Feyerabend 18

18

‘Thus science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is prepared to admit. It is one of the many forms of thought that have been developed by man, and not necessarily the best. It is conspicuous, noisy, impudent, but it is inherently superior only for those who have already decided in favour of a certain ideology, or who have accepted without ever having examined its advantages and its limits.  And as the accepting and rejecting of ideologies should be left to the individual it follows that the separation of state and church must be complemented by the separation of state and science, that most recent, most aggressive, and most dogmatic religious institution. Such a separation may be our only chance to achieve a humanity we are capable of, but have never fully realised’

‘The idea that science can and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for it takes too simple a view of the talents of man and the circumstances which encourage, or cause, their development. and it is pernicious, for the attempt to enforce the rules is bound to increase our professional qualifications at the expense of our humanity. In addition, the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic: every methodological rule is associated with cosmological assumptions, so that using the rule we take it for granted that the assumptions are correct. Naïve falsification takes it for granted that the laws of nature are manifest and not hidden beneath disturbances of considerable magnitude. Empiricism takes it for granted that sense experience is a better mirror of the world than pure thought. Praise of argument takes it for granted that the artifices of reason give better results than the unchecked play of emotions. Such assumptions may be perfectly plausible and even true. Still one should occasionally put them to a test. Putting them to a test means that we stop using the methodology associated with them and see what happens. Case studies as those reported in the preceding chapters show that such tests occur all the time, and that they speak against the universal validity of any rule. All methodologies have their limitations and the only rule that survives is ‘anything goes’.’

yes – it is unrealistic to suggest that science can and should be run in accordance with fixed and universal rules – if the idea here is that any rule suggested is beyond question

a ‘rule’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt is uncertain –

that we have rule governed propositional systems has more to do with getting things done in an efficient manner

‘increasing our professional qualifications at the expense of humanity’ –

this is a bit of a put-on –

it’s pretentious to think that what we do is at the expense of humanity –

I mean who is to say what this ‘humanity’ amounts to?

the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change?

you can make scientific change as complex and historical as you like –

the reality is that we have change – propositional change – that science is a driver of propositional change –

what we have in science – at any level is proposal – open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

naïve falsification – empiricism – praise of an argument – may well be methodologies that scientists use –

these methodologies – as with the science they ‘determine’ – are open to question

and as for ‘true’ –

a ‘true’ proposal – is one that is affirmed – for whatever reason

any proposal has an assumption – if you decide to give it one – to propose one

and you can argue – what is effectively an a priori argument – that every method presumes assumptions –

I really don’t see the point of it – the value of such –

it strikes me that all such a view does is load up a basic proposal with propositional / conceptual baggage – which in the end – just clogs up the works

that is it holds back and retards clear and straightforward thinking and action –

assumptions are propositional packaging

putting assumptions to the test?

there is no real ‘test’ of assumptions – you either think assumptions have a role to play – or you don’t –

no one is bound by them – no one is bound by this idea that every proposal – every theory is based on assumptions

so called ‘assumptions’ – logically are no different to any other proposal – they are open to question – they are uncertain

yes – all methodologies have their limitations –

is to say – all methodologies – all proposals – are – from a logical point of view – uncertain

it is not a matter of ‘anything goes’ –

such high-handed rhetoric is just as useless as the ‘fixed and universal rules’ idea – it purports to replace –

and is it not the case that for Feyerabend ‘anything goes’ – amounts to a fixed and universal rule?

the reality is – that in science – as in any propositional activity – it is rather –

what goes – is what goes –

and any interpretation of this – is what goes – too

we never leave the reality of proposal – be it in science – or in the interpretation of science

at all times we deal with what is put – the propositional reality

‘The change of perspective brought about by these discoveries leads on to the long forgotten problem of the excellence of science. It leads to it for the first time in modern history, for modern science overpowered its opponents, it did not convince them. Science took over by force, not by argument (this is especially true of the former colonies where science and the religion of brotherly love were introduced as a matter of course, and without consulting, or arguing with, the inhabitants). Today we realise that rationalism, being bound to science, cannot give us any assistance in the issue between science and myth and we also know, from inquires of an entirely different kind, that myths are vastly better than rationalists have dared to admit. Thus we are now forced to raise the question of the excellence of science. An examination then reveals that science and myth overlap in many ways, that the differences we think we perceive are often local phenomena which may turn into similarities elsewhere and that fundamental discrepancies are results of different aims rather than different methods trying to reach one and the same ‘rational’ end (such as, for example, ‘progress’, or increase of content, or ‘growth’).’

‘the excellence of science’?

this is just rhetoric – science as with any propositional activity is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

there is no propositional excellence – there is only propositional uncertainty –

nevertheless it is to be expected that scientists will promote and advertise their activity – they will put the best foot forward – political and religious leaders – do the same

we all do it

I think the reason that most people regard science with respect is that it delivers tangible practical – empirical outcomes

at the same time – it is not as if the populace has abandoned metaphysics –

i.e. people still hold to spiritual and religious and superstitious conceptions of reality –

and some regard these as ‘excellent’ too –

the reality I suspect is that people hold to various ‘excellencies’ – if you want to put the matter in those terms –

it is I think – for most – what conceptual scheme – works for what purpose –

and yes – the result is a mishmash of different conceptions – different schemes – and overall inconsistency

‘modern science overpowered its opponents, it did not convince them. Science took over by force’ –

by force of what?

I would say that science is dominant in the culture that I live in –

but the bloke next door is a religious fanatic –

in his world – in the culture he lives in – in his mind – science barely figures

how dominant is western science in Tibet at the present time?

or in the culture – the dreamtime culture – of Australian aboriginals?

and still the majority of human beings on this planet subscribe to some form of religion –

so where was the takeover – the victory?

this idea that science ‘overpowered its opponents’ – is just a crude myth –

I am skeptical about the power of argument – and of convincing anyone of anything –

and the reason is that I think that at their best human beings exhibit a healthy skepticism –

or perhaps this is just another form of the Australian heresy?

my real point is just that all you can have here with historical argument is different proposals – different perspectives –

so enjoy the different proposals – explore the possibilities – and keep an open mind

also we can ask – are we talking here about science – or the uses it is put to?

I think it is far enough to suggest that science has been used as an authoritarian weapon –

however the same could well be said of various myths and ideologies –

all this depends on the kind of story you want to tell –

and the ground of any such story telling – is not ‘objective fact’ – rather it is subjective perspective –

and where that comes from – how it is to be accounted for – is – really – anyone’s guess

there is no issue between science and myth –

if we de-mythologize myth for a moment – what we are talking about is proposal

science and myth are different proposals –

what they have in common is that they are attempts to make known

their object – is the unknown –

human beings make their knowledge – and this making of knowledge – in whatever form it takes – is uncertain

science and myth are uncertain – uncertain proposals – to make the unknown – known

the unknown is silent –

all we have is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

it is this uncertainty that is the fertile ground of all our propositional endeavors – the ground of human diversity – the ground of human creativity and freedom

yes science and myth can be said to cross paths –

from what I see and what I can deduce – it strikes me that no one actually operates exclusively with any one cosmological theory –

I suggest – it just doesn’t happen

people operate with various theories and ideas –

some of which may be scientific – some mythical – some religious – whatever –

and people’s ideas and approaches to life – are invariably – inconsistent

and the reason for this not a failure to think rationally or logically –

it is in fact a recognition of the logic of uncertainty – it is an embrace of rational uncertainty

and that – I think is a natural state of affairs –

and if so then those who advocate for universal rules of any kind – are flying in the face of empirical reality

their argument is not based on what occurs – it is rather the same tired old authoritarian / moral – argument – of what ‘should’ be the case

and why – why should it be the case?

presumably because someone is afraid of uncertainty – afraid of propositional diversity  – and would like to stomp it (reality) out

I think the authoritarian argument – in whatever form it takes – is based on fear –

and a fear based in logical ignorance

as to rational goals – or irrational goals – or any notion of a goal –

a ‘goal’ – is best understood as a pragmatic imperative –

no more complex than ‘something to aim for’ –

and this ‘something to aim for’ – this ‘goal’ – however it is expressed – gets the propositional game going –

and gives it a bit of grunt

‘The image of 20^th-century science in the minds of scientists and laymen is determined by technological miracles such as colour television, the moon shots, the infra-red oven, as well as by a somewhat vague but still influential rumour, or fairy-tale, concerning the manner in which these miracles are produced.

According to the fairy-tale the success of science is a result of a subtle, but carefully balanced combination of inventiveness and control. Scientists have ideas. And they have special methods for improving ideas. The theories of science have passed the test of method. They give a better account of the world than the ideas that have not passed the test.’

yes – the layman is impressed with the ‘miracles’ of 20^th-century science – and particularly impressed by the ones that he can use – that make his life more comfortable and more interesting –

as to the ‘influential rumour’ – or ‘fairy-tale’ – that is probably all it is –

a belief that there is a way of producing such effects –

as to the in and outs of that method – does it matter?

and I think that probably the same point applies to the scientist –

what counts for the scientist is the result – the effect

any methodology – can be put to the question – to doubt –

any methodological proposal can be shown to be uncertain –

nevertheless what we get from this ‘science’ – is usable results –

and that I suggest is the reason for science being held in high regard –

observable – practical – useful effects –

so even if it is a fairy-tale – it is a fairy-tale that produces concrete results

the point being that other propositional systems – i.e. religious conceptions of the world – may well produce their results – i.e. spiritual enlightenment and understanding – but they don’t throw up colour TV’s

I can still be a Christian a Jew or a Moslem or Buddhist etc. – and respect modern science

still regard it as instructive and useful

this is not to say that modern science gives ‘a better account of the world’ – it is only to say that modern science gives us a different account of the world –

and furthermore an account that while not consistent with other accounts – is of value

I take the view that there is no one approach – no one methodology –

that what we in fact have is propositional diversity –

and with propositional diversity comes propositional inconsistency –

the ground of this inconsistency – is uncertainty –

and our world is a world of propositional uncertainty –

and it is in this world of propositional uncertainty that we live –

it is in this world that we create –

it is in this world that we suffer –

and it is in this world that we find joy

‘But the fairy-tale is false, as we have seen. There is no special method that guarantees success or makes it probable. Scientists do not solve problems because they posses a magic wand – methodology or a theory of rationality – but because they have studied a problem for a long time, because they know the situation fairly well, because they are not too dumb (though that is rather doubtful nowadays when almost anyone can become a scientist), and because the excesses of one scientific school are almost always balanced  by the excesses of some other school. (Besides, scientists only rarely solve their problems, they make lots of mistakes, and many of their solutions are quite useless.) Basically there is hardly any difference between the process that leads to the announcement of a new scientific law and the process preceding passage of a new law in society: one informs either all citizens or those immediately concerned, one collects ‘facts’ and prejudices, one discusses the matter, and one finally votes. But while democracy makes some effort to explain the process so everyone can understand it, scientists either conceal it, or bend it, to make it fit their sectarian interests.’

there is no special method that guarantees success or makes it probable –

any propositional enterprise – its method – its ‘success’ – its probability – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

no guarantees

Feyerabend says scientists do not solve problems with methodology and theory of rationality –

my argument is that there is no solution to problems – if by ‘solution’ – is meant a proposal that is – not open to question – not open to doubt – that is certain

that is the fairy-tale

Feyerabend says that scientists solve problems – because they have studied hard – they know the situation well enough – and they are not too dumb

wow – a radical analysis of science and scientists – if ever I’ve heard one

this response from Feyerabend – is quite simply pathetic

‘studying a problem for a long time’ – means nothing –

you can study a problem for a long time – and at the end of it be none the wiser –

also isn’t it conceivable that a scientist could have a quick look at a problem and see the solution immediately?

‘knowing the situation fairly well’ – is in the same boat –

it just doesn’t follow that therefore a solution will be found –

and here I am not even getting into the issue of just what ‘knowing the situation fairly well’ – is supposed to mean

however I have to give it to him on the ‘not too dumb’ argument –

that you would imagine goes without saying –

we learn absolutely nothing here – from Feyerabend about scientific problem solving

the reality is that what goes for a solution in science – is what is agreed upon – by those involved –

and this is not a logical solution – it is a pragmatic solution

and of course any agreement is tenuous – is uncertain

Feyerabend says that democracy makes some effort to explain – so that everyone can understand –

well yes – in theory

and I guess Feyerabend has not heard of political skulduggery – of back room deals

and he says scientists either conceal or bend their results to fit with sectarian interests –

I suppose there are examples of this

however it strikes me that at least in this country – Australia – that scientific practice is  open and accessible

there are any number of ways a citizen can find out what is going on in the scientific world –

and from what I have observed – any scientist given the opportunity to explain his work – jumps at it

and as to who is more open and accountable – the politician or the scientist?

it’s no contest –

the scientist win hands down

‘No scientist will admit that voting plays a role in his subject. Facts, logic, methodology alone decide – this is what the fairy-tale tells us. But how do facts decide? What is their function in the advancement of knowledge? We cannot derive our theories from them. We cannot give a negative criterion by saying, for example, that good theories are theories which can be refuted, but which are not contradicted by any fact. A principle of falsification that removes theories because they do not fit the facts would have to remove the whole of science (or it would have to admit that large parts of science are irrefutable). The hint that a good theory explains more than its rivals is not very realistic either. True: new theories often predict new things – but almost always at the expense of things already known. Turning to logic we realise that even the simplest demands are not satisfied in scientific practise, and could not be satisfied, because of the complexity of the material. The ideas which scientists use to present the known and to advance into the unknown are only rarely in agreement with the strict injunctions of logic or pure mathematics and the attempt to make them conform would rob science of the elasticity without which progress cannot be achieved. We see: facts alone are not strong enough for making us accept, or reject, scientific theories, the range they leave to thought is too wide: logic and methodology eliminate too much, they are too narrow. In between these two extremes lies the ever changing domain of human ideas and wishes. And a more detailed analysis of successful moves in the game of science (‘successful’ from the point of view of scientists themselves) shows indeed that there is a wide range of freedom that   demands a multiplicity of ideas and permits the application of democratic procedures (ballot – discussion – vote) but that is actually closed by power politics and propaganda. This is where the fairy-tale of special method assumes its decisive function. It conceals the freedom of decision which creative scientists and the general public have even inside the most rigid and most advanced parts of science by a recitation of ‘objective’ criterion and it thus protects the ‘big-shots’ (Nobel Prize winners; heads of laboratories, of organizations such as the AMA, of special schools; ‘educators’; etc.) from the masses (laymen; experts in non-scientific fields; experts in other fields of science): only those citizens count who are subjected to the pressures of scientific institutions (they have undergone a long process of education), who succumbed to those pressures (they have passed their examinations), and who are now firmly convinced of the truth of the fairy-tale. This is how scientists have deceived themselves and everyone else about their business, but without any real disadvantage: they have more money, more authority, more sex appeal than they deserve, and the most stupid procedures and the most laughable results in their domain are surrounded by an aura of excellence. It is time to cut them down in size, and to give them a more modest position in society.’

proposals get put – arguments are made – decisions get made –

the culture of science as far as I know is hierarchical – it’s not democratic – it’s not one vote one value

and as far as I know working scientists are happy with that culture  – and if they’re not – it’s up to them to change it

and yes – it is fair enough that others have an opinion here –

but it will be working scientists who decide how they proceed

‘facts’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

facts don’t decide anything –

the facts of the matter – the proposals advanced – are decided upon by those involved in the propositional process

and here we are talking about which proposal – or proposals to take forward

and any decision made – like any ‘fact’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘we cannot derive theories from them’ –

a proposal (fact) may just lead to another proposal – i.e. a broader proposal (theory) – or an alternative proposal

‘derivation’ – may be the argument – inspiration may be the argument –

and a connection between proposals might be made – without any argument –

however the relation between proposals – however it might be described – or not –

will be open to question – open to doubt – will be uncertain

as to ‘falsification’ –

if falsification is understood in a broad sense – as the decision not to proceed with a theory – it has a role to play –

but yes in the narrow sense of removing a theory from consideration altogether – it is crude and stupid

‘The hint that a good theory explains more than its rivals is not very realistic either’

a good theory – to my mind – gives a different understanding – to its rivals – therefore its explanation – is different

‘Turning to logic we realise that even the simplest demands are not satisfied in scientific practise …’

yes – this idea of logic – as the imposing of a language game on science – and furthermore the imposing of an ‘authority’ on scientific thinking and practise – is old hat

I doubt that it has ever in fact been taken up by working scientists –

and Feyerabend is right – if it ever was taken up – it would rob science of its elasticity –

which is to say – it would rob science of its uncertainty – and hence its life blood

‘… there is a wide range of freedom that demands a multiplicity of ideas and permits the application of democratic procedures (ballot – discussion – vote) but that is actually closed by power politics and propaganda.’ –

there will naturally be a multiplicity of ideas – in a healthy propositional environment –

and yes – of course the application of democratic procedures is permitted –

the real issue is whether scientists regard such procedures as useful to their practise –

I haven’t seen a move in that direction – and if there is to be such a move – it’ll come from the scientists

Feyerabend draws a distinction between ‘democratic procedures’ and ‘power politics and propaganda’ – this strikes me a very odd –

as if there is no power politics and propaganda in the democratic process –

what planet does he live on?

I agree that there are those in power in science – who cover their asses with so called ‘objective criterion’ –

and yes this masquerade works – and it is welcomed by scientists and laymen alike –

they like to hear that there is an authority –

the idea being that some one really knows what’s going on

this – Feyerabend calls – a ‘fairy-tale’ –

it’s authoritarianism – plain and simple

science is not some special propositional activity – where there is no authoritarianism – no pretension – no prejudice and no rhetoric

science is human –

you don’t need to cut science or scientists down to size – there is only one size – and it fits all –  it’s humanity –

and humanity is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘This advice, which only a few of our well-conditioned contemporise are prepared to accept, seems to clash with certain simple and widely-known facts.

Is it not a fact that a learned physician is better equipped to diagnose and to cure illness than a layman or the medicine-man of a primitive society? Is it not a fact that epidemics and dangerous individual diseases have disappeared only with the beginning of modern medicine? Must we not admit that technology has made tremendous advances since the rise of modern science? And are not the moon-shots a most impressive and undeniable proof of its excellence? These are some of the questions which are thrown at the impudent wretch who dares criticize the special position of science.

These questions reach their polemical aim if one assumes that the results of science which no one will deny have arisen without any help from non-scientific elements, and that they cannot be improved by an admixture of such elements either. ‘Unscientific’ procedures such as the herbal lore of witches and cunning men, the astronomy of mystics, the treatment of the ill in primitive societies are totally without merit. Science alone gives us a useful astronomy, an effective method, a trustworthy technology. One must also assume that science owes its success to the correct method and not merely to a lucky accident. It was not a fortunate cosmological guess that led to progress, but correct and cosmologically neutral handling of data. These are the assumptions we must make to give the questions the polemical force they are supposed to have. Not a single one of them stands up to closer examination.’

what we get in what follows from Feyerabend is histories of modern science – astronomy – medicine – technology –

histories in which he argues that these modern forms owe their development and thus their successes to – non-scientific investigations and speculations –

you could well argue that all these non-scientific background stories show – is that science has changed as it has gone along –

and if that is the case then it is foolish to have too definite a view of science – modern or ancient –

is it not better to keep an open mind – to question – to doubt – to recognise that science – as with any propositional activity – is essentially – uncertain?

also what you have in Feyerabend’s argument here – is a proposal about the nature of science –

this is not the only view of the nature of science –

it is one among many – all of which are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

anyway my first point here is that there is an argument that the term ‘science’ – covers both ancient and modern – science – its methods and results.

the other option as I see it is to argue that herbal lore – witches – cunning men and mystics – are representatives of different propositional structures – different propositional paths –

this argument is effectively that such different propositional realities – are prime facie

incommensurable with modern science –

so drop off on the idea of comparing them –

and instead recognise the difference – respect it – and see it in terms of propositional enrichment –

and what this view can lead to is the idea that – yes modern science is successful – within its terms –

and that is to point to what it has achieved in medicine – astronomy and technology – etc.

I don’t know – but it may well be the case that herbal lore – witchcraft –  and mysticism – are just as successful in their own terms –

modern witches – I assume – don’t produce colour TVs – and modern physicists and physicians don’t cast spells

different propositional realities –

and I know it annoys modern physicians that people spend billions on herbal cures – as well as going to their general practitioner for a check up

and the scientifically minded – must just shake their heads when they see that there are modern men and women – who believe in and practice magic – as well as watching television programmes on science or reading books on science

uncertainty – open doors

how we regard modern science – its relation to any proposal regarding its history – and its relation to what is not held to be non-scientific – but perhaps superstitious or metaphysical – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

all we ever have here is proposals  –

knowledge is – proposal

Feyerabend concludes with the following –

‘How often is science improved, and turned into new directions by non-scientific influences! It is up to us, it is up to the citizens of a free society to either accept the chauvinism of science without contradiction or to overcome it by the counterforce of

public action. Public action was used against science by the Communists in China in the

fifties, and it was again used, under very different circumstances, by some opponents of evolution in California in the seventies. Let us follow their example and let us free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically petrified science just as our ancestors freed us from the strangling hold of the one true religion!

The way towards this aim is clear. A science that insists on possessing the only correct method and the only acceptable results is ideology and must be separated from the state. One may teach it, but only to those who have decided to make this particular superstition their own. On the other hand, a science that has dropped such totalitarian pretensions is no longer independent and self-contained, and it can be taught in many different combinations (myth and modern cosmology might be one combination). Of course, every business has the right to demand that its practitioners be prepared in a special way, and it may even demand acceptance of a certain ideology. (I for one am against the thinning out of subjects so that they become more and more similar to each other; whoever does not like present-day Catholicism should leave it and become a Protestant or an Atheist, instead of ruining it by such insane changes as mass in the vernacular). This is true of physics, just as it is true of religion, or of prostitution. But such special ideologies, such special skills have no room in the process of general education that prepares a citizen for his role in society. A mature citizen is not one who has been instructed in a special ideology, such as Puritanism, or critical rationalism, and who now carries this ideology with him like a mental tumour, a mature citizen is a person who has learnt how to make up his mind and who has then decided in favour of what he thinks suits him best. He is a person who has a certain mental toughness (he does not fall for the first ideological street singer he happens to meet) and who is therefore able consciously to choose the business that seems to be most attractive to him rather than being swallowed by it. To prepare him for his choice he will study the major ideologies as historical phenomena, he will study science as a historical phenomenon and not as the one and only sensible way of approaching a problem. He will study it together with other fairy-tales such as the myths of ‘primitive’ societies so that he has the information needed for arriving at a free decision. An essential part of a general education of this kind is an acquaintance with the most outstanding propagandists in all fields, so that the pupil can build up his resistance against all propaganda, including the propaganda called ‘argument’. It is only after such a hardening procedure that he will be called upon to make up his mind on the issue  rationalism-irrationalism, science-myth, science-religion, and so on. His decision in favour of science – assuming he chooses science – will then be much more rational than any decision in favour of science is today. At any rate – science and the schools will be just as carefully separated as religion and the schools today. Scientists will of course participate in governmental decisions, for everyone participates in such decisions. But they will not be given overriding authority. It is the vote of everyone concerned that decides fundamental issues such as the teaching methods used, or the truth of basic beliefs such as the theory of evolution, or the quantum theory, and not the authority

of big-shots hiding behind a non-existing methodology. There is no need to fear that such a way of arranging society will lead to undesirable results. Science itself uses the method of ballot, discussion, vote, though without a clear grasping of its mechanism, and in a heavily biased way. But the rationality of our beliefs will certainly be increased.’.

‘How often is science improved, and turned into new directions by non-scientific influences! –

if we drop the labels –‘scientific’ and ‘non- scientific’ – for a moment – and hold off on the rhetoric of ‘progress’ – the question is how often is one propositional structure modified by another?

well I think modification – change – goes on all the time –

propositional systems are not static

‘an ideologically petrified science’ –

what is this supposed to mean?

does it mean that because science operates with certain ideas – ideas that have proved fruitful – it is ideological – and further ‘ideologically petrified’?

I think this ‘ideologically petrified’ assertion – can’t really call it an argument – it is just a rhetorical grab

it makes sense to question – to doubt – to regard as uncertain – whatever it is you are doing –

this is to behave logically

but I would say – most will stick with what works – in the face of doubt – until a different way of doing things is shown to have some advantage over the status quo – and then they will give the alternative a go

and that strikes me as sensible –

keep an open mind as best you can – but work with what you think works best

one can speculate and propose until the cows come home – but if they come home on the same track night after night–

there you have it –

‘let us free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically petrified science just as our ancestors freed us from the strangling hold of the one true religion!’.

‘the strangling hold’ –

I don’t think any ideology – any system of ideas has a ‘strangling hold’ –

yes a particular ideology may well dominate the scene for a time – may be the fashion of times –

however logically speaking – any propositional system is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and it is for this reason – the logic of the matter – that there will be opposing points of view

so – while it is true that some propositional systems do get entrenched – and I might add some democratically entrenched – no system of proposals – no system of ideas – will have a ‘strangling hold’ –

there will always be question – doubt uncertainty – even in the most authoritarian contexts

‘The way towards this aim is clear. A science that insists on possessing the only correct method and the only acceptable results is ideology and must be separated from the state.’

I don’t like this idea –

if you allow a system of ideas and all that goes with it to operate outside of state sanction and oversight – then that ideology is not accountable to the people –

this is hardly the way to operate a democratic system

Feyerabend’s argument here is an argument for sectional privilege

the ‘privilege’ – if you can call it that – of not being accountable to democratic processes

it is just exactly what organised crime would like to see

to the list of special ideologies with special skills - physics – religion – prostitution – does Feyerabend wish to add – the mafia?

and if not – why not?

furthermore – I think any group that wants to argue that they have the only correct method and the only acceptable results – should be able to have their say –

of course their argument is stupid and pretentious –

but how will those who advocate it – ever come to know this – if they are excluded from rational discussion and debate –

and who knows – in the whole mix of it – they might have something of interest to contribute – even something of value?

I am not in favour of excluding or prohibiting any views –

I am not afraid of different perspectives – even ones I think are illogical – irrational – or dangerous

‘One may teach it, but only to those who have decided to make this particular superstition their own. On the other hand, a science that has dropped such totalitarian pretensions is no longer independent and self-contained, and it can be taught in many different combinations (myth and modern cosmology might be one combination).’

big concession here from Feyerabend – teach the evil ideology to those who have decided to embrace it

this is pretty dumb

what we need is critical teaching –

those who hold to an uncompromising ideology – ought to be respected – but they ought – also to be challenged – challenged with different ideas

yes – you may teach science in combination with myth – and that is all very well –

but your working scientist is not likely to be interested in myth – when he is conducting a physical experiment –

his focus will be on following a method that he thinks will deliver the results

this is not engaging in ‘a totalitarian pretension’ –

it is rather getting on with the job at hand – with the tools at one’s disposal – and doing the job in a way that it will be recognized by others as being well done

you have to wonder just who it is that has the ‘totalitarian pretensions’ here

‘Of course, every business has the right to demand that its practitioners be prepared in a special way, and it may even demand acceptance of a certain ideology… This is true of physics, just as it is true of religion, or of prostitution. But such special ideologies, such special skills have no room in the process of general education that prepares a citizen for his role in society.’

‘no room in the process of general education’ –

no room at the inn

again – the ideology of exclusion –

of course there can be a place in general education for specialist ideologies and specialist skills –

how do you teach high school science subjects without introducing the students into the ideas of the sciences – and the particular skills required to engage in these enterprises?

a general education if it is to have any substance at all – will involve the teaching of ideologies and specialist skills –

in the absence of such content – all you have is generalities –

‘A mature citizen is not one who has been instructed in a special ideology, such as Puritanism, or critical rationalism, and who now carries this ideology with him like a mental tumour, a mature citizen is a person who has learnt how to make up his mind and who has then decided in favour of what he thinks suits him best.’

‘a mature citizen”?

a mature citizen could be someone who has had little or no education – general or specialist –

but nevertheless is open minded and treats everyone with respect and kindness

how does one learn to make up one’s mind?

one learns by being taught to question – to doubt – and to not be  fooled by any claim of authority –

we all do what we think suits us best

‘He is a person who has a certain mental toughness (he does not fall for the first ideological street singer he happens to meet) and who is therefore able consciously to choose the business that seems to be most attractive to him rather than being swallowed by it. To prepare him for his choice he will study the major ideologies as historical phenomena, he will study science as a historical phenomenon and not as the one and only sensible way of approaching a problem.’

studying science as an historical phenomenon – should sharpen his critical skills –

but let’s be clear studying the history of science – is not doing science

and until you do it – you won’t really know what you are talking about – you won’t really know what it is –

and this is true of any propositional enterprise –

a background story of any kind is all very well – but it is not be confused with actually getting down and engaging in the enterprise itself

‘An essential part of a general education of this kind is an acquaintance with the most outstanding propagandists in all fields, so that the pupil can build up his resistance against all propaganda, including the propaganda called ‘argument’

propaganda is persuasion – argument is persuasion – argument is propaganda

if you build up a resistance against all propaganda – you take yourself out of the propositional game – out of the propositional life

you become some who is persuaded of nothing – and not able to be persuaded – and someone who is unable to persuade others –

you become a dead-head – and this it seems is Feyerabend’s idea of the new man

any propaganda – any persuasion – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

nevertheless a good deal of our propositional life just is the business of propaganda – persuading and being persuaded

without it – there wouldn’t be much going on

it’s pretty rich of Feyerabend to be disparaging of propaganda –

he is one of the great propagandists of his time

‘It is only after such a hardening procedure that he will be called upon to make up his mind on the issue rationalism-irrationalism, science-myth, science-religion, and so on. His decision in favour of science – assuming he chooses science – will then be much more rational than any decision in favour of science is today.’

this is I think a very traditional – old fashioned approach to learning –

you must study the basics before you can decide which way you will proceed

it’s a method that runs the risk of stifling any original inspiration or talent

what is against just following your instincts – into a specialized study – and not worrying about a so called general education?

who says you are not allowed to do this?

the important thing is that society provides you with the options of a general education – and specialist pathways –

if these options are available and real – then I think the student will begin by making the choice that best suits him or her

and a good education allows for re-thinks – and changes in direction

as for ‘more rational’ –

rationality is the underlying logic of question – doubt – uncertainty

in whatever you are doing – in whatever propositional adventure you embark on

‘At any rate – science and the schools will be just as carefully separated as religion and the schools today’

in Australia we have schools set up by the different religions – and we have religious studies in state schools

the reality on the ground is that religious studies – of whatever kind are integrated into a general education –

and the integration works well – largely I think because the Australian people regard religious education as part of a general education

for those parents and children who object to religious studies in the curriculum –

they can opt-out of the religion subject –

also you find in some schools – religious studies as part of a more general study of ethical systems

as to separating out science studies from the general curriculum – that is not going to happen

no one in their right mind would argue for this

‘Scientists will of course participate in governmental decisions, for everyone participates in such decisions. But they will not be given overriding authority’ –

I don’t know where it is that they are given overriding authority

the science community has to argue its case – just as all other vested interests have to argue their cases

‘It is the vote of everyone concerned that decides fundamental issues such as the teaching methods used, or the truth of basic beliefs such as the theory of evolution, or the quantum theory, and not the authority of big-shots hiding behind a non-existing methodology.’

there is a place for the big-shot in a democratic process – he like ‘everyone concerned’ should have a chance to put his case – and persuade others to his point of view –

and his point of view – like any other point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

any claim to authority should be recognised for what it is –

pretentious rhetoric

‘There is no need to fear that such a way of arranging society will lead to undesirable results. Science itself uses the method of ballot, discussion, vote, though without a clear grasping of its mechanism, and in a heavily biased way. But the rationality of our beliefs will certainly be increased.’

‘There is no need to fear that such a way of arranging society will lead to undesirable results’ –

arranging society in any way – will lead to the results that it will lead to

desirable – undesirable? –

it depends on who makes the assessment

‘Science itself uses the method of ballot, discussion, vote, though without a clear grasping of its mechanism, and in a heavily biased way’

this view of the practice of science – requires an evidential argument –

and Feyerabend offers no evidence for this view –

without some elaboration from Feyerabend  – why should we accept this claim?

in the absence of argument here – all we have is rhetoric

we can reasonably ask – in every scientific setting is the method of ballot – discussion – vote – the way it goes?

hard to imagine that in all contexts such an approach is used

and where it is not used – does science suffer?

and really how does a democratic process lead to better scientific results?

participation by all and sundry won’t necessarily result in good science –

and some might say democratizing scientific method and practice is more likely to result in bad science –

granted – a democratic procedures gives the ‘appearance’ of rationality – but is it anything more than that – a pretence of rationality?

‘But the rationality of our beliefs will certainly be increased.’

a belief is a proposal – how a proposal is arrived at – by what ‘process’ – democratic or otherwise – is logically irrelevant –

a proposal is held rationally – if it is held to be open to question – open to doubt – held to be uncertain

increasing – or decreasing rationality – makes no sense  –

you either hold your beliefs – your propositions – open to question – open to doubt – or you don’t –

if your proposal is only – as it were – open – ‘to some extent’ –

it is not genuinely open – and your so called ‘openness’ –

is pretentious

© greg t. charlton. 2017.