'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Monday, July 26, 2010

on certainty 566

566. Nor does a child who learns my language-game (No 2)* learn to say “I know that this is called a ‘slab’”.

Now of course there is a language-game in which the child uses that sentence. This presupposes that the child is already capable of using the name as soon as he is given it. (As if someone were to tell me “this colour is called…”.) – Thus, if the child has learnt a language-game with building stones, one can say something like “ and this stone is called’…’, and in this way the original language-game has been expanded.



‘and this stone is called …’ –

is an expansion or perhaps more correctly – an explanation

of the original language-game

I think Wittgenstein wants to suggest that ‘I know’ is a further expansion?

naming – like any propositional action –

is essentially – uncertain

‘I know’ – if it is a claim of certainty –

does not expand the original language-game –

it corrupts it


© greg t. charlton. 2010.