Feyerabend 12

12

‘Such irrational methods of support are need because of the ‘uneven development (Marx Lenin) of different parts of science. Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science survived only because reason was frequently overruled in their past.’

Feyerabend begins here with –

‘A prevalent tendency in methodological discussions is to approach problems of knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, as it were. Statements are compared to each other without regard to their history and without considering that they might belong to different historical strata. For example, one asks: given background knowledge, initial conditions, basic principles, accepted observations – what conclusions can we draw about a newly suggested hypothesis? The answers vary considerably. Some say that it is possible to determine degrees of confirmation and that the hypothesis can be evaluated with their help. Others reject any logic of confirmation and judge hypotheses by their content, and by the falsifications that have actually occurred. But almost everyone takes it for granted that precise observations, clear principles and well-confirmed theories are already decisive; that they can and must be used here and now to either eliminate the suggested hypothesis, or to make it acceptable, or perhaps even prove it!’

sub specie aeternitatis – from the point of view of eternity

there is no such point of view

a statement – a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

regardless of its history

its history by the way is someone’s proposal – someone’s theory – regarding where it came from

where it came from – might be of interest –

but logically speaking – it is not relevant

‘For example, one asks: given background knowledge, initial conditions, basic principles, accepted observations – what conclusions can we draw about a newly suggested hypothesis? The answers vary considerably.’

the answers vary considerably – because logically speaking the newly suggested hypothesis – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘But almost everyone takes it for granted that precise observations, clear principles and well-confirmed theories are already decisive; that they can and must be used here and now to either eliminate the suggested hypothesis, or to make it acceptable, or perhaps even prove it!’ –

‘almost everyone’?

where is the evidence for this?

what we have from Feyerabend here is a straw man argument –

I don’t know what everyone or almost everyone believes –

but I can say that any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if people believe in ‘precise observations’ – ‘clear principles’ – and that ‘well-confirmed theories are already decisive ‘ –

then they are deluding themselves –

this is not to say – such delusions – are not central to scientific practice –

they may well be

‘Such a procedure makes sense only if we can assume that the elements of our knowledge – the theories, the observations, the principles of our arguments – are timeless entities which share the same degree of perfection, are all equally accessible, and are related to each other in a way that is independent of the events that produced them. This is, of course, an extremely common assumption. It is taken for granted by every logician; it underlies the familiar distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification; and it is often expressed by saying that science deals with propositions and not with statements or sentences. However the procedure overlooks that science is a complex and heterogeneous historical process which contains vague and incoherent anticipations of future ideologies side by side with highly sophisticated theoretical systems ancient and petrified forms of thought. Some of its elements are available in the form of neatlty written statements, while others are submerged and become known only, by contrast, by comparison with new and unusual views. (This is the way in which the inverted tower argument helped Galileo to discover natural interpretations hostile to Copernicus. And this is also the way in which Einstein discovered certain deep-lying assumptions of classical mechanics, such as the assumption of the existence of infinitely  fast signals. For general considerations, cf. the last paragraph of chapter 5) Many of  the conflicts and  contradictions which occur in science are due to this heterogeneity of the material, to this ‘unevenness’ of the historical  development, as a Marxist would say, and they have no immediate theoretical significance. They have much in common with the problems which arise when a power station is needed right next to a Gothic cathedral. Occasionally, such features are taken into account; for example, when it is asserted that physical laws (statements) and biological laws (statements) belong to different

conceptual domains and cannot be directly compared. But in most cases, and especially in the case observation vs. theory, our methodologies project all the various elements of science and the different historical strata they occupy on to one and the same plane, and proceed at once to render comparative judgments. This is like arranging a fight between an infant and a grown man, and announcing triumphantly, what is obvious anyway, that the man is going to win (the history of kinetic theory and the more recent history of hidden variable theories in quantum mechanics is full of insane criticisms of this kind and so is the history of psychoanalysis and of Marxism). In our examination of new hypotheses we must obviously take the historical situation into account. Let us see how this is going to affect our judgment!’

‘Such a procedure makes sense only if we can assume that the elements of our knowledge – the theories, the observations, the principles of our arguments – are timeless entities which share the same degree of perfection, are all equally accessible, and are related to each other in a way that is independent of the events that produced them. This is, of course, an extremely common assumption. It is taken for granted by every logician; it underlies the familiar distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification; and it is often expressed by saying that science deals with propositions and not with statements or sentences.’

the elements of our knowledge – are not timeless entities –

any assumption to that effect – is simply rhetorical

any so called ‘context of discovery’ – is of course open to question

any so called ‘context of justification’ – likewise – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a proposition – any proposition – is a proposal –

and as such open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘However the procedure overlooks that science is a complex and heterogeneous historical process which contains vague and incoherent anticipations of future ideologies side by side with highly sophisticated theoretical systems ancient and petrified forms of thought.’

if there are ‘vague and incoherent anticipations of future ideologies’ – it is because they have been proposed –

if these ‘vague and incoherent anticipations of future ideologies’ – are not proposed – they are not there –

and if they are there – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and the same logic applies to ‘highly sophisticated theoretical systems ancient and petrified forms of thought.’

there is no hidden past or present – there is just what is proposed

and logically speaking what is proposed – is open to question

this hidden knowledge argument of Feyerabend is best placed in the middle ages –

or in those mythologies that deny the reality of the empirical world – or see it – as some kind of sham or illusion

Feyerabend is not a modern thinker – if he had his way – he would take epistemology and science back beyond the dark ages

he is an obscurantist – and as far as I can tell enjoys being so –

if you are not fair dinkum – then of course you can play the hide and seek game –

and to be honest I have no problem with this –

just one game among the many games – people play

‘Some of its elements are available in the form of neatlty written statements, while others are submerged and become known only, by contrast, by comparison with new and unusual views. (This is the way in which the inverted tower argument helped Galileo to discover natural interpretations hostile to Copernicus. And this is also the way in which Einstein discovered certain deep-lying assumptions of classical mechanics, such as the assumption of the existence of infinitely fast signals.’

Galileo proposed – interpretations that put to question Copernicus’ view

Einstein proposed – the existence of infinitely fast signals –

these arguments weren’t available – weren’t there – before they were proposed

what we deal with in reality is what is proposed –

reality – just is what is put – what is proposed

‘Many of  the conflicts and  contradictions which occur in science are due to this heterogeneity of the material, to this ‘unevenness’ of the historical  development, as a Marxist would say, and they have no immediate theoretical significance. They have much in common with the problems which arise when a power station is needed right next to a Gothic cathedral. Occasionally, such features are taken into account; for example,

when it is asserted that physical laws (statements) and biological laws (statements) belong to different conceptual domains and cannot be directly compared. But in most cases, and especially in the case observation vs. theory, our methodologies project all the various elements of science and the different historical strata they occupy on to one and the same plane, and proceed at once to render comparative judgments. This is like arranging a fight between an infant and a grown man, and announcing triumphantly,

what is obvious anyway, that the man is going to win.’

look proposals are put – propositions are put – different propositions are put –

and yes you can spend time outlining the historical differences –

the real issue is critical engagement – engagement in propositional uncertainty

decisions get made – uncertain decisions – decisions – open to question – open to doubt –

and we proceed

that is – we proceed with – and in – uncertainty –

and what we do is explore the uncertainty – we have proposed

the common ground of all propositional action is the unknown –

the unknown is silent –

and so we have no known common ground

what we do in our decision procedure is look for a way forward

and any way forward – any way decided upon – does not register a ding in eternity –

it is nothing more than a proposal – a contingent proposal –

which has no certainty to it –

and which in the passage of time – might well be tossed

as to the decision procedure –

we have invented various propositional games – games which pretend a common ground –  games such as verification and falsification

these games are easily dismissed – if we question their logic –

any ‘verified’ proposition – is open to question –

the same is true of falsification –

unless you stop the logical process of question and doubt – there is no verification – no falsification –

and any decision to stop – must be illogical

nevertheless these games and variants of them are played

and from a logical point of view – they can only be regarded as pretentious – and their only value is rhetorical

what percentage of scientific practise is logical – and what percentage is rhetorical – is indeed an interesting question

what is clear is that science does not work in a purely logical fashion – and that it does not work in a purely rhetorical manner –

science – as with the rest of our propositional life – is a mixture of logic and rhetoric –

if you like – the rational and the irrational

the rational purists will find this view intolerable –

and the irrationalist purists likewise will kick up –

the point I make is that the human being uses both rational and irrational strategies to get through this life

and in any complex propositional enterprise – you will find both the rational and the irrational – living together – uneasily perhaps – uncertainly – yes

referring to the Copernican theory –

Feyerabend continues –

‘It is obvious that such a new world view will take a long time appearing, and that we may never succeed to formulate it in its entirety. It is extremely unlikely that the idea of the motion of the earth will at once be followed by the arrival, in full formal splendour, of all the sciences that are now said to constitute the body of ‘classical physics’. Or, to be a little more realistic, such a sequence of events is not only extremely unlikely, it is impossible in principle, given the nature of man and the complexities of the world he inhabits. Yet it is only after these sciences have arrived that a test can be said to make sense.’

an odd statement –

‘it is impossible in principle, given the nature of man and the complexities of the world he inhabits’

I would put that the nature of man is uncertain – and that the complexities of the world he inhabits – are uncertain –

and it is in this uncertainty – that different – and hence new views arise – and that new views – even new disciplines – get developed

Feyerabend here is taking a sweeping view of the development of modern science –

such a view fails the test of now

and the test of now – is that which is proposed – that which is questioned – that which is a matter of doubt

we don’t know the future – we don’t know how a theory will be – in the future –

all we can reasonably talk about – is what we have now –

and how we are going to proceed with the proposals – the theories that are before us –

speculating about what is needed for a theory to be triumphant – is just pretence –

it is pretending a god’s eye view – a perspective that no one actually has –  and a perspective Feyerabend claims to argue against –

it is just fanciful rhetoric –

and if this ‘perspective’ is based on an historical argument –

i.e. what has been the case in the past – will be case in the future –

then it is a perspective based on very bad logic

‘This need to wait and to ignore large masses of critical observations and measurements, is hardly ever discussed in our methodologies. Disregarding the possibility that a new physics or a new astronomy might have to be judged by a new theory of knowledge and might require entirely new tests, scientists at once confront it with the status quo and announce triumphantly that ‘it is not in agreement with facts and received principles’. They are of course right, and even trivially so, but not in the sense intended by them. For at an early stage of development the contradiction only indicates that the old and new are different and out of phase. It does not show which is the better one. A judgment of this kind presupposes that the competitors confront each other on equal terms. How shall we proceed in order to bring about such a fair comparison?’

science is not a game of leap frog –

it is not about generating new theories or cosmologies for the sake of it

it is not about how to make one theory obsolescent and another triumphant – only to then render the triumphant theory – obsolescent – with the new theory etc. etc.

science is the investigation of propositional uncertainty – theoretical propositions – observational propositions –

uncertainty is the focus –

and yes out of this uncertainty come new perspectives on existing theories – and indeed new theories that challenge existing perspectives

those who hold to the status quo without question – are not scientists – they are bigots –

yes – old and new are different – and you can drop ‘old’ and ‘new – and just stick with ‘different’ –

‘it does not show which is the better one’ – quite right –

reason is – there is no ‘better one’ – there are only different ones

why does one scientific system gain supremacy over another?

well – who can say? –

but my bet is that – in the end – one view comes to be regarded as more useful than another –

that is just my speculation –

the logical reality is that – the question of why one view gains cultural supremacy – is an open question –

one for which there will be no definitive or final answer –

the question is live – and will remain live

‘A judgment of this kind presupposes that the competitors confront each other on equal terms.’

well – I don’t think it does –

that is I don’t think it presupposes that that they confront each other on equal terms –

there are no equal terms – if you are talking about fundamentally different theories – different conceptions

Feyerabend asks –

‘How shall we proceed in order to bring about such a fair comparison?”

‘The first step is clear: we must retain the new cosmology until it has been supplemented by the necessary auxiliary sciences. We must retain it in the face of plain and unambiguous facts. We may, of course, try to explain our action by saying that critical observations are either not relevant or that they are illusory, but we cannot support such  an explanation by a single objective reason. Whatever explanation we give is nothing but a verbal gesture, a gentle invitation to participate in the development of the new philosophy. Nor can we reasonably remove the received theory of perception which says that the observations are relevant, gives reasons for this assertion, and is confirmed by independent evidence. Thus the new view is quite arbitrarily separated from those data that supported its predecessor and is more ‘metaphysical’: a new period in the history of science commences with a backward movement that returns us to an earlier stage where theories were more vague and had smaller empirical content. This backward movement is not just an accident, it has a definite function; it is essential if we want to overtake the status quo, for it gives us the time and freedom that are needed for developing the main view in detail, and for finding the necessary auxiliary sciences.’

the ‘necessary auxiliary sciences’ – will be elements of a theory –

and the theory – with the auxiliary sciences – will be – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

the ‘necessary auxiliary sciences’ – will increase the uncertainty of the theory –

and this increase of uncertainty – is an increase of empirical content

there is no ‘must’ here – there is just what happens –

if a new theory is ‘retained’ – it will be retained presumably because someone thinks it has real promise

if – as it happens – it doesn’t light any fires – it will for all intents and purposes –

most likely – be dropped –

that is to say it will not be proceeded with by scientists working in the relevant field –

yes you can invite others to participate in the development of a new philosophy –

interesting intellectual game –

but if that is all it is – I think you will find – the players drop off –

look – this idea that the new view is arbitrarily separated from those data that supported its ‘predecessor’ –

                                                                                                                                      means either – it’s not in the game – or in fact it is not ‘separated from the data’ –

if you think it is separated from it – then all that means is that you haven’t been able to show that it can be an interpretation of the data –

that it offers a new and different view of the data

if it doesn’t do this then it is not likely to be of any use to anyone in the relevant critical context

it strikes me that Feyerabend is arguing for the new – for the sake of the new –

and in so doing has lost his bearings –

he’s floating around somewhere – but no port in sight

he seems to want to avoid any contact with the data – which is to say with the science – that is actually going on

and it has got a little queer – because he wants to justify this methodology – with a ‘backward movement’ – a retreat

a retreat to a pre-scientific perspective – a ‘more metaphysical’ time and place –

where ‘theories were more vague  and had smaller empirical content’ –

not to my mind – a step in the right direction

the whole point of this ‘backward movement’ – we are told is to ‘overtake the status quo’

well I don’t think the status quo need be too worried

and in any case – it strikes me that Feyerabend here in arguing for the overtaking of the status quo –  is closer to a capitalist notion of corporation takeover than he is to his professed anarchism

the point being – if a new scientific theory ‘takes over’ the status quo theory – it becomes the status quo – ripe for takeover from another theoretical start-up –

what do they call it?

dog eat dog.

‘This backward movement is indeed essential – but how can we persuade people to follow our lead? How can we lure them away from a well-defined, sophisticated and empirically successful system and make them transfer their allegiance to an unfinished and absurd hypothesis? To a hypothesis, moreover, that is contradicted by one observation after another if we only take the trouble to compare it with what is plainly shown to be the case by our senses? How can we convince them that the success of the status quo is only apparent and is bound to be shown as such in 500 years or more, when there is not a single argument on our side (and remember that the illustrations I used two paragraphs earlier derive their force from the success of classical physics and were not available to the Copernicans). It is clear that allegiance to the new ideas will have to be brought about by means other than arguments. It will have to be brought about by irrational means such as propaganda, emotion, ad hoc hypotheses, and appeal to prejudices of all kinds. We need these ‘irrational means’ in order to uphold what is nothing but a blind faith until we have found the auxiliary sciences, the facts, the arguments that turn the faith into sound ‘knowledge’.’

‘This backward movement is essential’?

no – its not essential – it is retrogressive – it’s a way of going backwards

‘It’s clear that allegiance to the new ideas will have to be brought about by means other than arguments’

no – this is not clear – not clear at all

what Feyerabend is saying here is – if you have a proposal – an hypothesis – a theory – a world view –

but you have no argument for it – and you still believe in it – still hold to it

you will try to persuade – without argument – you will use irrational means – i.e. – emotion

an ad hoc hypothesis – by the way is an argument – it is not irrational

and yes being a champion of ignorance – you will  double down on your prejudices

as for blind faith – just hot air

‘until we have found the auxiliary sciences’ –

that is until we have found the arguments that give the proposal something resembling substance –

waiting for the miracle to come –

it’s the methodology of the shyster – sign up now – and you will receive the goods in the mail – when in fact there are no goods at all

turning faith into knowledge –

turning faith into knowledge – is ditching faith altogether – and recognising that what we propose – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and it is understanding that the exploration of uncertainty – is the road of argument

I am seriously unimpressed with this ‘argument’ from Feyerabend –

if Feyerabend had his way – we’d be back in the dark ages – or beyond –

with no question – no doubt – and ‘secure’ in the arms of prejudice and propaganda

Feyerabend states at the head of this chapter –

‘Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science survived only because reason was frequently overruled’

we have no real account of what ‘reason’ is – from Feyerabend

he assumes we all know just what he means here –

and from what I can gather – ‘reason’ – as Feyerabend uses the term – is  some reining intellectual orthodoxy – even the status quo – that is in someway or another enforced by the powers that be

so – it is some form of an authoritarian intellectual hegemony

ok – the point is – this is not reason – this is prejudice – entrenched prejudice –

and Feyerabend’s central mistake is just that he confuses reason with prejudice

reason is the critical capacity

it is the propositional action of question – of doubt – and of regarding any proposal put as uncertain

there is no authority – but the authority of authorship –

and logically speaking – the authorship of a proposal – of a proposition of any form – is irrelevant

authority – or claims to authority – are logically irrelevant –

such claims are the province of prejudice and rhetoric

if Feyerabend was saying that Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science survived because prejudice and claims to authority were put to question – put to doubt –

then at least – he would have had a point as far as I can see – and at least he would have got reason and reasoning right

as to the why the Copernican theory et el survived –

it is an open question –

there will be various proposals put in explanation of the success of these theories

and these proposals – these explanations – will be open to question – open to doubt –

will be – uncertain