7
‘The new natural interpretations constitute a new and
highly abstract observation language. They are introduced and concealed
so that one fails to notice that the change has taken place (method of
anamnesis). They contain the idea of the relativity of all motion and
the law of circular inertia.’
‘Galileo replaces one natural interpretation by a very
different and as yet (1630) at least partly unnatural interpretation. How does
he proceed? How does he manage to introduce absurd and counterinductive assertions,
such as the assertion that the earth moves, and yet get them a just and
attentive hearing? One anticipates that arguments will not suffice – an
interesting and highly important limitation of rationalism – and Galileo’s
utterances are indeed arguments in appearance only. For Galileo uses propaganda.
He uses psychological tricks in addition to whatever intellectual
reasons he has to offer. These tricks are very successful: they lead him to
victory. But they obscure the new attitude to experience that is in the making,
and postpone for centuries the possibility of a reasonable philosophy. They
obscure the fact that the experience on which Galileo wants to base the
Copernican view is nothing but the result of his own fertile imagination, that
it has been invented. They obscure this fact by insinuating that the new
results which emerge are known and conceded by all, and need only to be called
to our attention to appear as the most obvious expression of the truth.
Galileo ‘reminds’ us that there are situations in which the
non-operative character of shared motion is just as evident and firmly believed
as the operative character of all motion is in other circumstances. (The latter
idea is, therefore, not the only natural interpretation of motion). The situations
are: events in a boat, in a smoothly moving carriage, and in other systems that
contain an observer and permit him to carry out some simple operations’
let us hear from Galileo himself –
‘Sagredo: There has just occurred to me a certain
fantasy which passed through my imagination one day while I was sailing to
Aleppo, where I was going as a consul for our country….If the point of a pen
had been on the ship during the whole voyage from Venice to Alexandretta and
had the property of leaving visible marks of its whole trip, what trace – what
mark – what line would it have left?
Simplicio: It would have left a line extending from Venice
to there; not perfectly straight – or rather, not lying in the perfect arc of a
circle – but more or less fluctuating as the vessel would now and again have
rocked. But this bending in some places a yard or two to the right or left, up
or down, in length of many hundreds of miles, would have made little alteration
to the whole extent of the line. These would scarcely be sensible, and, without
an error or any movement, it could be part of a perfect arc.
Sagredo: So if the fluctuation of the waves were
taken away and the motion of the vessel were calm and tranquil, the true and
precise motion of the pen would have been the arc of a perfect circle. Now if I
had that same pen continually in my hand and had moved it only a little
sometimes this way or that, what alterations should I have brought into the
main extent of this line?
Simplicio: Less than that which would be given to a
straight line a thousand yards long which deviated from the absolute
straightness here and there by a flea’s eye.
Sagredo: Then if an artist had been drawing with that
pen on a sheet of paper when he left the port and had continued doing so all
the way to Alexandretta, he would have been able to derive from the pen’s
motion a whole narrative of many figures, completely traced and sketched in
thousands of directions, with landscapes, buildings, animals, and other things.
Yet the actual real essential movement marked by the pen point would have been
only a line; long, indeed but very simple. But as to the artist’s own actions,
these would have been conducted exactly the same had the ship been standing
still. The reason that of the pen’s long motion no trace would remain except
the marks drawn upon the paper is that the gross motion from Venice
to Alexandretta was common to the paper, the pen, and
everything else in the ship. But the small motions back and forth, to the right
and left, communicated by the artist’s fingers to the pen but not to the paper,
and belonging to the former alone, could thereby leave a trace on the paper
which remained stationary to those motions.’
Galileo is arguing here that perspective is the key to
understanding motion
‘But this bending in some places a yard or two to the right
or the left, up or down, in length of many hundreds of miles, would have made
little alteration in the whole extent of the line’
the key phrase here is ‘the whole extent of the line’ – and
the point is that though we might naturally focus on a part of the line – ‘this
bending in some places’ – we can also adopt a broader perspective – the
perspective of the whole line
it is this perspective – the larger perspective which gives
us the ‘real motion’ of the boat
and if you take the fluctuations out of the analysis ‘if the
fluctuations are taken away’ – the alterations to the line ‘would be less than
a flea’s eye’
that is you can then ‘see’ the real motion as the arc of a
perfect circle
this is strictly speaking an argument against immediate
experience – or giving any weight to the perspective of immediate experience in
terms of understanding ‘real’ motion
the argument goes on to show that the appearance of being
stationary cannot be maintained relative to the perspective of real motion –
an artist drawing in the boat draws pictures of what he sees
– ‘Yet the actual real essential movement marked by the pen point would have
only been a line; long indeed but very simple – and the reason for this is the
‘gross motion (common motion) of the paper, the pen, and everything else in the
ship’
however the immediate actions of the artist’s fingers to the
pen – but not the paper – leaves a trace that ‘remained stationary’ – to those
motions
what is clear from this argument is that immediate
experience is a perspective – just as the so called ‘real’ motion is a
perspective
this is not to say that Galileo holds that these
perspectives should be given equal weight
Galileo
makes clear in this argument that he regards the perspective of immediate
experience as limited –
he clearly prefers the perspective of real motion – and his
implicit argument for this preference is that it does not suffer the limitation
of immediate experience
and the inference of course is that it will have greater
application and functionality
now to the second example –
‘Salviati:…..imagine yourself in a boat with your
eyes fixed on a point of the sail yard. Do you think that because the boat is
moving along briskly, you will have to move your eyes in order to keep your
vision always on the point of the sail yard and follow its motion?
Simplicio: I am sure that I should not need to make
any such change at all: not just to my vision, but if I had aimed a musket I
should never have to move a hairs breath to keep it aimed, no matter how the
boat moved.
Salviati: And this comes about because the motion
which the ship confers upon the sail yard, it also confers upon you and upon
your eyes, so that you need not move them a bit in order to gaze at the top of
the sail yard, which consequently appears motionless to you. (And the rays of
vision go from the eye to the sail yard, just as if a cord where tied between
two ends of the boat. Now a hundred cords are tied at different fixed points,
each of which keeps its place whether the ship moves or remains still).’
the argument here is that the appearance of the sail yard as
stationary is no more than a function of the motion of the boat from the
perspective of an observer in the boat
as Feyerabend says it is clear that these situations lead to
a non-operative concept of motion
(Galileo defines relative motion as motion ‘among things
which share it in common’
and that this motion is non-operative in that it ‘remains
insensible, imperceptible, and without any effect whatever’)
the first of the above two paradigms of non-operative motion
is followed by this statement –
‘It is likewise true that the earth being moved, the motion
of the stone in descending is actually a long stretch of many hundreds of
yards, or even many thousand; and had it been able to mark its course in
motionless air or some other surface, it would have left a
very long slanting line. But that part of all this motion
which is common to the rock, the tower, and ourselves remains insensible and as
if it did not exist. There remains observable only that part in which neither
the tower nor we are participants; in a word that with which the stone, in
falling measures the tower.
And the second paradigm precedes the exhortation to
‘transfer this argument to the whirling of the earth and to the rock placed on
top of the tower, whose motion you cannot discern because, in common with the
rock, you posses from the earth that motion which
is required for following the tower; you do not need to move
your eyes. Next, if you add
to the rock a downward motion which is peculiar to it and
not shared by you, and which is mixed with this circular motion, the circular
portion of the motion which is common to the stone and the eye continues to be
imperceptible. The straight motion alone is sensible, for to follow that you
must move your eyes downwards.’
Feyerabend says –
‘Yielding to this persuasion, we now automatically start
confounding the conditions of the two cases and became relativists. This is the
essence of Galileo’s trickery! As a result, the clash between Copernicus and
‘the conditions affecting ourselves and those in the air above us’ dissolves
into thin air, and we finally realize ‘that all terrestrial events from which
it is ordinarily held that the earth stands still and the sun and the fixed
stars are moving would necessarily appear just the same to us if the earth
moved and the other stood still.’
Feyerabend argues that Galileo ‘confounds the conditions of
the two cases’ – and that this is the essence of his trickery
is this so?
Galileo puts forward a proposal – for relativism and non-operative
shared motion
and this proposal – and the argument for it – does reconcile
the tower argument with the Copernican theory of motion – thus reconciling
operative and non-operative motion
Galileo argues by implication that the theory of absolute
motion is limited in that it cannot account for non-operative motion
whereas a relativistic theory does accommodate operative and
non-operative motion
the conditions of the two cases are not confounded – they
are placed on the equal epistemological footing of relativism
the relativist theory has greater range and applicability –
and it is this greater range and applicability that makes it
more useful to science than the Aristotelian idea of absolute motion
Galileo in his argument for the Copernican theory of motion
has done some first class philosophical thinking and argument –
and further he has illustrated his argument for non-operative
motion and relativism with examples that people can readily understand
it would suit Feyerabend to be able to show that Galileo was
some kind of fraud
this would fit beautifully with Feyerabend’s so called
irrationalism
the fact of it is though that on any fair reading of Galileo
– all you have is elegantly constructed rational argument –
the only one trying to be tricky here is Feyerabend – and
the trick doesn’t work –
what we have from Feyerabend is no real argument – just
rhetorical assertion –
and in the best traditions of rhetoric – the attempt to
discredit – a decent logical argument
Feyerabend puts forward two paradigms:
‘Let us now look at the situation from a more abstract point
of view. We start with two conceptual sub-systems of ‘ordinary’ thought…One of
them regards motion as an absolute process which always has effects, effects on
our sense included… the arguments of Copernicus’s opponents which are quoted by
Galileo himself and, according to him, are ‘very plausible’, show that there
was a widespread tendency to think in its terms, and that this tendency was a
serious obstacle to the discussion of alternative ideas.’
The second system is built around the relativity of motion,
and is also well entrenched in its own domain of application. Galileo aims at
replacing the first system by the second in all cases, terrestrial as well as
celestial. Naïve realism with respect to motion is to be completely
eliminated…
Now we have seen that this naïve realism is on occasions an
essential part of our observational vocabulary. On these occasions…the
observation language contains the idea of the efficacy of all motion. Or,
to express it in the material mode of speech, our experience in these
situations is an experience of objects which move
absolutely. Taking this into consideration, it is apparent that
Galileo’s proposal amounts to a partial revision of our observation language or
of our experience. An experience which partly contradicts the idea of
the motion of the earth is turned into an experience that confirms it,
at least as far as ‘terrestrial things’ are concerned. This is what actually
happens. But Galileo wants to persuade us that no change has taken place,
that the second conceptual system is already universally known, even
though it is not universally used. Salviati, his representative in the
dialogue, his opponent Simplicio and Sagredo the intelligent layman, all
connect Galileo’s method of argumentation with Plato’s theory of anamnesis
– a clever tactical move, typically Galilean one is inclined to say. Yet we
must not allow ourselves to be deceived about the revolutionary development
that is actually taking place.’
‘Now we have seen that this naïve realism is on occasions an
essential part of our observational vocabulary. On these occasions…the
observation language contains the idea of the efficacy of all motion.
Or, to express it in the material mode of speech, our experience in these
situations is an experience of objects which move
absolutely.’
our observational vocabulary can be interpreted in
terms of the proposal of naïve realism
and we can have the same vocabulary – without the
understanding that objects move absolutely –
that is we can have the same vocabulary – with a
relativistic understanding
and in a sense – this is just what Galileo proposes and
argues for
‘Taking this into consideration, it is apparent that
Galileo’s proposal amounts to a partial revision of our observation language or
of our experience. An experience which partly contradicts the idea of
the motion of the earth is turned into an experience that confirms it,
at least as far as ‘terrestrial things’ are concerned.’
‘a partial revision of our observation language or our
experience’
this is a confusing statement
I would put that our experience is not revised – and that
our observation language need not be revised –
what is different – is not the experience per se
– or even how it is expressed – but rather the understanding –
the understanding of
the experience – the understanding of the observation language
in time of course a different understanding can lead to
different expressions – changes in the observation language – but this is
really incidental –
the real issue is always how the ‘experience’ is interpreted
– how it is proposed – how it is understood
and the same is true with the observation language – the
issue is what interpretation it is given
the experience itself – neither confirms a theory or
contradicts it
what you have in play here is different theories of the
experience – different proposals –
that is where the argument is
and what Galileo does is argue that the relativistic theory
– the relativistic proposal –
can be shown to apply to all motion –
and in so arguing he puts that the proposal of absolute
motion is indeed – naïve
and I think you would find that Galileo would see his
proposal – as open to question – open to doubt – and therefore – uncertain
but also a proposal that represents the best of his thinking
–
and a proposal that he would say should be taken seriously
‘The resistance against the assumption that shared motion is
non-operative was equated with the resistance which forgotten ideas exhibit
towards the attempt to make them known. Let us accept this interpretation
of resistance. But let us not forget its existence. We must then admit
that it restricts the use of the relativistic ideas, confining them to part
of our everyday experience. Outside this part, i.e. in interplanetary
space, they are ‘forgotten’ and therefore not active. But outside this there is
not complete chaos. Other concepts are used, among them whose very same
absolutistic concepts which derive from the first paradigm. We not only use
them, but we must admit that they are entirely adequate. No difficulties arise
as long as one remains within the limits of the first paradigm. “Experience’,
i.e. the totality of all facts from all domains, cannot force us to carry out the
change which Galileo wants to introduce. The motive for change must come from a
different source.’
‘Other concepts are used, among them whose very same
absolutist concepts which derive from the first paradigm. We not only use them,
but we must admit that they are entirely adequate.’
if a concept is useful in a propositional context – then it
will be used
‘No difficulties arise as long as one remains within the
limits of the first paradigm.’
this can be argued – but the point really is that what we are
dealing with is two different proposals – different paradigms – different
theories of experience – different theories of motion
“Experience’, i.e. the totality of all facts from all
domains, cannot force us to carry out the change which Galileo wants to
introduce. The motive for change must come from a different source.’
Feyerabend is right here – at least in my terms he is right
–
‘experience’ as such is an unknown –
that is to say experience – in the absence of proposal – any
proposal – is unknown
we propose to make known
there is no known experience – independent of proposal – so
no use pretending that there is – or pretending that you can appeal to it
the best you can do is argue for your theory – your
interpretation – your proposal for experience – your understanding of
experience
while at the same time regarding it as open to question –
open to doubt – and as uncertain
‘The motive for change must come from a different source.’ –
‘the motive for change’?
my answer to this is to say that the proposal – in fact any
proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
motives and change – are responses to and expressions of
propositional uncertainty
Feyerabend continues –
‘It comes, first, from the desire to see ‘the whole [correspond]
to its parts with wonderful simplicity’, as Copernicus had already expressed
himself. It comes from the ‘typically metaphysical urge’ for unity of
understanding and conceptual presentation. And the motive for a change is
connected, secondly, with the intention to make room for the motion of the
earth, which Galileo accepts and is not prepared to give up. The idea of the
motion of the earth is closer to the first paradigm than to the second, or at
least it was at the time of Galileo. This gave strength to the Aristotelian
arguments and made them plausible. To eliminate this plausibility, it was
necessary to subsume the first paradigm under the second, and to extend the
relative notions to all phenomena. The idea of anamnesis functions here
as psychological crutch, as a lever which smooths the process
of submission by concealing its existence. As a result we
are now ready to apply the notions not only to boats, coaches, birds,
but to the solid and well-established earth’ as a whole. And we have the impression
that this readiness was in us all the time, although it took some effort to
make it conscious. This impression is most certainly erroneous: it is the
result of Galileo’s propagandistic machinations. We would do better to describe
the situation in a different way, as a change of our conceptual system. Or,
because we are dealing with concepts
which belong to natural interpretations, and which are therefore connected with
sensations in a very direct way, we should describe it as a change of
experience that allows us to accommodate the Copernican doctrine. The
change corresponds perfectly to the pattern described in Chapter 2 below: an
inadequate view, the Copernican theory, is supported by another inadequate
view, the idea of the non-operative character of shared motion, and both
theories gain strength and give support to each other in the process. It is
this change which underlies the transition from the Aristotelian point of view
to the epistemology of modern science.’
‘The idea of the motion of the earth is closer to the first
paradigm than to the second, or at least it was at the time of Galileo. This
gave strength to the Aristotelian arguments and made them plausible. To
eliminate this plausibility, it was necessary to subsume the first paradigm under
the second, and to extend the relative notions to all phenomena.’
look – which ever view you take – the argument will be that
the opposing point of view can be accounted for in your perspective
‘The idea of anamnesis functions here as
psychological crutch, as a lever which smooths the process of submission by
concealing its existence. As a result we are now ready to apply the notions not
only to boats, coaches, birds, but to the solid and well-established earth’ as
a whole. And we have the impression that this readiness was in us all the time,
although it took some effort to make it conscious. This impression is most
certainly erroneous: it is the result of Galileo’s propagandistic machinations’
Galileo presents his argument in a way that is likely to be
understood by the common man
propaganda – is opinion – without argument – masquerading as
knowledge
now seriously – is Feyerabend going to say that Galileo’s
elegant – thoughtful and logical argument – is opinion without argument
masquerading as knowledge?
well – apparently so
and it is just here that you have to ask – well who’s the
propagandist?
‘We would do better to describe the situation in a different
way, as a change of our conceptual system. Or, because we are dealing with
concepts which belong to natural interpretations, and which are therefore
connected with sensations in a very direct way, we should describe it as a
change of experience that allows us to accommodate the Copernican
doctrine.’
as Feyerabend illustrates here – the ‘situation’ – can be
described in different ways
different descriptions will suit different propositional
contexts –
different descriptions will suit different audiences
the logical point is that where there is a change of
perspective –
any proposal put to account for the change is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘For experience now ceases to be the unchangeable fundament
which it is both in common sense and in Aristotelian philosophy. The attempt to
support Copernicus makes experience ‘fluid’ in the very same manner in which it
makes the heavens fluid, ‘so that each star moves around in it by itself’. An
empiricist who starts from experience, and builds on it without ever looking
back, now loses the very ground on which he stands. Neither the earth, ‘the
solid, well-established earth’, nor the facts on which he usually relies on can
be trusted any longer. It is clear that a philosophy that uses such a fluid and
changing experience needs new methodological principles which do not insist on
an asymmetric judgement of theories by experience. Classical Physics
intuitively adopts such principles; at least the great and independent
thinkers, such as Newton, Faraday,
Boltzmann proceed in this way. But its official doctrine still clings to
the idea of a stable and unchanging basis. The clash between this doctrine and
the actual procedure is concealed by a tendentious presentation of the results
of research that hides their revolutionary origin and suggests that they arose
from a stable and unchanging source. These methods of concealment start with
Galileo’s attempt to introduce new ideas under the cover of anamnesis and
they culminate in Newton. They must
be exposed if we want to arrive at a better account of the progressive elements
in science.’
‘An empiricist who starts from experience, and builds on it
without ever looking back, now loses the very ground on which he stands.
Neither the earth, ‘the solid, well-established earth’, nor the facts on which
he usually lies can be trusted any longer.’
the ground of our knowledge of the world – if we are to
still run with such an idea –
is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
any proposal we put is open to question – open to doubt – is
uncertain
we can describe where we start – as ‘starting from
experience’ –
however to start here – is no different – logically speaking
– than any other proposed stating place –
it will be open to question –
which is to say that the proposal ‘experience’ – or whatever
your proposal is – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
a proposal – is put – not ‘trusted’ – and ‘facts’ are
proposals – open to question
we begin – logically speaking – in propositional uncertainty
as to an ‘official doctrine’ – I guess that depends on
whether you think there are ‘officials’ in science – and if so – who they are
science is a critical study of proposals – of propositions –
who puts a proposal – is irrelevant
and yes – science as with any propositional activity has a rhetorical
dimension –
however the rhetoric of science is about its presentation –
not its substance –
we need not make rhetoric our focus – unless it gets out of
hand
Feyerabend goes on about Galileo’s so called ‘methods of
concealment’ –
as I see it Galileo presents his argument is a way that
makes difficult philosophical and scientific issues – readily understandable to
a scientifically illiterate populace –
his ingenious and successful presentation of his
argument – may well explain why it gained support
‘exposing’ his presentation – is neither here nor there –
and hardly worth a mention
what is important is the argument – the philosophical
argument – the proposal –
that he advances in response to the Copernican problem –
a brilliant proposal – a brilliant argument – and one that
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
I think Galileo would agree with that
‘My discussion of the anti-Copernican argument is not yet
complete. So far, I have tried to discover what assumption will make a stone
that moves alongside a moving tower appear to fall ‘straight down’,
instead of being seen to move in an arc. The assumption which I shall call the relativity
principle, that our senses notice only relative motion and are completely
insensitive to a motion which objects have in common, was seen to do the trick.
What remains to be explained is why the stone stays with the tower and
is not left behind. In order to save the Copernican view, one must explain not
only why a motion that preserves the relation among visible objects remains
unnoticed, but also, why a common motion of various objects does not effect
their relation. That is, one must
explain why such a motion is not a causal agent.
Turning the question around … it is clear that the anti-Copernican argument
…rests on two natural interpretations: viz., the epistemological
assumption that absolute motion is always noticed, and the dynamical
principle that objects (such as the falling stone) that are not interfered
with assume their natural motion. The present problem is to supplement the relativity
principle with a new law of inertia in such a fashion that the motion of the
earth can still be asserted. One sees at once that the following law, the
principle of circular inertia as I shall call it, provides the required
solution: an object that moves with a given angular velocity on a frictionless
sphere around the centre of the earth will continue moving with the same
angular velocity forever. Combining the appearance of the falling stone with
the relativity principle, the principle of circular inertia and with some
simple assumptions concerning the composition of velocities, we obtain an
argument which no longer endangers Copernicus’ view, but can be used to give it
partial support.
yes – a good argument from Feyerabend – a good proposal in support of the
Copernican view –
clearly though – a
proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘The relativity principle was defended in two ways. The
first was by showing how it helps Copernicus: this defence is truly ad hoc.
The second was in pointing to its function in common sense, and by
surreptitiously generalizing that function (see above). No independent argument
was given for its validity. Galileo’s support for the principle of circular
motion is of exactly the same kind. He introduces the principle, again not by
reference to experiment or to independent observation, but by reference to what
everyone is supposed to know.’
Galileo put forward a proposal – and argues for a
change of perspective
what Galileo simply does is say – if you understand my
argument and accept my argument – you will see the inherent sense of its
conclusion
and you will see and understand the physical world
differently
no great conspiracy or deception there
and yes Galileo does not claim that his proposal is based on
‘independent argument for its validity’
perhaps he did not think there is such a thing
‘Simplicio: So
you have not made a hundred tests, or even one? And yet you so freely declare
it to be certain? …
Salviati: Without experiment I am sure the effect
will happen as I tell you, because it must happen that way; and I might also
add that you yourself also know that it cannot happen otherwise, no matter how
you might pretend not to know it …but I am so handy at picking people’s brains
that I shall make you confess this in spite of yourself.’
this is not Galileo’s finest moment – what we have here is
rhetoric – pretentious rhetoric
‘Step by step, Simplicio is forced to admit that a body that
moves, without friction, on a sphere concentric with the centre of the earth
will carry out a ‘boundless’, a ‘perpetual’ motion, that what Simplicio accepts
is based neither on experiment nor a corroborated theory. It is a daring
suggestion that involves a tremendous leap of the imagination. A little more
analysis then shows that this suggestion is connected with experiments, such as
the experiments of the Discorsi, by ad hoc hypotheses. (The
amount of friction to be eliminated follows not from independent investigations
– such investigations commence only much later in the 18th century –
but from the result to be achieved, viz. the circular law of inertia.) Viewing
natural phenomena in this way leads to a re-evaluation of all experience, as we
have seen. We can now add that it leads to the invention of a new kind of
experience that is not only more sophisticated but far more speculative
than is the experience of Aristotle or of common sense. Speaking paradoxically,
but not incorrectly, one may say that Galileo invents an experience that has
metaphysical ingredients. It is by means of such an experience that the transition
from a geocentric cosmology to the point of view of Copernicus and Kepler is
achieved.’
‘what Simplicio accepts is based neither on experiment nor a
corroborated theory. It is a daring suggestion that involves a tremendous leap
of the imagination.’
what is put to Simplicio – is a proposal –
and yes it is daring – and a leap of the imagination –
this is all very well – the logical point is that this
proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and daring and imaginative as
it is – it is as a proposal – uncertain
‘Viewing natural phenomena in this way leads to a
re-evaluation of all experience, as we have seen. We can now add that it leads
to the invention of a new kind of experience that is not only more
sophisticated but far more speculative than is the experience of
Aristotle or of common sense. Speaking paradoxically, but not incorrectly, one
may say that Galileo invents an experience that has metaphysical ingredient.’.
yes – viewing natural phenomena in this way – leads to a different
understanding of experience
it is not the invention of a ‘new kind of experience’ –
it is a new interpretation of experience – a new theory of
experience –
it is a new proposing of experience
and yes it can be seen as a more sophisticated theory than
that of Aristotle – or of common sense
and if it is held open to question – open to doubt – and
regarded as uncertain –
it will be springboard for speculation – speculation that is
logical
Galileo doesn’t invent an experience – he puts up a proposal
for how we can interpret experience
as to the ‘metaphysical ingredient’ –
what theory of reality – is without a metaphysical
ingredient?
or to put it more precisely –
what proposal – cannot be analysed in metaphysical terms?
