Feyerabend 3

3

‘The consistency condition which demands that new hypotheses agree with accepted theories is unreasonable because it preserves the older theory. Hypotheses contradicting well-confirmed theories give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way. Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while uniformity impairs critical power. Uniformity also endangers the free development of the individual.’

‘In this chapter I shall present more detailed arguments for the counter rule that urges us to introduce hypotheses which are inconsistent with well-established theories. The argument will be indirect. They will start with a criticism of the demand that new hypotheses must be consistent with such theories. This demand will be called the consistency condition.’

any proposal – any theory – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

this ‘consistency condition’ – in so far as it is designed to reduce – minimize – or protect

a theory from criticism – from question – from doubt – from the exploration of its uncertainty – is not logical

to protect against any kind of criticism – is to operate prejudicially

Feyerabend’s so called ‘counter-rule’ – ‘that urges us to introduces hypotheses which are inconsistent with well established theories’ – has a place – or can have a place in any open and critical discussion

however that a scientist doesn’t operate counterinductively – does not mean that therefore he proceeds illogically

he may well question – doubt – and regard his theory as uncertain – without availing himself of counterinductive procedures –

there is no demand to operate counterinductively – it is an option

as to whether counterinductive procedures produce better results – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

it is important to bear in mind that the logic of science – is not always reflected in the practice of science

science – as with any propositional activity can be logical – that is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

or it can be – to varying degrees – closed to question – to doubt – to uncertainty – and thus illogical –

whether logical or illogical – science is what scientists say it is – science is what they do – and how they do it –

you might be tempted to think ‘anything goes’ –

it is rather a case of – what goes – is what goes

‘Prime Facie, the case of consistency condition can be dealt with in a few words. It is well known (and has also been shown in detail by Duhem is that Newton’s theory is inconsistent with Galileo’s law of free fall and with Kepler’s laws; that statistical thermodynamics is inconsistent with the second law of phenomenological theory; that wave optics is inconsistent with geometrical optics; and so on. Note that what is being asserted here is logical inconsistency; it may well be that the differences of prediction are too small to be detected by experiment. Note also that what is being asserted is not the inconsistency of, say Newton’s theory and Galileo’s law, but rather the inconsistency of some consequences of Newton’s theory in the domain of validity of Galileo’s law, and Galileo’s law. In the last case the situation is especially clear. Galileo’s theory asserts that the acceleration of free fall is a constant but decreases (although imperceptibly) with the distance from the centre of the earth.’

different theories –  will have different theoretical constructs – different terminologies –  and in that respect – will be inconsistent

a focus on whether theories are consistent or not – is to miss the point

for the working scientist the real issue between theories – is which theory has the greater explanatory scope – and which theory has the greater predictive power

now of course these matters are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain –

but they will not be addressed or resolved by consideration of the question of consistency

                                                                                                                                           hardline methodological prescriptions with regard to which theories can or cannot be considered in any scientific argument have no place in a free and open discussion

decisions will be made as to the value of pursuing and developing different proposals –

and any such decision is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

                                                                                                                                         

‘To speak more abstractly: consider a theory Tʹ that successfully describes the situation inside domain Dʹ. Tʹ agrees with a finite number of observations (let their class be F) and it agrees with these observations inside a margin M of error. Any alternative that contradicts Tʹ outside F and inside M is supported by exactly the same observations and is therefore acceptable if Tʹ is acceptable (I shall assume that F are the only observations made). The consistency condition is much less tolerant. It eliminates a theory or hypothesis not because it disagrees with the facts; it eliminates it because it disagrees with another theory, with a theory moreover, whose confirming instances it shares. It thereby makes the as yet untested part of that theory a measure of validity. The only difference between such a measure and a more recent theory is age and familiarity. Had the younger theory been there first, then the consistency condition would have worked in its favour. ‘The first adequate theory has the right of priority over equally adequate aftercomers’ [C.Truesdell]. In this respect the effect of the consistency condition is rather similar to the effect of the more traditional methods of transcendental deduction, analysis of essence, phenomenological analysis, linguistic analysis. It contributes to the preservation of the old and familiar not because of any inherent advantage in it – for example not because it has a better foundation in observation than has the newly suggested alternative, or because it is more elegant – but because it is old and familiar. This is not the only instance where on closer inspection a rather surprising similarity emerges between modern empiricism and some of the school philosophies it attacks.’

‘It eliminates a theory or hypothesis not because it disagrees with the facts; it eliminates it because it disagrees with another theory, with a theory moreover, whose confirming instances it shares.’ –

logically speaking – any theory – that is any proposal – is valid

that a theory – for whatever reason – is proceeded with or not proceeded with – is a contingent matter –

and there could be any number of reasons for proceeding or not proceeding with a particular theory –

decisions get made –

any decision made is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘The only difference between such a measure and a more recent theory is age and familiarity.’

I would imagine that this argument of ‘age and familiarity’ – would only appeal to those who – for whatever reason – have stopped questioning – stopped doubting – and settled into ignorance

 ‘The first adequate theory has the right of priority over equally adequate aftercomers’ [C.Truesdell].’ –

any dictate as to how scientists should proceed – is when you strip it of pretence –  simply a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘Now it seems to me that these brief considerations, although leading to an interesting tactical criticism of the consistency condition, and to some first shreds of support for counterinduction, do not yet go to the heart of the matter. They show that an alternative to the accepted point of view which shares its confirming instances cannot be eliminated by factual reasoning. They do not show that such an alternative is acceptable; even less do they show that it should be used. It is bad enough, a defender of the consistency condition might point out, that the accepted view does not possess full empirical support. Adding new theories of an equally unsatisfactory character will not improve the situation; nor is there much sense in trying to replace the accepted theories by some of their possible alternatives. Such replacement will be no easy matter. A new formalism might have to be learned and familiar problems may have to be calculated in a new way. Textbooks must be rewritten, university curricula readjusted, experimental results reinterpreted. And what will be the result of the effort? Another theory which from an empirical standpoint has no advantage whatsoever over and above the theory it replaces. The only real improvement, so the defender of the consistency condition will continue, derives from the addition of new facts. Such new facts will either support the current theories, or they will force us to modify them by indicating precisely where they go wrong. In both cases they will precipitate real progress and not merely arbitrary change. The proper procedure must therefore consist in the confrontation of the accepted point of view with as many relevant facts as possible. The exclusion of alternatives is then simply a measure of expediency: their invention not only does not help, it even hinders progress by absorbing time and manpower that could be devoted to better things. The consistency condition eliminates such fruitless discussion and it forces the scientist to concentrate on the facts which, after all, are the only acceptable judges of a theory. This is how the practising scientist will defend his concentration on a single theory to the exclusion of empirically possible alternatives.’

‘They show that an alternative to the accepted point of view which shares its confirming instances cannot be eliminated by factual reasoning. They do not show that such an alternative is acceptable; even less do they show that it should be used.’

proposals – theories – are not ‘eliminated’ –

they are either put into play – or not put into play

                                                                                                                                          

the decision to proceed with a proposal – or indeed the decision not to proceed – can logically speaking – be based on any consideration

the point here is that there is no ‘authority’ to determine the ground of decision making

the matter is contingent – which is to say – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

yes – we have proposed standards and proposed criteria which have come about and been developed within different propositional traditions and contexts –

Feyerabend mentions one here in the propositional context of science – ‘factual reasoning’

that ‘factual reasoning’ might not indicate a difference between two theories – simply means that that criterion cannot be used to differentiate between the two theories in question

there may be any number of  other criteria that can be used  – i.e. first principles – explanatory scope – predictive power – simplicity – elegance –  etc

and any criterion proposed will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

as to what is ‘acceptable’ – that comes down to what is in fact accepted by those involved in the propositional activity

and as to what ‘should’ be used –

logically speaking there is no ‘imperative’ – there is just what is used – or not used – for whatever reason

the ‘should’ comes into it when you have theorists who are primarily interested in pushing their own agendas – i.e. Feyerabend

‘should’ here is authoritarian and rhetorical

proposals – propositions – theories – are different – and therefore relative to each other –

inconsistent

the so- called ‘consistency condition’ – is a pretence – a logical fraud

‘It is worthwhile repeating the reasonable core of this argument. Theories should not be changed unless there are pressing reasons for doing so. The only pressing reason for changing a theory is disagreement with facts. Discussion of incompatible facts will therefore lead to progress. Discussion of incompatible hypotheses will not. Hence, it is sound procedure to increase the number of relevant facts. It is not sound procedure to increase the number of factually adequate but incompatible alternatives. One might wish to add that formal improvements such as increased elegance, simplicity, generality, and coherence should not be excluded. But once these improvements have been carried out, the collection of facts for the purpose of tests seems to be indeed the only thing left to the scientist.’

if a scientist operates exclusively and rigorously within the terms of the theory that he is proposing – what he will see – the facts he uncovers – will be consistent with that theory

incompatible facts may be noticed along the way – but logically they will not be relevant to the theory – if he sticks to that theory

such is a very stilted approach to science – or for that matter life

and I doubt that such an approach is in fact the way of the working scientist

a properly engaged scientist will question any theory that he operates with – question its adequacy – and indeed question the ‘facts’ that it leads to

and critical observation will most likely lead to the proposing of facts which are not consistent with the theory in play

and I would think that an essential part of any critical evaluation of a theory – would be the consideration of alternative theories

in any case the ‘collection of facts’ – is of no use – if these ‘facts’ are not critically evaluated – that is to say – regarded as open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘And so it is – provided facts exist, and are available independently of whether or not one considers alternatives to the theory to be tested. This assumption, on which the validity of the foregoing argument depends in a most decisive manner, I shall call the assumption of the relative autonomy of facts, or the autonomy principle. It is not asserted by this principle that the discovery and description of facts is independent of all theorizing.  But it is asserted that the facts which belong to the empirical content of some theory are available whether or not one considers alternatives to this theory. I am not aware that this very important assumption has ever been explicitly formulated as a separate postulate of the empirical method. However, it is clearly implied in almost all investigations which deal with questions of confirmation and test. All these investigations use a model in which a single theory is compared with a class of facts (or observation statements) which are assumed to be ‘given’ somehow. I submit that this is much too simple a picture of the actual situation. Facts and theories are much more intimately connected than is admitted

by the autonomy principle. Not only is the description of every single fact dependent on some theory (which may, of course, be very different from the theory to be tested), but there also exist facts which cannot be unearthed except with the help of alternatives to the theory to be tested, and which become unavailable as soon as such alternatives are excluded. This suggests that the methodological unit to which we must refer when discussing questions of test and empirical content is constituted by a whole set of partly overlapping, factually adequate, but mutually inconsistent theories.’

‘It is not asserted by this principle that the discovery and description of facts is independent of all theorizing. But it is asserted that the facts which belong to the empirical content of some theory are available whether or not one considers alternatives to this theory.’

the relative autonomy of facts?

                                                                                                                                          

a fact is a proposal –

if a proposal / fact is put – it is put – and as such can be regarded as autonomous

relative to a theory – it will be interpreted in terms of that theory

relative to an alternative theory – it will have an alternative interpretation

different interpretations point to the logical reality of the fact – of the proposal –

that it is open to question – open to doubt – that it is uncertain

‘All these investigations use a model in which a single theory is compared with a class of facts (or observation statements) which are assumed to be ‘given’ somehow.’

facts – are proposed – and in that sense ‘given’ to us

theories may be proposed to account for accepted facts – that is accepted proposals –

and theories – explanatory proposals – may lead to new facts – proposals which are regarded as novel

‘Facts and theories are much more intimately connected than is admitted by the autonomy principle’

any proposal – fact or theory – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘Not only is the description of every single fact dependent on some theory (which may, of course, be very different from the theory to be tested), but there also exist facts which cannot be unearthed except with the help of alternatives to the theory to be tested, and which become unavailable as soon as such alternatives are excluded.’

yes – the description of every single fact is dependent on some theory – on some proposal

and yes of course there are facts / proposals which will not come to light without alternative theories – alternative descriptions of the world

‘facts’ are unavailable – if they are not proposed

‘This suggests that the methodological unit to which we must refer when discussing questions of test and empirical content is constituted by a whole set of partly overlapping, factually adequate, but mutually inconsistent theories.’

the methodological unit to which we refer when discussing questions of test and empirical content is the proposal –

and the proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

Feyerabend continues –

‘I want to discuss an example which shows very clearly the function of alternatives in the discovery of critical facts.

It is now known that the Brownian particle is a perpetual motion machine of the second kind and that its existence refutes the phenomenological second law. Brownian motion therefore belongs to the domain of relevant facts for the law. Now could this relation between Brownian motion and the law have been discovered in a direct manner i.e. could it have been discovered by an examination of the observational consequences of the phenomenological theory that did not make use of an alternative theory of heat? The question is really divided into two: (1) Could the relevance of the Brownian particle have been discovered in this manner? (2) Could it have been demonstrated that it actually refutes the second law?

The answer to the first question is that we don’t know. It is impossible to say to say what would have happened if the kinetic theory had not been introduced into the debate. It is my guess, however, that, in that case the Brownian particle would have been regarded as an oddity – in much the same way as Professor Ehrenhaft’s astounding effects were regarded as an oddity, and that it would not have been given the decisive position in contemporary theory. The answer to the second question is simply – No. Consider what  the discovery of an inconsistency between the phenomenon of Brownian motion and the second law would have required. It would have required (a) measurement of the exact motion of the particle in order to ascertain the change in its kinetic energy plus the energy spent on overcoming the resistance of the fluid ; and (b) it would have required precise measurements of temperature and heat transfer in the surrounding medium in order to

establish that any loss of energy of the moving particle and the work done against the fluid. Such measurements are beyond experimental possibilities: neither the heat transfer nor the path of the particle can be measured with desired precision. Hence a ‘direct’ refutation of the second law that would consider only the phenomenological theory and the ‘facts’ of the Brownian motion, is impossible. It is impossible because of the structure of the world in which we live and because of the laws that are valid in this world. And it is well known, the actual refutation was brought about in a very different manner. It was brought about via the kinetic theory and Einstein’s utilization of it in his calculation of the statistical properties of Brownian motion. In the course of this procedure, the phenomenological theory (T’) was incorporated into the wider context of statistical physics (T) in such a manner that the consistency condition was violated, and it was only then that a crucial experiment was staged (investigations of Svedberg and Perrin).

‘Now could this relation between Brownian motion and the law have been discovered in a direct manner i.e. could it have been discovered by an examination of the observational consequences of the phenomenological theory that did not make use of an alternative theory of heat?’

the reality is that the relation between Brownian motion and the law was not discovered directly –

Feyerabend suggests that if the kinetic theory of heat had not been introduced into the debate – the Brownian particle would have been considered an oddity – and therefore not been regarded as decisive

Ok – we can speculate here – but we don’t know what would have happened – we only know what didn’t happen –

no direct relation was proposed

‘And it is well known, the actual refutation was brought about in a very different manner. It was brought about via the kinetic theory and Einstein’s utilization of it in his calculation of the statistical properties of Brownian motion. In the course of this procedure, the phenomenological theory (T’) was incorporated into the wider context of statistical physics (T) in such a manner that the consistency condition was violated, and it was only then that a crucial experiment was staged (investigations of Svedberg and Perrin)’

we have a different proposal – a different theory from Einstein – a theory that places both the  phenomenological theory and Brownian motion in the wider context of statistical physics – and in terms of this theory – this propositional context – a crucial experiment can be proposed – and is performed

we can ask the question –

was the phenomenological theory – before the context of statistical physics – the same theory as the phenomenological theory that was incorporated into statistical physics?

the same question can be asked with respect to Brownian motion

be that as it may – the logical reality is that any decision between theories – is a decision between different – and hence inconsistent theories

bare in mind too that any ‘crucial experiment’ – is open to question open to doubt –

is uncertain

‘It seems to me that this example is typical of the relation between fairly general theories, or points of view, and the ‘facts’. Both the relevance and the refuting character of decisive facts can be established only with the help of other theories which, though factually adequate are not in agreement with the view to be tested. This being the case, the invention and articulation of alternatives may have to precede the production of refuting facts. Empiricism, at least in some of its more sophisticated versions, demands that the empirical content of whatever knowledge we possess be increased as much as possible. Hence the invention of alternatives to the view at the centre of discussion constitutes an essential part of the empirical method. Conversely the fact that the consistency condition eliminates alternatives now shows it to be in disagreement not only with scientific practice but with empiricism as well. By excluding valuable tests it decreases the empirical content of the theories that are permitted to remain (and these, as I have indicated above, will usually be theories that were there first); and it especially decreases the number of those facts that could show their limitations. The result of a determined application of the consistency condition is of very topical interest. It may well be that the refutation of the quantum-mechanical uncertainties presupposes just such an incorporation of the present theory into a wider context which no longer agrees with complementarity and therefore suggests new and decisive experiments. And it may also be that the insistence, on the part of the majority of contemporary physicists, on the consistency condition will, if successful, forever protects the uncertainties from refutation. This is how the condition may finally create a situation where a certain point of view petrifies into dogma by being, in the name of experience, completely removed from any conceivable criticism.’

yes – this scenario is quite possible –

if this ‘consistency condition’ amounts to the view that the reining scientific theory is beyond question –

then quite clearly we do not have an open and critical scientific practice

such a science defies logic – defies propositional reality

it is up to the scientists – the practitioners to decide how they want their activity to be – how they want science to proceed

I think the reality is that questions will be asked – doubts will be raised – uncertainties explored

yes there will be those who at certain times – and at certain points in any discussion – are affronted by question – doubt – and uncertainty

but that is the way of things –

propositional life just is this tension between logic and rhetoric –

open and critical discussion – and dogmatism

I think that to expect anyone – scientists included – to behave rationally in all  circumstances is at best fanciful –

and – if you wish to be empirical about it – what does the evidence tell us?

‘It is worthwhile examining this apparently ‘empirical’ defence of a dogmatic point of view in somewhat greater detail. Assume the physicists have adopted, either consciously or unconsciously, the idea of the uniqueness of complementarity and that they elaborate the orthodox point of view and refuse to consider the alternatives. In the beginning such a procedure might be quite harmless. After all, a man and even an influential school can only do so many things at a time and it is better if they pursue a theory in which they are interested rather than a theory they find boring. Now assume that the pursuit of the chosen theory has led to successes, and that the theory has been explained, in a satisfactory manner, circumstances that had been unintelligible for some time. This gives empirical support to an idea which to start with seemed to possess only this advantage: it was interesting and intriguing. The commitment to the theory will now be reinforced, and the attitude towards alternatives will become less tolerant. Now if it is true, as has been argued in the last section, that many facts become available only with the help of alternatives, then the refusal to consider them will result in the elimination of potentially refuting facts as well. More especially, it will eliminate facts whose discovery would show the complete and irreparable inadequacy of the theory. Such facts having been inaccessible, the theory will appear to be free from blemish and it will seem that ‘all evidence points with merciless definiteness in the … direction …that all the processes

involving … unknown interactions conform to the fundamental quantum law’ [L. Rosenfeld]. This will further reinforce the belief in the uniqueness of the accepted theory and in the futility of any account that proceeds in a different manner. Being now firmly convinced that there is only one good microphysics, the physicists will try to explain adverse facts in its terms, and they will not mind when such explanations occasionally turn out to be clumsy. Next the development becomes known to the public. Popular science books (and this includes many books on the philosophy of science) spread the basic postulates of the theory; applications are made in distant fields, money is given to the orthodox, and is withheld from the rebels. More than ever the theory seems to possess tremendous empirical support. The chances for consideration of alternatives are now very slight indeed. The final success of the fundamental assumptions of the quantum theory, and the idea of complementarity, seems to be assured.’

‘Now if it is true, as has been argued in the last section, that many facts become available only with the help of alternatives, then the refusal to consider them will result in the elimination of potentially refuting facts as well. More especially, it will eliminate facts whose discovery would show the complete and irreparable inadequacy of the theory.’

logically speaking – any theory is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

the methodological recommendation therefore is to explore the uncertainty in any theory

this is to proceed logically

one can proceed logically without entertaining alternative views

however where alternative theories are available – or where they can be developed – it makes sense to consider them

and to subject them to the same critical process as the original theory –

that is to regard them as open to question – open to doubt –

to explore their uncertainty

the logical reality is that whatever theory is considered – it is open to question – open to doubt

propositional uncertainty does not dictate – what path the scientist is to take –

we cannot say whether a particular path will lead to refuting facts – or will eliminate refuting facts

decisions will be made – and these decisions will be uncertain

‘Being now firmly convinced that there is only one good microphysics, the physicists will try to explain adverse facts in its terms, and they will not mind when such explanations occasionally turn out to be clumsy. Next the development becomes known to the public…’

‘being now firmly convinced’ of anything – is illogical

if we are talking about being ‘convinced’ – we are talking about pretension –

and the flagship of pretension – is rhetoric

pretension and rhetoric are what we must fight against – if our aim is to proceed logically

you can’t always be successful here – asking questions – raising doubts – exploring uncertainties – can fall flat – if people are not open – are not critical

in the end I think – broadly speaking – it’s a question of intelligence –

the ignorant hold hard to their prejudices –

and who is to say they shouldn’t?

‘At the same time it is evident, on the basis of our considerations, that this appearance of success cannot in the least be regarded as a sign of truth and correspondence with nature. Quite the contrary, the suspicion arises that the absence of major difficulties is a result of the decrease of empirical content brought about by the elimination of alternatives, and of facts that can be discovered with their help. In other words, the suspicion arises that this alleged success is due to the fact that that the theory, when extended beyond its starting point, was turned into rigid ideology. Such ideology is ‘successful’ not because it agrees so well with the facts; it is successful because no facts have been specified that could constitute a test, and because some such facts have been removed. Its ‘success’ is entirely man-made. It was decided to stick to some ideas, come what may, and the result was, quite naturally, the survival of these ideas. If now the initial decision is forgotten, or made only implicitly, for example, if it becomes common law in physics, then the survival itself will seem to constitute independent support, it will reinforce the decision, or turn it into an explicit one, and in this way close the circle. This is how empirical ‘evidence’ may be created by a procedure which quotes as its justification the very same evidence it has produced.’

‘this appearance of success cannot in the least be regarded as a sign of truth and correspondence with nature.’

there is no correspondence with nature – if by ‘nature’ is meant a proposition-independent reality –

there is no such reality – our reality is propositional

any proposed correspondence between one proposition and another – i.e. the proposal of nature and a description of that proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a true proposition – is a proposition affirmed –

affirmed that is by those involved in its assessment –

any such affirmation – is open to question

if a proposition is held to be true – it will be proceeded with – and as such will be regarded as successful

‘Quite the contrary, the suspicion arises that the absence of major difficulties is a result of the decrease of empirical content brought about by the elimination of alternatives, and of facts that can be discovered with their help.’

yes – this suspicion – may arise – this doubt may surface

‘In other words, the suspicion arises that this alleged success is due to the fact that that the theory, when extended beyond its starting point, was turned into rigid ideology.’

yes –  the suspicion could arise that the theory has become a rigid ideology

how in practice though would this be determined?

let’s say that those who accept the theory – say they are open to it being questioned – that they are open to it being put to doubt – that they regard it as uncertain –

that nevertheless they have decided to run with it

Feyerabend might say – ‘but you haven’t considered alternative theories?

they say – ‘true – we have decided to proceed with this theory for the time being – to understand it more completely and to further develop and test its consequences’

they could even add – ‘investigating alternative theories – is a good idea – but we’ll stick with this one for the present’

here the scientists have decided what they will work with – while keeping an open mind – and adopting a critical attitude

hardly dogmatic

Feyerabend’s argument regarding alternative theories – could well be used in regard to any alternative theorizing that he advocates

what about an alternative to the alternative?

that is a third alternative – and really why stop there – a fourth alternative – etc. etc.

                                                                                                                                         

the point is clear – decisions with regard to what will and will not be considered – must be made – if any work is to go forward –

yes – and any such decision – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

but decisions get made – and propositional action is taken

‘Its ‘success’ is entirely man-made. It was decided to stick to some ideas, come what may, and the result was, quite naturally, the survival of these ideas. If now the initial decision is forgotten, or made only implicitly, for example, if it becomes common law in physics, then the survival itself will seem to constitute independent support, it will reinforce the decision, or turn it into an explicit one, and in this way close the circle. This is how ‘empirical ‘evidence’ may be created by a procedure which quotes as its justification the very same evidence it has produced.’

yes – ‘success’ is entirely man-made – what else could it be?

sticking with ideas ‘come what may’ – is not logical – is not rational – it is dogmatic – it is stupid

and yes – ‘empirical evidence’ may be created by a procedure which quotes as its justification the very same evidence it has produced.’

any method – any procedure – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

there is no justification

‘justification’ is a rhetorical notion – not a logical notion

‘evidence’ – is a proposal – a proposal to be tested –

that is to say – put to question – put to doubt – it’s uncertainty – explored –

if you fall into the justification trap – yes you will end up in a vicious circle

the vicious circle of stupidity –

and you go nowhere

Feyerabend goes on to consider dogmatic theories –

‘At this point an ‘empirical’ theory of the kind described (and let us always remember that the basic principles of the present quantum theory, and especially the idea of complementarity, are uncomfortably close to forming such a theory) becomes indistinguishable from a second rate myth. In order to realise this, we need only consider a myth such as the myth of witchcraft and of demonic possession that was developed by Roman Catholic theologians that dominated 15^th-, 16^th- and 17^th century thought on the European continent. The myth is a complex explanatory system that contains numerous explanatory hypotheses designed to cover special cases, so it easily achieves a high degree of confirmation on the basis of observation. It has been taught for a long time; its

content is enforced with fear, prejudice, and ignorance, as well as by a jealous and cruel priesthood. Its idea permeates the most common idiom, infect[s] all modes of thinking and many decisions which mean a great deal in human life. It provides models for the explanation of any conceivable event – conceivable for those who have accepted it. This being the case, its key terms will be fixed in an unambiguous manner and the idea (which may have led to such a procedure in the first place) that they are copies of unchanging entities and that change of meaning, if it should happen, is due to human mistake – this idea will now be very plausible. Such plausibility reinforces all manoeuvres which are

used for preservation of the myth (elimination of opponents included). The conceptual

apparatus of the theory and the emotions connected with its application, having penetrated all means of communication, now guarantees the success of methods such as

transcendental deduction, analysis of usage, phenomenological analysis – which are

means for further solidifying the myth (which shows, by the way, that all these methods, which have been the trademark of various philosophical schools old and new, have one thing in common: they tend to preserve the status quo of intellectual life). Observational results, too, will speak in favour of the theory as they are formulated in it’s terms. It will seem that the truth has been arrived at. At the same time, it is evident that all contact with the world has been lost and that the stability achieved, the semblance of absolute truth, is nothing but the result of absolute conformism. For how can we possibly test, or improve on a theory if it is built in such a manner that any conceivable event can be described, and explained, in terms of its principles? The only way of investigating such all embracing principles would be to compare them with a different set of equally all-embracing principles – but this procedure has been excluded from the beginning. The myth is, therefore of no objective relevance; it continues to exist solely as the result of the effort of the community of believers and their leaders, be these now priests or Nobel prize winners. This, I think, is the most decisive argument against any method that encourages uniformity, be it empirical or not. Any such method is, in the last resort, a method of deception. It enforces an unenlightened conformism, and speaks of truth; it leads to a deterioration of intellectual capabilities, of the power of the imagination, and speaks of deep insight; it destroys the most precious gift of the young – their tremendous power of imagination, and speaks of education.’

‘For how can we possibly test, or improve on a theory if it is built in such a manner that any conceivable event can be described, and explained, in terms of its principles? The only way of investigating such all embracing principles would be to compare them with a different set of equally all-embracing principles – but this procedure has been excluded from the beginning.’

yes – a set of all-embracing principles does not allow for an alternative – by definition

so called ‘all-embracing principles’ – are not open to question – are not open to doubt – are not regarded as uncertain

such all embracing principles – are not proposals – they are not propositions – they are prejudices –

and as such – they are not relevant to a rational discussion

the logical reality is that any proposal – any principle – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if you drop this notion of ‘all-embracing’ – as in beyond question – beyond doubt – then a critical analysis of these principles can begin

the ‘all embracing principles’ notion – is just straight out pretence and rhetoric –

and that is the case whether it is put forward by the conformist – or by a flamboyant dissident

yes – you can play the rhetorical game –

or you can question – and doubt – and deal with propositional uncertainty

the choice is logic or rhetoric

‘The myth is, therefore of no objective relevance; it continues to exist solely as the result of the effort of the community of believers and their leaders, be these now priests or Nobel prize winners.’

or indeed so called ‘methodological anarchists’

as to – ‘of no objective relevance’ –

just what counts as ‘objective’?

my view is that a proposal – is objective – if it is put – and put publicly –

it is relevant to those who affirm it – irrelevant to those who don’t

‘This, I think, is the most decisive argument against any method that encourages uniformity, be it empirical or not. Any such method is, in the last resort, a method of deception’

any method that encourages non-critical acceptance of propositions – that doesn’t encourage question and doubt – is illogical –

and yes – in so far as it is represented as logical – as rational – such a method is a method of deception

‘It enforces an unenlightened conformism, and speaks of truth; it leads to a deterioration of intellectual capabilities, of the power of the imagination, and speaks of deep insight; it

destroys the most precious gift of the young – their tremendous power of imagination, and speaks of education.’

any method that unenlightened conformism –is pretentious authoritarianism

does it lead to a deterioration of intellectual capabilities – and the power of the imagination?

most likely I would think – but it might just be that such repression – sparks intellectual capacities and fires the imagination

‘the precious gift of the young’?

‘the tremendous power of imagination’?

it may be that there are some young people – who do have a ‘tremendous power of imagination’ – some old people too

it is more likely that most young people – have an imagination that is determined – not by its own ‘tremendous power’ – but rather by the social and artistic structures and contexts that they are born into – and that they live in

                                                                                                                                          

in any case – ‘unenlightened conformism’ – is a recipe for dullness – and stupidity

and we can always do better than that

‘To sum up: Unanimity of opinion may be fitting for a church, for the frightened or greedy victims of some (ancient, or modern) myth, or for the weak and willing followers of some tyrant. Variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge. And a method that encourages variety is also the only method that is compatible with a humanitarian outlook. (To the extent to which the consistency condition delimits variety, it contains a theological element which lies, of course, in the worship of ‘fact’ so characteristic of nearly all empiricism.)’

                                                                                                                                        ‘Unanimity of opinion’?  

it depends how it comes about –

if it comes about quite naturally – what’s the problem?

if on the other hand – it is an opinion presented as being  beyond question – beyond doubt – as certain – then it is not an  ‘opinion’ – it is a prejudice

and prejudicial thinking is illogical – and irrational

                                                                                                                                        

‘Variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge’

any proposal made public – is objective

a variety of opinion is natural

and a methodology that encourages variety is logical – if it presents our proposals – as open to question – open to doubt – as uncertain

if the consistency condition is to be used logically – 

its use will be held open to question – open to doubt – and will regarded as – uncertain