72. The indeterminacy of generality is not a logical indeterminacy.
The task of philosophy is not to create an ideal language, but to
clarify the use of existing language.
I’m allowed to use the word “rule” without first tabulating the rules
for the word. – If philosophy was concerned with the concept of the calculus of
all calculi, there would be such a thing as meta philosophy. – But there is
not.
‘the indeterminacy of generality is not a logical indeterminacy’?
a proposition – that proposes a generality –
like any other proposition – is open to question – open to doubt
what we are dealing with here is logic – plain and simple
the logic of the proposition – is the logic of uncertainty
‘the task of philosophy is not to create an ideal language, but to
clarify the use of existing language’?
my philosophy emphasizes one thing that everyone knows –
the reality we face is uncertain
‘I’m allowed to use the word “rule” without first tabulating the rules
for the word’?
you can use any word – without first ‘explaining’ it
‘if philosophy was concerned with the concept of the calculus of all
calculi, there would be such a thing as meta philosophy – but there is not’?
meta philosophy?
really all we are talking about here is –
a proposition put – i.e. a proposal as to the nature of philosophy –
and that proposition – like any other –
being held open to question
– open to doubt
© greg t. charlton. 2014.
