Feyerabend 2

2

‘For example, we may use hypotheses that contradict well-confirmed theories and / or well-established experimental results. We may advance science by proceeding counter-inductively.’

‘Examining the principle [anything goes] in concrete detail means tracing the consequences of ‘counterrules’ which oppose some familiar rules of scientific enterprise. To see how this works, let us consider the rule that it is ‘experience’, or ‘the facts’, or ‘experimental results’ which measure the success of our theories, that agreement between the theory and the ‘data’ favours the theory (or leaves the situation unchanged) while disagreement endangers it, and perhaps even forces us to eliminate it. This rule is an important part of all theories of confirmation and collaboration. It is the essence of empiricism. The ‘counterrule’ corresponding to it advises us to introduce and elaborate hypotheses which are inconsistent with well established theories and / or well established facts. It advises us to proceed counterinductively.’

‘Examining the principle [anything goes] in concrete detail means tracing the consequences of ‘counterrules’ which oppose some familiar rules of scientific enterprise.’

it is quite clear from this that ‘anything goes’ – just does not mean – anything goes –

what it means is ‘tracing the consequences of counter rules’ –

‘tracing the consequences of counterrules’ – is not ‘anything goes’

‘The ‘counterrule’ corresponding to it advises us to introduce and elaborate hypotheses which are inconsistent with well established theories and / or well established facts. It advises us to proceed counterinductively.’

let us be clear here that a ‘rule’ – is just a guiding proposal of practice

if you put your rules to question –  to doubt – if you explore their uncertainty –

then you may well come up with Feyerabend’s so called ‘counterrule’

this counterrule notion has nothing to do with ‘anything goes’ –

finding a counterrule is quite simply a result of  a critical analysis of the prevailing practice –

and whether you should or should not put this counterrule into practice – is not a moral question – there is no imperative here –

it is simply a matter of looking at it as a proposal – and considering whether in the circumstances such a rule – such a practice – will be of use

if the proposal is put – a decision will be made

and any decision made – will be open to question – open to doubt – will be – uncertain

‘The counterinductive procedure gives rise to the following questions: Is counterinduction more reasonable than induction? Are these circumstances favouring its use? What are the arguments for it? What are the arguments against it? Is perhaps induction always preferable to counterinduction? And so on.’

‘Are there circumstances favouring its use?’ –

there may well be

‘What are the arguments against it?’ –

arguments against it will be proposed in those circumstances where it is deemed to be of no use

‘Is perhaps induction always preferable to counterinduction?’ –

we can’t say that any methodological proposal is always preferable – will be functional in all circumstances –

we can’t say this because we cannot know that a methodology works in all circumstances

we can’t know all circumstances

what we can say is that a scientist can have at his disposal a number of methodologies that are candidates for use in whatever circumstance – whatever propositional context – he is working in –

and further – that any methodology – and any decision to use a methodology – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

                                                                                                                                        

‘These questions will be answered in two steps. I shall first examine the counterrule that urges us to develop hypotheses inconsistent with well established facts. The results may be summarized as follows.

In the first case it emerges that the evidence that might refute a theory can often be unearthed only with an incompatible alternative: the advise (which goes back to Newton and is still very popular today) to use only alternatives when refutations have already discredited the orthodox theory puts the cart before the horse. Also, some of the most important formal properties of a theory are found by contrast, not by analysis. A scientist who wishes to maximise the empirical content of the views he holds and who wants to understand them as clearly as he possibly can must therefore introduce other views; that is he must adopt a pluralistic methodology. He must compare ideas with other ideas rather than with ‘experience’ and he must rather try to improve rather than discard views that have failed in the competition. Proceeding in this way he will retain the theories of man and cosmos that are found in Genesis, or in the Pimander, he will elaborate them and use them to measure the success of evolution and other ‘modern’ views. He may then discover that the theory of evolution is not as good as is generally assumed and that it may be supplemented, or entirely replaced, by an improved version of Genesis. Knowledge as so conceived is not a series of self-consistent theories that converge towards an ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to the truth. It is rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps incommensurable) alternatives, each single theory, each fairy tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, via the process of competition, to the development of our consciousness. Nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account. Plutarch, or Diogenes Laertius and not Dirac, or even von Neumann are the methods for presenting knowledge of this kind in which the history of science becomes an inseparable part of science itself – it is essential for its further development as well as  for giving content to the theories it contains at any one moment. Experts and laymen, professionals and dilettanti, truth freaks and liars – they are all invited to participate in the contest and to make their contribution to the enrichment of our culture. The task of the scientist, however, is no longer ‘to search for truth’, or ‘to praise God’, or ‘to systematize observations’, or ‘to improve predictions’. These are but side effects of an activity to which his attention is now firmly directed and which is ‘to make clear the weaker case the stronger’ as the sophists said, and thereby sustain the motion of the whole.’

‘In the first case it emerges that the evidence that might refute a theory can often be unearthed only with an incompatible alternative: the advise (which goes back to Newton and is still very popular today) to use only alternatives only when refutations have already discredited the orthodox theory puts the cat before the horse.’

the problem with ‘anything goes’ – for Feyerabend is that on this principle – whatever occurs in the name of science is legitimate – even that is – the positions that Feyerabend argues against –

and why would he argue against any approach – any methodology – if as he says ‘anything goes’?

yes the evidence that might refute a theory might only be unearthed with an incompatible alternative

and there is nothing against this ‘incompatible alternative’ approach –

however whether it is in fact used or not depends on the circumstances in which the scientist is operating – what he decides to do – and what he wants to achieve –

perhaps he is not after a refutation – perhaps – for whatever reason – he has decided for the theory – and his work on the theory is an exploration of its consequences and applicability?

it is quite pointless to generalize about how scientists should proceed in all circumstances

and any assessment of a particular scientific context – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

what scientists do – is what science is –

whether you like the way they go about it or not

‘A scientist who wishes to maximise the empirical content of the views he holds and who wants to understand them as clearly as he possible can must therefore introduce other views; that is he must adopt a pluralistic methodology.’

‘as clearly as possible’ –

is an open-ended proposal – which could mean anything – and therefore amounts to nothing

the issue I would suggest is never ‘clarity’ – clarity is a ruse – the issue is uncertainty –

exploring theoretical – propositional – uncertainty –

a pluralistic methodology – is one way of approaching this – it is not the only way

a monolithic methodology – is just as open to question – open to doubt – is just as uncertain – as a pluralistic approach

‘Proceeding in this way he will retain the theories of man and cosmos that are found in Genesis or in the Pimander, he will elaborate them and use them to measure the success of evolution and other ‘modern’ views. He may then discover that the theory of evolution is not as good as is generally assumed and that it may be supplemented, or entirely replaced, by an improved version of Genesis.’

yes – proceeding in this way he may well retain – every theory that has come his way –

but really how useful would that be for investigating a theoretical or empirical issue?

                                                                                                                                           

I am not saying it wouldn’t – but it does strike me that too much background knowledge might blunt rather than sharpen one’s critical faculties –

and really you have to decide what it is you are on about –

are you making a survey of different cosmological and metaphysical systems – or are you having a hard look at a particular theory?

‘Knowledge as so conceived is not a series of self-consistent theories that converge towards an ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to the truth. It is rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps incommensurable) alternatives, each single theory, each fairy tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, via the process of competition, to the development of our consciousness.’

knowledge is what is proposed –

and our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

knowledge is uncertain

and yes it is not ‘a gradual approach to truth’ –

or for that matter – which I think effectively amounts to exactly the same thing – ‘the development of our consciousness’

Feyerabend – I suggest is not putting an alternative epistemology at all – he runs with exactly the same ideas he claims to be arguing against

his argument is a fraud – no matter how it is dressed up

‘Nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account. Plutarch, or Diogenes Laertius and not Dirac, or even von Neuman are the methods for presenting knowledge of this kind in which the history of science becomes an inseparable part of science itself – it is essential for its further development as well as for giving content to the theories it contains at any one moment. Experts and laymen, professionals and dilettanti, truth freaks and liars – they are all invited to participate in the contest and to make their contribution to the enrichment of our culture.’

nothing is ever settled –

but that does not mean that every view has a place in every account of anything

we choose – we decide – what is and is not relevant to the issue we are considering –

if you can’t make such a decision – then you don’t begin the critical process

and yes any decision you make is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

nothing is ever settled –

but decisions are made – actions are taken – we move on

the history of science – or should I say – someone’s history of science – might be of use in some context – that’s all –

on the other hand – it may well be entirely irrelevant – and a real distraction from the issue at hand –

as for inviting every man and his dog into the tent – no one does this

and the idea that doing so would be of use to a working scientist – or to anyone who’s actually doing anything constructive – is just laughable

‘The task of the scientist, however, is no longer ‘to search for truth’, or ‘to praise God’, or ‘to systematize observations’, or ‘to improve predictions’. These are but side effects of an activity to which his attention is now firmly directed and which is ‘to make clear the weaker case the stronger’ as the sophists said, and thereby sustain the motion of the whole.’

look – the task of scientist – is just what the scientist says it is –

philosophers can remind any hot-shot that whatever he proposes – at any stage of his work – is logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘The second counterrule which favours hypotheses inconsistent with observations, facts and experimental results, needs no special defence, for there is not a single interesting theory that agrees with all the known facts in its domain. The question is, therefore, not whether counter-inductive theories should be admitted into science, the question is, rather, whether the existing discrepancies between theory and fact should be increased, or diminished, or what else should be done with them.’

yes – the discrepancies –

as to what to do about discrepancies between theory and fact – yes we have options

the discrepancies can be increased – decreased – ignored –

what option will be taken up – will depend on the scientist and what he wants to achieve

what he thinks can be achieved

here there just are no rules – or if you like – every rule is a candidate

                                                                                                                                           

decisions are taken – and these decisions are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain

there is no universal answer to the question of how to deal with discrepancies – it is a question of circumstance and judgment

and if Feyerabend’s ‘should’ suggests that there is some universal or objective answer to the question –

it should be dropped from any methodological proposal – any methodological statement

what we are really talking about here is –

that method that one proposes – at the time – that will best do the job – whatever that job is –

and the whole matter is entirely uncertain

‘To answer this question it suffices to remember that observational reports, experimental results, ‘factual’ statements, either contain theoretical assumptions or assert them by the manner in which they are used…Thus our habit of saying ‘the table is brown’ when we view it under normal circumstances, with our senses in good order, but ‘the table seems to be brown’ when either the lighting conditions are poor or when we feel unsure in our capacity of observation expresses the belief that there are familiar circumstances, when our senses are capable of seeing the world ‘as it really is’ and other, equally familiar circumstances, when they are deceived. It expresses the belief that some of our sensory

impressions are veridical while others are not. We also take it for granted that the material between the object and us exerts no distorting influence, and that the physical entity that establishes the contact – light – carries a true picture. All these are abstract, and highly doubtful, assumptions which shape our view of the world without being accessible to a direct criticism. Usually, we are not even aware of them and we recognise their effects only when we encounter an entirely different cosmology: prejudices are found by contrast, not by analysis. The material which the scientist has at his disposal, his most sublime theories and most sophisticated techniques included, is structured in exactly the same way. It contains principles which are not known and which, if known, would be extremely hard to test. (As a result, a theory may clash with the evidence not because it is not correct, but because the evidence is contaminated.)’

‘It expresses the belief that some of our sensory impressions are veridical while others are not. We also take it for granted that the material between the object and us exerts no distorting influence, and that the physical entity that establishes the contact – light – carries a true picture. All these abstract, and highly doubtful, assumptions shape our view of the world without being accessible to a direct criticism.’

that a sensory impression is termed ‘veridical’ or termed ‘illusory’ – does not give it some kind of logical immunity

all these abstract assumptions – are highly doubtful – yes

they are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain –

and as such are accessible to direct criticism

and yes –

‘The material which the scientist has at his disposal, his most sublime theories and most sophisticated techniques included, is structured in exactly the same way.’ –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘(As a result, a theory may clash with the evidence not because it is not correct, but because the evidence is contaminated.)’

no theory is ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ –

a proposal is either adopted or it is not – a theory is either applied or it is not

all ‘evidence’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

the evidence is not ‘contaminated’ – the evidence is uncertain

‘Now – how can we possibly examine something we are using all the time? How can we analyse the terms in which we habitually express our most simple and straightforward observations? How can we discover the kind of world we presuppose when proceeding as we do?

The answer is clear: we cannot discover it from the inside. We need an external standard of criticism, we need a set of alternative assumptions or, as these assumptions will be quite general, constituting, as it were, an entire alternative world, we need a dream world in order to discover the features of the real world we think we inhabit (and which may be just another dream world). The first step in our criticism of familiar concepts and procedures, the first step in our criticism of ‘facts’, must therefore be an attempt to break the circle. We must invent a new conceptual scheme that suspends, or clashes with our

most carefully established observational results, confounds the most plausible theoretical

principles, and introduces perceptions that cannot form part of the existing perceptual world. This step is again counter-inductive. Counterinduction is therefore, always reasonable and it has a chance of success.’

‘Now – how can we possibly examine something we are using all the time?

this is a stupid question –

                                                                                                                                          

we can and we do – as a matter of fact – question – doubt – ‘what we are using all the time’ –

‘How can we analyse the terms in which we habitually express our most simple and straightforward observations?

we can analyse the terms we use – if we question the meaning – the use – of these terms

‘How can we discover the kind of world we presuppose when proceeding as we do?

first off – who is to say we are presupposing?

someone can of course argue this

but is this presupposition – that we presuppose – anything more than just another proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

what if someone says – look I’m not presupposing anything – look at just what I have proposed – and deal with that – fair and square –

what are you going to say?

that they don’t know what they are talking about – but you do? –

that is presumptuous indeed

‘we cannot discover from the inside’ –

the ‘inside’ of what?

all we have is what is proposed –

and any ‘discovery’ – so called – in relation to what is proposed – is a proposal

inside – outside – internal – external – are unnecessary categorizations –

they are a hangover from out-dated epistemology

‘We need an external standard of criticism, we need a set of alternative assumptions or, as these assumptions will be quite general, constituting, as it were, an entire alternative world, we need a dream world in order to discover the features of the real world we think we inhabit (and which may be just another dream world).’

‘an external standard of criticism’?

if you question – if you doubt – if you explore a proposal’s uncertainty – that is if you behave logically – you behave critically

there is no ‘standard’ involved here – and it is not ‘external’ to propositional activity

it simply a matter of question and doubt and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

alternative assumptions – can be a platform from which to launch a critical investigation

these alternative assumptions like the proposal they are directed at – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

you don’t need to construct a ‘dream world’ to question – to doubt – to regard as uncertain

there are not two worlds – the ‘real world’ – and the ‘dream world’ – or any other kind of world

there is the propositional world –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

by all means invent a new conceptual scheme – and contrast it with the current one –

the new conceptual scheme – as with the current one – is a proposal – and is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

counterinduction simply adds new proposals to be critically evaluated –

this may be useful – or it may not – it depends on the circumstance –

that is all you can say –

and if you try to set up counterinduction – as a method that will fit all circumstance –

then you are indeed in a dream world

‘Counterinduction is therefore, always reasonable and it has a chance of success.’

any proposal is reasonable – if it is open to question

as for ‘success’ – that is just a question of gaining support –

always a matter of persuasion – of rhetoric –

propositional arm twisting

‘In the following seven chapters, this conclusion will be developed in greater detail and it will be elucidated with the help of historical examples. One might therefore get the impression that I recommend a new methodology which replaces induction with counterinduction and uses a multiplicity of theories, metaphysical views, fairy-tales instead of the customary pair theory/observation. This impression would certainly be mistaken. My intention is not to replace one set rules by another such set: my intention is, rather, to convince the reader that all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits. The best way to show this is to demonstrate the limits and even the irrationality of some rules which she, or he, is likely to regard as basic. In the case of induction (including induction by falsification) this means demonstrating how well the counterinductive procedures can be supported by argument. Always remember that the demonstrations and rhetorics used do not express any ‘deep convictions’ of mine. They merely show how easy it is to lead people by the nose in a rational way. An anarchist is like an undercover agent who plays the game of reason in order to undercut the authority of Reason (Truth, Honesty, Justice, and so on).’

‘My intention is not to replace one set rules by another such set: my intention is, rather, to convince the reader that all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits.’

there is no argument here – I doubt that there is a methodologist of any persuasion who doesn’t recognise that his methodology has its limits

where the argument starts – where it begins – is with question of which methodology best facilitates scientific discovery?

does Feyerabend have anything to say here?

‘In the case of induction (including induction by falsification) this means demonstrating how well the counterinductive procedures can be supported by argument.’

ok – this is fair enough – and it might be news to some scientists – so it is worth making the point that counterinductive procedures are valid

however given that Feyerabend has already put that all methodologies – including counterinduction are limited – he hasn’t added anything to the obvious

as to the question – which methodology best facilitates scientific discovery?

I would argue not for one and against another – or for all or none

my argument is that – in practice – we can’t say – in any objective sense

the matter is uncertain –

what we can say is that there are different methodologies – it is worth knowing them – and understanding how they might be used

now science will be – what scientists determine it to be –

and any determination here will be open to question – open to doubt  –  will be uncertain

‘Always remember that the demonstrations and rhetorics used do not express any ‘deep convictions’ of mine. They merely show how easy it is to lead people by the nose in a rational way. An anarchist is like an undercover agent who plays the game of reason in order to undercut the authority of Reason (Truth, Honesty, Justice, and so on).’

it is one thing to question – to doubt – to be uncertain –

quite another to bullshit

if Feyerabend can’t be straight up about what he thinks – then what he says is not worth listening to

his anarchist – as the undercover agent –  is corrupt