'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Friday, June 26, 2009

on certainty 42


42. One can say “He believes it, but it isn’t so”, but not “He knows it, but it isn’t so”. Does this stem from the difference between the mental states of belief and of knowledge? No. – One may for example call “mental state” what is expressed by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures etc. It would thus be possible to speak of a mental state of conviction, and that may be the same whether it is knowledge or false belief. To think that different states must correspond to the words “believe” and “know” would be as if one believed that different people had to correspond.



all you need to say here is ‘it isn’t so’ –

claiming authority for the proposition – for the proposal –

be it the authority of belief – or the authority of knowledge –

is rhetoric –

and furthermore –

‘explaining’ the difference between –

the claim of belief and the claim of knowledge –

in terms of ‘mental states’ –

or indeed in other terms –

is just more rhetoric –

rhetoric –

on rhetoric


© greg t. charlton. 2010.