13.4.
520. Moore has every
right to say he knows there’s a tree there in front of him. Naturally he may be
wrong (For it is not the same as the
utterance “I believe there is a tree there.”) But whether he is right or wrong
in this case is of no philosophical importance. If Moore is attacking
those who say that one cannot really know a thing, he can’t do it by assuring
them that he knows this and that. For
one need not believe him. If his opponents had asserted that one could not believe this and that, then he could
have replied: “I believe it.”
even when you use rhetorical tricks –
like prefacing an assertion with ‘I know’
or ‘I believe’ –
the value of the assertion –
with or without this baggage –
is determined by assent or dissent
© greg t. charlton. 2010.
