IX
113. Is the pictorial character of thought an agreement with reality? In
what sense can I say that a proposition is a picture?
‘the pictorial character of thought’?
we can use the description ‘thought’ – and all that goes with it to
characterize what we propose – to characterize a proposition –
and you can then go on and further describe your characterization
‘thought’ – as a ‘picture’
does the proposal agree with reality?
if we are talking about an un-described reality – what we are talking about
is the unknown
does the proposal agree with the unknown?
the unknown is silent
if the question is – does the proposal agree with an already described
reality?
yea or nay – the matter is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
that is the logical and practical reality –
we may assume agreement or disagreement – simply to get on with it –
but here we are talking pragmatism – not logic
‘In what sense can I say that a proposition is a picture’?
a proposition can be described in any number of ways – ‘picture’ – is
one –
there is no necessity here – it depends on what your doing and why –
it’s a question of circumstance – of propositional context –
propositional practice –
even propositional histories
presumably in some circumstance – in some context – the description
‘picture’ works
and if so – the description has utility –
however utility or not – there is always a question
© greg t. charlton. 2015.