13
Galileo’s method works in other fields as well. For
example, it can be used to eliminate arguments against materialism and put an
end to the philosophical mind / body problem. (The corresponding scientific
problems remain untouched, however.)
Feyerabend says the following –
‘Galileo made progress by changing familiar connections
between words and words (he introduced new concepts), words and impressions (he
introduced new natural interpretations), by using new and unfamiliar principles
(such as the law of inertia and his principle of universal relativity), and by
altering the sensory core of his observation statements. His motive was the
wish to accommodate the Copernican point of view. Copernicanism clashes with
some obvious facts. It is inconsistent with plausible, and apparently
well-established, principles, and it does not fit in with the ‘grammar’ of a
commonly spoken idiom. It does not fit in with the ‘form of life’ that contains
these facts, principles, and grammatical rules. But neither the rules, nor the
principles, nor even the facts are sacrosanct. The fault may lie with them and
not with idea that the earth moves. We may therefore change them, create new
facts and new grammatical rules, and see what happens once these rules are
available and have become familiar. Such an attempt may take considerable time,
and in a sense the Galilean venture is not finished even today. But we can
already see that the changes were wise ones to make and that it would have been
foolish to stick with the Aristotelian form of life to the exclusion of
everything else.’
‘But neither the rules, nor the principles, nor even the
facts are sacrosanct. The fault may lie with them and not with idea that the
earth moves. We may therefore change them, create new facts and new grammatical
rules, and see what happens once these rules are available and have become
familiar.’
Feyerabend is on the right track here – nothing is
sacrosanct
from a logical point of view any proposal – any proposal –
is open to question – open to doubt – is to be regarded as – uncertain
proposals – theoretical and experimental – are put – and yes
– we see what happens
‘But we can already see that the changes were wise ones to
make and that it would have been foolish to stick with the Aristotelian form of
life to the exclusion of everything else.’
what we can see is that yes – changes were made –
and that from the point of view of the new perspective – the
Aristotelian ‘form of life’ was regarded as ‘inadequate’ –
that is how it has paned out –
was it ‘wise’ to make these changes?
well from the point of view of those who endorse the changes
– yes
and there is probably no-one today who would argue for
Aristotelianism –
but regardless of the fashion of the time –
logically all we have is not – wise and unwise perspectives
– but rather different proposals – simply different –
and proposals that regardless of who does or does not
endorse them – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain
‘With the mind/body problem, the situation is exactly the
same. We have again observations, concepts, general principles, and grammatical
rules which, taken together, constitute a ‘form of life’ that apparently
supports some view, such as dualism, and excludes others, such as materialism.
(I say ‘apparently’ for the situation is much less clear here than it was in
the astronomical case.) And we may again proceed in the Galilean manner, look
for new interpretations, new facts, new grammatical rules, new principles which
can accommodate materialism and then compare the total systems –
materialism and the new facts, rules, natural interpretations, and principles
on the one side; dualism and the old ‘forms of life’ on the other. Thus there
is no need to try, like Smart, to show that Materialism is compatible with the
ideology of common sense. Nor is the suggested procedure as ‘desperate’
(Armstrong) as it must appear to those who are unfamiliar with the conceptual
change. The procedure was commonplace in antiquity and it occurs wherever
imaginative researches strike out in new directions (Einstein and Bohr are
recent examples.)’
Feyerabend misses the logical point – the issue is not
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ –
what we have is different proposals
and if you are going to argue that the way forward is to find
new facts – new rules – new natural interpretations – for one view –
then presumably you are committed to doing the same for the
other view
it’s pretty clear here that Feyerabend advocates ‘free
thinking’ – for his own preference –
but does not extend the courtesy to points of view and
perspectives – that he doesn’t favour
so it is just the same old game – with a rhetorical flourish
– suggestive of the opposite to what it is
pure rhetoric – from Feyerabend
Smart proposes that materialism is compatible with common
sense – that’s all –
and his notion of common sense – is purely physicalist –
good luck with that
and Armstrong – in arguing that the mental should be defined
in causal terms and identified with purely physical processes in the brain (brain
states) – is – like Smart simply asserting physicalism
Smart and Armstrong – as with Feyerabend – are pushing their
own barrows –
that it seems is the philosophical game
in my view the object is not to ‘eliminate’ (falsify) points
of view – but to facilitate proliferation of different theories – different
views
Feyerabend seems to get this – when talking about physics –
but forgets it when looking at his own enterprise – a case of amnesia rather
than anamnesis?
he regresses – to a fundamentalist mind-set – where the
object is to eliminate the opposition
the rational approach I would suggest is to put our
resources into developing all points of view in the mind-body problem
I put that the history of the mind / body problem makes it clear
that different theories have been used at different times by different groups
for their purposes
i.e. Cartesian dualism suits idealists – and idealism
suits certain purposes – certain interests – i.e. religious
the mind-brain identity thesis – renders the mind consistent
with a physicalist metaphysics – and thus with modern physical science
the fact that historically there has never been just one
view of the nature of the mind-body relation indicates quite clearly that no
one view will serve all the purposes a theory of mind is needed for
what we have is different usages – different conceptual
schemes – different outlooks on the world – on the nature of reality
the argument for a single view of anything is I would
suggest the argument of a small mind – whatever that small mind is proposed to
be
