Feyerabend 5

5

‘No theory ever agrees with all the facts of its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of progress. It is also a first step in our attempt to find principles implicit in familiar observational notions.’

‘Considering now the invention, the elaboration and use of theories which are inconsistent, not just with other theories, but even with experiments, facts, observations, we may start by pointing out that no single theory ever agrees with all the known facts in its domain. And the trouble is not created by rumours, or the result of sloppy procedure. It is created by experiments and measurements of the highest precision and reliability.’

this ‘trouble’ according to Feyerabend is created by ‘experiments and measurements of the highest precision and reliability’

‘this trouble’ – is only a trouble – if you are troubled by logical reality –

‘theories’ – ‘experiments’ – ‘facts’ – ‘observations’ – are from a logical point of view – different characterizations of proposals

and any proposal – be it a ‘theory’ – an ‘experiment’ – a ‘fact’ – an ‘observation’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

the ‘trouble’ – so called – is uncertainty

‘experiments and measurements of the highest precision and reliability’ –

are when you drop the rhetoric (‘highest precision and reliability’) – proposals –

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

if we operate logically – we never leave uncertainty –

and if we operate illogically – we deal in pretension and rhetoric –

questions can always be asked – doubts raised – and uncertainties revealed –

pretension and rhetoric – for all their show and bluster – are grounded in prejudice and ignorance –

our only defence is logic

‘It will be convenient, at this place, to distinguish two kinds of disagreement between theory and fact: numerical disagreement, and qualitative failures.

The first case is quite familiar: a theory makes a numerical prediction and the value that is actually obtained differs from the prediction made by more than the margin of error. Precision instruments are usually involved here. Numerical disagreements abound in science. They give rise to an ‘ocean of anomalies’ that surrounds every single theory.

Thus the Copernican view at the time of Galileo was inconsistent with facts so plain and obvious that Galileo had to call it ‘surely false’. There is no limit to my astonishment’, he writes in a later work ‘when I reflect that Aristarchus and Copernicus were able to make reason so conquer sense that, in defiance of the latter, the former became mistress of their belief.’ Newton’s theory of gravitation was beset, from the very beginning, by difficulties serious enough to provide material for refutation. Even today and in the non-relativistic domain their ‘exist numerous discrepancies between observation and theory’. [Max Jammer] Bohr’s atomic model was introduced, and retained, in the face of precise and unshakable contrary evidence. The general theory of relativity was retained despite Kaufman’s unambiguous experimental results of 1906, and despite D.C. Miller’s refutation (I am speaking of a refutation because the experiment was, from the point of view of contemporary evidence, at least as well preferred as were the earlier experiments of Michelson and Morley). The general theory of relativity, though surprisingly successful in some domains…failed to explain 10˝ in the movement of the nodes of Venus and more that 5˝ in the movement of the nodes of Mars, moreover, it is now again in trouble due to the new calculations on the motion of Mercury by Dicke and others. All these are quantitative difficulties, which can be resolved by discovering a better set of numbers but which do not force us to make qualitative adjustments.’

numerical disagreement –

where the value that is actually obtained – differs from the prediction made –

Feyerabend says it is just a matter of discovering a better set of numbers –

any theory is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

its predictions are – uncertain

and any value actually obtained – will be a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

this is the logical reality

any proposal of agreement between theory and fact –

or any proposal of disagreement between theory and fact –

is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

agreement or disagreement – are pragmatic decisions – in the face of propositional uncertainty

you decide to endorse the theory in the face of quantitative difficulties –

or you decide to give more weight – a greater value – to the quantitative difficulties – than to the theory

any decision either way – will be open to question – open to doubt – will be uncertain

hoping that a better set of numbers will come along – may be why you decide to stick with the theory –

and there may well be any number of other reasons

the logical fact remains – any decision here – is a proposal – and as such is uncertain

‘The second case, the case of qualitative failures, is less familiar, but of much greater interest. In this case a theory is inconsistent not with a recondite fact, that can be unearthed with the help of complex equipment and is known to experts only, but with circumstances which are easily noticed and which are familiar to everyone.

The first and, to my mind, the most important example of an inconsistency of this kind is Parmenides’ theory of the unchanging and homogeneous One which is contradicted by almost everything we know and experience. The theory has much in its favour and plays a role even today in the general theory of relativity. Used in an undeveloped form by Anaximander, it led to the insight by Heisenberg in his theory of elementary particles that the basic substance, or the basic elements of the universe, cannot obey the same laws as the visible elements. The theory was supported by Zeno’s arguments, which showed the difficulties inherent in the idea of a continuum consisting of isolated elements. Aristotle took these arguments seriously and developed his own theory of the continuum. Yet the concept of the continuum as a collection of elements remained and continued to be used, despite the quite obvious difficulties, until these difficulties were almost removed in the 20^th century.’

‘but with circumstances which are easily noticed and which are familiar to everyone.’ –

this so called ‘easily noticed and familiar to everyone’ – whatever that amounts to – will be a proposal – regarding what is seen – what is experienced –

what you get with Parmenides’ theory of the unchanging and homogeneous One – is an alternative account of what is experienced

two different proposals  –

both open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the proposal regarding the ‘easily noticed and familiar to everyone’ – has a use – and has a function – in everyday life

and as Feyerabend demonstrates here – Parmenides’ proposal can be shown to have significance in physics

is anyone going to suggest that a proposal of the ‘easily noticed and familiar to everyone’ – will function in Heisenberg’s theory of elementary particles?

or that the unchanging and homogeneous One – will get a good run on the street?

what we have here is different proposals – different propositions – that function in different propositional contexts – that have different uses

yes you can put them side by side – and pretend a conflict –

but if you do this – all you show is an ignorance of propositional diversity and use –

we are not dealing here with ‘qualitative failure’ – that is rubbish

what we have is propositional difference – plain and simple

‘Yet the concept of the continuum as a collection of elements remained and continued to be used, despite the quite obvious difficulties, until these difficulties were almost removed in the 20^th century.’ –

proposals / theories – will remain significant if they have a use –

difficulties come and go –

what remains is propositional uncertainty

‘A further example of a theory with qualitative defects is Newton’s theory of colours. According to this theory, light consists of rays of different refrangibility which can be separated, united, refracted, but which are never changed in their internal constitution, and which have a very small lateral extension in space. Considering that the surface of mirrors is much rougher than the lateral extension of rays, the ray theory is found to be inconsistent with the existence of mirror images (as is admitted by Newton himself): if light consists of rays, then a mirror should behave like a rough surface, i.e. it should look to us like a wall. Newton retained his theory, eliminating the difficulty with the help of an ad hoc hypothesis: ‘The reflection of a ray is effected, not by a single point of the reflecting body, but by some power of the body which is evenly diffused all over its surface.

In Newton’s case the qualitative discrepancy between theory and fact was removed by an ad hoc hypothesis. In other cases not even this very flimsy manoeuvre is used: one retains the theory and tries to forget its shortcomings. An example of this is the attitude towards

Kepler’s rule according to which an object viewed through a lens is perceived at the point at which the rays travelling from the lens towards the eye intersect. The rule implies that an object situated at the focus will be seen infinitely far away.

‘But on the contrary’, writes Barrow, Newton’s teacher and predecessor at Cambridge, commenting on this prediction, ‘we are assured by experience that [a point situated close to the focus] appears variously distant, according to the different situations of the eye … And it does almost never seem further off than it would be if it were beheld with the naked eye; but on the contrary, it does sometimes appear much nearer …All of which

does seem repugnant to our principles.’ ‘But for me’, Barrow continues, ‘neither this nor any other difficulty shall have so great an influence on me, as to make me renounce that which I know to be manifestly agreeable to reason.’

Barrow mentions the qualitative difficulties, and he says that he will retain the theory nevertheless. This is not the usual procedure. The usual procedure is to forget the difficulties, never talk about them, and to proceed as if the theory were without fault. This attitude is very common today.

Thus the classical electrodynamics of Maxwell and Lorentz implies the motion of a free particle is self-accelerated. Considering the self-energy of the electron one obtains divergent expression for point charges while charges of finite extension can be made to agree with relativity only by adding untestable stress and pressures inside the electron. The problem reappears in the quantum theory, though it is here partially covered by ‘renormalization’. This procedure consists in crossing out the results of certain calculations and replacing them by a description of what is actually observed. Thus one admits, implicitly, that the theory is in trouble with formulating it in a manner suggesting that a new principle has been discovered. Small wonder when philosophically unsophisticated authors get the impression that ‘all evidence points with merciless definitiveness in the … direction … [that] all the processes involving … unknown interactions conform to the fundamental quantum law.’ [Rosenfeld in Observation and Interpretation, London, 1957, p.44].’

Newton’s ‘some power of the body which is evenly diffused all over its surface’ –

is hardly empirical – and for that matter barely theoretical –

but presumably Newton did not see the mirror problem as a good enough reason to dump the ray theory

and Kepler’s rule – quite obviously does not fit with veridical visual perception – or what would go for a normal understanding of it

and Barrow – for whatever reason is quite prepared to go with the theory – against the senses

it is examples like this – which makes you ask the question – well what really does drive science – what drives scientists?

I think in all honesty – we can only say – we don’t know –

and they don’t know either

yes – we will have theories of science – and of scientists – but such theories – are open to question – open to doubt – and for all intents and purposes – uncertain

‘all evidence points with merciless definitiveness in the … direction … [that] all the processes involving … unknown interactions conform to the fundamental quantum law’ [Rosenfeld]

do scientists fear that if they represented themselves and their enterprise as uncertain – they would loose any power they have?

I guess so – but if so – I think they are wrong about that –

I suspect that the uncertainty of science and the scientist – is already understood by the layman

and further that the public also recognise that uncertain as it is  –

science has great value – and has delivered great benefits to humanity  –

and that it has delivered catastrophes –

understanding and dealing with uncertainty – I would suggest is the common lot of man –

and it is no big jump to see that the so called ‘authorities’ – paraded before us – are in fact pretenders

I think we need pretence to get through this existence – but I think too – we can easily see it for what it is –

no more than a tool of survival – that can be of use

‘The problem reappears in quantum theory, though it is here partially covered by ‘renormalization’. This procedure consists in crossing out the results of certain calculations and replacing them by a description of what is actually observed.’

‘renormalization’ – now that’s a good one –

I think Feyerabend is right on the money here when he says –

‘Thus one admits, implicitly, that the theory is in trouble with formulating it in a manner suggesting that a new principle has been discovered.’

this leaves quantum theory – in a rather – uncertain position –

and this I would argue that is a good thing –

and that being in this uncertain position is in fact the logical reality – for any theory – for any proposal

‘To sum up this brief and incomplete list: wherever we look, whenever we have a little patience and select our evidence in an unprejudiced manner, we find that theories fail adequately to reproduce certain quantitative results, and that they are qualitatively incompetent to a surprising degree. Science gives us theories of great beauty and sophistication. Modern science has developed mathematical structures which exceed anything that has existed so far in coherence and generality. But in order to achieve this miracle all the existing troubles had to be pushed into the relation between theory and fact, and had to be concealed, by ad hoc approximations and by other procedures.’

quantitative results – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

qualitative results – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

this ‘miracle’ of coherence and generality – as I see it – is no miracle at all – it is the on-

going result of the exploration of propositional uncertainty

theory and fact – are propositional categories – organizational categories – that have proved  to be most useful

what Feyerabend refers to as ‘existing troubles’ – are propositional uncertainties –

ad hoc procedures – are open to question –

and an ad hoc theory – may well be used to cover theoretical difficulties – that is it may be a pretence –

this is not good practice

on the other hand – an ad hoc theory – may be a pragmatic action – the purpose of which is to move things along

in this case – the ad hoc action – enables work to proceed – while keeping an eye on the issues that need further investigation

any proposal – any propositional action – any propositional decision – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘This being the case, what shall we make of the methodological demand that a theory must be judged by experience and must be rejected if it contradicts accepted basic statements? What attitude shall we adopt towards the various theories of confirmation and corroboration, which all rest on the assumption that theories can be made to agree completely with known facts, and which use the amount of agreement reached as a principle of evaluation? This demand, these theories, are now all seen to be quite useless. They are as useless as medicine which heals a patient only if he is bacteria free. In practice they are never obeyed by anyone. Methodologists may point to the importance of falsifications – but they blithely use falsified theories. They may sermonize how important it is to consider all the relevant evidence, and never mention those big and drastic facts which show that the theories which they admire and accept, like the theory of relativity or the quantum theory, may be as badly off as the older theories which they reject. In practice they slavishly repeat the most recent pronouncements of the top dogs in physics, though in doing so they must violate some very basic rules of their trade. Is it possible to proceed in a more reasonable manner? Let us see.’

‘what shall we make of the methodological demand that a theory must be judged by experience and must be rejected if it contradicts accepted basic statements?’

what do we make of any demand?

a demand is authoritarian rhetoric – and we are best to see it as logically worthless –

that a theory is to be judged by experience – and rejected if it contradicts accepted basic statements – is a methodological proposal – a proposal as to how to proceed –

and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

this judging by experience – proposal – is a propositional practice that has developed in the culture of science –

and as with other such practices it has its uses and its limitations –

there is a logic to it – and indeed it can be a pretence

‘What attitude shall we adopt towards the various theories of confirmation and corroboration, which all rest on the assumption that theories can be made to agree completely with known facts, and which use the amount of agreement reached as a principle of evaluation?’

the assumption that theories can be made to agree completely with known facts –

is an instance of the assumption of certainty –

this assumption is not just fanciful – it is illogical –

theories are proposals – ‘known facts’ – are proposals – proposals are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

this assumption – that theories can be made to agree completely with known facts – is pretentious – and delusional

the amount of agreement reached – as a principle of evaluation?

well – any principle – any  evaluation – is uncertain –

nevertheless evaluation are made – and must be made – if there is to be any propositional movement

so if ‘the amount of agreement’ is decided on as a criterion – fair enough

‘In practice they slavishly repeat the most recent pronouncements of the top dogs in physics, though in doing so they must violate some very basic rules of their trade. Is it possible to proceed in a more reasonable manner?’

yes – human all too human –

is it possible to proceed in a more reasonable manner?

well – it all depends on what you think is reasonable –

I doubt that there will be any general long lasting agreement here – by those who actually do science – and those who observe and describe it –

in any case – science will proceed – as it proceeds

and as it proceeds – it will be open to question – open to doubt – and it will be uncertain

in my view – you can’t get more reasonable than that

‘According to Hume, theories cannot be derived from facts. The demand to admit only those theories which follow from facts leaves us without any theory. Hence, science as we know it can only exist if we drop the demand and revise our methodology.’

derivation – as I see it is – an explanation of the proposal – of its origin –

an explanation which by the way – is open to question – to doubt – is therefore – uncertain

my point though is that it is actually irrelevant where a proposal comes from –

unless of course you are running an argument for a particular epistemological prejudice

a proposal is put –

whether you want to chase it down to a sense datum – or an idea – or – nothing – makes no difference –

it has been put –

and so the question is – are you going to proceed with it – or not?

does it have value in the propositional context that it has been put in?

and that is the question – the doubt – the uncertainty

                                                                                                                                           

‘According to our present results, hardly any theory is consistent with the facts. The demand to admit only those theories which follow from the facts leaves us without any theory. (I repeat: without any theory, for there is not a single theory that is not is some trouble or another.) Hence, a science as we know it can exist only if we drop this demand also and again revise our methodology, now admitting counterinduction in addition to

admitting unsupported hypotheses. The right method must not contain any rules that make us choose between theories on the basis of falsification. Rather, its rules must enable us to choose between theories we have already tested and which are falsified.’

‘Hence, a science as we know it can exist only if we drop this demand also and again revise our methodology, now admitting counterinduction in addition to

admitting unsupported hypotheses.’

any demand is just – authoritarian rhetoric –

really any free thinking individual will see through any demand – from anywhere

it is not a question of admitting – counterinduction – or unsupported hypotheses –

it is rather seeing that any proposal is valid –

and that any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

that is the first point

the next thing to say is that whether a proposal has legs – is a question for those dealing with it

if a proposal is put in a scientific propositional context – it will be those working in that context who will determine the value of the proposal

‘The right method must not contain any rules that make us choose between theories on the basis of falsification. Rather, its rules must enable us to choose between theories we have already tested and which are falsified.’

more demands – more rules –

Feyerabend has not been able to get out of the trenches – his argument is no advance

falsification – verification – are propositional rituals that the practice of science has developed

at the end of the day whether a proposal is regarded as verified – or falsified – is logically irrelevant

it is open to question – open to doubt – it is uncertain

‘To proceed further. Not only are facts and theories in constant disharmony, they are never as neatly separated out as everyone makes them out to be. Methodological rules speak of ‘theories’, ‘observations’ and ‘experimental results’ as if these were clear-cut well defined objects whose properties are easy to evaluate and which are understood in the same way by all scientists’

the ‘fact’ – and the ‘theory’ – are propositional categories –

any distinction between a ‘theory’ and a ‘fact’ – is descriptive

we have different descriptions of propositions – because we have different uses for proposals – for propositions

logically speaking – any proposal – any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

regardless of how it is described or categorized – regardless of its use or function

‘methodological rules’ – are proposals for procedure –

they are of course – open to question – open to doubt – and as with any proposal – uncertain

whether one person – understands another’s proposals – in the way that the person putting the proposal does – is uncertain

we make an assumption here – an assumption of ‘understanding’ – and in everyday life – not to mention science – this assumption is constantly challenged – and indeed sometimes it appears to be entirely wrongheaded –

nevertheless we proceed

‘However, the material which a scientist actually has at his disposal, his laws, his experimental results, his mathematical techniques, his epistemological prejudices, his attitude toward the absurd consequences of the theories which he accepts, is indeterminate in many ways, ambiguous, and never fully separated from the historical background. The material is always contaminated by principles which he does not know

and which, if known, would be extremely hard to test. Questionable views on cognition such as the view that our senses, used in normal circumstances, give reliable information about the world, may invade the observation language itself, constituting the observational terms as well as the distinction between veridical and illusory appearance. As a result, observation languages may become tied to older layers of speculation which affect, in this roundabout fashion, even the most progressive methodology. (Example: the absolute space-time frame of classical physics which was codified and consecrated by Kant.) The sensory impression, however simple, always contains a component that expresses the physiological reaction of the perceiving organism and has no objective

correlate. This ‘subjective’ component often merges with the rest, and forms an unstructured whole which must then be subdivided from the outside with the help of counter-inductive procedures. (An example of this is the appearance of the fixed star to the naked eye, which contains the subjective effects of irradiation, diffraction, diffusion, restricted by the lateral inhibition of adjacent elements of the retina.) Finally, there are the auxiliary premises which are needed for the derivation of testable conclusions, and which occasionally form entire auxiliary sciences.’

‘However, the material which a scientist actually has at his disposal, his laws, his experimental results, his mathematical techniques, his epistemological prejudices, his attitude toward the absurd consequences of the theories which he accepts, is indeterminate in many ways, ambiguous, and never fully separated from the historical background.’

the material that a scientist actually has at his disposal –

his laws – experimental results – his mathematical techniques – his epistemological theories (as distinct from epistemological prejudices) – his attitude toward the consequences of his theories – are proposals

if they are not separated from ‘the’ historical background –

that is because an historical background has been proposed

‘The material is always contaminated by principles which he does not know and which, if known, would be extremely hard to test’

the ‘material’ – is not ‘contaminated’ – the material is open to question – open to doubt – the ‘material’ – is uncertain –

if someone proposes a ‘principle’ – in the material – then it is known –

prior to this proposal – the ‘principle’ – is not there – it doesn’t exist

it doesn’t exist – unless it is proposed – it is not known – until it is proposed

once proposed – it is open to question – open to doubt – it is uncertain

such ‘principles’ / proposals are not hard to test – they are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain

‘Questionable views on cognition such as the view that our senses, used in normal circumstances, give reliable information about the world, may invade the observation language itself, constituting the observational terms as well as the distinction between veridical and illusory appearance.’

any view is questionable

the ‘language itself’ – is propositional – open to question –

a distinction between veridical and illusory experience – is as with any proposal –

open to question

‘As a result, observation languages may become tied to older layers of speculation which affect, in this roundabout fashion, even the most progressive methodology.’

if other speculations – ‘older’ or not – are proposed – so be it

‘The sensory impression, however simple, always contains a component that expresses the physiological reaction of the perceiving organism and has no objective correlate.’

the ‘sensory impression’ – is a proposal – and as the philosophical work in this area shows only too well – the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘This ‘subjective’ component often merges with the rest, and forms an unstructured whole which must then be subdivided from the outside with the help of counter-inductive procedures.’

another proposal –

‘Finally, there are the auxiliary premises which are needed for the derivation of testable conclusions, and which occasionally form entire auxiliary sciences.’

well given that the proposal is – logically speaking – uncertain – yes it can be taken in any direction

‘Consider the case of the Copernican hypothesis, whose invention, and partial vindication runs counter to almost every methodological rule one might care to think of today. The auxiliary sciences here contained laws describing the properties and the influence of the terrestrial  atmosphere (meteorology); optical laws dealing with the structure of the eye and of the telescopes, and with the behaviour of light; and dynamical laws describing motion in moving systems. Most importantly, however, the auxiliary sciences contained a theory of cognition that postulated a certain simple relation between perceptions and physical objects. Not all these auxiliary disciplines were available in explicit form, many of them emerged with the observation language, and led to the situation described at the beginning of the preceding paragraph.*’

[* ‘However, the material which a scientist actually has at his disposal, his laws, his experimental results, his mathematical techniques, his epistemological prejudices, his attitude toward the absurd consequences of the theories which he accepts, is indeterminate in many ways, ambiguous, and never fully separated from the historical background.’]

Feyerabend here puts that it is the use of auxiliary sciences – that is auxiliary propositional systems – which leads to the situation where the material a scientist has at his disposal – is indeterminate and ambiguous –

yes – science is a theoretical patchwork –

but this is not the reason it is indeterminate or ambiguous –

indeterminacy and ambiguity – are expressions of uncertainty

the propositions of science – as with the propositions of any other human acttivity or endeavour – are proposals

from a logical point of view the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt –  is – uncertain

you can propose an account of a proposition – that analyses it in term of the propositional systems that have led to it – or contributed to it – or in fact have been developed from it –

this can be an interesting study – an interesting portrayal – an interesting proposal

however logically – it is neither here nor there –

the uncertainty of any propositional system is to found in the uncertainty of any proposition

‘Consideration of all theses circumstances, of observation terms, sensory core, auxiliary sciences, background speculation, suggest that a theory may be inconsistent with the evidence, not because it is incorrect, but because the evidence is contaminated. The theory is threatened because the evidence either contains unanalysed sensations which only partly correspond to external processes, or because it is presented in terms of antiquated views, or because it is evaluated with the help of backward auxiliary theories.’ The Copernican theory was in trouble for all these reasons.’

a theory inconsistent with the evidence – because the evidence is contaminated?

this ‘evidence’ is – proposal – propositions – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

in the same way that the theory is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

Feyerabend confuses contamination – with uncertainty

I think ‘contamination’ suits Feyerabend better than uncertainty – for ‘contamination’ has more of a rhetorical ring to it

and frankly – I don’t think Feyerabend understands logical uncertainty

‘The theory is threatened because the evidence either contains unanalysed sensations which only partly correspond to external processes, or because it is presented in terms of antiquated views, or because it is evaluated with the help of backward auxiliary theories.’

if you understand that the theory is a proposal – that is uncertain – then the theory is not threatened

and not threatened by unanalysed sensations – or the terms in which it is presented or any association with auxiliary theories –

these ‘unanalysed sensations’ – ‘the terms of the theory’ – and its ‘relation to auxiliary theories’ – are proposals –

proposals that are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a theory gets proposed – it is argued – for and against – it is accepted – or not – it is proceeded with – or not

that’s the guts of it

and yes you can do an historical / methodological serenade or hatchet job on its success or on its lack of success

these stories are always good fun to read – and often quite insightful – but such romances and tragedies – have nothing to do with science

if you are looking for the answer to the question – why one theory prevailed – and another didn’t – keep looking –

the best you can get here is proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

                                                                                                                                           

decisions get made – decisions as to whether to proceed with a theory – to proceed with the evidence

any decision is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

the dogs bark and the caravan moves on

‘It is this historico-physiological character of the evidence, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs but also expresses subjective, mythical and long forgotten views concerning this state of affairs, that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology. It shows that it would be extremely imprudent to let the evidence judge our theories directly and without any further ado. A straightforward and unqualified  judgement of theories by ‘facts’ is bound to eliminate ideas simply because they do not fit into the framework of some older cosmology. Taking experimental results and observations for granted and putting the burden of proof on the theory means taking the

observational ideology for granted without having ever examined it. (Note the experimental results are supposed to have been obtained with the greatest possible care. Hence ‘taking observations, etc., for granted’ means ‘taking them for granted after the most careful examination of their reliability’: for even the most careful examination of an observation does not interfere with the concepts in which it is expressed, or with the structure of the sensory image.)’

‘It is this historico-physiological character of the evidence, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs but also expresses subjective, mythical and long forgotten views concerning this state of affairs, that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology.’

it is not this historical-physiological character of evidence … that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology’

this historical-physiological character of evidence – is a methodological proposal –

in the same boat as the methodological proposals – Feyerabend discredits

let’s be clear – methodological proposals are either propositional directives – before the fact of scientific activity – or they are descriptions of scientific work – after the fact

methodological directives – can either be rhetoric that serves an epistemological prejudice –

or they can be guidelines – the point of which is to get the process of investigation under way

if the former – their point is to serve a prejudice –

if the latter – then they are proposals that may be useful –

as to methodological proposals that are descriptions after the fact – they are as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

they may be of use to the scientist – or they may not

‘a fresh look at methodology’ –

is to see it as a propositional activity that is an ancillary activity to actual science –

and to see it as – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘It shows that it would be extremely imprudent to let the evidence judge our theories directly and without any further ado. A straightforward and unqualified judgement of theories by ‘facts’ is bound to eliminate ideas simply because they do not fit into the framework of some older cosmology

well any judgement that is ‘direct and without further ado’ – is unwise

our judgements are open to question

however judgements get made – and yes ideas – get eliminated –

if they don’t – what kind of ‘judgement’ is it?

as to older cosmologies – most likely they will be tossed –

this won’t be the case however – if these older cosmologies – are seen to be relevant –

and any claim of relevance will require argument – and eventually – decision

decision – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

decision nevertheless

‘Taking experimental results and observations for granted and putting the burden of proof on the theory means taking the observational ideology for granted without having ever examined it’ –

yes – this can happen – does happen – science proceeds

‘Now – how can we possibly examine something we use all the time and presuppose in every statement? How can we criticize the terms in which we habitually express our observations? Let us see!’

                                                                                                                                          

well I find it hard to believe that there would be anyone dumb enough – and rigid enough – to presuppose ‘something’ – meaning the same ‘something’ – in every statement

however – if we presuppose – then we either know we presuppose – or we don’t know –

and if we don’t know – we don’t presuppose –

someone else may say you do – but that is only their interpretation of your statement

if you are aware of a presupposition to your statement –  your presupposition – that is –

you can question it – subject it to doubt – explore its uncertainty

‘the terms in which we habitually express  our observations’ – are open to question – open to doubt – they are from a logical point of view – uncertain

how can we do it? –

we just do it – if we are interested in proceeding logically

‘The first step in our criticism of commonly-used concepts is to create a measure of criticism, something with which these concepts can be compared. Of course, we shall later want to know a little more about the measuring-stick itself; for example, we shall want to know whether it is better than, or perhaps not as good as, the material examined. But in order for this examination to start; there must be a measuring stick in the first place. Therefore, the first step in our criticism of customary concepts and customary reactions is to step outside the circle and either invent a new conceptual system, for example a new theory, that clashes with the most carefully established observational results and confounds the most plausible theoretical principles, or to import such a system from outside science, from religion, from mythology, from the ideas of incompetents, or the ramblings of madmen. This step is, again, counterinductive. Counterinduction is thus a fact – science could not exist without it – and a legitimate and much needed move in the game of science.’

‘The first step in our criticism of commonly-used concepts is to create a measure of criticism, something with which these concepts can be compared. Of course, we shall later want to know a little more about the measuring-stick itself; for example, we shall want to know whether it is better than, or perhaps not as good as, the material examined. But in order for this examination to start; there must be a measuring stick in the first place.’

this is methodological pragmatism –

you propose a ‘measuring stick’ – a standard – in order to start working

the ‘measuring stick’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘Therefore, the first step in our criticism of customary concepts and customary reactions is to step outside the circle and either invent a new conceptual system, for example a new theory, that clashes with the most carefully established observational results and confounds the most plausible theoretical principles, or to import such a system from outside science, from religion, from mythology, from the ideas of incompetents, or the ramblings of madmen.’

if what Feyerabend here calls the ‘circle’ – is propositional reality – we never step out of it –

the best that you have here is different proposals – different propositions – put against each other

different proposals – will clash – because they are different

a new theory / proposal that clashes with ‘the most carefully established observational results’ – will most likely only get a look in – and most likely only if there is some catastrophic failure in the original theory

and a theory ‘that confounds the most plausible theoretical principles’ – will need a great deal of work – and some very skilful argument if it is to get a run

in principle there is nothing against proposing – an outsider

the issue is whether it will get enough support to be a serious contender

who can say?

my hunch is – that it is unlikely

‘the ideas of incompetents’ – ‘the ramblings of madmen’ – I mean who does Feyerabend think he’s kidding? –

this is just rhetorical rubbish

and I don’t think that the counterinductive argument should be reduced to this –

what Feyerabend calls counterinduction – the entry of a complete theoretical outsider – an outsider I might add that is not incompetent or the ramblings of a madman – but rather an outsider that is competent – and intelligent – may indeed be valuable – have a place – in exceptional circumstances –

and in any case this idea of counterinduction is worth keeping on the table

however the real point here is – who can say in advance what theories – what evidence – what kind of testing – what standards of evaluation – what methodologies are to be used?

the best we can hope for is a range of methodological options

science does – as science does –

it is up to the scientists to decide how they conduct themselves

we can have this kind of discussion because we know that there are certain propositional practices that scientists adopt –

that is where we start –

but once we have made this start – we see – very quickly – that any description of the practice of science – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

the best methodological approach – is to have a good understanding of the methodologies that are proposed – that are in use –

to have a critical and open mind on these methods –

and to have an eye to inventing new methodologies – new approaches

while recognizing – that any method proposed – is open to question