aid the scientist in evaluating the historical situation in which he makes his decisions: it does not contain rules that tell him what to do.’

‘Lakatos agrees with this. He emphasises ‘one may rationally stick to degenerative programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after’’

so what is the point of ‘rationality’ here for Lakatos?

it seems he might just as well have said – ‘one may work on a degenerative programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after – or not’ –

i.e. just do your work

which is effectively to say – nothing – from a methodological point of view –

and if that is all Lakatos was effectively saying – I can see Feyerabend’s  attraction to his point of view

as Feyerabend’s ‘anything goes’ – is on one reading – to say nothing

in my view – one may work on – whatever one works on – for whatever reason one has

and if you regard your ‘programme’ as open to question – open to doubt – as uncertain –

you have a rational – as in logical – perspective

if you don’t regard your work critically – you don’t have a rational / logical  perspective

science – as with any other propositional activity – can be rational and logical  – or not –

successful scientific work may come from a rational / logical perspective – or it may come from a prejudiced perspective –

the work – is the work – however it is appraised – the results are the results – however they come –

                                                                                                                                         

this not to say that there won’t be argument about how to proceed –

and it is not to say that argument won’t be efficacious in terms of outcomes –

this may well be the case – but just as equally it may not be

there seems to be this notion in philosophy of science – that unless science conforms to ‘rational practise’ – it’s not science –

Popper was big on this – and it’s rubbish –

science is science – however it is regarded from the point of view of someone’s theory of rationality

‘the methodology of research programmes provides standards that aid the scientist in evaluating the historical situation in which he makes his decisions: it does not contain rules that tell him what to do.’

perhaps –

but the point is that Lakatos is not saying that his standards are a piece with all other standards –

that is to say – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and presumably he holds that his standards – his recommendations – have a solid basis –

a solid basis in history

a solid basis in history – or whatever – is still the problem of a solid basis

logically speaking there is no solid basis

any standard – any recommendation – in short any proposal – is open to question – and is therefore uncertain – not solid –

either that or Lakatos’ standards – his recommendations – are no more than his proposals – methodological proposals –

proposals the scientist can take up or leave –

Feyerabend has hitched his wagon to Lakatos –

and I think the reason is that Feyerabend has realised that with his ‘anything foes’ – he’s got nothing – nothing of substance

so if he can convince us that Lakatos with his historical standards and recommendations –

is in fact on the ‘anything goes’ track –

then he (Feyerabend) – actually has some content to his methodology – while preserving the freewheeling rhetoric of ‘anything goes’ –

it’s hard to see though – why logically speaking – there is a preference for Lakatos’ standards – as against any other standards – if all they are is proposals –

and indeed – if ‘anything goes’

perhaps Feyerabend – just has a preference for Lakatos’ proposals

and that is fair enough – but in that case – methodology – comes off as simply one preference against another –

and really all that will separate one preference from another – in practise – is persuasion – rhetoric –

my argument is simply that – if you are to behave rationally – if you want to operate logically – you regard any proposal – any standard – any argument – as open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and this is the argument for rational / logical scepticism –

for methodological scepticism

‘The methodology of research programmes thus differs radically from inductivism, falsification and from other even more paternalistic philosophies. Inductivism demands that theories that lack empirical support be removed. Falsification demands that theories that lack excess empirical content over their predecessors be removed. Everyone demands that inconsistent theories or theories with low empirical content, be removed. The methodology of research programmes neither does contain such demands nor can it contain them, as we have seen. Its rationale – ‘to provide a breathing space’ – and the

arguments that established the need for more liberal standards make it impossible to specify conditions in which a research programme must be abandoned, or when it becomes irrational to continue supporting it. Any choice of the scientist is rational, because it is compatible with the standards. “Reason’ no longer influences the actions of the scientist. (But it provides terminology for describing the results of these actions.)’

yes – the methodology of research programmes is not overtly prescriptive –

but its ‘recommendations’ – make it prescriptive-lite

I think it is a more subtle and sophisticated form of prescriptivism – in the guise of descriptivism

it strikes me as an urbane prescriptivism

if you take out the prescriptivism of inductivism and falsification –

what you have is propositional models for scientific practice

and the methodology of research programmes – is just another one of these – a model for scientific practice –

these models – and any other models offered – provide useful insights into science –

and also useful methods of procedure

a methodological proposal – is just that – a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

the scientist can use it – or not – and whether he does or not – will be determined by circumstance –

the prescriptivist approach in philosophy of science is naïve – infantile – and frankly –

irrelevant –

scientists don’t need prescriptions –

methodological proposals may be of use

the big plus that Feyerabend sees for the methodology of research programmes is that it provides a ‘breathing space’

if you drop prescriptivism from science – forget about what someone claims should be done – and focus of what can be done

then the great ‘breathing space’ argument – sinks to the level of common sense –

no big leap forward

‘‘Reason’ no longer influences the actions of the scientist.’

if by reason you mean ‘prescriptions’ that may be true

but what needs to be understood – and I don’t think either Lakatos or Feyerabend do understand this – is that reason is not a prescription

‘prescriptions’ as in ‘directions’ – characteristically are – to whatever degree –

authoritarian pronouncements

prescriptivism in any shape or form – is the opposite of reason

reasoning is the action of propositional question – and doubt –

reason is the recognition of propositional uncertainty –

as for the claim that reason doesn’t influence the actions of the scientist –

to say this – is to say that question – doubt – uncertainty – doesn’t influence the actions of the scientist –

if you think this you are either deluded – living in a fantasy world – or just plain ignorant

no propositional activity – be it described as ‘science’ or whatever – is without question –  or beyond doubt –

our propositional reality is uncertain

referring to his intellectual relationship to Lakatos – Feyerabend says –

‘… there is no ‘rationally’ describable difference between Lakatos and myself, always taking Lakatos’ standards as a measure of reason. However there is certainly a great difference in rhetorics: and we also differ in or attitude toward the ‘freedom of research’ that emerge from our ‘standards’. I now take a closer look at these differences.

The hallmark of political anarchism is its opposition to the established order of things: to the state, its institutions, the ideologies that support and glorify these institutions. The established order must be destroyed so that human spontaneity may come to the fore and exercise its right of freely initiating action, of freely choosing what it thinks is best. Occasionally one wishes to overcome not just some social circumstances but the entire physical world which is seen as being corrupt, unreal, transient, and of no

importance. This religious or escatological anarchism denies not only social laws, but moral, physical and perceptual laws as well and it envisages a mode of existence that is no longer tied to the body, its reactions and its needs. Violence, whether political or spiritual, plays an important role in almost all forms of anarchism. Violence is necessary to overcome the impediments erected in a well-organized society, or by one’s own modes of behaviour (perception, thought, etc.), and it is beneficial for the individual, for it releases one’s energies and makes one realise the power at one’s disposal. Free associations where everyone does what best suits their talents replace the petrified institutions of the day, no function must be allowed to become fixed – ‘the commander of yesterday can become a subordinate tomorrow.’ [Bakunin]. Teaching is to be based on curiosity and not on command, the ‘teacher’ is called upon to further this curiosity and not to rely on any fixed method. Spontaneity reigns supreme, in thought (perception) as well as in action.’

‘opposition to the established order of things’ –

‘the established order must be destroyed so that human spontaneity can come to the fore’

this suggests that nothing that is done within the established order of things enables human spontaneity to come to the fore

now most I think would find this an odd statement – for it flies in the face of experience – of the very human actions and achievements that have their basis in spontaneity

however if we take Feyerabend’s statement on face value – then the question is – if spontaneity cannot ‘come to the fore’ in the established order of things –  if it is not a feature of the established order of things – the order that we experience and operate in –

how can we know of spontaneity – how can we speak of it at all?

just a note – we have no definition of spontaneity from Feyerabend – and certainly no argument about the nature of spontaneity

what we get from Feyerabend here – is just an assertion –

which for all intents and purposes – has no content

his spontaneity – is empty – hollow – and without meaning

his ‘spontaneity’ – is rhetorical

‘the established order must be destroyed’ –

you destroy and existing order of things – only to replace it with a new order of things –

and then once again you have an established order of things

the idea that we can operate without any established order – without anything being established – is ridiculous

Feyerabend goes on to speak of religious or escatological anarchism –

the idea being that social – moral – physical and perceptual laws are denied

denial makes no sense

on the other hand – questioning – raising doubts  – and proposing – different – physical  and perceptual laws – is logical and rational

‘an existence no longer tied to the body, its reactions and needs’ –

this is a stupid and delusional notion –

‘Violence is necessary to overcome the impediments erected in a well-organized society, or by one’s own modes of behaviour (perception, thought, etc.), and it is beneficial for the individual, for it releases one’s energies and makes one realise the power at one’s disposal’

it is plainly not the case that violence is necessary to overcome the impediments erected in a well organised society –

impediments can be overcome in any number of ways –

we might think our way over or around an impediment

we might change our physical position – our place in the world – to overcome our impediments

we have – do and will – use science to overcome our impediments –

and yes – there will be impediments we can’t overcome –

violence might do the job in certain circumstances –

but like any other means we use – there are no guarantees – violence may well fail –

in any case it is quite clearly not necessary

and yet again we have no account – no definition – no argument – from Feyerabend regarding the nature of violence

just a bald rhetorical assertion

Feyerabend’s view of political anarchism is the standard view –

it is s a theory of anarchism that doesn’t stand up to scrutiny –

and cannot be regarded as serious political philosophy –

I think Feyerabend’s view – the standard view – has got anarchism wrong

political anarchism – as I see it – is not about overthrowing the established order of things

this is just rhetoric

the anarchist argument – is the argument against institutional authority

we can and do have ‘established orders’ within our experience that are not authoritarian –

most of our interpersonal relations are – and can be – of this kind –

we see this also on a local – social and political level – with the establishment of co-operatives of various kinds

the matter is more difficult on a national and international level –

however social democratic health and welfare programmes are steps in the right direction

just as the united nations – for all its faults and failures – is an attempt to overcome international authoritarianism –

and there are other international organisations that promote co-operation

I don’t know if we can completely eliminate authoritarian structures

nevertheless this is the anarchist idea – and it is a worthy one

it is an argument that makes sense in the real world – and make sense of the real world

overthrowing everything and using violence to do so – with the idea of unleashing spontaneity – is barbarism – not anarchism

and is I think an ideology designed to exploit those who are disadvantaged and oppressed

the real objective should be to lift up the downtrodden – and to give them material and psychological security –

so that they have a chance of finding some fulfilment and happiness in this world –

it’s about changing and improving their world – not tearing it down

while I think there is a sensible argument for political anarchism –

I don’t think that anarchism – or for that matter any other political philosophy – has a monopoly on truth

the world we operate in – is uncertain –

if we are to respond intelligently to our circumstances – we need to maintain an open mind – and be prepared to consider all options when dealing with our social and political

realities

any proposal of political philosophy that we put up – needs to be seen for just what it is –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

political philosophy – if it is done well – is the exploration of this uncertainty

and it is the development of new and different ideas – new ways of seeing and new ways of doing

we should avoid fundamentalism – of any kind –

that includes totalitarianism in all it forms – liberal democratic fundamentalism – communist and socialist fundamentalism – anarchist fundamentalism and religious fundamentalism

fundamentalism has no basis in logic – it is grounded in prejudice –

it is the mark of ignorance –

it is what needs to be overcome – not promulgated or indulged in

if Feyerabend was genuinely ‘against method’ –

he would be arguing just this point

‘Epistemological anarchism differs both from scepticism and from political (religious) anarchism. While the sceptic either regards every view as equally good or equally bad, or desists from making such judgements altogether, the epistemological anarchist has no compunction to defend the most trite, or the most outrageous statement. While the political or the religious anarchist wants to remove a certain form of life, the epistemological anarchist may want to defend it, for he has no everlasting loyalty to, and no everlasting aversion against, any institution or any ideology. Like the Dadaist, whom he resembles much more than he resembles the political anarchist, he ‘not only has no programme [he is] against all programmes’, [Hans Richter] though he will on occasion be the most vociferous defender of the status quo, or of his opponents: ‘to be a true Dadaist, one must also be anti-Dadaist’ [Hans Richter]. His aims remain stable, or change as a result of argument, or of boredom, or of a conversion experience, or to impress a mistress, and so on. Given some aim, he may try to approach it with the help of organised groups, or alone; he may use reason, emotion, ridicule, an ‘attitude of serious concern’, and whatever other means have been invented by humans to get the better of their fellow men. His favourite pastime is to confuse rationalists by inventing compelling reasons for unreasonable doctrines. There is no view, however ‘absurd’ or ‘immoral’, he refuses to consider or act upon, and no method is regarded as indispensable. The one thing he opposes positively and absolutely are universal standards, universal laws, universal ideas such as ‘Truth’, ‘Reason’, ‘Justice’ ‘Love’ and the behaviour they bring along, though he does not deny that it is often good policy to act as if such laws (such standards, such ideas) existed, and  as if he believed them. He may approach the religious anarchist

in his opposition to science and the material world, he may outdo any Nobel Prize winner in his vigorous defence of scientific purity. He has no objection to regarding the fabric of the world as described by science and revealed by his senses as a chimera that either conceals a deeper and, perhaps spiritual reality, or as a mere web of dreams that reveals, and conceals nothing. He takes great interest in procedures, phenomena and experiences such as those  reported by Carlos Casteneda, which indicate that perceptions can be arranged in highly unusual ways and the that the choice of a particular arrangement as ‘corresponding to reality’, while not arbitrary (it almost always depends on traditions), is certainly not more ‘rational’ or more ‘objective’ than the choice of another arrangement: Rabbi Akiba, who in ecstatic trance rises from one celestial sphere to the next and still higher and who finally comes face to face with God in all his Splendour, makes genuine observations once we decide to accept his way of life as a measure of reality, and his mind is as independent of his body as the chosen observations tell him. Applying this point of view to a specific subject such as science, the epistemological anarchist finds that its accepted development (e.g. form the Closed World to the ‘Infinite Universe’) occurred only because the practitioners unwittingly used his philosophy within the confines of their trade – they succeeded because they did not permit themselves to be bound by ‘laws of reason’, ‘standards of rationality’, or ‘immutable laws of nature’. Underneath all this outrage lies his conviction that man will cease to be a slave and gain a dignity that is more than an exercise in cautious conformism only when he becomes capable of stepping outside the most fundamental categories and convictions, including those which allegedly make him human. ‘The realization that reason and anti-reason, sense and nonsense, design and chance, consciousness and unconsciousness [and, I would add, humanitarianism and anti-humanitarianism] belong together as a necessary part of the whole – this was the central message of Dada,’ writes Hans Richter. The epistemological anarchist agrees, though he would not express himself in such a constipated manner. There is no room, in the present essay, to pursue all the implications of this radical view which is reasonable in the sense that every move that it recommends can be defended with the help of the most beautiful arguments (after all, reason is the slave of passions).’

‘Epistemological anarchism differs both from scepticism and from political (religious) anarchism. While the sceptic either regards every view as equally good or equally bad, or desists from making such judgements altogether…’

this is a fair representation of the standard view of scepticism

my view of scepticism is different –

what I argue is that the sceptic regards any view – as a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – as uncertain

I don’t say there is no knowledge – rather that all knowledge is propositional – and as such – uncertain

‘good’ and ‘bad’ – these notions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

moral questions – are an exploration of propositional uncertainty –

our moral landscape just is the various meta and normative ethical theories that are proposed –

these theories – these ethical proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain

our moral decisions will reflect – or can be interpreted in terms of different ethical standpoints at different times

we are enriched if we are exposed to the great variety of ethical systems –

and we are impoverished if our exposure to different ethical perspectives is limited –

our morality is always open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

ethical authoritarianism  – is – as with any other form of propositional authoritarianism – pretentious and irrational

it is the ground of prejudice and ignorance

as for judgments –

judgments are propositional – and so – open to question – open to doubt

of course we make judgments – but as I see it – these judgments – are uncertain –

and yes – we act on our judgments – but our actions – as with our judgments – are proposals – open to question

‘the epistemological anarchist has no compunction to defend the most trite, or the most outrageous statement’

if the idea is to defend – rather than critically evaluate – this ‘epistemological anarchist’ is no different from your standard justificationalist –

perhaps he thinks that by defending ‘the most trite, or the most outrageous statement’ – he is being less boring – than his fellow justifications – who defend the serious and most conservative statement –

yes – the epistemological anarchist – may well provide some entertainment and comic relief – in the philosophy department

and perhaps if the idea catches on every philosophy department will have a fool – a court jester – to take the edge off.

‘While the political or the religious anarchist wants to remove a certain form of life, the epistemological anarchist may want to defend it, for he has no everlasting loyalty to, and no everlasting aversion against, any institution or any ideology.  

not having any commitment – but pretending to – is just fraud

Feyerabend argues for pretence and deception

and as to the ideas of the Dadaist movement – or the thoughts of Carlos Casteneda –  or the trances of Rabbi Akiba –

what we have from a logical point of view is proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

that’s the real game –

the antics of Feyerabend’s so called ‘epistemological anarchist’ –

are just an irrelevant side show

Feyerabend goes on to show how his epistemological anarchist might act in specific situations ‘assuming he has temporarily decided to choose a certain aim and to accept a certain description of the ‘state of the world’ –

in the first example Feyerabend gives –

‘He may proceed more directly and defend the ideal of stability that underlies the Aristotelian point of view and that still appeals to sizable groups of the population. This is how, playing the game of some rationalists and using social laws as temporary levers, the anarchist may defeat the urge for progress of other rationalists.’

in the second case –

‘Assume on the other hand our anarchist detests the emotional, intellectual, the social bonds to which his contemporaries are subjected, that he regards them as a hindrance rather than the presupposition of a happy and fulfilling life…..In this case he will look for some principles that are opposed to some fundamental assumptions of the orthodox ideology and which can be used as intellectual levers for overthrowing this ideology.’

in the third example –

‘…….take an anarchist who is interested in the improvement of scientific astronomy only and who views increase in content as a necessary condition of such improvement …..Building his content-increase on new observations entirely, he must reject the old observations and he buries them without ever explaining why they should never be used…….This is how increase of content is manufactured by a combined use of enthusiasm, forgetfulness, and historical change.’

Feyerabend goes on –

‘The last two examples which are slightly bowdlerized versions of actual historical developments establish one point: given any aim, even the most narrowly ‘scientific’ one, the non-method of the anarchist has a greater chance of succeeding than any well defined set of standards, rules, prescriptions…..The first example makes it plausible that argument, judiciously used, could have prevented the rise of modern science.’

first up what is this ‘non-method’?

in the examples that Feyerabend gives his ‘anarchist’ chooses a certain aim and accepts a certain description of the state of the world – and then argues against other views – using various approaches – that is – methods

what I am getting at is – ok there is no one universal description of the method of science – but this does not mean there are not methods employed in science

Feyerabend undercuts his own so called argument for non-method – by illustrations of the ‘anarchist’ adopting clearly defined methods

in saying that methods are indeed used in science – all that is being said is that for science to be – scientists find ways to proceed – to do their work

Feyerabend’s examples above are perfect examples of this

now the claim that Feyerabend makes of this ‘non-method’ is that it ‘has a greater chance of succeeding than any well-defined set of standards, rules, prescriptions’ –

his claim that the methodologies adopted by his anarchists have a greater chance of succeeding is not established

he has not shown how the approaches he gives as examples of epistemological anarchism compare with other approaches –

he simply asserts that his non-method is more likely to be successful

in the actual practice of science – how would we know in advance – what methodology will succeed?

and for that matter – who is to say in advance – what success is?

one gets the impression that Feyerabend has already decided the issue – independently of what happens

which is bad enough

however coupled with the fact that his non-method argument is baloney

the overall picture is not good

as for his so called ‘anarchists’ –

all they are on face value is narrow minded practitioners – who it seems really don’t value anything – except cheap intellectual thrills

it is unlikely I think that anyone as vacuous as a ‘Feyerabendian anarchist’ would have enough grunt to bother with the deception that the master calls ‘non-method’ in any kind of a sustained manner –

                                                                                                                                       

surely even these fools must come face to face eventually with the question ‘why?’

and given that they will have no answer beyond ‘I felt like it’ – if that –

what’s the point?

Feyerabend finishes off this section with –

‘….one will be strongly inclined to believe that there are many different ways of approaching nature and society and many different ways of evaluating a particular approach, that we must make a choice, and that there are no objective conditions to guide us. So far, a brief and very incomplete sketch of the ideology of epistemological anarchism and some possible applications.’

at the best what you have here is an argument for scepticism

‘epistemological anarchism’ – is the idiot brother

Feyerabend gets back to Lakatos –

‘Imre Lakatos, on the other hand, wants science and, indeed the whole of intellectual life to conform to fixed standards, he wants it to be ‘rational’. This means two things: (a) The chosen standards must never be overruled by standards of a different kind; if knowledge or science is to be part of a larger context, then this must not affect its nature;

science especially must retain its ‘integrity’. (b) the standards must have heuristic force as well, that is, the activity that is governed by them must be different from the intellectual freelancing of the anarchist.’

conforming to fixed standards –

you can put forward the proposal that as a matter of fact science – and the whole of intellectual life can be described in terms of certain standards – and argue your case –

all you have is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and you will find other similar proposals – if you keep your eyes and ears open

if you get prescriptive – moralistic – i.e. –  hold that your chosen standards must never be overruled by different standards –  and that the activity that is governed by them must be different from other approaches –

then you are really just wasting your pompous breath –

science will be – what it will be –

and how it is described – will be open to question –

that is the logical reality

those who have a fixed view of the nature of science – operate with fixed standards –

are blind – and the blindness is self-inflicted

and furthermore – what gets me is they celebrate their logical blindness – and recommend it to others

such people may well have good hearts but they are logically backward

by all means have a theory – and develop it – and test it in the propositional marketplace 

throw it into the mix –

but understand – really understand – that it is just one of any number of proposals that can – that are – and that will be – advanced –

and understand too – that what such proposals have in common – what all proposals have in common – is that they are open to question – open to doubt – that they are uncertain

as for Feyerabend –

if he is fair dinkum about ‘intellectual freelancing’ – then his argument is the argument of the sceptic –

his so called ‘epistemological anarchist’ – is just a wayward – not very bright –

provocateur

who without Feyerabend’s bombastic rhetoric – could easily be set on a more intelligent path

Feyerabend has an outdated notion of scepticism –

he thinks the sceptic withholds judgment and does nothing

when if you take my view of scepticism – quite the opposite is the case –

the sceptic makes judgments – but understands that they are open to question

the sceptic acts – but understands that his actions – are open to question –

this sceptic is free – and he knows his freedom is the freedom of uncertainty