Feyerabend 6

6

‘As an example of such an attempt I examine the tower argument which the Aristotelians used to refute the motion of the earth. The argument includes natural interpretations – ideas so closely connected with observation that it needs a special effort to realise their existence and to determine their content. Galileo identifies the natural interpretations which are inconsistent with Copernicus and replaces them by others.’

‘As a concrete illustration and as a basis for further discussion, I shall now briefly describe the manner in which Galileo defused an important counter-argument against the idea of the motion of the earth. I say defused, and not refuted, because we are dealing with a changing conceptual system as well as certain attempts at concealment.

According to the argument which convinced Tycho, and which is used against the motion of the earth in Galileo’s own Trattato della sfera, observation shows that  ‘heavy bodies…..falling down from on high, go by a straight and vertical line to the surface of the earth. This is considered an irrefutable argument for the earth being motionless. For, if it made the diurnal rotation, a tower from whose top a rock was let fall, being carried by the whirling of the earth, would travel many hundreds of yards to the east in the time the rock would consume in its fall, and the rock ought to strike the earth that distance away from the base of the tower.

In considering the argument Galileo at once admits the correctness of the sensory content of the observation made, viz. that ‘heavy bodies …falling from a height, go perpendicularly to the surface of the earth.’ Considering an author (Chiaramonti) who sets out to convert Copernicans by repeatedly mentioning this fact, he says: ‘I wish this author would not put himself to such trouble trying to have us understand from our sense that this motion of falling bodies is simple straight motion and no other kind, nor get angry and complain because such a clear, obvious, and manifest thing should be called into question. For in this way he hints at believing that to those who say that such motion is not straight at all, but rather circular, it seems they see the stone move visibly in an arc, since he calls upon their senses rather than their reason to clarify the effect. This is not the case Simplicio; for just as I …have never seen nor expect to see, the rock fall any way but perpendicularly, just so do I believe it appears to the eyes of everyone else. It is therefore better to put aside the appearance on which we all agree, and to use the power of reason to confirm its reality or to reveal its fallacy.’ [Galileo, Dialogue] The correctness of the observation is not in question. What is in question is its ‘reality’ or ‘fallacy’. What is meant by this expression?

The question is answered by an example that occurs in Galileo’s next paragraph, ‘from which … one may learn how easily anyone may be deceived by simple appearance, or let us say by the impressions of one’s senses. This event is the appearance to those who travel along a street by night of being followed by the moon, with steps equal to theirs, when they see it go gliding along the eves of roofs. There it looks to them just as would a cat really running along the tiles and putting them behind it: an appearance which if reason did not intervene, would only too obviously deceive the senses.’

Feyerabend says here –

‘In this example we are asked to start with a sensory impression and to consider a statement that is forcefully suggested by it. (The suggestion is so strong that it has led to entire systems of belief and to rituals, as becomes clear from a close study of the lunar aspects of witchcraft and other cosmological hypotheses.) Now ‘reason intervenes’; the

statement suggested by the impression is examined, and one considers other statements in its place. The nature of the impression is not changed a bit by this activity. (This is only approximately true; but we can omit from our present purpose the complications arising from an interaction of impression and proposition.) But it enters new observation statements and plays new, better or worse, parts in our knowledge. What are the reasons and methods that regulate such exchange?

To start with, we must become clear about the nature of the total phenomenon: appearance plus statement. There are not two acts – one, noticing a phenomenon; the other, expressing it with the help of the appropriate statement – but only one, viz. saying in a certain observational situation, ‘the moon is following me’, or ‘the stone is falling straight down’. We may, of course, abstractly subdivide this process into parts, and we may also try to create a situation where statement and phenomenon seem to be psychologically apart and waiting to be related. (This is rather difficult to achieve and perhaps entirely impossible.) But under normal circumstances such a division does not occur; describing a familiar situation is, for the speaker, an event in which statement and phenomenon are firmly glued together.’

what we have here is a statement – a proposal – the proposal is that there is this ‘phenomenon’ – appearance plus statement

‘This unity is the result of a process of learning that starts in one’s childhood. From our very early days we learn to react to situations with the appropriate responses, linguistic or otherwise. The teaching procedures both shape the ‘appearance’ or the ‘phenomenon’ and establish a firm connection with words, so that finally the phenomena seem to speak for themselves without outside help or extraneous knowledge assert them to be. They are what the associated statements assert them to be. The language they ‘speak’ is, of course, influenced by the beliefs of earlier generations which have been held so long that they no longer appear as separate principles, but enter the terms of everyday discourse, and, after the prescribed training, seem to emerge from the things themselves.’

first up –  there is no unity of statement and phenomenon – there is only the statement – the proposal – the proposal that …

this teaching procedure which Feyerabend refers to – doesn’t establish a firm connection between phenomenon and words –

there is only the proposal – in this case in the form of language – of words

the words – the proposal(s) – make the reality –

the words propose the phenomenon

independent of any proposal – independent of propositional reality – what we deal with – what we face – is the unknown

our proposals – make known – and this making known – is the making of propositional reality

we are born into a propositional reality – we are born into proposal –

and if it can be said that there is a basis to our proposals –

it is the basis of proposals – of the propositional reality we come into learn to deal with –

and learn to deal with – with proposals

and our proposals – our propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

our propositional reality is uncertain – or perhaps more correctly – our propositional realities – are uncertain

‘At this point we may want to compare, in our imagination and quite abstractly, the results of the teaching of different languages incorporating different ideologies. We may even want consciously to change some of these ideologies and adapt them to more ‘modern’ points of view. It is very difficult to say how this will alter our situation, unless

we make the further assumption that the quality and structure of sensations (perceptions) or at least the quality and structure of these sensations which enter the body of science, is independent of their linguistic expression. I am very doubtful about even the approximate validity of this assumption, which can be refuted by simple examples, and I am sure that we are depriving ourselves of new and surprising discoveries as long as we remain within the limits defined by it. Yet, I shall for the moment, remain quite consciously within these limits. (My first task, if I should ever resume writing, would be to explore these limits and to venture beyond them.)’

‘At this point we may want to compare, in our imagination and quite abstractly, the results of the teaching of different languages incorporating different ideologies. We may even want consciously to change some of these ideologies and adapt them to more ‘modern’ points of view.’

teaching different languages – incorporating different ideologies – is to teach different propositional systems

 ‘It is very difficult to say how this will alter our situation, unless we make the further assumption that the quality and structure of sensations (perceptions) or at least the quality and structure of these sensations which enter the body of science, is independent of their linguistic expression’

‘it is difficult say’ – the matter is open to question – open to doubt – it is uncertain

the quality and structure of these sensations – is no more than the proposals that we take as basic to our propositional system or enterprise

there is no rock bottom here – there are only proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I am very doubtful about even the approximate validity of this assumption, which can be refuted by simple examples, and I am sure that we are depriving ourselves of new and surprising discoveries as long as we remain within the limits defined by it.’

we only stay within the limits defined by our proposals – if we fail to question – to doubt  and to explore their uncertainty

‘Making the additional simplifying assumption, we can now distinguish between sensations and those ‘mental operations which follow so closely upon the senses’, and which are so firmly connected with their reactions that a separation is difficult to achieve. Considering the origin and effect of such operations, I shall call them natural interpretations.’

sensations – are proposals – are propositions

those ‘mental operations which follow so closely upon the senses’ –

are those proposals – those propositions which are interpretations – of the initial proposal – the initial proposition

‘which are so firmly connected with their reactions that a separation is difficult to achieve.’ –

our propositional reactions can be immediate – and habitual –

this immediacy and habituation is a function of the propositional culture we operate in –

and also of a non-critical approach to the initial proposal – or those propositions in common use

much of what we ‘know’ – is what is taught to us – proposed to us – in a non-critical fashion –

and much of what is taught to us – proposed to us – is in normal circumstances not challenged – either by ourselves – or by others

any ‘firm connection’ is a non-critical connection –

there is no difficulty in separating out a primary proposal from secondary proposals – or interpretative proposals –

you have to understand firstly that what you have is proposals – propositions –

and secondly that any proposal – any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

there is only a difficulty if you don’t question – if you don’t doubt – if you don’t explore propositional uncertainty

these ‘natural interpretations’ of Feyerabend – are interpretive propositions –

the point of which is to propose an understanding of the subject proposition –

the subject proposition is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and any proposed interpretation of it is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

any proposal – any proposition – is ‘natural’

‘In the history of thought, natural interpretations have been regarded either as a priori presuppositions of science, or else prejudices which must be removed before any serious examination can begin. The first view is that of Kant, and in a very different manner and on the basis of very different talents, that of some contemporary linguistic philosophers.

The second view is due to Bacon (who had predecessors such as the Greek sceptics).’

the notion of an a priori presupposition – is essentially authoritarian and rhetorical –

any principle – any presupposition – is a proposal – and from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to  doubt – uncertain

if a presupposition – is not held open to question – then yes – it functions as a prejudice

in so far as we operate with presuppositions – presuppositions provide a basis for further propositional activity

                                                                                                                                         

and the fact that you have a basis for propositional action – does not mean that that basis is non-critical – or beyond criticism

authoritarianism – of any kind – is philosophical failure

                                                                                                                                         

the search for a basis in certainty – is really pre-logical – and I think just based on a fear –

fear of criticism –

it is philosophical weakness – it is a lack of courage – it is the failure to positively embrace uncertainty

according to Feyerabend Galileo’s method is the critical method –

‘Galileo is one of those rare thinkers who neither wants forever to retain natural interpretations nor altogether to eliminate them. Wholesale judgments of this kind are quite alien to his way of thinking. He insists upon a critical discussion to decide which natural interpretations can be kept and which must be replaced. This is not always clear from his writings. Quite the contrary. The methods of reminiscence, to which he appeals so freely, are designed to create the impression that nothing has changed and that we continue expressing our observations in old and familiar ways. Yet his attitude is relatively easy to ascertain: natural interpretations are necessary. The senses alone, without the help of reason cannot give us a true account of nature. What is needed for arriving at such a true account are ‘the…senses, accompanied by reasoning’. Moreover, in the arguments dealing with the motion of the earth, it is this reasoning, it is the connotation of the observational terms and not the message of the senses that causes trouble. ‘It is, therefore, better to put aside the appearance, on which we all agree, and to use the power of reason either to confirm its reality or to reveal its fallacy.’ Confirming the reality or revealing the fallacy of appearances means, however, examining the validity of these natural interpretations which are so intimately connected with the appearances that we no longer regard them as separate assumptions. I turn now to the first natural interpretation implicit in the argument from falling stones.’

‘Galileo is one of those rare thinkers who neither wants forever to retain natural interpretations nor altogether to eliminate them. Wholesale judgments of this kind are quite alien to his way of thinking’

and this is logically correct –

in logical reality – no proposal – no proposition is eliminated –

the question is one of utility – which proposal do we proceed with – which proposal do we think will deliver the results we have in mind?

‘He insists upon a critical discussion to decide which natural interpretations can be kept and which must be relaced’

the idea is to have a critical discussion to decide which proposals to go forward with –

a critical discussion to decide which view to adopt –

and I would venture to suggest – that this outlook – the critical outlook – is no more than common sense – in relation to science – or for that matter in relation to any propositional activity

‘The methods of reminiscence, to which he appeals so freely, are designed to create the impression that nothing has changed and that we continue expressing our observations in old and familiar ways.’

this can only be a rhetorical ploy – and one that I think that will have limited success –

eventually people adjust to new expressions

‘natural interpretations are necessary. The senses alone, without the help of reason cannot give us a true account of nature.’

natural interpretations are necessary – is only to say – proposals are necessary –

our reality in the absence of proposal is unknown

proposals – or ‘natural interpretations’ – make known

and any proposal – any ‘natural interpretation’ – is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

the distinction between ‘the senses’ – and ‘reason’ –

is no more than a distinction between propositional categories – propositional descriptions

‘The senses alone, without the help of reason cannot give us a true account of nature. What is needed for arriving at such a true account are ‘the…senses, accompanied by reasoning’.

this notion of a ‘true account of nature’ is rubbish –

all we can have – logically speaking – are different accounts of nature –

what is ‘true’ – is matter of fashion

‘Moreover, in the arguments dealing with the motion of the earth, it is this reasoning, it is the connotation of the observational terms and not the message of the senses that causes trouble.’

‘the connotation of the observational terms’ – is what is proposed as the message of the senses

and yes – there should be trouble – there should be question – doubt – uncertainty – whatever is proposed

‘Confirming the reality or revealing the fallacy of appearances means, however examining the validity of these natural interpretations which are so intimately connected with the appearances that we no longer regard them as separate assumptions.’

confirming the reality or revealing the fallacy – of the interpretations of appearances –

is the critical process –

with the rider that there is logically speaking – no final confirmation – or falsification of any proposal –

confirmation and falsification – are decisions to proceed or not to proceed with a proposal

they are essentially pragmatic decisions – decisions which are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain

‘According to Copernicus the motion of a falling stone should be ‘mixed straight-and-circular’. By the ‘motion of the stone’, is meant not just its motion relative to some visible mark in the visual field of the observer, or its observed motion, but rather its motion in the solar system or in (absolute) space, i.e. its real motion. The familiar facts appealed to in the argument assert a different kind of motion, a simple vertical motion. This result refutes the Copernican hypothesis only if the concept of motion that occurs in the observation statement is the same as the concept of motion that occurs in the Copernican prediction. The observation statement ‘the stone is falling straight down’ must, therefore, refer to a movement in (absolute) space. It must refer to a real motion.

Now the force of an ‘argument from observation’ derives from the fact that the observation statements involved are firmly connected with appearances. There is no use appealing to observation if one does not know how to describe what one sees, or if one can only offer one’s description with hesitation only, as if one had just learned the language in which it is formulated. Producing an observation statement, then consists of two very different psychological events: (1) a clear and unambiguous sensation and (2) a clear and unambiguous connection between this sensation and parts of language. This is the way in which sensation is made to speak. Do the sensations in the above language speak the language of real motion?’

‘Now the force of an ‘argument from observation’ derives from the fact that the observation statements involved are firmly connected with appearances.’

the force of the ‘argument from observation’ derives from the fact that the observation statements involved are not put to question – not put to doubt – are regarded as certain

‘There is no use appealing to observation if one does not know how to describe what one sees, or if one can only offer one’s description with hesitation only, as if one had just learned the language in which it is formulated.’ –

yes – in a complex propositional context there is no use proposing an ‘observation’ statement – if one does not know how to describe it – to propose in relation to it

as to being hesitant – well that is neither here nor there

there is though the deeper logical issue if understanding that your proposal is open  to question – open to doubt – that it is uncertain

‘Producing an observation statement, then consists of two very different psychological events: (1) a clear and unambiguous sensation and (2) a clear and unambiguous connection between this sensation and parts of language. This is the way in which sensation is made to speak.’ –

as to a ‘clear an unambiguous’ sensation / proposition – yes you can put on some front –

but in so doing you defy propositional logic –

the logic of question – doubt – and uncertainty

‘This is the way in which sensation is made to speak. Do the sensations in the above language speak the language of real motion?’

this is the way the sensation / proposal is interpreted –

is it interpreted in terms of the Copernican proposal of ‘real motion’?

well it can be

‘They speak the language of real motion in the manner of 17^th century everyday thought. At least, this is what Galileo tells us. He tells us that the everyday thinking of the time assumes the ‘operative’ character of all motion, or, to use well-known philosophical terms, it assumes a naïve realism with respect to motion: except for occasional and unavoidable illusions, apparent motion is identical with real (absolute) motion. Of course, this distinction is not explicitly drawn. One does not first distinguish the apparent motion from the real motion and then connect the two by a correspondence rule. One rather describes, perceives, acts toward motion as if it were the real thing. Nor does one proceed

in this matter under all circumstances. It is admitted that objects may move that are not seen to move; and it is also admitted that certain motions are illusory (cf. the example of the moon mentioned earlier in this chapter). Apparent motion and real motion are not always identified. However there are paradigmatic cases in which it is psychologically very difficult, if not plainly impossible, to admit deception. It is from these paradigmatic cases, and not from the exceptions, that naïve realism derives its strength. These are also the situations in which we first learn our kinematic vocabulary. From our very early childhood we learn to react to them with concepts, which have naïve realism built right into them, and which inextricability connect movement and the appearance of movement. The motion of the stone in the tower argument, or the alleged motion of the earth, is such a paradigmatic case. How could one possibly be unaware of the swift motion of a

large bulk of matter such as the earth is supposed to be! How could one possibly be unaware of the fact that the falling stone traces a vastly extended trajectory through space! From the point of view of 17^th century thought and language, the argument is therefore, impeccable and quite forceful. However, notice how theories (‘operative character’ all motion; essential correctness of sense reports) which are not formulated explicitly, enter the debate in the guise of observational terms. We realise again that observation terms are Trojan horses which must be watched most carefully. How is one supposed to proceed in such a tricky situation?’

‘it assumes a naïve realism with respect to motion: except for occasional and unavoidable illusions, apparent motion is identical with real (absolute) motion. Of course, this distinction is not explicitly drawn’

what this amounts to is  – that the proposal of naive realism – once subjected to question – doubt – is shown to be uncertain

and if in the face of ‘occasional and unavoidable illusion’ – it is proceeded with –

we can only say it is proceeded with – with uncertainty – and that it is decided that even in the face of this uncertainty – it will prove useful

‘One does not first distinguish the apparent motion from the real motion and then connect the two by a correspondence rule. One rather describes, perceives, acts toward motion as if it were the real thing. Nor does one proceed in this matter under all circumstances. It is admitted that objects may move that are not seen to move; and it is also admitted that certain motions are illusory (cf. the example of the moon  mentioned earlier in this chapter’.

what one does is critically evaluate the proposal of ‘real motion’ –

where it is put that objects move that are not seen to move – and that certain motions are illusory –

this proposal of real motion – will be regarded as open to question – open to doubt – and regarded as – uncertain

‘Apparent motion and real motion are not always identified. However there are paradigmatic cases in which it is psychologically very difficult, if not plainly impossible, to admit deception’

apparent motion and real motion are not easily identified – because the proposal of motion – is uncertain

a so called paradigmatic case – is really just a proposal that is not subjected to question – to doubt –

or if it is – it is decided that it is worth sticking with

the history of science is a history of changing paradigms

paradigms – represent the given – the accepted view – within a propositional context

it is not an issue of whether or not there is deception –

the issue is whether or not there is question – doubt – critical evaluation –

deception – like ‘the real deal’ – gets a free pass if there is no critical evaluation

‘It is from these paradigmatic cases, and not from the exceptions, that naïve realism derives its strength’

I suspect that the proposal of naïve realism ‘derives its strength’ – from its usefulness – in ordinary or commonly used propositional contexts

where it is not useful – i.e. in certain theoretical propositional contexts – it looks weak – and inadequate

‘These are also the situations in which we first learn our kinematic vocabulary. From our very early childhood we learn to react to them with concepts, which have naïve realism built right into them, and which inextricability connect movement and the appearance of movement.’

this is just to reinforce the utility argument

‘However, notice how theories (‘operative character’ all motion; essential correctness of sense reports) which are not formulated explicitly, enter the debate in the guise of observational terms. We realise again that observation terms are Trojan horses which must be watched most carefully.’

yes – you can run with the Trojan horse analogy here – but again this is really old epistemology

the real point is not what is contained in or hidden in observational terms –

it is rather just that these terms are – logically speaking – open to question – to doubt –

it is to say that in spite of a proposed utility – that they are – uncertain

‘How is one supposed to proceed in such a tricky situation?’

the fact of it is that there is no way that one is ‘supposed’ to proceed –

one proceeds as one does –

if you proceeds with the understanding that the propositions you use – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain – then you proceed logically

if on the other hand you proceed without question or doubt – if you think your propositions are certain – then you proceed – illogically

‘The argument from falling stones seems to refute the Copernican view. This may be due to an inherent disadvantage of Copernicanism; but it may also be due to the presence of natural interpretations which are in need of improvement. The first task, then, is to discover and isolate these unexamined obstacles to progress’

the old Trojan horse rears its head again

this is the whole basis of analysis – discovering – the hidden –

there is nothing hidden –

all that we have is what is proposed –

and what is proposed – is apparent –

all that so called ‘analysis’ can throw up is – new proposals

‘the unexamined obstacles to progress’

these unexamined obstacles –

will just be what they are proposed to be

and yes – I am sure any proposal here will be of interest –

but that is all it will be – a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

as to ‘progress’ –

progress is in the eye of the beholder –

really all you can speak of – with a logically clear conscience

is different proposals – and different propositional paths

‘It was Bacon’s  belief that natural interpretations could be discovered by a method of analysis that peels them off, one after another, until the sensory core of every observation is laid bare. This method has serious drawbacks. First, natural interpretations of the kind considered by Bacon are not just added to a previously existing field of sensations. They are instrumental in constituting the field, as Bacon says himself. Eliminate all natural interpretations, and you also eliminate the ability to think and perceive. Second, disregarding this fundamental function of natural interpretations, it should be clear that a person who faces a perceptual field without a single natural interpretation at his disposal would be completely disoriented, he could not even start the business of science. The fact that we do start, even after some Baconian analysis, therefore shows that the analysis has stopped prematurely. It has stopped at precisely those natural interpretations of which we are not aware and without which we cannot proceed. It follows that the intention to start from scratch, after a complete removal of all natural interpretations, is self-defeating.’

‘It was Bacon’s  belief that natural interpretations could be discovered by a method of analysis that peels them off, one after another, until the sensory core of every observation is laid bare

the ‘sensory core’ – is a proposal

natural interpretations are proposed –

natural interpretations of a sensory core proposal – place the primary proposal – the sensory core proposal – within a propositional framework

also the natural interpretations of the sensory core proposal – propose function and use of the sensory core proposal

here we are talking about proposal in relation to a proposal

there is no ‘peeling off’ – as if this sensory core exists independently of interpretation – of proposal –

any natural interpretation proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

                                                                                                                                      

natural interpretations are not ‘peeled off’ – they are critically evaluated

there is no ‘core’ of every observation – there are only proposals in relation to the observation proposal

‘First, natural interpretations of the kind considered by Bacon are not just added to a previously existing field of sensations. They are instrumental in constituting the field, as Bacon says himself. Eliminate all natural interpretations, and you also eliminate the ability to think and perceive. Second, disregarding this fundamental function of natural interpretations, it should be clear that a person who faces a perceptual field without a single natural interpretation at his disposal would be completely disoriented, he could not even start the business of science.’

yes – the ‘field’ – the propositional field is constituted – by proposal

the propositional field is logically speaking – never stable –

the propositional field is open to question – to doubt –

the propositional field is uncertain

eliminate all proposals – and what you face is the unknown –

and yes eliminate all proposals and you are disorientated – and unable to proceed

we propose in order to think and perceive and act

our thought and our perception is propositional

‘The fact that we do start, even after some Baconian analysis, therefore shows that the analysis has stopped prematurely. It has stopped at precisely those natural interpretations of which we are not aware and without which we cannot proceed. It follows that the intention to start from scratch, after a complete removal of all natural interpretations, is self-defeating.’

we are aware of what is proposed –

there is no hidden reality – no undiscovered core

there is no starting from scratch – there is no scratch

we begin in – inherit – a propositional reality – a reality that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain.

we put forward new and different proposals in response to this reality  –

this critical process – logically speaking is never-ending – and is the engine of our creativity

‘Furthermore, it is not possible even to partly unravel the cluster of natural interpretations. At first sight the task would seem to be simple enough. One takes observation statements, one after the other, and analyses their content. However, concepts that are hidden in observation statements are not likely to reveal themselves in the more abstract parts of language. If they do, it will still be difficult to nail them down; concepts just like percepts, are ambiguous and dependent on background. Moreover, the content of a concept is determined also by the way in which it is related to perception. Yet, how can this way be discovered without circularity? Perceptions must be identified, and the identifying mechanism will contain some of the very same elements which govern the use of the concept to be investigated. We never penetrate this concept completely, for we always use part of it to find its constituents. There is only one way to get out of this

circle, and it consists in using an external measure of comparison, including new ways of relating concepts and percepts. Removed from the domain of natural discourse and from all those principles, habits, and attitudes which constitute its form of life, such an external measure will look strange indeed. This, however, is not an argument against its use. On the contrary, such an impression of strangeness reveals that natural interpretations are at work, and it is the first step towards their discovery. Let us explain this situation with the help of the tower example.’

there is no cluster of natural interpretations – unless – you propose a cluster

the content of observation statements – is proposed

concepts are proposed

that which is proposed – is not hidden

there is no hidden content – in an observation statement – in a proposal

the observation statement has no content – but the content proposed

if background is a consideration – it is a consideration – because it is proposed

perceptions and conceptions – are propositional categories –

how a conceptual proposition is related to a perceptual proposition – is the issue of how one proposal is related to another

any answer to this question – is a proposal

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘We never penetrate this concept completely, for we always use part of it to find its constituents’

the concept is a proposal – and we propose in relation to it – and any proposal put – is logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

there is no problem here 

the notion of ‘complete penetration’ – is essentialist rubbish

this ‘external measure’ – is just another proposal to work with –

and this ‘external measure’ proposal – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt –  and is uncertain

if it is regarded as useful it will have a role to play –

if not it will be dropped

introducing such a proposal is not a revolutionary move –

it is just another propositional action thrown into the mix

‘The example is intended to show that the Copernican view is not in accordance with ‘facts’. Seen from the point of view of these ‘facts’, the idea of the motion of the earth is outlandish, absurd and obviously false, to mention only some of the expressions which were frequently used at the time, and which are still heard whenever professional squares confront a  new and counter-factual theory. This makes us suspect that the Copernican view is an external measuring rod of precisely the kind described above.’

the Copernican theory is a different view –  a different view of the ‘facts’ –

and therefore a different view from the facts

the ‘facts’ are proposals – interpreted in terms of other proposals – theories

and the ‘facts’ – as with the theories – are open to question – open to doubt – and they are – before or after interpretation – uncertain

and just by the way all proposals – all views  – are external – to each other

as for ‘measuring-rod’ – nice touch

a pretence of mathematics here – of calculation –

when in reality all we have – if we have any engagement between different views – is argument

‘We can turn the argument around and use it as detecting devise that helps us to discover the natural interpretations which exclude the motion of the earth. Turning the argument around, we first assert the motion of the earth and then inquire what changes will remove the contradiction. Such an inquiry may take considerable time, and there is a good sense in which it is not finished today. The contradiction may stay with us for decades or even centuries. Still it must be upheld until we have finished our examination, or else the

examination, the attempt to discover the antediluvian components of our knowledge, cannot even start. This, we have seen, is one of the reasons one can give for retaining, and, perhaps, even for inventing, theories which are inconsistent with the facts. Ideological ingredients of our knowledge and, more especially, of our observations, are discovered with the help of theories which are refuted by them. They are discovered counter-inductively.’

‘Turning the argument around, we first assert the motion of the earth and then inquire what changes will remove the contradiction.’

the argument – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

so yes – you can ask the question – what changes will remove the contradiction?

this is one example of the kind of questioning that can be employed in a critical examination of the argument – of the proposal

‘Such an inquiry may take considerable time, and there is a good sense in which it is not finished today’

true enough – logically speaking a propositional inquiry – is never at an end

‘The contradiction may stay with us for decades or even centuries. Still it must be upheld until we have finished our examination, or else the examination, the attempt to discover the antediluvian components of our knowledge, cannot even start.’

there will be no finish – no mission accomplished – in a logical sense –

at best there will be – more questions – more doubts – greater uncertainty

any decision to put an end to questioning – is pragmatic – and is itself – open to question

discovering the antediluvian components of our knowledge –

if such ‘discoveries’ – lead to question – doubt and uncertainty – regarding the propositions in play – ok

however it strikes me that such a venture will most likely be a waste of time – energy and resources

and likely to divert the critical focus from the propositional issues being dealt with

what we are dealing with is proposals put – in the here and now – not some mythical history of them

‘This, we have seen, is one of the reasons one can give for retaining, and, perhaps, even for inventing, theories which are inconsistent with the facts. Ideological ingredients of our knowledge and, more especially, of our observations, are discovered with the help of theories which are refuted by them. They are discovered counter-inductively.’

any fact is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

subjecting facts to different theories – wherever they spring from – is a good way of putting the facts to question –

at the same time we need to put to question – any theories advanced –

ideological ingredients of our knowledge and observations?

ideological ingredients –

it is useful to understand the epistemological – ontological – metaphysical perspectives one operates with –

and to realise that these perspectives – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

does counterinduction discover these different perspectives?

I don’t think so

the discovery of different perspectives – will be the result of a critical investigation –

that is – of question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

in such an investigation all theories involved – counterinductive or not – will be put to question – put to doubt –

and out of such a critical process –

new perspectives – new theories – new proposals can emerge                                                                                                                                     

‘Let me repeat what has been asserted so far. Theories are tested and possibly refuted, by facts. Facts contain ideological components, older views which have vanished from sight or were perhaps never formulated in an explicit manner. Such components are highly suspicious. Firstly, because of their age and obscure origin: we do not know why or how they were first introduced; secondly, because their very nature protects them, and always has protected them, from critical examination. In the event of a contradiction between a new and interesting theory and a collection of firmly established facts, the best procedure, therefore, is not to abandon the theory but to use it to discover the hidden principles responsible for the contradiction. Counter-induction is an essential part of such a process of discovery. (Excellent historical example: the arguments against motion and atomicity of Parmenides and Zeno. Diogenes of Sinope, the Cynic, took the simple course that would be taken by many contemporary scientist and all contemporary philosophers: he refuted the arguments by rising and walking up and down. The opposite course,

recommended here, has led to much more interesting results, as is witnessed by the history of the case. One should not be too hard on Diogenes, however, for it is also reported  that he beat up a pupil who was content with his refutation, exclaiming that he had given reasons which the pupil should not accept without additional reasons of his own.)’

‘Theories are tested and possibly refuted, by facts. Facts contain ideological components, older views which have vanished from sight or were perhaps never formulated in an explicit manner.’

facts are proposals

if a fact contains ideological components – it because ideological proponents are proposed

older views that have vanished from sight?

this is irrelevant

if an older view is proposed – and formulated in an explicit manner – it will be a candidate for relevance

‘Such components are highly suspicious. Firstly, because of their age and obscure origin: we do not know why or how they were first introduced; secondly, because their very nature protects them, and always has protected them, from critical examination.’

their age and obscure origin – are logically irrelevant

no proposal – ancient or current – is protected from criticism – if questions are asked – doubts raised – and uncertainties explored

the view itself is a proposal –

how it is dealt with – i.e. – either critically or non-critically – is up to those dealing with it

they can behave logically – or not

‘In the event of a contradiction between a new and interesting theory and a collection of firmly established facts, the best procedure, therefore, is not to abandon the theory but to use it to discover the hidden principles responsible for the contradiction.’

setting things up this way gives you the opportunity to re-evaluate the so called ‘firmly established facts’ –

to put them to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty

this you could do anyway without the prop of the alternative theory –

and in any case – the new theory – is not sacrosanct – it too is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain -

prime facie – relative to the issue of critical evaluation – the alternative theory proposal – doesn’t really change anything

I am suspicious of any claim of methodological superiority –

we have the logical method of question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

this method can be recommended – but only recommended –

how the scientist deals with the materials he has at his disposals – the theories and facts he works with – is in a real sense is up to him –

and that I think ought to be respected

‘Counter-induction is an essential part of such a process of discovery.’ –

as I have said – I think Feyerabend’s counterinduction – can play a role in science –

it can play a role – if scientists in fact find counter-induction to be useful in their work

‘is it an essential part of such a process of discovery?’

well first off there is no ‘essential’ part to any process of discovery –

discovery – as with the proposals – that are discovered – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

as for Diogenes –

a great advertisement for counter-induction

we shouldn’t be too hard him?

he beat up a student who agreed with him

Diogenes was an ignorant thug

‘Havering discovered a particular natural interpretation, how can we examine it and test it? Obviously we cannot proceed in the usual way, i.e. derive predictions and compare them with ‘the results of observation’. These results are no longer available. The idea that the senses, employed under normal circumstances, produce correct reports of real events, for example reports of the real motion of physical bodies, has been removed from all observational statements. (Remember that this notion was found to be an essential component of the anti-Copernican argument). But without it our sensory reactions cease to be relevant for tests. This conclusion has been generalized by some older rationalists, who decided to build their science on reason only and ascribed to observation a quite insignificant auxiliary function. Galileo does not adopt this procedure.’

the point is that – however you build your science – be it on reason or observation

the logical reality is that your theories – your proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain

‘If one natural interpretation causes trouble for an attractive view, and if its elimination removes the view from the domain of observation, then the only acceptable procedure is to use other interpretations and to see what happens. The interpretation that Galileo uses restores the senses to their position as instruments of exploration, but only with respect to the reality of relative motion. Motion ‘among things which share it in common’ is ‘non-operative’, that is, ‘it remains insensible, imperceptible, and without any effect whatever’. Galileo’s first step, in his joint examination of the Copernican doctrine and of a familiar but hidden natural interpretation, consists therefore in replacing the latter by a different interpretation. In other words he introduces a new observation language.’

Feyerabend is still persisting with the ‘hidden’ –

if an interpretation is proposed – if it is familiar – it is not hidden

if it is not proposed – it is not hidden – if it is not proposed – it is not there

a new observation language –

yes – a new observation language – in the sense that we have a different theory – a different account of what is observed

‘This is of course an entirely legitimate move. In general the observation language which enters an argument has been in use for a long time and is quite familiar. Considering the structures of common idioms on the one hand, and of the Aristotelian philosophy on the other, neither this use nor this familiarity can be regarded as a test of the underlying principles. These principles, these natural interpretations, occur in every description. Extraordinary cases which might create difficulties are defused with the help of ‘adjuster words’, such as ‘like’ or ‘analogous’, which divert them so that the basic ontology remains unchallenged. A test is, however, urgently needed. It is essentially needed in those cases where the principles seem to threaten a new theory. It is then quite reasonable

to introduce alternative observation languages and so compare them both with the original idiom and with the theory under examination. Proceeding this way we must make sure that the comparison is fair. That is we must not criticize an idiom that is supposed to function as an observation language because it is not yet well known and is, therefore, less strongly connected with our sensory reactions and less plausible than another, more ‘common’ medium. Superficial criticisms of this kind, which have been elevated into an entire new ‘philosophy’ abound in discussions of the mind-body problem. Philosophers who want to introduce and test new views thus find themselves faced not with arguments, which they could most likely answer, but with an impenetrable stone wall of well-entrenched reactions. This is not at all different from the attitude of

people ignorant of foreign languages, who feel that a certain colour is much better

described by ‘red’ than by ‘rosso’. As opposed to such attempts at conversion by appeal to familiarity (I know what pains are, and I also know, from introspection, that they have nothing whatever to do with material processes!’), we must emphasise that a comparative judgment of observation languages, e.g. materialistic observation languages, phenomenalistic observation languages, objective-idealistic observation languages, theological observation languages, etc., can start only when all of them are spoken equally fluently.’

‘It is then quite reasonable to introduce alternative observation languages and so compare them both with the original idiom and with the theory under examination.’

as to comparison –

let’s be clear – if you are dealing with different – conflicting observation languages – there is no common ground to begin with

to suggest that the common ground is the ‘original idiom’ and the theory under examination – is a hoax

if the common ground was the original idiom and theory – there would be no argument – no ‘alternative’ observation language

the real point here is that there is no test – to suggest that there is – is pretentious

yes – there are propositional alternatives advanced –

and there is argument –

and once we get past the pretence of being ‘fair’ –

the persuasive battle takes off –

and the battle is to establish a propositional ground

now there is no way to predict in advance – which observation language – which theory  – which world view – will win the day in any propositional conflict

you have to see what happens

‘As opposed to such attempts at conversion by appeal to familiarity (I know what pains are, and I also know, from introspection, that they have nothing whatever to do with material processes!’), we must emphasise that a comparative judgment of observation languages, e.g. materialistic observation languages, phenomenalistic observation languages, objective-idealistic observation languages, theological observation languages, etc., can start only when all of them are spoken equally fluently.’

yes – I am afraid conversion or at least some form of persuasion – wins the day –

for even ‘when all of them are spoken equally fluently’ – there will still be the question of which to proceed with –

speaking different languages fluently doesn’t determine which language to use – in which circumstance

we have options here – and that is a good thing –

one language may function better than another in a particular propositional context –

it is worth investigating different observational languages and their uses

however decisions must be made – and in practice that comes down to persuasion – to rhetoric –

and whatever decision is made – whatever rhetoric wins the day –

that decision – that rhetoric – is open to question – open to doubt – is logically speaking –

uncertain