Feyerabend 15

15

‘Finally, the discussion in Chapters 6-13 shows that Popper’s version of Mill’s pluralism is not in agreement with scientific practice and would destroy science as we know it. Given science, reason cannot be universal and unreason excluded. This feature of science calls for an anarchistic epistemology. The realization that science is not sacrosanct, and that the debate between science and myth has ceased without having been won by either side, further strengthens the case for anarchism.’

here Feyerabend prepares the way for his argument for incommensurable theories in science

to this end he looks at the critical standards it is claimed by some constitute the content of rational argument

specifically he wants to look at the standards of the Popperian school

‘These standards are standards of criticism; rational discussion consists in the attempt to criticize and not in the attempt to prove or make probable. Every step that protects a view from criticism, that makes it safe or ‘well founded’, is a step away from rationality. Every step that makes it more vulnerable is welcome. In addition, it is recommended to abandon ideas which have been found wanting and it is forbidden to retain them in the face of strong and successful criticism unless one can present suitable counter arguments. Develop your ideas so that they can be criticized; attack them relentlessly; do not protect them, but exhibit their weak spots; eliminate them as soon as their weak spots become manifest – these are some of the rules put forward by our critical rationalists.

These rules become more definite and more detailed when we turn to the philosophy of science and, especially, to the philosophy of the natural sciences.

Within natural sciences, criticism is connected with experiment and observation. The content of a theory consists in the sum total of those basic statements which contradict it; it is the class of potential falsifiers. Increased content means increased vulnerability, hence theories of large content are to be preferred to theories of small content. Increase of content is welcome, decrease of content is to be avoided. A theory that contradicts an accepted basic statement is to be given up. Ad hoc hypotheses are forbidden – and so on and so forth’

‘to prove or to make probable’ –

if by ‘proof’ – you mean  a logical end – to question – to  doubt – to uncertainty –

there is no proof

and if by ‘probable’ – you mean a logical end to question – to doubt – to uncertainty –

there are no probable statements – hypotheses or theories –

proof and probability – are not logical concepts – they are rhetorical devices –

devices designed to boost any decision – to proceed

to render any such decision – acceptable and advisable

‘Every step that protects a view from criticism, that makes it safe or ‘well founded’ is a step away from rationality’ –

no view is logically speaking –  beyond question or beyond doubt –

if by ‘well-founded’ – is meant – beyond criticism – then the well-founded view is a prejudice

uncertainty doesn’t stop us from action – uncertainty is the ground of action

we act – for whatever reason – and any reason we have – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

philosophers of science who have failed to accept – or understand this – have tended to act like moralists – fundamentalists even – preachers from the pulpit spouting moral imperatives –

this I think is true of the logical positivists – of Popper – and of Feyerabend –

though Feyerabend camouflages his fundamentalism – in the rhetoric of ‘anything goes’ 

and I would say it is not true of Kuhn and Lakatos –

they are – by and large – descriptivists – not prescriptivists

however the logical reality is that any description is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

science is what scientists do –

how the scientist proceeds – why the scientist proceeds as he does – and how he regards his procedure –

is the practice of science –

and yes the practice of science is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

methodologists – of any persuasion – can put forward their theories and their insights

and I feel sure that any such proposals will be of interest to the reflective scientist –

but it is not for the methodologist to legislate or pontificate

such rhetoric will be seen by the working scientist for what it is – pretentious

the role of the methodologist is to question – to doubt – and to explore the uncertainty –

that is scientific practice –

and if necessary to educate the scientist to do the same

‘Now at this point, one may raise two questions.

1. Is it desirable to live in accordance with the rules of critical rationalism?

2. Is it possible to have both science as we know it and these rules?

As far as I am concerned the first question is far more important than the second. True, science and other increasingly depressing and narrow minded institutions play an important part in our culture, and they occupy the centre of interest for many philosophers (most philosophers are opportunists). Thus the ideas of the Popperian school were obtained by generalizing solutions for methodological and epistemological problems. Critical rationalism arose from the attempt to solve Hume’s problem and to understand the Einsteinian revolution, and it was then extended to politics and even to the conduct of one’s private life. (Habermas and others therefore seem justified in calling Popper a positivist.) Such a procedure may satisfy a school philosopher, who looks at life through the spectacles of his own technical problems and recognizes hatred, love, happiness, only to the extent that they occur in these problems. But if we consider the interests of man and, above all, the question of his freedom (freedom from hunger, despair, from the tyranny of constipated systems of thought and not academic ‘freedom of the will’) then we are proceeding in the worst possible fashion.

For is it not possible that science as we know it today, as a ‘search for the truth’ in the style of traditional philosophy, will create a monster? Is it not possible that it will harm man, turn him into a miserable, unfriendly, self-righteous mechanism without charm and humour? ‘Is it not possible’, asks Kierkegaard. ‘that my activity as an objective [or critico-rational] observer of nature will weaken my strength as a human being?’ I suspect the answer to all these questions must be affirmative and I believe that a reform of the sciences that makes them more anarchistic and more subjective (in Kierkegaard’s sense) is urgently needed.’

ok – I understand the view that ‘science and other depressing and narrow minded institutions play an important part in our culture’ –

I have been in that mood myself – but it is just one view –

and philosophers as opportunists? –

not my experience – but I can see that they could well be painted in that way

I find the ideas of the Popperian school – most interesting proposals –

and if they provide insights for the working scientist – they will be useful in his work

as to the ‘interests of man’ – that is an open question –

and feel free to throw anything you like into the mix –

but not a good idea to take yourself too seriously here –

‘the interests of man’ – is a work in progress –

as to what constitutes a ‘monster’ – there will be  different theories 

is it possible that science will turn man ‘into a miserable, unfriendly, self-righteous mechanism without charm and humour?’

miserable – unfriendly – self righteous – without charm and humour –

it depends where you are – and who you know –

it seems to me that such characteristics – if they are displayed – are best understood as circumstantial –

human beings and their propositional practices – are too variable to be so definitively described –

and as for what will happen – well it is – unknown

best not to let your fears – dictate your theory of knowledge – or indeed your view of the world –

keep an open mind – whatever mood you’re in

as to ‘reforming the sciences’ – get off your high horse –

leave its shape and form – to the scientists

science is what it is – and will continue to be – whatever it is –

and whatever it is – is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘But these are not the problems I want to discuss now. In the present essay I shall restrict myself to the second question and I shall ask: is it possible to have a science as we know it and the rules of critical rationalism as described? And to this question the answer seems to be a firm and resounding No.

To start with we have seen, though rather briefly, that the actual development of institutions, idea, practices, and so on, often does not start from a problem but rather from some irrelevant activity, such as playing, which, as a side effect, leads to developments which can latter be interpreted as solutions to unrealised problems. Are such developments to be excluded? And, if we do exclude them, will this not considerably reduce the number of our adaptive reactions and the quality of our leaning process?’

‘is it possible to have a science as we know it and the rules of critical rationalism as described? And to this question the answer seems to be a firm and resounding No.’

I don’t know if Popper’s ideas are reflected in the actual practise of science –

and I have to say the same with regard to Feyerabend’s proposals –

both Popper and Feyerabend have interesting and useful things to say about scientific practise –

whether they are adopted by practicing scientists – is an empirical matter –

I don’t see any empirical studies on the matter from Popper or Feyerabend –

and yes – philo-historical analyses are worth having –

however they are just proposals – in the same boat as any other proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and yes – the actual development of science – may or may not start with a problem

again – just how scientific work begins – is open to question

I have to note that we have the makings of a shell game from Feyerabend –

when is an irrelevant activity – no longer irrelevant? –

watch carefully

and when does not having a problem turn into a problem?

and furthermore there are no ‘unrealised problems’ lurking in a philosophical underworld

there is only what is put – what is proposed –.

that is the reality we face – and that is the reality we deal with –

a propositional reality – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Secondly, we have seen …that a strict principle falsification, or ‘naïve falsification’ as Lakatos calls it, would wipe out science as we know it and would never have permitted it to start.’

yes – a strict principle of any kind – would I think wipe out science as we know it

we don’t operate with strict principles –

yes we have some priests – some politicians and some philosophers – and some nut cases  – barking out strict principles –

but from what I can see this mob is in the business of convincing themselves rather than anyone else –

in any case it is just harsh rhetoric – and most people see through it pretty quickly

just on falsification – from a logical point of view –

any so called falsification – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

in practice I think falsification is best seen as a propositional move –

a move in one direction – rather than the other

‘The demand for increased content is not satisfied either. Theories which effect the overthrow of a comprehensive and well-entrenched point of view, and take over after its demise, are initially restricted to a fairly narrow domain of facts, to a series of paradigmatic phenomena which lend them support, and they are only slowly extended to other areas……Later on of course the theory is extended to other domains; but the mode of extension is only rarely determined by the elements that constitute the content of its predecessors. The slowly emerging conceptual apparatus of the theory soon starts  defining its own problems, and earlier problems, facts and observations are either forgotten or pushed aside as irrelevant. ….. A comprehensive theory, after all, is supposed to contain an ontology that determines what exists and thus delimits the domain of possible facts and possible questions. The development of new science agrees with these considerations. New views soon strike out in new directions and frown upon the older problems…which so much exercised the minds of earlier thinkers. And they do pay attention to preceding theories, they try to accommodate their factual core in the manner already described, with the help of ad hoc hypotheses, ad hoc approximations,

redefinition of terms, or by simply asserting, without any more detailed study of the matter, that the core ‘follows from’ the new basic principles. They are ‘grafted on to older programmes with which they [are] blatantly inconsistent’.

The result of these procedures is an interesting epistemological illusion: the imagined content of the earlier theories (which is the intersection of the remembered consequences of these theories with the newly recognized domain of problems and facts) shrinks and may decrease to such an extent that it becomes smaller than the imagined content of

the new ideologies (which are the actual consequences of these ideologies plus all those ‘facts’, laws, principles which are tied to them by ad hoc approximations or by the say-so of some influential physicist or philosopher of science – and which properly belong to the predecessor).

‘Theories which effect the overthrow of a comprehensive and well-entrenched point of view, and take over after its demise, are initially restricted to a fairly narrow domain of facts, to a series of paradigmatic phenomena which lend them support, and they are only slowly extended to other areas……’

a new theory – if viewed exclusively in  terms of the old theory – will be restricted to a narrow domain of facts – the domain of the old theory –

but here we are talking about how the new theory is being viewed – and how it is being utilized and applied –

it depends on how you look at the new theory –

if you see the new theory in terms of what might be regarded as its full expression – it’s relation to the older theory – crucial as that may be in a particular context  – may well be its least important dimension

‘Later on of course the theory is extended to other domains; but the mode of extension is only rarely determined by the elements that constitute the content of its predecessors. The slowly emerging conceptual apparatus of the theory soon starts defining its own problems, facts and observations are either forgotten or pushed aside as irrelevant. ….. A comprehensive theory, after all, is supposed to contain an ontology that determines what exists and thus delimits the domain of possible facts and possible questions.

the extension to other domains need not be later – it may already have been proposed –

it’s a question of context –

just how important the content of its predecessor is to its mode of extension – is something we can only speculate on –

it will depend on just what importance it is given by those involved at the time

‘a slowly emerging conceptual apparatus’? –

look – any theory new or old is – a logically speaking in a constant state of uncertainty –

the conceptual apparatus will be a propositional work in progress – whose central characteristic will be uncertainty

and yes – the facts and observations of the older theory will be put to question – to doubt – and will – if the procedure is logical – be regarded as uncertain –

and yes – they may be forgotten – they may be pushed aside

decisions get made –

any decision – is open to question –

as to the ‘comprehensive ontology’ – again – propositions will be put – or if you like assumed or presupposed –

but in any dynamic propositional action – the ontology of a theory – will be – as with all other propositional dimensions of the theory – uncertain

‘New views soon strike out in new directions and frown upon the older problems…which so much exercised the minds of earlier thinkers. And they do pay attention to preceding theories, they try to accommodate their factual core in the manner already described, with the help of ad hoc hypotheses, ad hoc approximations, redefinition of terms, or by simply

asserting, without any more detailed study of the matter, that the core ‘follows from’ the new basic principles. They are ‘grafted on to older programmes with which they [are] blatantly inconsistent.’

‘blatant inconsistency’ – 

logically speaking inconsistency is the fabric of propositional endeavour and action –

inconsistency is a marker for propositional uncertainty

theoretical action – theoretical development – is an exploration of propositional uncertainty

the ‘epistemological illusion’ – the ‘imagined’ content of earlier theories –

look – how a theory – its content is regarded – at any time – is open to question – is open to doubt – is uncertain –

one could say the whole point of a new theory is that it reinterprets –

and yes – there will be different – conflicting views on this –

that is the propositional reality

as Feyerabend’s illustrations above show – there is no certainty as to the relation between the new and the old theory

really it is a contingent matter –

it is just a question of how the situation is viewed by those involved at the time –

any proposed relation is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

on the ground – the reality is that perspectives are adopted – and proceeded with –

until for whatever reason – the propositional state of affairs is reviewed and re-interpreted

‘To sum up: wherever we look, whatever examples we consider, we see that the principles of critical rationalism (take falsification seriously: increase content; avoid all ad hoc hypotheses; ‘be honest’ – whatever that means; and so on) and a fortiori the principles of logical empiricism (be precise; base your theories on measurement; avoid vague and unstable ideas; and so on) give an inadequate account of the past development of science and are liable to hinder science in the future. They give an inadequate account of science because science in much more ‘sloppy’ and ‘irrational’ than its methodological image. And, they are liable to hinder it, because the attempt to make science more ‘rational’ and more precise is bound to wipe it out, as we have seen. The difference between science and methodology which is such an obvious fact of history, therefore, indicates a weakness of the latter, and perhaps of the ‘laws of reason’ as well. For what appears as ‘sloppiness’, ‘chaos’ or ‘opportunism’ when compared with such laws

has a most important function in the development of those very theories which we today regard as essential parts of our knowledge of nature. These ‘deviations’, these ‘errors’, are pre-conditions of progress. They permit knowledge to survive in the complex and difficult world which we inhabit, they permit us to remain free and happy agents.

Without ‘chaos’, no knowledge. Without a frequent dismissal of reason, no progress. Ideas which today form the basis of science exist only because there were such things as prejudice, conceit, passion; because these things opposed reason; and because they were permitted to have their way. We have to conclude then, that even within science reason cannot and should not to allowed to be comprehensive and that it must be overruled, or eliminated, in favour of other agencies. There is not a single rule that remains valid under all circumstances and not a single agency to which appeal can always be made.’

there is no methodological account of science – be that critical rationalism – or Feyerabend’s so called ‘methodological anarchism’ – or whatever – that is beyond question – beyond doubt

what we get – at the best – from these and other methodological proposals – is insights –

suggested ways of proceeding – suggested methods of evaluation –

science is what it is –

which amounts to saying – it is how it is described – by whoever proposes a description

it is always a question of how you see –

some interpret in terms of some form of rational theory –

Feyerabend sees it as – sloppy – chaotic – opportunistic

in the absence of description – of any description at all – science is – unknown

it is made known in terms of descriptive proposals –

any such proposal is – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

‘without ‘chaos’, no knowledge’?

forget chaos – what we are dealing with is propositional uncertainty –

knowledge is our response to the unknown –

and our responses are uncertain –

logically speaking – there is no such thing as ‘progress’ – what we have is movement in propositional space

what gets written up as ‘progress’ – is an exercise in rhetoric

Feyerabend’s ‘argument’ regarding reason – is I would suggest rather chaotic and sloppy itself –

yes – you can run with ‘anything goes ‘ – and go nowhere

reason is critical analysis –

a rational argument – is any argument that is up for question – up for doubt – is regarded as uncertain

‘There is not a single rule that remains valid under all circumstances and not a single agency to which appeal can always be made.’

yes – what we have from Feyerabend here is not an argument for his so called ‘anarchism’ – rather an argument for epistemological scepticism

and this is the central problem with ‘Against Method’ –

where it has value – it is not what it claims to be –

‘Against method’ – is at its best where it can be seen to endorse and advocate a methodological scepticism

Feyerabend is in many respects a traditionalist – he sees scepticism as a useful tool – a means to an end – and the end for Feyerabend is to defeat his philosophical enemies –

he plays the same tired old game

the radical step – is to see that any methodological proposal – an indeed – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and is – uncertain

it is to see that uncertainty is the ground and engine of propositional activity – of propositional life

‘Now we must remember that this conclusion has been drawn on condition that science as we know it today remains unchanged and that the procedures it uses must be permitted to determine its future development as well. Given science, reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be excluded. This peculiar feature of the development of science strongly supports an anarchistic epistemology. But science is not sacrosanct. The restrictions it imposes (and there are many such restrictions though it is not easy to spell them out) are not necessary to have general coherent and successful views about the world. There are myths, there are dogmas of theology, there is metaphysics, and there are many other ways of constructing a world view. It is clear that a fruitful exchange between science and such ‘non-scientific’ world-views will be in even greater need of anarchism than is science itself. Thus anarchism is not only possible, it is necessary both for the internal progress of science and for the development of our culture as a whole. And Reason, at last joins all those other abstract monsters such as Obligation, Duty, Morality, Truth and their more concrete predecessors, the Gods, which were once used to intimidate man and restrict his free and happy development: it withers away ….’

‘Given science, reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be excluded’ –

the problem with unreason – as in propositional action that is not open to question – open to doubt – that is regarded as certain – is that you get nowhere with it – in the sense that you don’t get beyond it –

here I have in mind prejudice in whatever form it takes –

you don’t get beyond it – you don’t move from it – until you question it – until you take the supposed certainty out of it

passion is interesting – it can be an exploration of uncertainty – or an obstinate stand against doubt –

that is to say it can be rational or irrational –

I would put that no-one operates rationally under all circumstances –

and I don’t think that people are essentially – irrational

I think our lives are an uncertain mix of rational and irrational behaviour

the issue is understanding the difference

‘But science is not sacrosanct. The restrictions it imposes (and there are many such restrictions though it is not easy to spell them out) are not necessary to have general coherent and successful views about the world.’

yes – that I would have thought is obvious

‘It is clear that a fruitful exchange between science and such ‘non-scientific’ world views will be in even greater need of anarchism than is science itself.’

scientific and non-scientific world views – are proposals – open to question – to doubt – and uncertain

fruitful exchange between different world views – or should we say – between the proponents of different world views – is always possible if those involved are open to question – open to doubt – and can deal with uncertainty

anarchism as such has nothing to do with it –

where you have bigot against bigot – there will be no fruitful exchange

Feyerabend’s anarchism – as the methodology of overthrow – will suit the thugs

‘And Reason, at last joins all those other abstract monsters such as Obligation, Duty, Morality, Truth and their more concrete predecessors, the Gods, which were once used to intimidate man and restrict his free and happy development: it withers away’

these so called ‘abstract monsters’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

Feyerabend here displays his own prejudices – and thus his ignorance