on certainty 111

111. “I know that I have never been on the moon.” That sounds quite different in the circumstances which actually hold, to the way it would sound if a good many men had been on the moon, and some perhaps without knowing it. In this case one would give grounds for knowledge. Is there not a relationship here similar to that between the general rule of multiplying and particular multiplications that have been carried out?

I want to say: my not having been on the moon is as sure a thing for me as any grounds I could give for it.

Wittgenstein suggests here –

that whether grounds are required or not –

is a matter of circumstance

if so whether a claim to knowledge requires grounds or not –

is an uncertain matter –

and as a result any claim to knowledge –

is at base uncertain

he says where grounds are required –

the relation between the giving of grounds

and the claim to knowledge

is similar to –

the general rule of multiplying –

and multiplications carried out

that is to say the giving of grounds –

is the application of a rule

the application of a ‘rule’ –

is effectively –

the decision to stop questioning –

to stop thinking –

if that is what ‘knowledge’ amounts to –

then for Wittgenstein –

‘knowledge’ is ignorance

‘I want to say: my not having been on the moon is as sure a thing for me as any grounds I could give for it.’

here he is saying –

his certainty is groundless

© greg t. charlton. 2009.