Feyerabend 17

17

‘Moreover, these standards, which involve a comparison of content classes, are not always applicable. The content of classes of certain theories are incomparable in the same way that none of the usual logical relations (inclusion, exclusion, overlap) can be said to hold  between them. This occurs when we compare myth and science. It also occurs in the most advanced, most general and therefore most mythological parts of science itself.’

Feyerabend begins –

‘I have much sympathy with the view, formulated clearly and elegantly by Whorff (and anticipated by Bacon), that languages and the reaction patterns they involve are not merely instruments for describing events (facts, states of affairs), but that they are also shapers of events (facts, states of affairs), that their ‘grammar’ contains a cosmology, a comprehensive view of the world, of society, of the situation of man which influences thought, behaviour, perception. According to Whorff the cosmology of language is expressed partly by the overt use of words, but it also rests on classifications ‘which ha[ve] no overt mark….but which operate [ ] through an invisible “central exchange” of linkage bonds in such a way as to determine other words which mark the class.’ Thus ‘[t]he gender nouns such as boy, girl, father, wife, uncle, woman, lady, including thousands of given names like George, Fred, Mary, Charlie, Isadore, Jane, John, Alice, Aloysius, Ester, Lester, bear no distinguishing mark of gender like the Latin –us or –a within each motor process, but nevertheless each of these thousands of words has an invariable linkage bond connecting it with absolute precision either to the word “he”

or to the word “she” which, however, does not come into the overt behaviour picture until and unless special situations of discourse require it.’

‘languages and the reaction patterns they involve are not merely instruments for describing events (facts, states of affairs), but that they are also shapers of events (facts, states of affairs), that their ‘grammar’ contains a cosmology, a comprehensive view of the world, of society, of the situation of man which influences thought, behaviour, perception.’

languages are complex propositional systems

‘facts’ – ‘states of affairs’ – are proposals

grammars are propositional constructs

if a grammar ‘contains a cosmology’ – that is because – it has been proposed that the grammar contains a cosmology

‘According to Whorff the cosmology of language is expressed partly by the overt use of words, but it also rests on classifications ‘which ha[ve] no overt mark….but which operate [ ] through an invisible “central exchange” of linkage bonds in such a way as to determine other words which mark the class.’

as a matter of propositional fact – there are no ‘covert’ classifications – there is only what is proposed

if it is not proposed – it is not there

a proposal of covert classifications – is deliberate epistemological obscurantism –

there is no ‘invisible exchange’

‘but nevertheless each of these thousands of words has an invariable linkage bond connecting it with absolute precision either to the word “he” or to the word “she” which, however, does not come into the overt behaviour picture until and unless special situations of discourse require it.’

there is no ‘invariable linkage bond’ – or ‘absolute precision’ –

any relation of words – of proposals – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

accepted and habitual propositional behaviour – signifies propositional utility

Feyerabend goes on –

‘Covert classifications (which because of their subterranean nature are ‘sensed rather than comprehended – awareness of [them] has an intuitive quality’ – which ‘are quite apt to be more rational than overt ones’ and which may be very ‘subtle’ and not connected ‘with any grand dichotomy’) create ‘patterned resistances to widely divergent points of view’. If these resistances oppose not just the truth of the alternatives but the presumption that an alternative has been presented, then we have an instance of incommensurability.’

luckily for us – we have secret agent Paul Feyerabend on the job

Feyerabend needs this ‘covert reality argument’ – simply because without it – there would be no basis for his epistemological anarchism – for his incommensurability thesis

– but his rhetoric

the rhetoric has to have a basis – so he thinks – even if the basis is ‘covert’

and as with all epistemological foundationalists – he needs a foundation

his foundation is the unseen – the hidden –

he thinks he can get away with arguing – vehemently – against foundationalism – while having his secret – ‘covert’ – foundation –

I sympathise with him in one respect – the law and order – rule governed epistemology of twentieth century western philosophy – is a straight jacket –

and the history of this period is really the history of philosophers wriggling one way – or wriggling another

Feyerabend wanted out – and good on him – but going ‘underground’ – was not the answer –

the same building – just a different floor – the basement – as it turns out

we just don’t need this subterranean mysticism – our reality is what is put – what is proposed – in the light of day – as it were

if it is not proposed – it is not lurking in a hidden dimension – it quite simply – is not there –

our reality – or realities – are proposed – nothing is hidden

Feyerabend says –

‘covert classifications are sense rather than comprehended – awareness of them has an intuitive quality’

‘sensed’ rather than comprehended?

 smelt – touched – heard – seen – tasted?

if so these ‘covert classifications’ – are not covert at all – they are phenomenal

‘an intuitive quality’ – means what?

Feyerabend is peddling obscurantism – and he should know better

‘apt to be more rational than overt ones’ –

and what is ‘more rational’?

there is no ‘more rational’ – a proposal is held rationally if it is held – open  to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

if it is not open to question – open to doubt – not regarded as uncertain – then it is not held rationally

‘If these resistances oppose not just the truth of the alternatives but the presumption that an alternative has been presented, then we have an instance of incommensurability.’

these ‘resistances’ of Feyerabend – are just phantasms –

we don’t need phantasms – all we need – in fact all we have – is proposals – propositions

where you have a propositional confrontation – that is where proposals are put against each other – you will have incommensurability

which is to say prime facie – they will not be comparable

incommensurability is the starting position of any propositional confrontation –

the next step in the propositional action is to propose a ground for comparison –

and following this – if any such proposal is successful – a decision procedure – for deciding what proposal – what theory – to proceed with

there is no covert propositional action

and any propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘I also believe that scientific theories, such as Aristotle’s theory of motion, the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, classical and modern cosmology are sufficiently general, sufficiently ‘deep’ and have developed in sufficiently complex ways to be considered along the same lines as natural languages. The discussions that prepare the transition to a new age in physics, or in astronomy, are hardly ever restricted to the overt features of the orthodox point of view. They often reveal hidden ideas, replace them by ideas of a different kind, and change overt as well as covert classifications. Galileo’s analysis of the tower argument led to a clearer formulation of the Aristotelian theory of space and it also revealed the difference between impetus (an absolute magnitude that inheres in the object) and momentum (which depends on the chosen reference system)…Attending to cases such as these we realize that scientific arguments may be subjected to ‘patterned resistances’ and we expect that incommensurability will also occur among theories.’

‘The discussions that prepare the transition to a new age in physics, or in astronomy, are hardly ever restricted to the overt features of the orthodox point of view.’

this is a very confused statement

discussions – are overt – ‘any features of the orthodox point of view’ – that are discussed 

are overt – it cannot be any other way

‘They often reveal hidden ideas, replace them by ideas of a different kind, and change overt as well as covert classifications.’

if an idea is proposed in a discussion – it is hardly ‘hidden’

and if a classification – is proposed in a discussion – it is not – covert

‘Galileo’s analysis of the tower argument led to a clearer formulation of the Aristotelian theory of space and it also revealed the difference between impetus (an absolute magnitude that inheres in the object) and momentum (which depends on the chosen reference system.’

a ‘clearer formulation of the Aristotelian theory of space’– is a proposal

and a proposal that reveals the difference between impetus and momentum – is – as with any proposal – out in the open – and open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Attending to cases such as these we realize that scientific arguments may be subjected to ‘patterned resistances’ and we expect that incommensurability will also occur among theories.’

if you divest ‘patterned resistances’ of it is ‘covert’ rhetoric –

what you have is the confrontation of different proposals

incommensurability – is this confrontation – it is where we start – it is ground zero

we propose a common ground – for the purpose – ultimately of proceeding –

and any such proposal of common ground – is of course – open to question

theories of verification and falsification – are proposals for decision making

and logically speaking these decision proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

commensurability is ‘manufactured’ – is a pragmatic action –

and of course – open to question

‘(As incommensurability depends on covert classifications and involves major conceptual changes it is hardly ever possible to give an explicit definition of it. Nor will the customary ‘reconstructions’ succeed in bringing it to the fore. The phenomenon must be shown, the reader must be led to it by being confronted with a great variety of instances, and he must then judge for himself. This will be the method adopted in the present chapter.)’

if incommensurability depends on covert classifications – hidden classifications  –

then this concept of incommensurability – is irrelevant to actual scientific practice –

there is no covert dimension to propositional activity

a proposal is what is put –

if it is not proposed – it is not open to question – it is not open to doubt

 if a proposal – a proposition is not revealed – it’s not there

what we have with Feyerabend’s ‘incommensurability’ – is some kind of medieval obscurantism –

‘nor will the customary reconstructions succeed in bringing it to the fore’ –

which is just to say even if this incommensurability (Feyerabend’s incommensurability) – is proposed – it is still covert – still hidden –

and that of course is ridiculous

he calls it a ‘phenomenon’ –

it is not a ‘phenomenon’ – if no one is able to see it – or identify it

and in any case – if incommensurability is anything  – it is an argument –

an argument regarding the relation between theories –

i.e. that there are theories that cannot be compared given the usual criteria for comparison

which is to say incommensurability is a propositional construct –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

however it seems that Feyerabend would prefer incommensurability to be a covert presence – a presence that haunts scientific practice

‘The phenomenon must be shown, the reader must be led to it by being confronted with a great variety of instances, and he must then judge for himself.’

yes – very mystical

it strikes  me that Feyerabend’s incommensurability – is just a con-artist’s trick –

now you see it – now you don’t – ok judge for yourself –

bring in the ghost busters

there is no common – objective – ground for the comparison of theories – or the comparison of propositions – but the unknown

our proposals are our responses to the unknown –

the unknown – is silent

‘Interesting cases of incommensurability occur already in the domain of perception…... Given appropriate stimuli, but different systems of classification (different ‘mental sets’) our perceptual apparatus may produce objects which cannot be easily compared. A direct judgement is impossible. We may compare the two attitudes in our memory, but not while attending to the same picture. .. Not even memory can give us a full view of the alternatives.’

what we have here – with this ‘different systems of classification’ – is different proposals

and yes – we may compare the two proposals –

and what is revealed – is propositional uncertainty –

incommensurability = uncertainty

what needs to be understood from the get go here –

is that incommensurability – is not a phenomenon

it is not a reality that exists independent of propositional reality

there is no such thing as a phenomenon – independent of propositional reality

in the absence of proposal – what we have – what we face – is the unknown

our propositional action – is what creates our reality – our realities –

and our propositional activity is the modification and change of the propositional realities that are proposed – that we work with and in

Feyerabend continues –

‘Every picture with just a modicum of perspective exhibits this phenomenon: we may decide to pay attention to the piece of paper on which the lines are drawn – but then there is no three-dimensional pattern: on the other hand we may decide to investigate the properties of this pattern, but then the surface of the paper disappears, or is integrated into what can only be called an illusion. There is no way of catching the transition from one to another. In all these case the perceived image depends on the ‘mental sets’ that can be changed at will without the help of drugs, hypotheses, reconditioning. But mental sets may become frozen by illness, as a result of one’s upbringing in a certain culture, or

because of physiological determinants not in our control. (Not every change of language is accompanied by perceptual changes.) Our attitude towards other races, or towards people of a different cultural background often depends on ‘frozen’ sets of the second kind: having learned to ‘read’ faces in a standard way we make standard judgements and are led astray.’

‘Every picture with just a modicum of perspective exhibits this phenomenon: …’

it is not the ‘picture’ that exhibits a ’modicum of perspective’ –

the picture is a proposal – to which proposals are put – different proposals – described as ‘perspectives’

‘There is no way of catching the transition from one to another.’ –

what we have here is different proposals – there is nothing ‘to catch’ – a proposal is put – another proposal is put – one is not the other – there is no transition – there is just different proposals – at different times –

different ways of seeing

‘mental sets’ – again a description of proposals – operating proposals  –

a ‘perceptual change’ – so called – is a propositional change

any standard judgment – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

any proposal – not regarded as uncertain – is ‘frozen’ –

and yes – some proposals – for some people – remain frozen –

there is at any time in human history – in human lives – frozen realities

we get led astray by claims of certainty –

the claim of certainty – is irrational – is the ground of prejudice –

and I suspect that no one is completely free of prejudice –

that is propositions that are not put to question

‘An interesting example of physiologically determined sets leading to incommensurability is provided by the development of human perception. As has been suggested by Piaget and his school, a child’s perception proceeds through various stages before it reaches its relatively stable adult form. In one stage, objects seem to behave very much like after-images and are treated as such. The child follows the object with his eyes until it disappears; he does not make the slightest attempt to recover it, even if this should require but a minimal physical (or intellectual) effort, an effort, moreover that is already in the child’s reach. There is not even a tendency to search – and this is quite appropriate ‘conceptually’ speaking. For it would be nonsensical to ‘look for’ an after-image. It’s ‘concept’ does not provide for such an operation.

The arrival of the concept, and of the perceptual image, of material objects, changes the situation dramatically. There occurs a drastic reorientation of behavioural patterns and, so one may conjecture, of thought. After-images, or things somewhat like them, still

exist; but they are now difficult to find and must be discovered by special methods (the earlier visual world therefore literally disappears). Such methods proceed from a new conceptual scheme (after-images occur in humans, they are not part of the physical world) and cannot lead back to the exact phenomena of the previous stage. (These phenomena should therefore be called by a different name, such as ‘pseudo-after-

images’ – a very interesting analogue to the transition from, say Newtonian mechanics to special relativity.) Neither after-images nor pseudo-after-images have a special position in the new world. For example, they are not treated as evidence on which the new notion of material object is supposed to rest. Nor can they be used to explain this notion: after-images arise together with it, they depend on it, and are absent from the minds of those who do not yet recognize material objects; and pseudo-after-images disappear as

soon as such recognition takes place. The perceptual field never contains after-images together with pseudo-after-images. It is to be admitted that every stage possesses a kind of observational ‘basis’ to which special attention is paid and from which a multitude of suggestions are received. However, this basis (a) changes from stage to stage, and (b) it is part of the conceptual apparatus of a given stage, nor its one and only source of interpretation as some empiricists would like to make us believe.

                                                                                                                                   Considering developments such as these, we may suspect that the family of concepts centring upon the ‘material object’ and the family of concepts centring upon ‘pseudo-after-image’ are incommensurable in precisely the sense that is at issue here; these families cannot be used simultaneously and neither logical nor perceptual connections can be established between them.’

the object of perception – in the absence of proposal – is unknown –

Piaget’s theory of perceptual development – is a proposal that makes known –

and as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

what we have with ‘the family of concepts centring upon the ‘material object’’ and the family of concepts centring upon the ‘pseudo-after image’ – is two proposals – two different proposals – regarding the object of perception – here described as ‘the material object’ –

this is not a problem – if you understand that the object of perception – its description –

is not propositionally fixed –

how we describe the object of perception  – is logically open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and any proposal that functions for us – in whatever circumstance – is valid

‘these families [of concepts] cannot be used simultaneously’ –

this is just  to say different proposals cannot be used simultaneously –

a statement of the logical obvious –

‘neither logical nor perceptual connections can be established between them’ –

in so far as we have two different proposals in response to the question of the object of perception –

then we do have a logical relation – or a proposal that can be put to that effect

as to the question of perceptual connections –

perceptual connections are propositional connections

in terms of Piaget’s theory – a theory of perceptual development and change – obviously you cannot ‘experience’ two propositional states at the same time –

though you can propose a relation between two proposals –

and this is just what Piaget has done –

and could you not argue – that in terms of his theory – his theory of conceptual change and development –

that these different proposals regarding the perception of the material object – are indeed commensurable?

the point being that it is this theory of Piaget’s – that renders them commensurable

commensurable within the terms of the theory

Feyerabend has focused on two stages of Piaget’s theory of conceptual and perceptual development – taken them out of the context of Piaget’s proposal – and put that they are incommensurable theories

this is philosophical cherry picking –

and while I don’t think it is fair to Piaget –

it should also be pointed out that it is actually irrelevant as far as incommensurability goes

any proposal is incommensurable with any other proposal – unless some ground of comparison is proposed

Piaget’s theory is a good example of just how different forms of perception and conception – can be related –

that is the idea of his theory – to show such a relation – to propose such a relation –

and to propose a ground of comparison

Feyerabend goes on –

‘Now is it reasonable to expect that conceptual and perceptual changes of this kind occur only in childhood? Should we welcome the fact, if it is a fact, that an adult is stuck with a stable perceptual world and an accompanying stable conceptual system, which he can modify in many ways but whose general outlines have forever become immobilized? Or is it not more realistic to assume that fundamental changes, entailing incommensurability, are still possible and that they should be encouraged lest we remain forever excluded from what might be called a higher stage of knowledge and consciousness? Besides,

the question of the mobility of the adult stage is at any rate an empirical question that must be attacked by research, and cannot be settled by methodological fiat. The attempt to break through the boundaries of a given conceptual system, and to escape the reach of Popperian spectacles, is an essential part of such research (and it should also be an essential part of any interesting life.)’

our propositional reality is uncertain –

just where the future will takes us – we don’t know –

we can only speculate

I say – use whatever spectacles you find useful –

and make new ones if that strikes you as necessary

keep your eyes open – and keep an open mind –

and you will have an interesting life

‘Such an attempt involves much more than a prolonged ‘critical discussion’ as some relics of the enlightenment would have us believe. One must be able to produce and to grasp new perceptual and conceptual relations, including relations which are not immediately apparent (covert relations – see above) and that cannot be achieved by critical discussion alone …The orthodox accounts, of course, are restricted to (physical) theories (or, rather, to emaciated caricatures of them), they neglect the covert relations that contribute to meaning, disregard perceptual changes and  treat the rest in a rigidly standardized way so that any debate of unusual ideas is at once stopped by a series of routine responses. But now this whole array of responses is in doubt. Every concept that occurs in it is suspect, especially fundamental concepts such as ‘observation’, ‘test’, and of course, the concept ‘theory’ itself. And as regards the word ‘truth’ we can at this stage only say that it is certainly has people in a tizzy, but has not achieved much else. The best way to proceed in such circumstances is to use examples which are outside the range of the routine responses.’

‘One must be able to produce and to grasp new perceptual and conceptual, including relations which are not immediately apparent (covert relations – see above) and that cannot be achieved by critical discussion alone …’ –

this is a weak statement – a weak argument

there will be no production of – or grasping of new proposals – perceptual and conceptual – without critical evaluation –

without critical evaluation – no new proposals will be put – no new ways of seeing or understanding will be imagined

to say that a relation is not immediately apparent – is a statement after the fact of it being made apparent – after it being proposed –

anyone can say – that what was not immediately apparent – now is

‘covert relations’ – is a propositional  deception –

a relation exists if and when it is proposed

meaning does not exist in some metaphysical nether world –

meaning is a question of usage –

meaning is exploring how a proposal or a theory is used –  meaning is a propositional investigation

perceptual changes – are propositional changes

yes – unusual ideas can be stopped by routine responses –

however if you are proposing an unusual idea – you should expect routine road blocks –

and be ready – to go right through them

and yes – the whole array of responses – is in doubt –

any proposal put – at any point – is open to question –

any ‘concept’ – is a proposal – and logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt

observation – test – truth – these are concepts – proposals – 

central epistemological concepts – that as with any concept / proposal  – are – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and this should be no news to anyone

‘The best way to proceed in such circumstances is to use examples which are outside the range of the routine responses.’

yes by all means do this –

and doing so is good critical practice –

an example – is a proposal – and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt

you don’t somehow avoid propositional logic by using an example

Popper advocated criticism –  critical evaluation –

but he did not understand that the concepts that were central to his methodology – falsification – corroboration –  verisimilitude – growth of knowledge – etc. –

are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

Popper was not prepared to see – or not able to see – that his methodology – was in the same boat as the methodologies he argued against

my point is logical –

and it is that any proposal – in any shape or form – is by its nature – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

that is to say that our propositional reality – is uncertain

some run from this and seek a security in authority and prejudice

it does take courage to face the reality of uncertainty full on –

and courage to embrace it – and see it in a positive light

and as for those who don’t take up the challenge –

or those who make it their business to side step it at every turn –

let he who has not sinned …

‘It is for this reason that I have decided to examine means of representation different from languages or theories and so to develop my terminology in connection with them. More especially, I shall examine styles in painting and drawing. It will emerge that there are no ‘neutral’ objects which can be represented in any style, and which can be used as objective arbiters between radically different styles. The application to languages is obvious.’

any means of representation –  is a proposal – and as such logically speaking no different from languages and theories

we propose our reality – in any number of ways – and one of the most significant propositional actions – is artistic proposal

no proposal – is neutral – in the sense that it is beyond question – or beyond doubt

there are no certainties –

and artistic endeavour – is a response to and launches from propositional uncertainty

art – if you speak of it in general terms – is an exploration of uncertainty –

and what we know too – is that artistic work  – as well giving us different ways of perceiving and conceptualizing our reality –

is a source of real joy for human beings

as to ‘objectivity’ –

if you take the standard western philosophical view – of a reality independent of propositional action –

you end up in the dog house of authoritarianism and prejudice – with all the other dogs

on the other hand – it can be seen for what it is – just a proposal –

a proposal for the giving of perspective –

we need proposals for organizing our perceptions – our conceptions – our theories and our language use –

and we need proposals to provide a propositional focus –

the real function of the objective proposal is to organize and provide focus –

if objectivity is understood in this way it is a useful proposal

I will now look at Feyerabend’s argument here –

he says –

‘there are no ‘neutral’ objects which can be represented in any style, and which can be used as objective arbiters between radically different styles.’ –

Feyerabend begins with an account of the ‘archaic style’ as defined by Emmanuel Loewy

Feyerabend quotes Loewy –

‘Side by side with the images which reality presents to the physical eye there exists an entirely different world of images which live or, better, come to life in our mind only and which, although suggested by reality, are totally transformed. Every primitive act of drawing … tries to reproduce these images and them alone with the regularity of a physical function.’

Feyerabend goes on to say –

‘The archaic style changes as a result of ‘numerous planned observations of nature which modify the pure mental images’, initiate the development towards realism and thus start the history of art. Natural, physiological reasons are given for the archaic style and for its change.

Now it is not clear why it should be more ‘natural’ to copy memory images than images of perception which are so much better defined and so much more permanent. We also find that realism precedes more schematic forms of representation. This is true of the old Stone Age of Egyptian Art, of Attic Geometric Art. In all these cases the ‘archaic style’ is a result of  conscious effort (which may of course be aided, or hindered, by unconscious tendencies and physiological laws) rather than a natural reaction to the internal deposits of external stimuli. Instead of looking for the psychological causes of a ‘style’ we should therefore rather try to discover its elements, analyse their function, compare them with other phenomenon of the same culture (literary style, sentence construction, grammar, ideology) and thus arrive at an outline of an underlying world view including an account of the way in which this world view influences perception, thought, argument, and of the limits it imposes on the roaming about of the imagination. We shall see that such an analysis provides a better understanding of conceptual change than either the naturalistic account or trite phrases such as ‘critical discussion and comparison of … various frameworks is always possible’. Of course, some kind of comparison is always possible (for example one physical theory may sound more melodious when read to the accompaniment of a guitar than another physical theory). But lay down specific rules for the process of comparison, such as the rules of logic as applied to the relation of content classes, and you will find exceptions, undue restrictions, and you will be forced to talk your way out of trouble at every turn. It is much more interesting and instructive to examine what kinds of things can be said (represented) and what kinds of things cannot be said (represented) if the comparison has to take place within a certain specified historically well structured framework.’

looking for the psychological causes of a style – is a valid approach –

as valid I would say – as any other

in a certain context it may be just what is required –

however – like any approach – any methodology – it is just one approach among many

and as with any methodology – open to question

discovering the elements of style – comparing them with other phenomena of the same culture and thus arriving at an underlying world view – would indeed be an interesting study

on the face of it such a study is different from that of  looking for the psychological cause of style –

but that is all – it is different

again in a particular context – this discovery of the elements of style – may be just what will prove instructive and useful

but if the focus is psychological – such a study – interesting as it may well be – would not be relevant

now Feyerabend contrasts his elements of style approach to that of the critical approach –

however – the fact remains that Feyerabend’s ‘elements of style approach’ has only come about as a result of his critical evaluation of other methods i.e. the psychological method of Loewy –

that is to say – Feyerabend’s own work on scientific method – didn’t come out of nowhere

his theories are a direct result of his critical appraisal of other methodologies –

and he knows this – if anyone does

yes – some kind of comparison is always possible –

which is to say one theory is placed against another

that is where we begin in the business of critical evaluation

you have to propose a ground of comparison – and then you get about the critical evaluation of the different proposals

and you then immerse yourself in the uncertainty of the propositional reality

and whatever comes out of such a process – is itself – open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

the ‘growth of knowledge’ – so called – is the exploration of propositional uncertainty

‘lay down specific rules for the process of comparison, such as the rules of logic as applied to the relation of content classes, and you will find exceptions, undue restrictions, and you will be forced to talk your way out of trouble at every turn.’

yes – that is the game – critical evaluation and arguing your case –

dealing with propositional uncertainty

‘To sum up: the archaic world is much less compact than the world that surround us, and is also experienced as being less compact. Archaic man lacks ‘physical’ unity, his body consists of a multitude of parts, limbs, surfaces, connections; and he lacks mental unity. his mind is composed of a variety of events, some of them not ‘mental’ in our sense, which either inhabit the body-puppet as additional constituents or are brought into it from the outside. Events are not shaped by the individual, they are complex arrangements of parts into which the body-puppet is inserted at the appropriate place. This is the world view that emerges as a result of an analysis of the formal features of ‘archaic’ art and Homeric poetry, taken in conjunction with an analysis of the concepts which the Homeric poet used for describing what he sees. These individuals live indeed in the same kind of world that is depicted by their artists.’

‘To sum up: the archaic world is much less compact than the world that surround us, and is also experienced as being less compact’ –

here we have a couple of straight out traditional naive ‘objective’ statements –

it would have been epistemologically more sophisticated – had the claim been that the archaic world is represented in archaic art and poetry

the archaic world – as with any world – or any description of the world – is a matter of interpretation

statements about what is the case – are fair enough – so long as you understand them for what they are – interpretative

and it is just pretentious to assert that the archaic world is experienced by those who lived in it – as –compact – or as whatever –

I mean who knows how it was experienced?

who can say how this world – our world is experienced?

the best we can do on this matter – is to put forward various proposals

‘Archaic man lacks physical unity, his body consists of multiple parts, limbs, surfaces, connections’

from the point of view of  21^st century medical sciences – the same could be said of modern man

‘some of them not ‘mental’ in our sense, which either inhabit the body-puppet as additional constituents or are brought into it from the outside’

‘in our sense’ – who’s he kidding here?

‘this body puppet’ – may just be a primitive expression for Cartesian dualism –

as for ‘brought in from the outside’ – here we could well be discussing a theory of sensation

‘Events are not shaped by the individual, they are complex arrangements of parts into which the body-puppet is inserted at the appropriate place’

determinists and modern social theorists could get with this

‘this is the world view …’ –

this is a world view proposed by Feyerabend as a result of his analysis –

and there is nothing wrong with that as such

the Homeric poet – was a poet –

that is one who creates with language a view of the world –

his description – is a description of how he conceives or imagines what he sees

‘These individuals live indeed in the same kind of world that is depicted by their artists.’

I ask – how is anyone to know this?

fair enough – that it is proposed – it is an interesting idea – but not one that is beyond question – beyond doubt –

perhaps ‘these individuals’ have entirely different world views to their artists?

and just how unusual would that be?

we all live in ‘the same kind of world’ – for what that’s worth

whether we are archaic men – or modern men –

‘our world’ – just is – the great variety of propositional realities that we create –

propositional realities – that are open to question – open to doubt – that are uncertain

‘To repeat and conclude: the modes of representation used during the early archaic period

 in Greece are not just reflections of incompetence or of special artistic interests, they give a faithful account of what are felt, seen, thought to be fundamental features of the world of archaic man. This world is an open world. Its elements are not formed or held together by an ‘underlying substance’, they are not appearances from which this substance may be inferred with difficulty. They occasionally coalesce to form assemblages. The relation of a single element to the assemblage to which it belongs is like the relation of a part to an aggregate of parts and not like the relation of a part to an overpowering whole. The particular aggregate called ‘man’ is visited, and occasionally inhabited by ‘mental events’. Such events may reside in him, they may also enter from the outside. Like every other object man is an exchange station of influences rather than a unique source of action, an ‘I’ (Descartes’ ‘cogito’ has no point of attack in this world, and his argument cannot even start). There is a great similarity between this view and Mach’s cosmology except that the elements of the archaic world are recognizable physical and mental shapes and events while the elements used by Mach are more abstract, they are as yet unknown aims of research, not its object. In sum, representational units of the archaic world view admit of a realistic interpretation, they express a coherent ontology, and Whorff’s observations apply.’

of course the modes of representation used during the early archaic period in Greece are not reflections of incompetence –

there is no issue of competence – in representation –

a representation – however it is regarded or assessed – is a proposal –

open to question

‘competence’ or ‘incompetence’ – are rhetorical notions –

not logical concepts

and it might well be argued that a mode of representation – is a reflection of a special artistic interest –

that is for us – an anthropological question

who is to say what is a ‘faithful’ account of what is seen – felt – and thought – at any time?

‘faithful’ is a rhetorical term – a term used to persuade

for Feyerabend to be so sure of himself here – is I think just plain pretentious –

by all means put up the ‘faithful’ claim as a possibility – (among others) and indeed argue your case –

but the hard reality is – you don’t know

and that should temper your enthusiasm

the rational approach is to look for as many interpretations as possible –

that is – work to filling out the logical picture of the representation

and yes – you won’t end up with a knock down – take no prisoner’s conclusion

but that is the logical reality

‘This world is an open world. Its elements are not formed or held together by an ‘underlying substance’, they are not appearances from which this substance may be inferred with difficulty.’

here is a proposal regarding the world of Greece in the archaic period – a proposal –

that is all

interesting as it is – it is will be just one of any number of proposals to account for and explain the Greek world of the archaic period

Feyerabend elaborates his proposal – and concludes with –

‘In sum, representational units of the archaic world view admit of a realistic interpretation, they express a coherent ontology, and Whorff’s observations apply.’

a realistic interpretation?

that will depend on your idea of realism

a coherent ontology? –

was that ever in question?

and as for Whorff’s observations – why not throw them in too?  

Feyerabend has done some first class anthropological thinking –

he has proposed an analysis of Greece in the Archaic period –

all to the good –

however in terms of the question of the historical / anthropological method –

what we get here is just a different methodology – a different approach – a different analysis

it is one among many possible proposals –.

my argument is that any methodological proposal – is valid – is worthy of consideration

I see no problem with considering different approaches

it is likely to be to the advantage of the working historian – to have a number of methodological options at his disposal –

and Feyerabend’s methodology – would be among these

what historians do and how they proceed is up to them –

I make the logical point that whatever methodology is adopted –

it is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

Feyerabend proceeds –

‘At this point I interrupt my argument in order to make some comments which connect the preceding observations with problems in the philosophy of science.

1.

It may be objected that the foreshortenings and other indications of perspective are such frivolous features of our perceptual world that they cannot have been absent from the perceptual world of the Ancients. The archaic manner of presentation is therefore incomplete, and its realistic interpretation incorrect.’

in response to this Feyerabend says –

‘Reply: Foreshortenings are not an obvious feature of our perceptual world unless special attention is drawn to them (in an age of photography and film this is rather frequently the case)…….Aspects, foreshortenings, if they enter our consciousness at all……. are noticed in special situations only. In ancient Greece such special situations arose in the theatre…..Besides why should the conceptual world of the Greeks coincide with ours?’

‘its realistic interpretation’ – is just that – an interpretation –

Feyerabend puts his argument for this interpretation – and his argument is questioned

there is nothing new here

‘why should the conceptual world of the Greeks coincide with ours?’

‘ours’ is what?

the many and diverse points of views and  perspectives – that actually exist – that can exist – as responses to the unknown –

was the ancient Greek propositional reality any different?

that is to say – uncertain responses to the unknown?

2.

‘The reader should take notice of the method that has been used for establishing the peculiarities of the archaic cosmology. In principle the method is identical with the method of an anthropologist who examines the world-view of an association of tribes. The differences which are quite noticeable, are then due to the scarcity of the evidence and to the particular circumstances of its origin (written sources; works of art; no personal contact).’

Feyerabend replies –

‘Having completed his study the anthropologist carries within him both the native society and his own background, and he may now start comparing the two. The comparison decides whether the native way of thinking can be reproduced in European terms (provided there is a unique set of European terms’) or whether it has a ‘logic’ of its own, not found in Western language. In the course of the comparison the anthropologist may rephrase certain native ideas in English. This does not mean that English as spoken                                                                                                                                     independently of the comparison is commensurable with the native idiom. It means that language can be bent in many directions and that understanding does not depend on any set of rules.’

evidence is always incomplete – inadequate

this criterion of the adequacy of evidence – does not distinguish one proposal from another

what the anthropologist ‘carries with him’ is – proposals –

whether ‘relapsing into his native English’ – or using ‘native idiom’ – the anthropologist’s proposals will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

the anthropologist is in the thick of propositional uncertainty

the best he can hope for is a perspective – an argument – that others give their assent to –.

or that they find interesting and worthy of their attention

commensurability and incommensurability – are propositional games

and whether you play the commensurability game or the incommensurability game –

uncertainty remains

3.

‘The examination of key ideas passes through various stages, none of which leads to complete clarification. Here the researcher must exercise firm control over his urge for instant clarity and logical perfection. He must never try to make a concept clearer than is suggested by the material (except as a temporary aid for further research). It is this material and not his logical concepts that decides about the content of concepts.’

Feyerabend responds –

‘Each item of information is a building block of understanding, which means that it is to be clarified by the discovery of further blocks from the language and ideology of the tribe rather than by premature definitions…….Lack of clarity of any particular anthropological statement indicates the scarcity of the material rather than the vagueness of the logical intuitions of the anthropologist.’

the logic of the matter is that the concepts – content – the proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

each ‘block’ is – a block of uncertainty – open to question –

clarity is a rhetorical delusion

scarcity of material may be embarrassing – but logically – it is irrelevant

with a greater range of material – or more adequate material –

we increase the domain of uncertainty

4.

‘Exactly the same remarks apply to my attempt to explore incommensurability. Within the sciences incommensurability is closely connected with meaning. A study of incommensurability in the sciences will therefore produce statements that contain meaning-terms – but these terms will be only incompletely understood …And the remark

that such statements should be made after a clear theory of meaning is as sensible as the remark that statements about Nuer time, which are the material that leads to an understanding of Nuer time, should be written down only after such an understanding has been achieved. My argument presupposes, of course that the anthropological method is the correct method for studying the structure of science (and for that matter, of any other form of life).’

yes – these statements can only be ‘incompletely understood’

for any statement is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

this doesn’t mean that we don’t use ‘incompletely understood statements’ – or that we don’t operate with uncertain proposals

any theory of meaning – as with the statements it is designed to explain – is logically speaking incomplete – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

what we have at any point in time in science is a range of methodological proposals –

and the decisions of the practising scientist –

whatever methodologies – whatever perspectives – are put into play – will be a matter of circumstance

however whatever approach is used –

it will be open to question – open to doubt – it will be uncertain –

the anthropological method – is just one methodological option – and Feyerabend should know this –

there is no ‘correct’ method

5.

‘Logicians are liable to object. They point out that an examination of meanings and the relation between terms is the task of logic, not of anthropology.’

to this  Feyerabend says –

‘Now by ‘logic’ one may mean at least two different things. Logic may mean the study of, or the results of the study of, the structures inherent in a certain type of discourse. And it may mean a particular logical system, or set of systems.

A study of the first kind belongs to anthropology.’

logic is the study of propositions

propositions are proposals

proposal are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

this is the case however propositions are classified – i.e. as ‘logical’ – as ‘anthropological’ – or whatever

6.

Feyerabend here considers the objection that can be put given the application of a particular logical system

and in this connection he has Professor Giedymin in his sights –

‘A logical study of science as Giedymin and his fellow logicians understand it, is a study of sets of formulae of this system, of their structure, the properties of their ultimate constituents (intension, extension, etc.), of their consequences and possible models. If this study does not repeat the features an anthropologist has found in, say, science then this either shows that science has some flaws, or that the anthropologist does not know any logic….. [On this view] science is axiomatics plus model theory plus correspondence rules plus observation language.’

to this Feyerabend says –

‘It does not make the slightest difference to the logician in this second sense that his formulae do not look like scientific statements, that they are not used like scientific statements and that science could not possibly run in the simple ways his brain is capable of understanding (and therefore regards as the only permissible ways). He does not notice the discrepancy or he regards it as due to imperfections that are to be removed from a satisfactory account. Not once does it occur to him that the imperfection may have an important function, and that scientific progress might be impossible once they are removed.

Such a procedure assumes (without noticing that there is an assumption involved) that an anthropological study which familiarizes us with the overt and hidden classifications of

science has been completed, and that it has decided in favour of the axiomatic (etc. etc.) approach. No such study has ever been carried out. And the bits and pieces of field work available today mainly as a result of the work of Hanson, Kuhn, Lakatos, and others, shows that the logician’s approach removes not just some inessential embroideries of science, but those very features which make scientific progress thereby possible.’

Giedymin outlines a model for science – and a model for assessing scientific practice

this is one of any number of such models that have and can be proposed

the problem here is that what you get with Giedymin’s view – is not a logical analysis – but rather an authoritarian pronouncement

by that I mean – we are meant to assume that his analysis has the authority of logic

there is no authority – but the authority of authorship –  and authorship – logically speaking  – is irrelevant

and any claim that there is ‘authority’ other than authorship – is pretentious

what we get from Giedymin – is stock standard philosophical pretension –

a proposition – a proposal – if considered logically – is put to the question – is put to doubt –

logical analysis is the exploration of propositional uncertainty

where a philosopher like Giedymin comes to an embarrassing halt – is when it is put to him that his model – his philosophical model – is logically speaking – no different to any other proposal –

it is open to question – open to doubt  – uncertain

Feyerabend’s response to Giedymin is to say that his model – his perspective –

does not have an anthropological basis to it

Giedymin would agree with this – and not be at all concerned by it –

probably thinking that anthropology is for anthropologists – and philosophy for philosophers

I see no problem with an anthropological perspective on scientific method – or for that matter on any propositional activity

my point is that such a perspective – like the activity it is a response to – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

it is just one of a number of possible perspectives

Feyerabend says of Giedymin’s argument –

‘that his formulae do not look like scientific statements and that science could not possibly run in the simple ways his brain is capable of understanding’

perhaps Giedymin could make a similar response to Feyerabend’s view –

Feyerabend’s proposal is not as ‘clean’ or straightforward as Giedymin’s – it is different

it is more complex – it is messy –

and some I imagine would regard this as a step in the right direction

however there may well be scientists who looking at Feyerabend’s proposal – might say that his model does not capture the nature of scientific practise and behaviour – that interesting as it is – it’s on the wrong track –

would Feyerabend accept that his model – is just one of a number of possible valid views?

or does he just want to keep slugging it out with the other philosophical authoritarians?

7.

‘For Giedymin….this term [‘meaning’] and its derivatives such as the term ‘incommensurability’ are unclear and sufficiently imprecise.’

for Feyerabend –

‘The question is what role they play in (actual, non-reconstructed) science. Clarification must come from a more detailed study of this role, and lacunae must be filled with the results of such a study. And as the filling takes time the key terms will be ‘unclear and sufficiently imprecise’ for years and perhaps decades.’

unclarity and imprecision – are not peculiar to ‘meaning’ and ‘incommensurability’

once you drop the so called objective view of knowledge – which is really just a sophisticated epistemological authoritarianism –

and recognize that propositions are in fact – proposals – and that proposals are open to question – and open to doubt –

you will understand that from a logical point of view – any term – any concept – any description – is uncertain

it is not a matter of ‘years and perhaps decades’ of unclarity and imprecision – as Feyerabend states –

the issue is not unclarity and imprecision –

it is rather an issue of logical integrity

the problem is not how to get rid of uncertainty – the problem is understanding that it is the ground of propositional life – that it is the source of our creativity

those looking for certainty will always find it – in their prejudices –

philosophers can be among the worst offenders

if the result of being intellectually sophisticated and clever is just another form of ignorant authoritarianism – then the point has been missed entirely

better to ditch the load altogether  – and walk free – free of intellectual pretension –

doing so – has to make for a better life

8.

Feyerabend distinguishes two senses of clarity –

‘Arguments, theories, terms, points of view and debates can therefore be clarified in at least two different ways: (a) in the manner already described, which leads back to the familiar ideas and treats the new as a special case of things already understood, and (b) by the incorporation into a language of the future, which means that one must learn to argue with unexplained terms and to use sentences for which no clear rules of usage are as yet available.’

Feyerabend’s view of (a) is –

‘so the course of an investigation is deflected into the narrow channels of things already understood and the possibility of  fundamental conceptual discovery (or of fundamental conceptual change) is considerably reduced.’

he argues for (b) –

‘Now the building of new world view, and a corresponding new language, is a process that takes considerable time, in science as well as in meta-science. The terms of the new language become clear only when the process is fairly advanced, so that each single word is the centre of numerous lines connecting it with other words, sentences, bits of reasoning, gestures which sound absurd at first but which become perfectly reasonable once the connections are made.’

a critical investigation that ‘treats the new as a special case of things already understood’

puts those ‘things already understood’ – to question – to doubt – renders them – uncertain

learning to ‘argue with unexplained terms and to use sentences for which no rules of usage are as yet available’ – is to operate critically – putting the terms – the sentences – to question – to doubt – recognizing their uncertainty

rules come and go – they are uncertain

whether the channel is narrow or not – is logically irrelevant –

any propositional program or structure – whether familiar or new – is open to question –

open to doubt – is uncertain

time is not the issue –

thinking that establishing a propositional structure over time – makes it more logically secure –

is just the same old foundationalist argument with a temporal twist

it matters little whether your propositional endeavour is conservative or adventurous –

‘conservative’ or ‘adventurous’ – are purely rhetorical descriptions

9.

‘There is still another dogma to be considered before turning to the main narration. It is the dogma that all subjects, however assembled, quite automatically obey the laws of logic, or ought to obey the laws of logic. If this is so then anthropological field work would seem to be superfluous. ‘What is true in logic is true in psychology…..in scientific method, and in the history of science,’ writes Popper.’

Feyerabend argues –

‘This dogmatic assertion is neither clear nor is it (in one of its main interpretations) true…There is Hegel, there is Brower, there are formalists. They offer not just different interpretations of one and the same bulk of logical ‘facts’, but different ‘facts’ altogether. And the assertion is not true as there exist legitimate scientific statements which violate simple logical rules. For example there are statements which play an important role in established scientific disciplines and which are observationally adequate only if they are self-contradictory: fixate a moving pattern that has just come to a standstill, and you will see it move in the opposite direction, but without changing its position. The only phenomenologically adequate description is ‘it moves, in space, but it does not change place’ – and this description is self-contradictory.

Secondly, let us assume that the expressions ‘psychology’ ‘anthropology’ ‘history of science’, ‘physics’ do not refer to facts and laws but to certain methods of assembling facts including certain ways of connecting observation with theory and hypothesis. That is, let us consider the activity ‘science’ and its various subdivisions. We may approach this activity in two ways. We may lay down ideal demands of knowledge and knowledge-acquisition, and we may try to construct a (social) machinery that obeys these demands. Almost all epistemologists and philosophers of science proceed this way…Such an enquiry on the other hand will have to explore the way scientists actually deal with their surroundings, it will have to examine the actual shape of their product, viz. ‘knowledge’, and the way in which this product changes as a result of decisions and actions in complex social and material conditions. In a word such an enquiry will have to be anthropological.’

‘What is true in logic is true in psychology…in scientific method, and in the history of science,’ writes Popper.’

this really is an empty statement –

it is just the attempt to establish – an authority –

it’s a rhetorical statement

and I think an attempt to intimidate – in the guise of reason –

and as Feyerabend shows there is no real consensus on just what logic is –

that’s the brute fact of it –

the matter is open to question

if you can get away from this inherent assumption of most of Western philosophy – that the task is to establish an authority –

if you can see that such an argument is simply a deception designed to make you obey –

obey in your thoughts – and in your actions –

someone else’s view of the world –

then you have a chance of seeing what the real state of play is

we deal in propositions – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and this applies as much to so called logical statements and systems – as it does to any other statements or propositional systems

there is no authority – there is only propositional uncertainty

epistemology is proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘…Such an enquiry, on the other hand, will have to explore the way scientists actually deal with their surroundings, it will have to examine the actual shape of their product, viz. ‘knowledge’, and the way in which this product changes as a result of decisions and actions in complex social and material conditions. In a word such an enquiry will have to be anthropological.’

yes – and by all means propose your model of scientific practice –

however – be aware that any such model – at best – will only provide an insight into science

what we should be doing as methodologists is critically examining existing methodological proposals –

and proposing and developing different descriptions of scientific practise

just putting up one model and then arguing its merits ‘til the crows come home – is really pretty pathetic –

keep an open mind – look and see where – different methodologies – different descriptions – make sense – where they work – and where they don’t –

and keep at it

Feyerabend’s anthropological idea is a good one – from a brilliant thinker

but it is not the only one –

whatever is put – however simple – or however comprehensive and elaborate our proposals are –

they are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and we never leave propositional uncertainty –

Feyerabend now returns to consideration of the paratactic universe of the archaic Greeks – to the substance-appearance universe of their followers

he begins with this –

‘The archaic cosmology (which from now on I shall call cosmology A) contains things, events, their parts; it does not contain any appearances. Complete knowledge of an object is complete enumeration of its parts and peculiarities. Man cannot have complete knowledge. There are too many things, two many events, too many situations (Iliad, 2.488), and he can be close to only a few of them (Iliad, 2.485). But although man cannot have complete knowledge, he can have a sizeable amount of it. The wider his experience, the greater his number of adventures, of things seen, heard, read, the greater his knowledge.’

‘The archaic cosmology (which from now on I shall call cosmology A) contains things, events, their parts; it does not contain any appearances’ –

the epistemological reality is that what the ‘archaic cosmology’ contains – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

that Homer is interpreted as representing it in a certain way is a proposal

‘Complete knowledge of an object is complete enumeration of its parts and peculiarities. Man cannot have complete knowledge. There are too many things, two many events, too many situations (Iliad, 2.488), and he can be close to only a few of them.’

again – Feyerabend’s interpretation of Homer’s epistemology

‘But although man cannot have complete knowledge, he can have a sizeable amount of it. The wider his experience, the greater his number of adventures, of things seen, heard, read, the greater his knowledge.’

the real problem with Feyerabend’s interpretation – is that it cannot be assumed that the concepts that he uses – ‘things’ – ‘their parts’ and ‘experience’ – or the lack of it  –  ‘complete knowledge’ – ‘wide experience’ would connect with Homer –

did Homer think in these terms?

I think Feyerabend’s interpretation – and his use of modern western concepts – is ok – as far as it goes – but it must be represented – presented – for what it is –

an interpretation – and an interpretation that has its roots in the modern mind

as far as I can tell Feyerabend wants to say that his descriptions of the Homeric world and his analysis of so called ‘Homeric epistemology’ – in these modern western terms – is the correct account of the matter – end of story –

when from a logical point of view all he has done is put a proposal – open to question – open to doubt

a proposal that is – logically speaking – uncertain –

at best what we have from Feyerabend is a rhetorical argument

‘The new cosmology (cosmology B) that arises in the 7the to 5th century B.C. distinguishes between much-knowing, [Greek term], and true knowledge, and it warns against trusting ‘custom born of experience’, [Greek term]. Such a distinction and such a warning make sense only in a world whose structure is very different from the structure of A. In one version that played an important role in the development of Western civilization and which underlies such problems as the problem of the existence of theoretical entities and the problem of alienation the new events form what one may

call a True World, while the events of everyday life are now appearances that are but its dim and misleading reflection. The true world is simple and coherent, and it can be described in a uniform way. So can every act by which its elements can be comprehended: a few abstract notions replace the numerous concepts that were used in cosmology A for describing how man might be ‘inserted’ into his surroundings and for expressing the equally numerous types of information thus gained. From now on there is only one important type of information, and that is: knowledge.’

‘From now on there is only one important type of information, and that is: knowledge.’ –

certainly that is the standard view – the received wisdom – but is there anything here but rhetoric?

is there any evidence for this view?

Feyerabend does not present any evidence here  –

there is no anthropology here – just assertion

Feyerabend – just doesn’t get that – the world is variously described and that any description – from a logical point of view is valid –

does he think that in the many cultures of the 7^th to the  5^th century – there was only one view of reality –

that even with the emergence of modern science – other interpretations of the world – simply ceased to exist?

it would seem so

if you accept Feyerabend’s A / B distinction – what we have is different propositions – different propositional structures – different propositional analyses that’s ok – different views of the world – at different times –

no great news

Feyerabend continues –

‘The conceptual totalitarianism that arises as a result of the slow arrival of B has interesting consequences, not all of them desirable.’

conceptual totalitarianism – is an authoritarian myth –

the claim is that there is one conceptual scheme –

and if so – it must hold sway – i.e. there are no others –

or if it is claimed that there are others – the claim is false –

or that such conceptual schemes are inadequate

the issue here is not conceptualism – rather authoritarianism –

any proposal put is open to question – open top doubt – is uncertain

the uncertainty of any conceptual scheme – puts pay to any claim of authority

that there may be a conceptual scheme that dominates a particular propositional context – at a particular time and place – is best understood in terms of fashion – propositional fashion

and you will always find that such a conceptual scheme is not the full story –

in any context – at any time or place you will find alternative conceptions –

and even within the most ‘fashionable’ conceptual scheme – you will find question – doubt – dissent

and as for the claim that the ‘slow arrival of B has consequences that are not ‘desirable’ –

not desirable from who’s point of view?

such an argument is not logical – it is not scientific – it is pretentious and rhetorical –

this conceptual totalitarianism that Feyerabend is putting up – and presumably arguing against – is a straw man argument – a red herring

and if Feyerabend had a non-authoritarian view himself –

he would see that this totalitarian argument is quite unnecessary to the prosecuting of his  ‘anthropological view’

and here it needs to be noted that Feyerabend – has got anthropology wrong

the anthropologist – as with all empirical scientists understands that what he deals with – what he observes – is difference

and when we come to the theoretical level – exactly the same situation pertains –

we have different theories – different propositions

the anthropological world is a world of difference – of question – of doubt – of uncertainty

here is the logic of anthropology

Feyerabend seems to think – that all you have to do is come up with a new interpretation

a radically new interpretation – and that’s the end of the story

his view is unscientific – and naïve in the extreme

‘Situations which made sense when tied to a particular type of cognition now become isolated, unreasonable, apparently inconsistent with other situations: we have a ‘chaos of appearances.’ The ‘chaos’ is a direct consequence of the simplification of language that goes with the belief in the True World.’

situations don’t become ‘isolated, unreasonable, apparently inconsistent with other situations’

these ‘situations’ – when given different interpretation – are enhanced –

they are broadened and expanded – given a new life – by the different interpretation

it is only the narrow minded philosophical pugilist that would regard them as isolated and unreasonable

propositional difference – and variety – does not signify chaos  –

it signifies propositional uncertainty – that is to say logical health

forget this notion of ‘simplification of language’ – that is just philosophical party political narrow mindedness

                                                                                                                                         

what you have is different propositional responses to these ‘situations’ –

‘situations’ – mind you – that in the absence of any propositional action / interpretations –

are ‘unknowns’

belief in the ‘True world’ – is of course ridiculous –

but I think it should be pointed out that it is just as ridiculous to think in terms of the ‘False world’ –

implicit in Feyerabend’s work here – is a belief in absolutes – True and False –

absolutes he pretends to argue against –

his own view – if you drop all the sophistication that he wraps it up in –

is logically speaking – no different to the views he argues against –

he argues quite forcefully for his conceptualization of scientific method –

alternative views are just put to be debunked and ridiculed –

it’s an intellectual hatchet job 

Feyerabend goes on to ask –

‘How is the ‘irrationality’ of the transition period overcome?

his answer is the following –

‘It is overcome in the usual way (cf. item 8 above), i.e. by the determined production of nonsense until the material produced is rich enough to permit the rebels to reveal, and everyone else to recognize, new universal principles. (Such revealing need not consist in writing the principles down in the form of clear and precise statements.) Madness turns into sanity provided it is sufficiently rich and sufficiently regular to function as the basis of a new world view. And when that happens, then we have a new problem: how can the old view be compared with the new view?

‘the irrationality of the transition period’ – so called – is a critical period –

a period of question – doubt – uncertainty

logically speaking – such is essentially – no different to any other period of critical / scientific activity

so as far as I am concerned – what Feyerabend calls ‘irrationality’ – question – doubt – uncertainty – is logical

in my view the absence of question doubt and uncertainty  – is what is ‘irrational’

how is a period of question – doubt – and uncertainty overcome?

with pretence –  authoritarian pretence –

which I would suggest – is an ever present feature of propositional activity – or propositional life – of science –

it is not realistic to regard human beings as completely rational / logical – or completely ‘irrational’ / illogical

propositional life – is a mixture of both the rational and irrational –

human beings are rational and irrational –

and as far as I can see – both the rational and the irrational play essential and significant roles in human experience

the job of the philosopher is not to proselytize against the so called ‘irrational’ – and to champion the so called ‘rational’

the task of the philosopher is to distinguish – to show the difference – between logical and illogical propositional action

‘From what has been said it obvious that we cannot compare the contents of A and B.

A-facts and B-facts. A-facts and B-facts cannot be put side by side, not even in memory: presenting B-facts means suspending principles assumed in the construction of A-facts. All we can do is draw B-pictures of A-facts in B, or introduce B-statements of A-facts into B. We cannot use A-statements of A-facts in B. Nor is it possible to translate language A into B. This does not mean that we cannot discuss the two views – but the discussion cannot be in terms of any (formal) relations between the elements of A  and the elements of B. It will have to be ‘irrational’ as was the talk of those intent on leaving A.’

we cannot compare the contents of A and B?

A and B are proposals – different proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

if all you have is A and B – that’s all you have – two proposals

if two proposals are compared – they are compared to – compared in relation to another – a third proposal –

there must be a third proposal against which the two subject proposals are put

i.e. does A lend support to C – does B lend support to C?

any decision here –  will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

comparison is best seen as a propositional game – perhaps even as a propositional ritual

in any case –  the logic of a comparative exercise or study – is the logic of the proposition

in a comparative game – the propositions involved – i.e. A – B – C and  any relational proposal between A and C – or B and C – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

if you don’t want to – or don’t see the need to – or you don’t have a reason to – play this propositional game –

presumably you won’t

the fact is we do play this game in all propositional contexts – science is just one –

to say that this game is not played – defies the empirical facts of propositional life

to say that it shouldn’t be played – is to take yourself out of propositional reality

this game will be played whether we are dealing with propositional systems separated by centuries – or separated by minutes

we play the game with question – with doubt – with uncertainty – and we go wherever it takes us –

Feyerabend says that A-facts and B-facts cannot be put side by side –

well they can – and they are – Feyerabend needs only to look at his own work to see this.

for this is just exactly what he does – puts them side by side

if you have two propositions – two proposals – you don’t have – one

you have – you always have – different propositions – and they are put side by side –

that is the propositional reality

but just putting them side by side – is not comparing them

if they are to be compared – they are put in relation another proposition

‘presenting B-facts means suspending principles assumed in the construction of A-facts.’

no it doesn’t – it means putting different facts – putting different principles

it’s walking and chewing gum at the same time

‘All we can do is draw B-pictures of A-facts in B, or introduce B-statements of A-facts into B’

drawing B pictures of A-facts – yes – or introducing B-statements of A-facts – could well be an interesting propositional game –

however any such game – if it has a serious end in view – will require a critical activity – the critical activity of question – of doubt

‘We cannot use A-statements of A-facts in B.’ –

well – you can – but if you do – quite obviously you change the character of B –

‘Nor is it possible to translate language A into B’ –

if you translate the language of A into B – you propose a new language

‘This does not mean that we cannot discuss the two views – but the discussion cannot be in terms of any (formal) relations between the elements of A  and the elements of B. It will have to be ‘irrational’ as was the talk of those intent on leaving A.’

any discussion of the two views will be an exploration of  propositional uncertainty –

formal relations between the elements of A and the elements of B – is nothing more than some proposal put –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

and whether it is a useful proposal or not will be decided upon – at the time – by those involved

critical talk – is uncertain – not irrational –

the idea that you can’t engage in a critical evaluation of different proposals – is what is irrational –

this seems to be Feyerabend’s preferred position

‘Now it seems to me that the relation between, say, classical mechanics (interpreted in terms of the view of Niels Bohr), or between Newtonian mechanics (interpreted realistically) and the general theory of relativity (also interpreted realistically) is in many respects similar to  the relation between cosmology A and cosmology B. (There are of course also important differences: for example the modern transition has left the arts, ordinary language, and perception unchanged.) Thus every fact of Newton’s mechanics presumes that shapes, masses, periods are changed only by physical interactions and this presumption is suspended by the theory of relativity. Similarly the quantum theory constitutes facts in accordance with the uncertainty relations which are suspended by the classical approach.’

straight up – the relation between any two proposals – is of course similar to that of the relation between A and B

we have two different proposals – or – in the example Feyerabend gives – three – with quantum theory –

different proposals – different propositional constructions

does Feyerabend’s argument – come down to anything more than this?

I can’t see it –

why B was preferred to A – in the day – why relativity gained acceptance over Newtonian mechanics – is open to question –

and there will be any number of explanations advanced –

and these explanations – as with the theories themselves  – will be – are – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

we cannot say definitively – why one proposal – one proposition – or propositional construction – wins the day – the matter is uncertain –

the best we can do here is advance as may proposals as are possible – as are useful

that is to say explore the critical state of affairs

and whatever explanation is adopted – useful or enlightening as it may be – will be – as with any other – open to question – to doubt – uncertain –

the reality just is that decisions get made – for whatever reason – and propositional action is taken

we all operate in various propositional structures and networks –

this is the empirical reality –

what structures and networks we have to hand – are those that are customary –

or those that are not –

the call – which way to go – is always open to question – open to doubt –

is always uncertain –

Feyerabend proceeds –

‘I shall conclude this chapter by repeating its results in the form of theses…

The first thesis is that there are frameworks of thought (action, perception) which are incommensurable.

I repeat that this is a historical (anthropological) thesis which must be supported by historical (anthropological) evidence….’

the claim is that there are theories – that are incommensurable – and that the basis for this claim has to be anthropological evidence

the idea is that a theory is incommensurable – if rendered so – by anthropology

the anthropology of a theory – may well be of interest – but it doesn’t follow that because a theory is given an anthropological dimension – it is incommensurable

the issue of comparison is not a question of the evidence for or against a theory

for two proposals to be compared – they will be placed in relation to a third proposal

i.e. – which of the two proposals lends support to the third proposal?

the two proposals per se – cannot be compared to each other – except to say the obvious – that they are different

we know this regardless of any anthropological research – we know this because it is a logical fact – quite independent of any scientific evidence

if two propositions are not different – there is only one proposition –

where you have two propositions – the propositions are not the same – they are different

the way Feyerabend has set up this issue – is disingenuous

Feyerabend’s A and B – are radically different conceptions of reality –

now of course you can ask the question – which conception of the natural world do you think has more going for it?

unless you are talking to poets – the answer most likely will be – B –

but this is really just an intellectual exercise –

is anyone seriously – realistically – going to compare A and B?

isn’t it rather that you recognise the difference – and the integrity of both proposals – and consider yourself enriched by this propositional diversity – and leave it at that?

it’s not that you can’t compare A and B – it’s just that there seems no good reason to do so –

so perhaps incommensurability is really just about whether you have a reason to compare propositions or not –

if not – it is because – it doesn’t happen

and yes Feyerabend can go on forever about what doesn’t happen – and why it doesn’t happen –

he can construct a theory to that end – and rummage around in anthropology all he likes searching for his ‘evidence’

but who is interested in what doesn’t happen – and why it doesn’t happen?

the focus of science is on what does happen –

and that too should be the focus of the philosopher –

I can’t help but think that Feyerabend wants to bring science as we know it – scientific method – to an end –

and in its place to have nothing but screwball ideas fighting it out – to no end at all

‘Secondly, we have seen that incommensurability has an analogue in the field of perception and that it is part of the history of perception. This is the content of my second thesis on incommensurability: the development of perception and thought in the individual passes through stages which are mutually incommensurable.’

this thesis – defeats itself –

stages of development of the individual are just that – stages

we have one theory here

to separate out ‘individual stages’ – and treat them as separate theories – is to destroy the theory as a theory of stages

and if you do that – then you do not have a theory of stages

you don’t have one theory at all – you have a number of disconnected theories

so yes – you can take the ‘stages’ out of context – treat them as un-related – and then claim – they are incommensurable – because – they are unrelated

if you don’t propose a propositional relation between propositions – then there is no relation

and if there is no relation – they are incommensurable

so this incommensurability of Feyerabend – has to do with extracting theories out of a propositional context

a theory that is not related to another theory – in a propositional context – cannot be compared

theories are neither commensurable – or incommensurable per se

commensurability is a propositional relation between theories

if you don’t propose such a relation – if you don’t compare theories – they won’t be –

commensurable

incommensurability has nothing to do with theory itself –

it is just the decision – not to compare – not to propose a relation between one theory and another

it’s a propositional – non-action

‘My third thesis is that scientists, and especially their views on basic matters, are often as different from each other as are the ideologies underlying different cultures. Even worse: there exist scientific theories which are mutually incommensurable though they apparently deal ‘with the same subject matter’. Not all competing theories have this property and those which have the property have it only as long as they are interpreted in a special way, for example, without reference to an ‘independent observation language’. The illusion that we are dealing with the same subject matter arises in these cases as a result of an unconscious confusion of two different types of interpretation. Using an ‘instrumentalistic interpretation of the theories which sees them as no more than instruments for the classification of certain ‘facts’ one gets the impression that there is some common subject matter. Using a ‘realistic’ interpretation that tries to understand the theory in its own terms such a subject matter seems to disappear although there is the definite feeling (unconscious instrumentalism) that it must exist. Let us now see how incommensurable theories may arise.’

of course scientists’ views on basic matters will be different –

people have different views – whatever they work at

‘even worse’ – worse than what? – not having different views?

different scientific theories – that because of context – because of circumstance – are not compared?.

given a different propositional set – a different propositional context – they may well be placed in relation to – a theory – an hypothesis – that its advocates think can gain by the involvement of one or other of these so called ‘incommensurable’ theories

theories are ‘incommensurable’ – only if they are not compared

this ‘same subject matter’ will be a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and indeed – uncertain

and the idea is that the exploration of such a proposal – the exploration of its uncertainty

will lead to further propositional discoveries

and yes – theories get interpreted –

and they get interpreted into propositional contexts –

some might say they get mangled into them – whatever –

they get used in propositional contexts

as to an ‘independent observation language’ – there is only what is proposed – what is put

and that is open to question – open to doubt – it is uncertain –

uncertain – not independent – or independent

there is no ‘illusion’ that we are dealing with the same subject matter –

there is the proposal of ‘the same subject matter’ –

and I would put that it is best seen – not as an instrumentalist proposal  – or realist proposal – but rather as a pragmatic proposal –

for without such a proposal – what can be done?

if all you have is different proposals that have no proposal of common reference – what do you have?

nothing goes

‘a common reality’ – is a pragmatic decision

as for all this ‘unconscious’ guff –

science is demeaned by any talk of a hidden reality –

and as a matter of fact – we are all demeaned – whatever it is we do – whenever we do it – by such obscurantism –

what we deal with – is what there is – and what there is – is what is proposed –

and ‘proposed’ means put – not hidden

‘Scientific investigation, says Popper, starts with a problem and proceeds by solving it.’

I don’t think so

scientific investigation begin with propositional uncertainty

logically speaking there is no ‘solving’ of propositional uncertainty – there is only the exploration of propositional uncertainty

a ‘problem’ is  a proposed focus

‘This characterization does not consider that problems may be wrongly formulated, that one may inquire about properties of things and processes which latter views declare to be non-existent. Problems of this kind are not solved, they are dissolved and removed from the  domain of legitimate inquiry.’

‘wrongly formulated?’

any problem-proposal will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

there is no ‘wrong’ formulation – any formulation is uncertain

‘which latter views declare to be non-existent’?

well the problem changes –  one problem leads to another – we have different problems –

Popper’s critical rationalism can accommodate this –

and from my point of view such a scenario is simply critical activity

problems don’t get solved – and they don’t dissolve –

any formulation of a problem – is uncertain – and therefore logically speaking – can always be revisited

yes – we make pragmatic decisions to move on from one formulation to another –

however any formulation is open to question

‘The discovery that certain entities do not exist may prompt the scientist to re-describe the events, processes, observations which are thought to be manifestations of them and which were therefore described in terms assuming their existence (Or rather it may prompt him to introduce new concepts since the older words will remain in use for a considerable time.) This applies especially to those ‘discoveries’ which suspend universal principles. The discovery of an ’underlying substance’ and of a ‘spontaneous I’ is of this kind, as we have seen.’

‘the discovery that certain entities do not exist’ –

is – a re-description of the proposals that have been used –

i.e. ‘events’ – processes’ – ‘observations’ –

what exists independently of proposal – of description – is the unknown

our proposals – our descriptions – make known –

and this knowledge is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

so called ‘new concepts’ – are proposals –

and ‘the older words’ – are not beyond question – beyond doubt –

they can be re-interpreted

‘universal principles’ – at best are pragmatic guidelines – at worst authoritarian rhetoric

the ‘discovery’ of  an ‘underlying substance’ or a ‘spontaneous I’ –

is to propose a substance – is to propose an  I –

these proposals are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain 

‘An interesting development occurs when the faulty ontology is comprehensive, that is when its elements are thought to be present in every process in a certain domain. In this case, every description inside the domain must be changed and must be replaced by a different statement (or by no statement at all). Classical physics is a case in point. It has developed a comprehensive terminology for describing some very fundamental  properties of physical objects, such as shapes, masses, volumes, time intervals and so on. The conceptual scheme connected with this terminology assumes, at least in one of its numerous interpretations, that the properties inhere in the objects and change only as a result of direct physical interference. This is one of the universal principles of

classical physics. The theory of relativity implies, at least in the interpretation accepted by Einstein and Bohr, that inherent properties of the kind do not exist, that shapes, masses, time intervals are relations between physical objects and co-ordinate systems which may change, without any physical interference, when we replace one coordinate system with another. The theory of relativity also provides new principles for constituting mechanical facts. The new conceptual system that arises in this way does not deny the classical state of affairs, it does not even permit it to formulate statements expressing such a state of affairs. It does not, and cannot, share a single statement with its predecessor – assuming all the time that we do not use the theories as classificatory schemes for the ordering of neutral facts. If we interpret both theories in a realistic manner, then the ‘formal conditions for a suitable successor’, which were stated in chapter 15 (it has to repeat successful consequences of the older theory, deny its false consequences, and make additional predictions), cannot be satisfied and the positivistic scheme of progress with its ‘Popperian spectacles’, breaks down. Even Lakatos’ liberalized version cannot survive this result; for it too assumes that content-classes of different theories can be compared, i.e. that a relation of inclusion, exclusion or overlap can be established between them. It is no use trying to connect classical statements by an empirical hypothesis. An hypothesis of this kind would be as laughable as the statement ‘whenever there is possession by a demon there is a discharge in the brain’, which establishes connections between terms of a possession theory of epilepsy and more recent ‘scientific’ terms. For we clearly do not want to perpetuate the older devilish terminology, and take it seriously, just in order to guarantee compatibility of content-classes. But in the case of relativity vs. classical mechanics, an hypothesis of this kind cannot even be formulated .Using classical terms we assume a universal principle that is suspended by relativity which means it is suspended whenever we write down a sentence with the intention to express a relativistic state of affairs. Using classical terms in the same statement we both use and suspend certain universal principles which is another way of saying that such statement do not exist: the case of relativity vs. classical mechanics is an example of two incommensurable frameworks. Other examples are the quantum theory vs. classical mechanics, the impetus theory vs. Newton’s mechanics, materialism vs. mind-body dualism, and so on.’

there are no faulty ontologies – there are different ontologies

Feyerabend goes on to talk of the conceptual schemes of classical physics – ‘at least in one of its numerous interpretations’ and the theory of relativity ‘at least in the interpretation accepted by Einstein and Bohr’ –

so yes these theories are – open to interpretation – and obviously – open to interpretation relative to each other

and Feyerabend has adopted interpretations – and proceeds with his view of their relation

it is that on the Einstein / Bohr interpretation – the inherent properties – do not exist –

‘that shapes, masses, time intervals are relations between physical objects and co-ordinate systems which may change, without any physical interference, when we place one coordinate system with another.’

and yes – of course – if you adopt this interpretation you can get that result –

but what has been achieved?

the two systems are different – their conceptual schemes – are different – their world views – are different

we knew this before we started here

‘The new conceptual system that arises in this way does not deny the classical state of affairs, it does not even permit it to formulate statements expressing such a state of affairs.’

we have two different theories – with different terminologies –

and there is no co-relate in the new conceptual scheme for the terms of the old scheme –

or vice versa

Feyerabend’s overall point here is that such theories cannot be compared

his problem is that he doesn’t understand comparison

two different theories – will be different – because they do not share a common language

all a comparison between the two – will show is that there is this difference

if you are to compare two such theories – the comparison will be relative to a third proposal –

i.e. which of these two theories is relevant to – adds to – supports – etc. – this third proposal?

the issue may be well argued one way or the other – and it will be an argument about different concepts – different terminologies – different content classes –  etc.

but there you have it – the argument – and this is all a comparison amounts to –

and even when a decision has been made – as to whether and how – either of the two theories is relevant to the third –

that decision will be open to question – open to doubt – it will be – uncertain

again the question is not whether comparisons can be made –

all you have to do is relate two different proposition to a third proposition – and argue the

case –

the real point is – not pretending – that anyone thinks – that two radically different views of nature – are anything but that – radically different

Feyerabend’s ‘method’ – is to float the notion that someone thinks that classical physics and relativity theory share common terminology – and then – shoot it down –

the net result is that there is nothing to disagree with – hey there never was –

the whole kit and caboodle is a fraud –

the real problem with such a ‘method’– is – nothing changes –

nothing is ventured – nothing is gained – but for – pretension – empty pretension

Feyerabend considers the Popperian approach – that a new theory has to repeat successful consequences – deny its false consequences – and make additional predictions

I think these methodological prescriptions – if they were followed – would result in a substantial weakening of the power of any new proposal – because they effectively attempt to minimize the difference –

it is as if from this point of view the die has been set – and any alternative theory – has to fit in – when it may be the case that the point of the new theory – is to offer an entirely different perspective

the Popperian approach places too great an emphasis on continuity –

continuity may be comforting – but discontinuity – is the logical reality –

pretending logical continuity – when there isn’t any – is just logical fraud

‘It is no use trying to connect classical statements by an empirical hypothesis. An hypothesis of this kind would be as laughable as the statement ‘whenever there is possession by a demon there is a discharge in the brain’ –

look you would call this a bridging proposition –

it’s neither one thing nor the other – however it has the advantage of showing that different perspectives do exist – that a connection can be proposed – that a relation can be proposed –

look any proposal is just that – a proposal – let’s not shoot it down – just because it doesn’t fit neatly into one or other straight-jackets –

Feyerabend says that Lakatos’ theory like Popper’s assumes that content classes of different theories can be compared –

logically speaking the content class of any theory is not a fixed description – it is open to question – to doubt – it is an uncertain description

that it is not held to be – by the proponents of the theory – is either logical blindness –

or a pragmatic decision – to move on – .

with content classes – we are not taking about fixed entities – fixed formulations

anyway –

my main point here is that if two theories are placed in a comparative relation relative to a third proposal – the content classes of the two theories will be redescribed –

relative to the ‘comparative’ proposal or theory – if the ‘comparative action’ is to go forward

normally we don’t bother about ‘comparing’ radically different theories in any serious manner

we have a look at them – to see which – if any – will suit our purposes –

and sometimes we cherry pick from what is available – and work with a mishmash – a patchwork of concepts and languages

‘But in the case of relativity vs. classical mechanics, an hypothesis of this kind cannot even be formulated.’

yes – if you are going to take a hard line – an authoritarian line about what can and cannot be proposed – what can and cannot be considered –

you can always stitch it up so that no new relation is allowed to be proposed – and be satisfied – that your theory has not been tainted by another

any such formulation – like the demon and epilepsy example – will be a tapestry of different concepts and terminology –

nevertheless – if that is what happens – ok – just a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

who knows what such could lead to – and isn’t it healthy to throw different propositional constructs into the mix?

I thought that was what Feyerabend was arguing –

he seems to have reverted to common and garden philosophical sectarianism –

and a sectarianism that goes nowhere – changes nothing

‘Other examples are the quantum theory vs. classical mechanics, the impetus theory vs. Newton’s mechanics, materialism vs. mind-body dualism .’

yes different conceptions – different proposals –

the world – our world – the propositional world is just this – the reality of different proposals – the reality of difference

and our freedom lies just in the logical reality – of question – doubt – and uncertainty –

the enemies of difference – or a world of difference – are those who hold to any conception – to  any proposal – as a certainty –

it is not that any proposal is certain – it is just that the claim is made or assumed – as a support to ignorance and prejudice

Feyerabend – pretends a genuine liberalism – but it is a sham –

the only genuine liberality – is scepticism – thorough-going and positive –

if you shirk this – as Feyerabend has – there is no gain – only pretence and hyperbole –

in the end though – if that’s where your at – that’s where your at –

there is no sin

‘Shapere (and others after him) have tried to show that incommensurable theories are not just rare, but are a philosophical impossibility. I now turn to a discussion of these arguments.

I have said that a scientific change may lead to a replacement of statements in a certain domain and that replacement will be comprehensive when we are dealing with comprehensive ideologies. It will effect not only theories but observational statements and (see Galileo above) natural interpretations. Now such an adaptation of observation to theory (and this is the gist of the first objection) often removes conflicting observation reports and saves a new cosmology in an ad hoc manner. Moreover, there arises the suspicion that observations which are interpreted in terms of a new theory can no longer be used to refute the theory. It is not difficult to reply to these points.

As regards the objection let me point out, in agreement with what has been said before (cf. Chapters 5 and 6) that an inconsistency between theory and observation may reveal a fault of the observational terminology (and even of our sensations), so that it’s quite natural to change this terminology, adapt it to the new theory and see what happens. Such

a change gives rise (and should give rise) to new auxiliary subjects (hydro-dynamics,

theory of solid objects, optics in the case of Galileo) which may more than compensate

for the loss of empirical content. And as regards the suspicion, we must remember that the predictions of a theory depend on its postulates (and associated grammatical

rules) and also on initial conditions while the meaning of the ‘primitive’ notions depends on the postulates and (and associated grammatical rules) only. In those rare cases, however, where a theory entails assertions about possible initial conditions we can refute it with the help of self-inconsistent observation reports such as ‘object A does not move on a geodesic’, which if analysed in accordance with the Einstein-Infeld-Hoffman account, reads ‘singularity µ which moves on a geodesic does not move on a geodesic.’

an inconsistency between theory and observation –

is a sign of propositional uncertainty

who can say where any propositional investigation will lead?

perhaps to different theories – different observations –

perhaps you drop the theory altogether –

perhaps you turn a blind eye to the observations

you might decide to do some terminological tinkering

and render the situation – consistent –

you might give up – and start again –

you might look for another occupation –

who’s to say?

my point is that whatever approach is taken – and there are any number of them –

any approach is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

the methodology – if you can call it that – is the methodology of uncertainty

Feyerabend’s response is to say that in the face of inconsistency – change the observational terminology – adapt it to the new theory and see what happens –

ok – why not?

and he says such a change gives rise to new auxiliary subjects

well maybe it does – maybe it doesn’t – there is no necessity here

and in any case Feyerabend’s response is just one of the many possible responses to inconsistency

the Einstein-Infeld-Hoffman manoeuvre is simply a re-interpretation of the data –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

and as with any proposal – if it fits the bill at the time – it may well be used –

it all depends on the circumstance – and that is a most uncertain state of affairs – at any time

this discussion of inconsistency is all very well – but it has nothing to do with whether one theory can or cannot – is or isn’t – be compared to another –

it has nothing to do with incommensurability

‘The second objection criticizes an interpretation of science that seems to be necessary for incommensurability to come about. I have already pointed out that the question ‘are two particular comprehensive theories, such as classical mechanics and the special theory of relativity, incommensurable?’ is not a complete question. Theories can be interpreted in different ways. They will be commensurable in some interpretations, incommensurable in others. Instrumentalism, for example, makes commensurable all those theories which are related to the same observation language and are interpreted on its basis. A realist on the other hand, wants to give a unified account, both of observable and unobservable matters, and he will use the most abstract terms of whatever theory he is contemplating for that purpose. He will use such terms in order either to give meaning to observation or else to replace their customary interpretation. (For example, he will use the ideas of the  special theory of relativity in order to replace the customary classical interpretation of everyday statements about shapes, temporal sequences, and so on.) Against this, it is pointed out by almost all empiricists that theoretical terms receive their interpretation from being connected with a pre-existing language, or with another theory that has already been connected with such a language. Thus Carnap asserts, in a passage I have already quoted, that there is ‘no independent interpretation for LT [the language in terms of which a certain theory, or a certain world view, is formulated].The system T [the axioms of the theory and the rules of derivation] is in itself an uninterpreted postulate system. [Its] terms … obtain only an indirect and incomplete interpretation by the fact that some of them are connected by the [correspondence] rules C with observation terms …’ Now, if theoretical terms have no ‘independent interpretation’, then they cannot be used for correcting the interpretation of observation statements which is the one and only source of their meaning. It follows that realism, as described here, is an impossible doctrine and that incommensurability cannot arise as long as we keep within the confines of ‘sound’ (i.e. empiricist) scientific method.

The guiding idea behind this very popular objection is that new and abstract languages cannot be introduced in a direct way, but must first be connected with an already existing, and presumably stable, observation idiom.’.

as to an ‘independent interpretation’ –

you can work with an instrumentalist interpretation – or a realist interpretation – or whatever –

any interpretation – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

the idea of an ‘independent interpretation’ – is an authoritarian fantasy –

i.e. there is an authority – that can be appealed to in the matter of interpretation

the logical uncertainty of the proposition undercuts any notion of authority

and yes – Carnap was right – there is no independent interpretation –

and yes system T is an uninterpreted postulate system (until it is interpreted) –

and any interpretation is not just ‘indirect and incomplete’ – it is uncertain – open to question – open to doubt –

as is any ‘connection’ with observation statements

and further – ‘observation statements’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt 

they are in the same boat as theories – in the same boat as any proposal –  they are uncertain

‘new and abstract languages’ –

of course you can propose that they have their basis in a customary idiom –

but this proposal is just another – open to question

and the argument can be made that they are indeed unique – and do not owe their existence to what has come before –

again – a proposal – open to question

as to incommensurability –

incommensurability is propositional difference – logical difference

and unless different proposals are put into a comparative relation to a third – they remain incommensurable

and putting the two proposals in a comparative relation to a third – i.e. ‘which of these two proposals best supports the third?

this is a pragmatic action –

or you can see it is a propositional game – a propositional ritual –

however in such a game – in such a ritual – the logic of the situation is unaltered –

any action of commensurability – or any propositional action that results from the action of commensurability – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and that – as I see it – is the propositional reality – and is in fact the empirical reality

when I say propositions and propositional systems are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain –

what I am saying is that there is no necessity regarding how we interpret the world –

different cultures at different times will have different propositional systems –

different individuals at different times will use different and uncertain propositional systems –

my point is that from a logical point of view any proposal – any propositional system is uncertain

that scientists at the present – in modern western cultures – operate with the propositional categories –  systems and practices that they do – i.e. theory / experiment / verification / falsification - etc.) –

is logically speaking no different to the propositional action of those in ancient cultures – or indeed – in different cultures at the present time – where the propositional practices and descriptions of these practices are radically different to those of modern western science

and further – how the world is interpreted – is proposed – by anyone at any time – is valid

when it comes to the question of the legitimacy of different methodologies and different theories within propositional cultures  – we are not dealing with a logical issue –

any proposal is legitimate –

what we are dealing with is contingent issues –

if you propose a radically different methodology – or a radically different theory – the chances of it having a place at the table – are slim

that would be my observation

entrenched propositional practices are essentially conservative –

changing entrenched practices is difficult –

you need courage and resilience – and there is no guarantee that that you will have success –

it is a matter finally of persuasion – which amounts to rhetoric

‘It is also said that by admitting incommensurability into science we can no longer decide whether a new view explains what it is supposed to explain, or whether it does not wander off into different fields. For example, we would not know if a newly invented physical theory is still dealing with problems of space and time, or whether its author has not by mistake made a biological assertion. But there is no need to possess such knowledge. For once the fact of incommensurability has been admitted, the question which underlies the objection does not arise (conceptual progress often makes it impossible to ask certain questions and to explain certain things, thus we can no longer ask for the absolute velocity of an object, at least as long as we take relativity

seriously). Is this a serious loss for science? Not at all! Progress was made by the very same ‘wandering off into different fields’ whose undesirability now so greatly exercises the critic. Aristotle saw the world as a super-organism, as a biological entity, while one essential element of the new science of Descartes, Galileo and their followers in medicine and biology is its exclusively mechanistic outlook. Are such developments to be forbidden? And if they are not, what, then, is left for the complainant?’

different theories – different perspectives – different world views – are the life blood of science – are the life blood of a rational – and I would say – joyous – life

no theory – perspective or world view is beyond question – beyond doubt –

any proposal put in any setting is logically speaking – uncertain –

however for purposes of work – for the purpose of utility – it is necessary to have some propositional discipline – otherwise –  no theory gets properly formulated – nothing constructive gets done

which perspective to pursue – which to develop – which world view to investigate – is always a live question

and a live question at any stage of any propositional investigation – of any propositional development

faced with this uncertainty – we make decisions – albeit logically uncertain decisions – but decisions nevertheless

what we pursue – and what we don’t pursue – is a question of propositional practice –

the fact that we have a range of different propositional paths open to us – is where we start –

there is no news in this –

where we go – is where the action is

‘A closely connected objection starts from the notion of explanation or reduction and emphasizes that this notion assumes continuity of concepts (other notions could be used for starting exactly the same kind of argument). To take my example, relativity is supposed to explain the valid parts of classical physics, hence it cannot be incommensurable with it! The reply is obvious! Why should the relativist be concerned with the fate of classical mechanics except as a part of a historical exercise? There is only one task we can legitimately demand of a theory, and that is that it should give a correct account of the world, i.e. of the totality of facts as constituted by its own basic concepts. What have the principles of explanation got to do with this demand? Is it not reasonable to assume that a point of view, such as the point of view of classical mechanics,

that has been found wanting in various respects and gets into difficulty with its own facts (see above, on crucial experiments), cannot have entirely adequate concepts? Is it not equally reasonable to try to replace its concepts by those of a more successful cosmology? Besides, why should the notion of explanation be burdened by the demand for conceptual continuity? This notion has been found to be too narrow before (demand for derivability) and it had to be widened to include partial and statistical connections. Nothing prevents us from widening it still further to admit, say, ‘explanations by equivocation’.’

Feyerabend says that there is one task that we can legitimately demand of a theory – that it gives us a correct account of the world – within its own facts

a correct account – within it’s own facts –

well that depends on just how its own facts are interpreted –

‘facts’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘correctness’ – like beauty – is in the eye of the beholder –

 and it should be a skeptical eye at that

classical mechanics and relativity theory are different accounts of the physical world

the idea that one theory explains another – really doesn’t get off the ground logically speaking – they are different proposals – different conceptions

what we face in the absence of either account – or for that matter any account at all – is the unknown

our theories are responses to the unknown –

the unknown is the common ground –

and we make known with our proposals our different proposals – our theories –

and yes – it is reasonable to assume that the concepts of classical mechanics – are not entirely adequate

and the reason is that any concept – that is any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

this applies equally to relativity theory

as for ‘a more successful cosmology’ –

we have different proposals – different theories for different tasks –

which cosmology is more ‘successful’ – will in the end depend on what you are doing – and what you can accomplish – with the theories – the cosmologies – you have at your disposal – and of course – how you judge success

conceptual continuity? –

yes well you can always make up a story of conceptual continuity –

prime facie some such a story will satisfy those who get comfort from the myth of the ascent of man – or some other teleological rubbish

but it won’t survive detailed analysis 

‘explanations by equivocation’ – yes –

there is no other explanation –

any explanation is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

quite a surprise – a pleasant surprise – to find that this is where Feyerabend has finally landed

let’s hope he doesn’t equivocate – on equivocation

‘Incommensurable theories, then can be refuted by reference to their own respective kinds of experience; i.e. by discovering internal contradictions from which they are suffering (in the absence of commensurable alternatives these refutations are quite weak, however, as can be seen from the arguments for proliferation in chapters 2 and 3.) Their contents cannot be compared. Nor is it possible to make a judgment of verisimilitude except within the confines of a particular theory (remember that the problem of incommensurability arises only when we analyse the change of  comprehensive points of view – restricted theories rarely lead to the needed conceptual revisions). None of the

methods which Carnap, Hempel, Nagel and Popper or even Lakatos want to use for

rationalizing scientific changes can be applied, and the one that can be applied,

refutation, is greatly reduced in strength. What remains are aesthetic judgments of taste, metaphysical prejudices, religious desires, in short, what remains are our subjective wishes: science at its most advanced and general returns to the individual a freedom he seems to lose when entering its more pedestrian parts, and even its ‘third world’

image, the development of its concepts, ceases to be ‘rational’. This is the last argument needed for retaining the conclusion of Chapter 15 ( and of the entire book) despite the attacks of our most modern and sophisticated rationalists.’

yes – well as to falsification –

in the end it is the decision not to proceed –

and this decision – as with its opposite – is open to question – open to doubt – is always –

uncertain

‘internal contradictions’ – point to uncertainty

any comparison –  is really only the decision to expand the critical domain – to bring in other theories – and with respect to some more general proposal

if you decide not to adopt this perspective – but to simply stick with your theory – you make it incommensurable

a theory is neither commensurable or incommensurable – per se

commensurability – or indeed incommensurability is an action – in respect of the theory

if you decide to make your theory commensurable – to place in a multi-theoretical context – with respect to some other proposal –

you simply broaden the critical domain

if you decide – not to do this – to render your theory – incommensurable – it and you – go nowhere

as to the methods of Carnap, Hempel, Nagel, Popper and Lakatos – these are proposals

and as with any proposal – open to question – to doubt – they are uncertain

nevertheless they are valid perspectives – that have provided deep and interesting insights into the nature of science – they deserve respect

and as with any methodological perspective – if they have a use – they have a use –

where and when why and by whom – is an empirical matter –

so it’s not a question of ‘what remains’ –

I have no problem with ‘aesthetic judgments of taste, metaphysical prejudices, religious desires’ – or anything else you want to throw up

any proposal is worthy – is valid – has a seat at the table – and any proposal is open to question –  open to doubt – is uncertain