Feyerabend 14

14

‘The results obtained so far suggest abolishing the distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification and disregarding the related distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms. Neither distinction plays a role in scientific practice. Attempts to enforce them would have disastrous consequences.’

Feyerabend proceeds –

‘Let us now use the material of the preceding sections to throw light on the following features of contemporary empiricism: (1) the distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification; (2) the distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms; (3) the problem of incommensurability. The last problem will lead us back to the problem of rationality and order vs. anarchism, which is the main topic of this essay.

One of the objections which may be raised against my attempt to draw methodological conclusions from historical examples is that it confounds two contexts which are essentially distinct, viz. a context of discovery, and a context of justification. Discovery may be irrational and need not follow any recognised method. Justification, on the other hand, or – to use the Holy Word of a different school – criticism, starts only after the discoveries have been made, and it proceeds in an orderly way. ‘It is one thing’, writes Herbert Feigl, ‘to retrace the historical origins, the psychological genesis and development, the socio-political-economic conditions for the acceptance or rejection of scientific theories; and it is quite another thing to provide a logical reconstruction of the conceptual structure and of the testing of scientific theories.’ These are indeed two different things, especially as they are done by two different disciplines (history of science, philosophy of science), which are quite jealous of their independence. But the question is not what distinctions a fertile mind can dream up when confronted with a complex process, or how some homogeneous material may be subdivided by accidents of history; the question is to what extent the distinction drawn reflects a real difference and whether science can advance without a strong interaction between separated domains. (A river may be subdivided by national boundaries, but this does not make it a discontinuous entity.) Now there is, of course, a very noticeable difference between rules of testing as ‘reconstructed’ by philosophers of science and the procedures which scientists use in actual research. The difference is apparent to the most superficial examination. On the one hand a most superficial examination shows that a determined application of the methods of criticism and proof which are said to belong to the context of justification, would wipe out science as we know it – and would never have permitted it to arise. Conversely, the fact that science exists proves that these methods were frequently over ruled. They were overruled by precisely those procedures which are now said to belong to the context of discovery. To express it differently: in the history of science, standards of justification often forbid moves that are caused by psychological, socio-economic- political and other ‘external’ conditions and science survives only because

these moves are allowed to prevail. Thus the attempt ‘to retrace the historical origins,

the psychological genesis and development, the socio-political-economic conditions for the acceptance or rejection of scientific theories’, far from being an enterprise entirely

different from the consideration of tests, actually leads to a criticism of these considerations – provided the two domains, historical research and discussion of test procedures, are not kept apart by fiat.’

any proposition – be that a proposition of discovery or a proposition of justification – is a proposal

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

that is the logic of propositional action – be it termed ‘scientific’ – ‘philosophical’ – or whatever

irrational action – is propositional action that is not held open to question – open to doubt

that is – propositional action that is regarded as certain

the claim of certainty – is the hallmark of irrationality

discovery – is irrational – if it is regarded as a process that leads to certainty

discovery as the investigation of uncertainty – of uncertain propositions – is rational

justification – if it is a process that is said to lead to certainty – is irrational

justification – as the decision to proceed with uncertainty – in uncertainty – is rational

criticism does not start only after discovery –

criticism is the engine of propositional discovery –

it is through propositional criticism that discoveries are made – and are proposed

and as to the ‘justification of the proposition’ – the decision to hold to a proposition – to proceed with a proposition –

that decision – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘justification’ – logically speaking – can only be the investigation of propositional uncertainty

the investigation of propositional uncertainty is criticism – is a critical activity

‘retracing the historical origins’ etc. – of a proposition – of theory – if it is done rationally

is a critical activity –

just as – ‘the logical reconstruction of the conceptual structure of scientific theories ’ – and the testing of scientific theories – if it is rational – is a critical activity

discovery and justification –

there are not ‘two different things’ –

rational activity – in any propositional context – is critical – and – from a logical point of view – never stops being critical

so there are no ‘separated domains’ – in rational activity –

what you actually have with this context of discovery / context of justification issue – if you have anything at all – is simply a division of labour – a division of work practices –

i.e. when one is in the discovery mode – justification may not be a central focus –

and when one’s focus is ‘justification’ – the discovery phase will have less significance

whether or not there is in actuality – in practise – anything like a real distinction here – could only be determined by a comprehensive empirical study of scientific work practices

to my mind – this distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification is really a nothing issue

the thinking scientist I suspect understands that – at every turn – at any point in his work – there are questions – doubts – uncertainties –

discovery can well be seen as a question of justification – if you like –

and justification – a question of discovery –

there is nothing here

‘the rules of testing as ‘reconstructed’ by philosophers’ – if they are dealt with rationally are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

the same is to be said of any procedure a scientist uses

a determined application of the methods of criticism – does not – would not – in fact ‘wipe out science as we know it’ –

a critical attitude simply gives a rational perspective – a rational understanding of science

science – has and will – does – proceed – whether or not it is prosecuted in a rational or irrational manner

it is the scientist who decides what science is

philosophers focus on the question of rationality –

if a standard of justification adopted by a scientific community ‘forbids moves that are caused by psychological, socio-economic-political and other ‘external’ conditions’ –

so be it – there you have it –

if the attempt ‘to retrace the historical origins, the psychological genesis

and development, the socio-political-economic conditions for the acceptance or

rejection of scientific theories’ – is a critical activity – then the activity is rational

if such an attempt is not critical – it is not rational

‘A similar argument applies to the ritual distinction between methodological prescriptions and historical descriptions, Methodology, it is said, deals with what should be done and cannot be criticized by reference to what is. But we must of course make sure that our prescriptions have a point of attack in the historical material, and we must also make sure that their determined application leads to desirable results. We make sure by considering (historical, sociological, physical, psychological, etc.) tendencies and laws which tell us what is possible and what is not possible under the given circumstances and thus separate feasible prescriptions from those which are going to lead into dead ends. Again, progress can be made only if the distinction between the ought and the is is regarded as a temporary device rather than a fundamental boundary line.’

how scientists proceed – is how they proceed –

there is no ‘ought’ here

either you operate in a manner that is recognized by those who practice science – or you don’t do science

how science is practised – how it is done – is open to question –

and historical studies show us that the practice of science – is uncertain –

nevertheless it is scientists who decide what science is and how it is practised

as to ‘desirable results’ –

this notion is I think facile and immature –

you propose and develop theories and test them – you see what the results are

and the results – whether you like it – or not – are the results

if that’s not satisfaction enough for you – find another job

what is possible and what is not possible – is determined in the testing

dead ends – require new theories – or new tests – or both

‘progress’ – is whatever results from the work

as for the use of historical material – historical insights – yes they must have a point relevant to whatever is being investigated –

historical examples though – are not science – they are history

these notions of ‘prescriptions’ and ‘progress’ – are rhetorical –

good for the advertising and selling of science –

but irrelevant to the actual practice of science

Feyerabend doesn’t get that science is about what is – not about what was – or what will be – or should be –

whatever he is on about – it is not science

‘A distinction which once may have had a point but which has now definitely lost it is the distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms. It is now generally admitted that this distinction is not as sharp as it was thought to be only a few decades ago. It is also admitted, in complete agreement with Neurath’s original views, that both theories and observations can be abandoned; theories may be removed because of conflicting with observations, observations may be removed for theoretical reasons. Finally, we have discovered that learning does not go from observation to theory but always involves both elements. Experience arises together with theoretical assumptions

not before them, and an experience without theory is just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory without experience; eliminate part of the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have a person who is completely disoriented and incapable of carrying out the simplest action. Eliminate further knowledge and his sensory world (‘his observation language’) will start disintegrating, colours and other simple sensations will  disappear until he is in a stage even more primitive than a small child. A small child on the other hand does not posses a stable perceptual world which he uses for making sense of the theories before him. Quite the contrary – he passes through various perceptual stages which are only loosely connected with each other (earlier stages disappear when new stages take over – see chapter 17) and which embody all the theoretical knowledge available at the time. Moreover, the whole process starts only because the child reacts correctly towards signals, interprets them correctly, because he posses means of interpretation even before he has experienced his first sensation.’

observational terms – and theoretical terms –

what we have is proposals – and propositional categories

the categorizing – ‘observational’ – ‘theoretical’ – is organizational –

we organize our propositions – our propositional actions – into categories – to create propositional order and function

we categorize – and we create these categories – because such an ordering has proved useful

if we take a purely logical view here – we simply have proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

however propositional function – propositional utility – requires propositional organization

an observation is a propositional action

theory creation is a propositional action

experience is propositional action

our reality is propositional – and we categorize and organize our propositional actions into forms that enable function and use

‘an experience without theory’?

any ‘experience’ – is a propositional action – any ‘theory’ is a propositional action

a small child does not posses propositional stability – or propositional utility

we are born into a propositional world – we are taught a propositional reality

there is no ‘correct’ interpretation – there is only functional or non-functional propositional action

a sensation – is a propositional action – a propositional interpretation – an interpretation of what is given

and what is given is what is proposed – however – wherever – and in whatever form it takes

in the absence of proposal – what we face is the unknown –

our reality – is our propositional response to the unknown