'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Saturday, July 21, 2018

Feyerabend 9


9


‘In addition to natural interpretations, Galileo also changes sensations that seem to endanger Copernicus. He admits that there are such sensations, he praises Copernicus for having disregarded them, he claims to have removed them with the help of his telescope. However he offers no theoretical reasons why the telescope should be expected to give a true picture of the sky.’


Feyerabend says –


‘For while it might be admitted that Copernicus simply acted on faith, it may also be said that Galileo found himself in an entirely different position. Galileo, after all, invented a new dynamics. And he invented the telescope. The new dynamics, one might point out, removes the inconsistency between the motion of the earth and the ‘conditions affecting ourselves and those in the air above us’. And the telescope removes the ‘even more glaring’ clash between the changes in the apparent brightness of Mars and Venus as predicted on the basis of the Copernican scheme and as seen with the naked eye. This incidentally is Galileo’s own view. He admits that ‘were it not for the existence of a superior and better sense than natural and common sense to join forces with reason’ he would have been ‘much more recalcitrant towards the Copernican system’. The ‘superior and better sense’ is of course, the telescope, and one is inclined to remark that the apparent counterinductive procedure was as a matter of fact induction (or conjecture plus
refutation plus new conjecture) but one based on a better experience, containing not only better natural interpretations but also a better sensory core than was available to Galileo’s Aristotelian predecessors. This matter must now be examined in more detail.’


‘The telescope is a superior and better sense’ that gives new and more reliable evidence for judging astronomical matters. How is this hypothesis examined, and what arguments are presented in its favour?’

in the Sidereus Nuncius Galileo writes that he ‘succeeded  (in building the telescope) through a deep study of the theory of refraction’

Feyerabend says this suggests that Galileo had theoretical reasons for preferring the results of telescopic observations – to observations with the naked eye

but according to Feyerabend the particular reason Galileo gives – his insight into the theory of refraction – is not correct and not sufficient

Feyerabend here points out that Galileo in a letter to Guiliano Medici in 1610 more than half a year after the publication of the Sidereus Nuncius – asks for a copy of Kepler’s Optics of 1604 saying he had not been able to obtain it in Italy

and that Jean Tarde who in 1614 asked Galileo about the construction of telescopes of pre-assigned magnification – says that Galileo regarded the matter as difficult and that he found Kepler’s Optics so obscure ‘that perhaps its own author had not understood it’

also in a letter to Liceti two years before his death Galileo says the nature of light is still in darkness

Feyerabend concludes Galileo’s knowledge of optics was inferior to that of Kepler’s

ok

first off Galileo does not claim to have a superior knowledge of optics to that of Kepler

he says Kepler’s book is virtually unreadable –

you cannot assume from this claim that Galileo concludes anything at all about Kepler’s knowledge

further it doesn’t tell us anything about Galileo’s knowledge

the fact that he may have regarded the nature of light as still in darkness – again does not tell us anything in particular about Galileo’s mastery or not of the subject

it is fair enough to assume that in making such a statement Galileo knew something of what he was talking about

in my opinion it suggests he has looked at the various theories and found them all wanting – or something along these lines

also ‘a deep study of the theory of refraction’ – means just that – a deep study

one can make a deep study of subject and still be unclear or unsure of its principles

we don’t know if this was the case with Galileo
                                                                                                                                   
but it is clear that deep study does not necessarily result in one being confident about one’s knowledge

so what can we make of his claim that he succeeded in building the telescope through a deep study of the theory of refraction?

I am inclined to accept Galileo at his word

a deep – albeit inconclusive study – may well result in the production of an instrument

let’s say that in Galileo’s mind the construction of the telescope was the a result of his study of refraction

and we can ask – what other ‘explanation’ did he have – could he have had?

let us assume for argument’s sake that Galileo is mistaken here – that even though he explains the making of the telescope in terms of his study – in fact there were other factors involved which he did not recognize such as i.e. luck or inspiration

we can say here Galileo’s view of what he accomplished is only one view –

other accounts are possible

in this case we really don’t have enough information as to what did or did not go on

perhaps if you got right down to it Galileo might have to admit he did not know how he made the telescope with any certainty

this is not to question the instrument or its making – just the epistemology surrounding it

in any case Feyerabend clearly thinks that if you can show Galileo was deficient in his knowledge of the theory of refraction – then he did not really have any theoretical reasons for preferring the observations of the telescope over those of the naked eye

my point would be – even if Galileo was not confident in his knowledge of the theory of refraction –

this in itself is not relevant for why one would regard the telescope’s observations as preferable to those of the naked eye

a theory of refraction will explain how the telescope works – it will also explain how the eye works

the theory of refraction will not give you reason for preferring one over the other

it is actually irrelevant to this question

Galileo says of the telescope that it removes the ‘even more glaring’ clash between the changes in the apparent brightness of Mars and Venus as predicted on the basis of the Copernican scheme and as seen with the naked eye

so the clash between the Copernican theory and the naked eye is removed by the use of telescope

it seems clear to me that the theoretical reason Galileo gives for preferring the telescope as an instrument over the naked eye (as an instrument) is just that its results can be seen to support of the Copernican view

and here we have a genuine theoretical reason

Feyerabend’s argument about theoretical preference here depends on a confusion between different kinds of theory – a theory of refraction – on the one hand – and a cosmological theory on the other hand

the theory of refraction will not settle the issue of the preference of instruments – the naked eye or the telescope –

it seems that for Galileo – the issue is settled by the support that the telescope’s results give to the Copernican cosmology

whether you agree with him or not here – you have to admit – it is a genuine reason in support of one theory against another

Feyerabend goes on to quote Professor E Hoppe –


‘Galileo’s assertion that having heard of the Dutch telescope he reconstructed the apparatus by mathematical calculation must of course be understood with a grain of salt; for in his writings we do not find any calculations and the report by letter, which he gives of his first effort says that no better lenses had been available; six days later we find him on the way to Venice with a better piece to hand it as a gift to the Doge Leonardi Donati. This does not look like calculation; it rather looks like trial and error. The Calculation may well have been of a different kind, and here he succeeded, for on 25 August 1609 his salary was increased by a factor of three.’


the only real argument here is that there were no calculations found in his writings

this does not mean no calculations were made

and even if you accept the so called alternative – it is hard to see how a process of trial and error – in the making of a telescope – would not involve calculation

Feyerabend goes on to say –


‘‘it was experience and not mathematics that led Galileo to a serene faith in the reliability of his device’. [Geymonat] This second hypothesis on the origin of the telescope is also supported by Galileo’s testimony, in which he writes that he had tested the telescope ‘a hundred times on a hundred thousand stars and other objects.’’ [Letter to Cariosco 1616]


the reality is that ‘experience’ is the problematic – what is to count as genuine experience?
                                                                                                                                  
the observations of the naked eye or the observations obtained via the telescope?

experience actually will not arbitrate the matter – what decides the issue here?

clearly Galileo’s preference for the Copernican system

the argument of the telescope is really that it makes the naked eye argument irrelevant

the observations of the naked eye can now be seen as a limited case of telescopic vision

that is to say the naked eye has not been refuted – rather it has been incorporated into a larger vision

our interest becomes then not what is seen with the naked eye – but rather what can be seen when the naked eye is extended

the argument of the telescope is that it enables us to have greater vision

this is primarily an instrumentalist argument

it is the instrument – not its theory – that enables us to see experience in a new light

in the appendix 2 of this chapter Feyerabend says –


‘It is different with the psychological problems raised by the telescopic observations. These problems were seen by Pecham and others (such as Roger Bacon) and they still remain (moon illusion). At the time of Galileo they were tremendous, and they account for the strange reports (some of which were discussed in my text). These problems are comparable to the problems of somebody who, having never seen a lens before, looks for the first time into a very bad microscope. Not knowing what to expect (after all, one doesn’t meet man size fleas on the sidewalk), he is unable to separate the properties of the ‘object’ from the ‘illusions’ created by the instrument (distortions; coloured fringes; discolouring; etc.) and he cannot make sense of the objects themselves. On the surface of the earth – with buildings, ships, etc. – the telescope of course will work well; these are familiar things and our knowledge of them eliminates most distortions just as the first
observers soon noticed, and said. Thus it is true that the telescope causes illusions both in the sky and in the terrestrial cases (p. 20), but only the heavenly illusions were a real problem, for the reasons just stated.’


outside of an observational context – any observation – of the naked eye or of another instrument such as the telescope will be without known reference

which is to say the observation will not be identifiable – it will not be describable – it is an unknown

what is to count as real and what is to count as illusion is always a matter of context –

i.e. relative to the use of a particular instrument in a particular context – distortions etc. will be regarded as real –

that is they are real effects of such a use of the instrument in that context

on the other hand relative to a broader epistemological context that involves complex scientific theory and complex philosophical theory – these effects can be categorized as non-central and hence illusory

it all depends finally – not on what is there – but rather what you are looking for

that is it depends on the conceptions – the proposals – you bring to the observation

with the original use of the telescope in the celestial context – the issue is of course –  just the establishment of the context –

factors involved in this process will be e.g. previous observational preconceptions – the state of the critical discussion – and the goals of the current endeavour etc.

may I suggest that at the beginning – looking through the telescope into the heavens – the only clear vision was the unknown

Feyerabend began this chapter with –


‘However, he offers no theoretical reasons why the telescope should be expected to give a true picture of the sky’.


Feyerabend does not show that Galileo held the view that the ‘telescope should be expected to give a true picture of the sky’

we can safely assume Galileo believed that the telescope provides a different picture of the sky

we just don’t know if this picture was for Galileo – the ‘true’ picture

it is at least conceivable that Galileo did not think a ‘true picture’ – in the sense of an end to the matter – was achievable

which is to say he may just have had an open mind on the nature of the heavens

we do know that he favoured the Copernican view and that he thought the observations from the telescope supported that view

having said this it nevertheless strikes me that Galileo regarded the instrumental advantage of the telescope to be obvious to anyone with their eyes open

in the end however  – what we have from Galileo here – is a proposal – nothing more –
a proposal that is open to question – open to doubt – and is in every respect – uncertain