'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Monday, December 22, 2014

Philosophical Grammar 97


97. This is connected with the question whether a machine could think. This is like when we say: “The will can’t be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you take is something that simply happens, not something we do.” But there is no doubt that you also have experiences when you move your arm voluntarily, although the phenomena of doing are indeed different from the phenomena of observing. But there are very different cases here



‘This is connected with the question whether a machine could think’?

the proposition – the proposal – is that which is put

I think there is an argument for saying that a machine can propose

what we deal with logically speaking is propositions – that which is proposed

how you explain the origin of the proposal – what account you give of how it came about – i.e. man or machine – is logically irrelevant –

that is to say that who or what puts the proposal – is irrelevant – and who or what deals with the proposal – is irrelevant

even if you accept that a machine can or does propose – you might ask – how could a proposal put by a machine – be held open to question – to doubt – by the machine?

an interesting question –

and your answer here will depend on just what you think counts as questioning – and how you understand doubt

in relation to the machine perhaps it’s a hardware – if not a software problem?

that might be the case with humans too

“The will can’t be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you take is something that simply happens, not something we do.” But there is no doubt that you also have experiences when you move your arm voluntarily, although the phenomena of doing are indeed different from the phenomena of observing. But there are very different cases here

no doubt that you have experiences?

well what happens is what happens – the question is how best to describe?

and yes the common description is ‘experience’ –

but just what that amounts to could be anything –

and the term ‘experience’ – in certain propositional contexts – may not be used at all

‘although the phenomena of doing are indeed different from the phenomena of observing’?

logically speaking no –

whether doing or observing – we propose –

we put forward proposals – propositions –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain



© greg t. charlton. 2014.