Feyerabend 4

4

‘There is no idea, however ancient and absurd that is not capable of improving our knowledge. The whole history of thought is absorbed into science and is used for improving every single theory. Nor is political interference rejected. It may be needed to overcome the chauvinism of science that resists alternatives to the status quo.’

‘This finishes the discussion of part one of counterinduction dealing with the invention and elaboration of hypotheses inconsistent with a point of view that is highly confirmed and generally accepted. It is pointed out that the examination of such a point of view often needs an incompatible alternative theory so that the (Newtonian) advice to postpone alternatives until after the first difficulty has arisen means putting the cart before the horse. A scientist who is interested in maximal empirical content, and who wants to understand as many aspects of his theory as possible, will accordingly adopt a pluralistic

methodology, he will compare theories with other theories rather than with ‘experience’, ‘data’, or ‘facts’, and he will try to improve rather than discard the views that appear to lose in the competition. For the alternatives, which he needs to keep the contest going, may be taken from the past as well. As a matter of fact, they may be taken from wherever one is able to find them – from ancient myths, and modern prejudices; from lucubrations of experts and from the fantasies of cranks. The whole history of a subject is utilized in the attempt to improve its most recent and ‘advanced’ stage. The separation between the history of science, its philosophy and the science itself dissolves into thin air and so does the separation between science and non-science.’

‘It is pointed out that the examination of such a point of view often needs an incompatible alternative theory so that the (Newtonian) advice to postpone alternatives until after the first difficulty has arisen means putting the cart before the horse.’

‘often needs’ –

perhaps also – ‘often doesn’t need’?

what we are dealing with here is uncertainty – methodological uncertainty

where a theory is critically evaluated without consideration of an alternative –

presumably that is because those involved in the critical examination decide that the alternative is not relevant –

now of course they may at some point reconsider this view –

however – not considering an alternative – does not render their science invalid

consideration of an alternative – is an option – a valid option – and where it is relevant to consider an alternative – you would expect that that is what would happen –

it is the working scientist that makes this call

practitioners make decisions – they have to make decisions – for their work to proceed

if they proceed logically – they recognise that their decisions – are open to question – open to doubt – that they are uncertain

if the idea is that all alternatives must be considered at all times –

the question can be asked – ‘says who?’

and also if you are to take this methodological edict to its logical conclusion – all you would ever be looking at is alternatives – and alternatives to alternatives – etc. etc.

this is not going to happen –

and to even go some way down this path – runs the risk of losing the plot –

the real issue for the working scientist is a keen focus on the business at hand – not alternatives to alternatives – to alternatives

or is the idea that if alternatives have not been proposed – they must be found –

again – says who?

also – not I would think a useful methodological proposal –

if he followed this edit the working scientist would do little or no science –

as his attention and time would be devoted to discovering theories –

theories he is not working on

all very well to issue edicts – and put yourself up as an authority about something you are not actually doing –

however to the working scientist I would think such rhetoric would be regarded as pretentious and irrelevant

I think any methodological proposal is valid –

the role for the philosopher of science here is to develop methodological proposals and argue for them

philosophy of science provides the working scientist with a range of methodological insights perspectives and options –

anyone of which might prove to be of use to an intelligent scientist – at some time

and it is the working scientist who will decide the value of any such proposal –

and he will decide not as a matter of principle – but as a matter of utility –

the question for the scientist – who has at his disposal a range of methodological options might be something like this –

‘what perspective on this matter will best enable me to get to where I want to go?’

or ‘might a different methodology take my work to a new and interesting place?”

as for the cart before the horse argument –

look it doesn’t matter whether an alternative is brought into play – before or after difficulties arise in the theory –

yes – either way – there are likely to be differences in what eventually emerges –

but that is science – that is life

it’s a decision for the those critically evaluating the theory –

and there are no rules here

‘A scientist who is interested in maximal empirical content, and who wants to understand as many aspects of his theory as possible, will accordingly adopt a pluralistic methodology, he will compare theories with other theories rather than with ‘experience’, ‘data’, or ‘facts’, and he will try to improve rather than discard the views that appear to lose in the competition.’

yes different methodologies will produce different empirical propositions – different tests – and perhaps different testing procedures –

different perspectives on the theory

at some point however a decision has to be made as to what methodology – to proceed with

some decision has to be made on the plurality of methods – and the plurality of understandings

any such decision will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

but it will be made – if there is to be any actual science done

‘theories’ –  ‘experience’ – ‘data’ – ‘facts’ –

logically speaking these are categorizations of proposals –

‘theories’ are proposals – ‘experience’ is proposal – ‘data’ are proposals – ‘facts’ are proposals –

the scientist will put proposal against proposal – whether that is theory against theory – theory against experience – theory against data – theory against facts –

or facts against data – data against experience – etc. etc.

these terms – ‘theory’ – ‘experience’ – ‘data’ – ‘facts’ –

are propositional classifications

what is put against what – will be the decision – the critical decision of the scientist –

there are no rules here – or – any so called  ‘rule’ is just the rhetoric of some methodologist –

as for the ‘competition’ – this is a pretty superficial view of science –

a scientist will attempt to improve – rather than discard a theory that has not gained enough support – if he thinks for some reason – it is worth sticking with it –

if he doesn’t think it has merit – he won’t proceed with it –

if he worked on a theory that he thought had no value – he would be an idiot –

plain and simple

‘The whole history of a subject is utilized in the attempt to improve its most recent and ‘advanced’ stage. The separation between the history of science, its philosophy and the science itself dissolves into thin air and so does the separation between science and non- science.’

this is just mumbo-jumbo –

‘the whole history of a subject’ – for one thing – there is no such thing

what we have at best – is different histories of a subject –

and any such history is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘the most recent and advanced stage‘ –

what you have here – when you drop the rhetoric (‘advanced stage’)  –

is the propositional work that is being done at present

‘The separation between the history of science, its philosophy and the science itself dissolves into thin air and so does the separation between science and non-science.’

the history of science –  the philosophy of science – science and non-science – are different proposition activities – different propositional practices

however any proposal – any proposition – regardless of how it is described – regardless of how it is classified – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘This position which is a natural consequence of the arguments presented above, is frequently attacked – and not by counter-arguments, which would be easy to answer, but by rhetorical questions. ‘If any metaphysics goes,’ writes Dr. Hesse in her review of an earlier essay of mine, ‘then the question arises why we do not go back and exploit the objective criticism of modern science available in Aristotelianism, or indeed in Voodoo?” – and insinuates that a criticism of this kind would be altogether laughable. Her insinuation, unfortunately, assumes a great deal of ignorance in her readers. Progress was often achieved by a ‘criticism from the past’, of precisely the kind that is now dismissed by her. After Aristotle and Ptolemy, the idea that the earth moves – that strange, ancient and ‘entirely ridiculous’, Pythagorean view – was thrown on the rubbish heap of history, only to be revived by Copernicus and to be forged by him into a weapon for the defeat of its defeaters. The Hermetic writings played an important part in this revival, which is still not sufficiently understood, and they were studied with care by the great Newton himself. Such developments are not surprising. No idea is ever examined in all its ramifications and no view is ever given all the chances it deserves. Theories are abandoned and superseded by more fashionable accounts long before they have an opportunity to show their virtues. Besides, ancient doctrines and ‘primitive’ myths appear strange and

nonsensical only because their scientific content is not known, or is distorted by philologists or anthropologists unfamiliar with the simplest physical, medical or astronomical knowledge. Voodoo, Dr Hesse’s piece de resistance, is a case in point. Nobody knows it, everybody uses it as a paradigm of backwardness and confusion. And yet Voodoo has a firm though not sufficiently understood material basis, and a study of its manifestations can be used to enrich, and perhaps even revise, our knowledge of physiology.’

Dr. Hesse’s question – ‘If any metaphysics goes, then the question arises why we do not go back and exploit the objective criticism of modern science available in Aristotelians, or indeed in Voodoo?” – is fair enough –

Feyerabend’s answer – ‘Progress was often achieved by a ‘criticism from the past’, or precisely the kind that is now dismissed by her’ – is fair enough

‘No idea is ever examined in all its ramifications and no view is ever given all the chances it deserves.’ – correct –

any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

I think the real issue here has to do with scientific practice – what scientists actually do

the reality is that voodoo – is not used in physiology

my point with regard to ‘anything goes’ is that if anything goes – then what in fact does go – whatever that may be – is valid –

and that Feyerabend – given his principle – ‘anything goes’ – can’t argue against any actual practice 

what he can do is suggest alternative approaches – but what he can’t do – is go on about what should happen

there is no imperative – no ‘should’ – ‘in anything goes’

his argument about what should happen – which is the argument of ‘Against Method’ –

is authoritarian rhetoric pure and simple

‘An even more interesting example is the revival of traditional medicine in Communist China. We start with a familiar development: a great country with great traditions is subjected to Western domination and is exploited in the customary way. A new generation recognises or thinks it recognizes the material and intellectual superiority of the West and traces it back to science. Science is imported, taught and pushes aside all traditional elements. Scientific chauvinism triumphs: ‘What is compatible with science should live, what is not compatible with science should die.’ [Chou Shao] ‘Science’ in this context means not just a specific method, but all the results the method has so far produced. Things incompatible with the results must be eliminated. Old style doctors, for example, must either be removed from medical practice, or they must be re-educated. Herbal medicine, acupuncture, moxibustion and the underlying philosophy are things of the past, no longer to be taken seriously. This was the attitude up to about 1954, when the combination of bourgeois elements in the ministry of Health started a campaign for the revival of traditional medicine. No doubt the campaign was politically inspired. It contained at least two elements, viz. (1) the identification of Western science with bourgeois science and (2) the refusal of the party to except science from political supervision and to grant experts special privileges. But it provided the counterforce that was needed to overcome the scientific chauvinism of the time and to make a plurality (actually a duality) of views possible. (This is an important point. It often happens that parts of science become hardened and intolerant so that proliferation must be enforced from the outside, and by political means. Of course, success cannot be guaranteed – see the Lysenko affair. But this does not remove the need for non-scientific controls on science.)’

‘But it provided the counterforce that was needed to overcome the scientific chauvinism of the time and to make a plurality (actually a duality) of views possible.’

the reality is that a plurality – or duality – of different views – was always there –

political moves gave an emphasis to traditional medicine – after it had taken a backseat to western science

‘It often happens that parts of science become hardened and intolerant so that proliferation must be enforced from the outside, and by political means.’

‘proliferation must be enforced’?

this statement puts pay to Feyerabend’s anti-authoritarian ‘argument’ – for what he calls his philosophical or methodological anarchism –

for Feyerabend science is an authoritarian / political battleground –

where  ‘anything goes’ – if it bring about his view of science

‘Now this politically enforced dualism has led to most interesting and puzzling discoveries both in China and in the West and to the realization that there are effects and means of diagnosis for which modern medicine cannot repeat and for which it has no explanation. It revealed sizeable lacunae in Western medicine. Nor can one expect that the customary scientific approach will eventually find an answer. In the case of herbal medicine the approach consists of two steps. First, the herbal concoction is analysed into its chemical constituents. Then the specific effects of each constituent are determined and the total effect on a particular organ explained on their basis. This neglects the possibility that the herb, taken in its entirety, changes the state of the whole organism and that it is this new state of the whole organism rather than a specific part of the whole concoction that cures the diseased organ. Here as elsewhere knowledge is obtained from a proliferation of views rather than from the determined application of a particular ideology. And we realise that proliferation may have to be enforced by non-scientific agencies whose power is sufficient to overcome the most powerful scientific institutions. Examples are the public discontent, or money: the best single entity to get a modern scientist away from what his ‘scientific conscience’ tells him to pursue is still the Dollar (or, more recently, the German Mark)’

‘This neglects the possibility that the herb, taken in its entirety, changes the state of the whole organism and that it is this new state of the whole organism rather than a specific part of the whole concoction that cures the diseased organ.’

whether it is an organ by organ investigation from the start –

or a holistic proposal – which is put forward  – and then the specifics are tested –

is no more than the difference between a deductive and inductive approach to the question

‘the determined application of a particular ideology’ –

be it of western science – or of eastern science – a determined application of a particular ideology has its place – but it also has its limitations –

 and in any critical process these limitations should be identified and investigated 

‘And we realise that proliferation may have to be enforced by non-scientific agencies whose power is sufficient to overcome the most powerful scientific institutions.’

no – we don’t realise that proliferation may heave to be enforced –

(how is it that these so called radicals and revolutionists – turn into the very same bastards they started out deploring – and often turn out to be even worse?)

it is not a matter of enforcing anything –

this authoritarianism is a stone-age mentality –

it is the method of meat-heads and ignoramuses

what is required – which I think Feyerabend and his ilk are secretly afraid of – is the critical investigation of all methodologies – including their methodologies –

that is – actually holding your methodology – whatever it is –

open to question – open to doubt – and facing up to and dealing with its uncertainty

as to scientific institutions –  they can be made and unmade –

and furthermore – new institutions can be proposed and developed by those interested in doing so

no methodological proposal is guaranteed support – or success

‘Examples are the public discontent, or money: the best single entity to get a modern scientist away from what his ‘scientific conscience’ tells him to pursue is still the Dollar (or, more recently, the German Mark)’

yeah – well scientists must be relieved – even over joyed that that they don’t have to consult their consciences – don’t have to deal with their uncertainties –

how lucky are they to have Feyerabend as the conscience of science!

logically speaking I think motivation is irrelevant – what counts is what is proposed – and how it is investigated

‘The examples of Copernicus, the atomic theory, Voodoo, Chinese medicine show that even the most secure theory is not safe, that it can be modified or entirely overthrown with the help of views which the conceit of ignorance has already put into the dustbin of history. This is how the knowledge of today may become the fairy-tale of tomorrow and how the most laughable myth may eventually turn into the most solid piece of science.’

yes the most secure theory can be modified or entirely overthrown –

if it is held open to question – open to doubt – if it is regarded logically – as an uncertain proposal

from a logical point of view – there is no history – there is no dustbin

any proposal is live – if it is put

and if it is put – it is open to question – open to doubt – and its uncertainty is there to be explored

knowledge is what is proposed

that certain propositions and propositional systems are held to be ‘secure’ –

is pretentious rhetoric

‘Pluralism of theories and metaphysical views is not only important for methodology, it is also an essential part of a humanitarian outlook. Progressive educators have always tried to develop the individuality of their pupils and to bring to fruition the particular, and sometimes quite unique talents and beliefs that a child possesses. Such an education, however, has very often seemed to be a futile exercise in day dreaming. For is it not necessary to prepare the young for life as it actually is? Does this not mean that they must learn one particular set of views to the exclusion of everything else? And if a trace of their imagination is still to remain, will it not find its proper application in the arts or in a thin domain of dreams that has but little to do with the world we live in? Will this

procedure not finally lead to a split between a hated reality and welcome fantasies, science and the arts, careful description and unrestrained self expression? The argument for proliferation of views shows this need not happen. It is possible to retain what one might call the freedom of artistic creation and to use it to the full, not just as a road of escape but as a necessary means for discovering and perhaps even changing the features of the world we live in. This coincidence of the part (individual man) with the whole (the world we live in), of the purely subjective and arbitrary with the objective and lawful, is one of the most important arguments in favour of a pluralistic methodology. For details the reader is advised to consult Mill’s magnificent essay On Liberty.’

our realities are what we propose

our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

seeing that there are different proposals – that people create different propositional realities – is seeing life as it actually is

‘pluralism of theories and metaphysical views’ – is the norm

and this is blatantly obvious to anyone with their eyes open

Feyerabend’s ‘revolutionary argument’ – is a statement of the obvious – a rhetorical burst – that leaves everything as it is

as to educating the young –

I say expose them to as many different propositional realities as possible –

and teach them that whatever is put to them – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

encourage them to propose their own realities – and to keep an open mind –

on themselves – and the world