VIII
109. A description of language must achieve the same result as language
itself.
Suppose some says that one can infer from a proposition the fact that
verifies it. What can one infer from a proposition apart from itself?
The shadowy anticipation of a fact consists in our being able already to
think that that very thing will
happen which hasn’t yet happen.
‘must achieve the same result as language itself’?
what result is that?
in answer to this question there will be any number of proposals –
all of which will be open to question – to doubt
‘Suppose some says that one can infer from a proposition the fact that
verifies it’?
the point is that inference – is proposal
yes you can play defined games of inference –
but the notion of inference is – is like any other logical notion –
uncertain – even when given a specific definition
an inference from the proposition – to the fact – that verifies it?
any so called ‘fact’ – is a proposal – a description
the relation between proposition and fact is – whether you call it
inference or not – up for grabs –
as to verification –
in practice verification is a decision to stop investigating –
it is a pragmatic decision – a rhetorical move –
it has no basis in logic
‘What can one infer from a proposition apart from itself?’
in the broadest sense – to infer is to expand – to expand a proposition
–
which amounts to – a new
proposal
the original proposal has led to a another proposal –
and because P1 led – in the course of things to P2 – there is a relation
– a contingent relation –
in certain defined contexts – this move from P1 to P2 is termed
‘inference’
any account of how you get from P1 to P2 – will be most interesting –
as interesting and as questionable – as any other proposition
a proposition that ‘infers’ itself – is no more than a restatement of
the proposition
‘The shadowy anticipation of a fact consists in our being able already
to think that that very thing will
happen which hasn’t yet happen’
this ‘shadowy anticipation of fact’ –
when you drop the poetry – is uncertainty –
and yes we propose –
propose descriptions – propose states of affairs – we propose realities
and the ‘fact’ – the description –
anticipated – will – like any other proposal –
be open to question – open to doubt –
will be uncertain
© greg t. charlton. 2014.
