Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Part 1. 601-693

601. ‘When I talk about this table,—am I remembering that this

object is called a "table"?’

part of what I am doing – when I am talking about this table – is proposing that this object is called a ‘table’

the naming of the object is a proposal – a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

when I talk about this table – I am not remembering that it is called a table – I am proposing that it is called a table

and – I am not proposing an explanation of the name I give the object – of my use of the word ‘table’

that is a different matter

as to any explanation of my use of the word ‘table’ –

the use is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘remembering that this called a ‘table’’ – is one proposal – that could be put forward as an explanation

but even so – it is not clear just what this means

do I in talking about the table – for a moment forget what it is called – and then remember?

or do I just use the term – and in the act of using the term do not forget and then remember?

just what remembering is – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

I think it is fair enough to say I can use the term – without remembering it

602. ‘Asked "Did you recognize your desk when you entered your

room this morning?"—I should no doubt say "Certainly!" And yet

it would be misleading to say that an act of recognition had taken

place. Of course the desk was not strange to me; I was not surprised

to see it, as I should have been if another one had been standing there,

or some unfamiliar kind of object.’

‘Asked "Did you recognize your desk when you entered your room this morning?"’

if an act of recognition took place – yes

if not – no

asking someone what happened when they entered the room

is asking them to explain – to reconstruct the event

an explanation – a reconstruction – is quite a different matter to the actual happening of the event

for one – the explanation – the reconstruction – is not the event

it is a proposal – a proposal of explanation – post the event

and any proposed explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

603. ‘No one will say that every time I enter my room, my long-familiar

surroundings, there is enacted a recognition of all that I see and have

seen hundreds of times before.’

perhaps a neurologist might say this –

but here he would have to argue that not all recognition is conscious recognition

in any case – what we see – and how we describe what we see –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

604. ‘It is easy to have a false picture of the processes called

"recognizing"; as if recognizing always consisted in comparing two

impressions with one another. It is as if I carried a picture of an object

with me and used it to perform an identification of an object as the one

represented by the picture. Our memory seems to us to be the agent of

such a comparison, by preserving a picture of what has been seen

before, or by allowing us to look into the past (as if down a spy-glass).’

there are no false pictures

a picture is a proposal –  there are no false proposals

a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘recognizing’ – is a propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

memory is a propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

605. ‘And it is not so much as if I were comparing the object

with a picture set beside it, but as if the object coincided with the picture.

So I see only one thing, not two.’

what you have here is two proposals – the object proposal – and the picture proposal

the object coincides with the picture?

to make this judgment – you have to first compare the two proposals

isn’t it rather that you propose that one proposal reflects another?

                                                                                                                                       606. ‘We say "The expression in his voice was genuine". If it was

spurious we think as it were of another one behind it.—This is the

face he shews the world, inwardly he has another one.—But this does

not mean that when his expression is genuine he has two the same.(("A quite particular expression."))’

an expression is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

‘inwardly he has another’?

all we deal with – all that there is to deal with – is what is proposed / expressed

we do not deal with what is not proposed – which in this case – is this supposed ‘inner life’

‘inwardly he has another’ – is just metaphysical rubbish –

if you fall for this claptrap  – you miss the point –

you miss the reality expressed – the reality proposed –

and you end up in a logical no man’s land

607. ‘How does one judge what time it is? I do not mean by

external evidences, however, such as the position of the sun, the

lightness of the room, and so on.—One asks oneself, say, "What time

can it be?", pauses a moment, perhaps imagines a clock-face, and

then says a time.—Or one considers various possibilities, thinks first

of one time, then of another, and in the end stops at one. That is the

kind of way it is done.——But isn't the idea accompanied by a feeling

of conviction; and doesn't that mean that it accords with an inner

clock?—No, I don't read the time off from any clock; there is a feeling

of conviction inasmuch as I say a time to myself without feeling any

doubt, with calm assurance.—But doesn't something click as I say

this time?—Not that I know of; unless that is what you call the coming-

to-rest of deliberation, the stopping at one number. Nor should I ever

have spoken of a 'feeling of conviction' here, but should have said:

I considered a while and then plumped for its being quarter past five.—

But what did I go by? I might perhaps have said: "simply by feel",

which only means that I left it to what should suggest itself.——

But you surely must at least have disposed yourself in a definite way

in order to guess the time; and you don't take just any idea of a time

of day as yielding the correct time!—To repeat: I asked myself "I

wonder what time it is?" That is, I did not, for example, read this

question in some narrative, or quote it as someone else's utterance;

nor was I practising the pronunciation of these words; and so on.

These were not the circumstances of my saying the words.—But then,

what were the circumstances?—I was thinking about my breakfast

and wondering whether it would be late today. These were the kind

of circumstances.—But do you really not see that you were all the same

disposed in a way which, though impalpable, is characteristic of guess-

ing the time, like being surrounded by a characteristic atmosphere?—

Yes; what was characteristic was that I said to myself "I wonder

what time it is?"—And if this sentence has a particular atmosphere,

how am I to separate it from the sentence itself? It would never have

occurred to me to think the sentence had such an aura if I had not

thought of how one might say it differently—as a quotation, as a joke,

as practice in elocution, and so on. And then all at once I wanted to

say, then all at once it seemed to me, that I must after all have meant

the words somehow specially; differently, that is, from in those other

cases. The picture of the special atmosphere forced itself upon me;

I can see it quite clear before me—so long, that is, as I do not look

at what my memory tells me really happened.

And as for the feeling of certainty: I sometimes say to myself "I am

sure it's . . . o'clock", and in a more or less confident tone of voice,

and so on. If you ask me the reason for this certainty I have none.

If I say, I read it off from an inner clock,—that is a picture, and the

only thing that corresponds to it is that I said it was such-and-such a

time. And the purpose of the picture is to assimilate this case to the

other one. I am refusing to acknowledge two different cases here.’

‘Yes; what was characteristic was that I said to myself "I wonder what time it is?"—And if this sentence has a particular atmosphere, how am I to separate it from the sentence itself?

this ‘atmosphere’ argument is vague – and basically useless

what we have is a sentence in a particular propositional context –

‘And then all at once I wanted to say, then all at once it seemed to me, that I must after all have meant the words somehow specially; differently, that is, from in those other cases.’

this is how we begin to define the propositional context

‘The picture of the special atmosphere forced itself upon me; I can see it quite clear before me—so long, that is, as I do not look at what my memory tells me really happened.’

what happened is that the sentence – ‘I wonder what time it is’ – was put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored

specifically different propositional contexts were investigated

‘And as for the feeling of certainty: I sometimes say to myself "I am sure it's… o'clock", and in a more or less confident tone of voice, and so on. If you ask me the reason for this certainty I have none.’

the reason you have none – is because there is none

this feeling of certainty is an illusion – and the result of illogical – and irrational thinking

any feeling – any proposal – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘If I say, I read it off from an inner clock,—that is a picture, and the only thing that corresponds to it is that I said it was such-and-such a time. And the purpose of the picture is to assimilate this case to the other one. I am refusing to acknowledge two different cases here.’

it doesn’t matter whether it is called an inner clock – or an outer clock – what you have is a propositional game – what you do here is play a propositional game

determining the time is a rule-governed propositional exercise –

and any number of different games been devised to tell the time

different games – for different propositional contexts

when you play the game – you play it in accordance with its rule

i.e. – when you look at your wrist watch – you accept the rule of its game

if you question the rule – your wrist watch as a ‘time-piece’ – is useless

where we question – doubt and explore propositional uncertainty – is in the matter of determining which time-game is appropriate for which propositional context –

and any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

608. ‘The idea of the intangibility of that mental state in estimating

the time is of the greatest importance. Why is it intangible? Isn't it

because we refuse to count what is tangible about our state as part of

the specific state which we are postulating?’

‘The idea of the intangibility of that mental state in estimating the time is of the greatest importance.’

this ‘intangibility of that mental state’ – is not ‘of the greatest importance’ – it is entirely irrelevant to the question of estimating the time

telling the time – estimating the time – is a rule-governed propositional game

be it of whatever form – of whatever construction – you play the game – the propositional game – in accordance with its rule –

if you don’t play in accordance with its rule – you won’t know what time it is –

you can slosh around in ‘the mental state’ all you like – and you will get nowhere –

at any time

609. ‘The description of an atmosphere is a special application of

language, for special purposes.

((Interpreting 'understanding' as atmosphere; as a mental act. One

can construct an atmosphere to attach to anything. 'An indescribable

character.'))’

if you deal logically with proposals – with propositions – you can dispense with this notion of ‘atmosphere’

I don’t know where it springs from – except to say that it seems to be the result of just not understanding that proposals – propositions – have propositional context

not atmosphere – propositional context

and yes – when you put your proposals / propositions to question to doubt – when you explore their uncertainty – you will investigate propositional context(s)

you will consider critically – different propositional contexts that a proposal – a proposition can be placed in –

can be understood in terms of

‘Interpreting ‘understanding’ as atmosphere, as a mental act’ –

understanding is a propositional act – an action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what we deal with is what is proposed –

and yes you can propose ‘a mental act’ – and put that proposal – that proposition – to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty

that’s fair enough

why you would then go on to describe a mental act – as an atmosphere – escapes me

this notion of ‘atmosphere’ is unnecessary – and irrelevant –

and likely to lead you into a logical never-never land

‘One can construct an atmosphere to attach to anything. An indescribable

character.'

yes – you can attach an atmosphere to anything – which means this notion of atmosphere – adds nothing to anything

and Wittgenstein – completely gives the game away when he says of this ‘atmosphere’ – that it is indescribable

indescribable = there is nothing you can say about it

i.e. – it has no significance – no meaning –

and this it seems is what Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning comes down to –

nothing

610. ‘Describe the aroma of coffee.—Why can't it be done? Do we

lack the words? And for what are words lacking?—But how do we get

the idea that such a description must after all be possible? Have you

ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to describe

the aroma and not succeeded?

((I should like to say: "These notes say something glorious, but I

do not know what." These notes are a powerful gesture, but I cannot

put anything side by side with it that will serve as an explanation.

A grave nod. James: "Our vocabulary is inadequate." Then why

don't we introduce a new one? What would have to be the case for us

to be able to?))’

‘Describe the aroma of coffee.—Why can't it be done?’

well it can be done –

consider the following from Serena Styles:

‘Describe the coffee’s aroma. Your nose is capable of detecting things that your taste buds cannot. For example, you can smell fruity, floral and citrus undertones in coffee that you might otherwise miss. Inhale the coffee’s scent before a sip to best detect these accents.’

‘Do we lack the words?

no

‘And for what are words lacking?’

words don’t lack anything – words are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘But how do we get the idea that such a description must after all be possible?’

we get the idea because any proposal – is open to further  proposal – is open to description

our descriptions come as a result of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

‘Have you ever felt the lack of such a description?’

yes –

if you question – if you doubt – if you explore propositional uncertainty – you may at times find that coming up with an adequate description – is not easy –

and you may at some point in the critical process feel the lack of description –

likely though – if you persevere – you will have some success –

even though whatever you come up with will – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘((I should like to say: "These notes say something glorious, but I do not know what." These notes are a powerful gesture, but I cannot put anything side by side with it that will serve as an explanation.’

this is just obscurantist rubbish

‘James: Our vocabulary is inadequate." Then why don't we introduce a new one? What would have to be the case for us to be able to?’

our vocabulary is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and as a result of this – new propositional contexts get proposed – new words are proposed –

the growth of knowledge can be viewed in these terms

language is not dead – it’s alive and kicking –

alive and kicking with question doubt and uncertainty

611. ‘"Willing too is merely an experience," one would like to say

(the 'will' too only 'idea'). It comes when it comes, and I cannot bring

it about.

Not bring it about?—Like what? What can I bring about, then?

What am I comparing willing with when I say this?’

we propose –

now there are any number of ways to account for the action of proposing –

and one might say the whole history of philosophy is devoted to this question

‘willing’ – is one of the many accounts that can be given

and this willing / explanation – has been and still is regarded by some as useful

however – as with any proposal – any proposed explanation – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Not bring it about?—Like what? What can I bring about, then? What am I comparing willing with when I say this?’ –

these questions from Wittgenstein illustrate the point

612. ‘I should not say of the movement of my arm, for example;,

it comes when it comes, etc. And this is the region in which we say

significantly that a thing doesn't simply happen to us, but that we do

it. "I don't need to wait for my arm to go up—I can raise it." And

here I am making a contrast between the movement of my arm and,

say, the fact that the violent thudding of my heart will subside.’

‘And this is the region in which we say significantly that a thing doesn't simply happen to us, but that we do it.’

yes – we do it – but to what extent is this doing determined by what happens to us –

that is – by the contexts in which we operate in?

and if there is a determination here – then perhaps undetermined action is illusory?

‘the violent thudding of my heart will subside’?

and here we can ask – is this perhaps because we do certain things – like i.e. resting after vigorous exercise – or taking a medication?

and so we can ask – to what extent is what happens to us – determined by us –

and be that consciously – or unconsciously?

this contrast between what we do – and what happens to us – is a distinction we operate with –

however as with any distinction – any proposal – to explain our propositional reality –

it is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

613. ‘In the sense in which I can ever bring anything about (such

as stomach-ache through over-eating), I can also bring about an act

of willing, In this sense I bring about the act of willing to swim by

jumping into the water. Doubtless I was trying to say: I can't will

willing; that is, it makes no sense to speak of willing willing. "Willing"

is not the name of an action; and so not the name of any voluntary

action either. And my use of a wrong expression came from our

wanting to think of willing as an immediate non-causal bringing-

about. A misleading analogy lies at the root of this idea; the causal

nexus seems to be established by a mechanism connecting two parts of

a machine. The connexion may be broken if the mechanism is

disturbed. (We think only of the disturbances to which a mechanism is

normally subject, not, say, of cog-wheels suddenly going soft, or

passing through one another, and so on.)’

‘I can also bring about an act of willing, In this sense I bring about the act of willing to swim by jumping into the water.’

jumping into the water is not bringing about an act of willing

willing – whatever it amounts to –  logically speaking – precedes the act of jumping into the water

and jumping into the water – precedes the act of swimming

‘Doubtless I was trying to say: I can't will willing; that is, it makes no sense to speak of willing willing.’

‘willing’ is an explanation of a propositional action

if you say I can’t will willing – you are saying you can’t explain – explaining

well you can – and it might be useful to do so –

but it is really a back story to a back story

‘"Willing" is not the name of an action; and so not the name of any voluntary action either. And my use of a wrong expression came from our wanting to think of willing as an immediate non-causal bringing-about …’

I see ‘willing’ as an explanation of a certain class of propositional action –

and ‘willing’ is a common and useful explanation of certain propositional actions –

what we deal with is proposals –

any explanation we give of the proposal – of propositional action – like ‘willing’ –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘willing’ – is uncertain

614. ‘When I raise my arm 'voluntarily' I do not use any instrument to bring the movement about. My wish is not such an instrument either.’

logically speaking – raising my arm – is a proposal – a propositional action –

it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and any explanation of it – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

615. ‘"Willing, if it is not to be a sort of wishing, must be the action

itself. It cannot be allowed to stop anywhere short of the action."

If it is the action, then it is so in the ordinary sense of the word;

so it is speaking, writing, walking, lifting a thing, imagining

something. But it is also trying, attempting, making an effort,—

to speak, to write, to lift a thing, to imagine something etc. .’

we deal with proposals – with propositional actions – and with their description and explanation

‘willing’ is a commonplace description / explanation of a class of proposal – of a class of propositional action

any proposal – any propositional action – any propositional description / explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

so do we further describe ‘willing’ – as ‘wishing’ – or ‘the action itself’ – or do we give it some other account?

as to ‘further describing’ ‘willing’ – as the ‘action itself’ –

this – to my mind is to say that ‘willing’ – is a description / explanation of a class of propositional action

and there is the question of just what you include in this class of propositional action –

Wittgenstein here gives quite a comprehensive list –

and of course this list is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

616. ‘When I raise my arm, I have not wished it might go up.

The voluntary action excludes this wish. It is indeed possible to say:

"I hope I shall draw the circle faultlessly". And that is to express a wish

that one's hand should move in such-and-such a way.’

what of the case of someone with an injury in their arm which affects the arm’s mobility?

one could well imagine that when he raises his arm he has wished that it goes up

a voluntary act? – yes – a wishful act? – yes – voluntary and wishful? – yes

what is clear here is that the descriptions ‘voluntary ‘ and ‘wishful’ – are not mutually exclusive –

these terms can in a certain context be used to describe the one act –

but to understand this you have to have an appreciation of context – propositional context

Wittgenstein’s statement – ‘When I raise my arm, I have not wished it might go’ –

does not take context into account

his view is a one size fits all –

what we have from Wittgenstein is not explanation – rather declaration –

and that declaration – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

617. ‘If we cross our fingers in a certain special way we are sometimes

unable to move a particular finger when someone tells us to do

so, if he only points to the finger—merely shews it to the eye. If on

the other hand he touches it, we can move it. One would like to

describe this experience as follows: we are unable to will to move the

finger. The case is quite different from that in which we are not able

to move the finger because someone is, say, holding it. One now feels

inclined to describe the former case by saying: one can't find any point

of application for the will till the finger is touched. Only when one

feels the ringer can the will know where it is to catch hold.—But this

kind of expression is misleading. One would like to say: "How am

I to know where I am to catch hold with the will, if feeling does not

shew the place?" But then how is it known to what point I am to

direct the will when the feeling is there?

That in this case the finger is as it were paralysed until we feel a

touch on it is shewn by experience; it could not have been seen

a priori.’

‘If we cross our fingers in a certain special way we are sometimes unable to move a particular finger when someone tells us to do so, if he only points to the finger—merely shews it to the eye. If on the other hand he touches it, we can move it. One would like to describe this experience as follows: we are unable to will to move the

finger.’

this statement – ‘we are unable to will to move the finger’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

one might say – I am able to will the finger to move – but it doesn’t move –

point being just because you will something – doesn’t mean it is going to happen

‘One now feels inclined to describe the former case by saying: one can't find any point of application for the will till the finger is touched. Only when one feels the ringer can the will know where it is to catch hold.—But this kind of expression is misleading. One would like to say: "How am I to know where I am to catch hold with the will, if feeling does not shew the place?" But then how is it known to what point I am to direct the will when the feeling is there?’

what comes out of this is that if you get into the ‘will argument’ – questions can be raised – doubts – surface –

and this is as it should be

let’s be clear the will argument is an explanation of action –

and where there is no action – it looks irrelevant – and useless – and its proponents have to scramble to find some way to keep it afloat

in the example given by Wittgenstein you can’t move the finger under certain conditions – and you can under different conditions

as to why this is the case – the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

different explanations can be advanced –

a purely physiological account would suit me as starting point

the ‘will argument’ – is just ‘ghost in the machine’ stuff –

and I think we can do much better than that –

still in all – it is a valid explanation – if held open to question – open to doubt – and regarded as uncertain

and in untangling the will – we do get a number of questions from Wittgenstein

a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the whole point of the so called ‘a priori argument’ – is that it is not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain

the so called ‘a prior argument’ – or ‘ a priori proposition’ – is illogical

so – what we have is not an a priori proposal – rather an a priori prejudice –

a prejudice – masking as a logical statement –

the a priori argument is a philosophical deception –

of the worst kind

618. ‘One imagines the willing subject here as something without

any mass (without any inertia); as a motor which has no inertia in

itself to overcome. And so it is only mover, not moved. That is:

One can say "I will, but my body does not obey me"—but not: "My

will does not obey me." (Augustine.)

But in the sense in which I cannot fail to will, I cannot try to will

either.’

this notion of ‘will’ is an explanation – an explanation of action –

it is an explanatory proposal –

and as with any proposal – any explanation – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘my will does not obey me’ – and – ‘I cannot fail to will, I cannot try to will either.’

the logical statement is – ‘my will is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain’

619. ‘And one might say: "I can always will only inasmuch as I can

 never try to will."’

the ‘will’ is an explanation of action – so –

‘I can always will only inasmuch as I can never try to will’ – amounts to –

‘I can always explain an action only inasmuch as I can never try to explain an action’

which I think demonstrates – the absurdity of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘will’

620. ‘Doing itself seems not to have any volume of experience. It

seems like an extensionless point, the point of a needle. This point

seems to be the real agent. And the phenomenal happenings only to be

consequences of this acting. "I do . . ." seems to have a definite sense,

separate from all experience.’

‘Doing itself seems not to have any volume of experience.’

doing is action –

‘seems not have any volume of experience’ –

if you can speak of it in these terms – it is an unknown

it is only in  proposing in relation to doing – that it is no longer ‘extensionless’ – that it is – known

‘"I do . . ." seems to have a definite sense separate from all experience.’

in practise – ‘I do…’ – is never without context – propositional context –

and the action of ‘I do …’ – in the context and contexts – that it is given – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘I do’ is uncertain – but nevertheless – yes –

‘the point of the needle’

621. ‘Let us not forget this: when 'I raise my arm', my arm goes up.

And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my

arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?

((Are the kinaesthetic sensations my willing?))’

‘I raise my arm’ is an explanation of ‘my arm goes up’

‘what is left if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?’

what  is left is an explanation – a proposed explanation – without anything to explain

if the arm doesn’t go up – ‘I raise my arm’ – has no context – makes no sense

‘((Are the kinaesthetic sensations my willing?))’

‘willing’ – is a proposed account of – a proposed explanation of – certain actions

‘kinaesthetic sensation’ – is a different account – a different explanation

‘willing’ – as generally understood – implies conscious agency –

‘kinaesthetic sensation’ – I would think is a straight out causal explanation – that does not include agency

a combination of the two?

well Descartes went for the pineal gland – but no one has been able to make any sense of that –

in any case Wittgenstein has put the question – so we await his answer

the important point here is that any explanation – be it the will – or kinaesthetic sensation – or whatever – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

622. ‘When I raise my arm I do not usually try to raise it.’

true –

and how we explain the action – when it occurs without trying – and when it occurs with trying – are matters – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

623. ‘"At all costs I will get to that house."—But if there is no

difficulty about it—can I try at all costs to get to the house?’

‘at all costs I will get to that  house’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

whether there is no difficulty about it – really depends on how you understand ‘difficulty’ –

is the difficulty – the path to the house? – apparently not

is there some other difficulty – i.e. some psychological difficulty about going to that house – perhaps the idea fills me with dread?

and if we take it that there is no difficulty – at all

then the proposal – ‘at all costs I will get to that house’ – comes across as something of a rhetorical overstatement

‘can I try at all costs to get to the house?’

yes you can – but if there are no difficulties – you will find that the effort is wasted –

and that you have got the matter wrong

624. ‘In the laboratory, when subjected to an electric current, for

example, someone says with his eyes shut "I am moving my arm up

and down"—though his arm is not moving. "So," we say, "he has

the special feeling of making that movement."—Move your arm to

and fro with your eyes shut. And now try, while you do so, to tell

yourself that your arm is staying still and that you are only having

certain queer feelings in your muscles and joints!’

in the first case – in the laboratory – the movement is not made

in the second case – the movement is made –

from a logical point of view what these ‘experiments’ show –

is that the proposal – ‘the special feeling of making that movement’ –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

625. ‘"How do you know that you have raised your arm?"—"I

feel it." So what you recognize is the feeling? And are you certain

that you recognize it right?—You are certain that you have raised your

arm; isn't this the criterion, the measure, of the recognition?’

‘"How do you know that you have raised your arm?"’

our knowledge is what we propose –

and what we propose – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

our actions – are proposals – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the raising of my arm – is a proposal – is a propositional action

this proposal – this propositional action – is knowledge –

and this knowledge – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

Wittgenstein asks these questions –

‘So what you recognize is the feeling? And are you certain that you recognize it right?—You are certain that you have raised your arm; isn't this the criterion, the measure, of the recognition?’

are you certain that you recognise it right?

there is no propositional certainty –  your knowledge – your recognition is – uncertain

and any criterion that comes into play here – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

626. ‘"When I touch this object with a stick I have the sensation of

touching in the tip of the stick, not in the hand that holds it." When

someone says "The pain isn't here in my hand, but in my wrist",

this has the consequence that the doctor examines the wrist. But

what difference does it make if I say that I feel the hardness of the

object in the tip of the stick or in my hand? Does what I say mean

"It is as if I had nerve-endings in the tip of the stick?" In what sense is it

like that?—Well, I am at any rate inclined to say "I feel the hardness

etc. in the tip of the stick." What goes with this is that when I touch

the object I look not at my hand but at the tip of the stick; that I

describe what I feel by saying "I feel something hard and round

there"—not "I feel a pressure against the tips of my thumb, middle

finger, and index finger . . . ." If, for example, someone asks me

"What are you now feeling in the fingers that hold the probe?" I

might reply: "I don't know——I feel something hard and rough over

there."’

here I think Wittgenstein makes the point – that any proposal of feeling – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

627. ‘Examine the following description of a voluntary action: "I

form the decision to pull the bell at 5 o'clock, and when it strikes 5, my

arm makes this movement."—Is that the correct description, and not

this one: "..... and when it strikes 5, I raise my arm"?——One

would like to supplement the first description: "and see! my arm goes

up when it strikes 5." And this "and see!" is precisely what doesn't

belong here. I do not say "See, my arm is going up!" when I raise it.’

raising your arm – is not describing / explaining – raising your arm –

any proposed description / explanation of an action – is prime facie – valid

and any description / explanation is open to question – open to doubt – and is

uncertain

the ‘and see’ – strikes me as rhetorical –

but the question whether it ‘belongs here’ – or not – is not something that can be decided off the bat

we need context here – propositional context –

and it is only then that the matter can be properly critically assessed

628. ‘So one might say: voluntary movement is marked by the

absence of surprise. And now I do not mean you to ask "But why

isn't one surprised here?"’

I would think any regularity is marked by the absence of surprise

and that is because we have some idea about why and how the regularity occurs

consider an irregular movement – one you know is caused by some illness – and one that has recurred over a long period of time – and one you have reason to believe will continue to occur –

would the next occurrence surprise you?

and what of the one time irregular movement?

whether you are surprised of not by such an occurrence – doesn’t that too depend on your knowledge – your knowledge of the body and how it works – of your own body and how it works?

someone with no knowledge may well be surprised –

on the other hand – if such occurred to a person with medical training – perhaps not?

‘surprise’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is – surprisingly / unsurprisingly? – I can’t decide –

uncertain

629. ‘When people talk about the possibility of foreknowledge of

the future they always forget the fact of the prediction of one's own

voluntary movements.’

any prediction is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if you predict / propose a future – I don’t see why you can’t predict / propose that in the future your movements will be voluntary

630. ‘Examine these two language-games:

(a) Someone gives someone, else the order to make particular

movements with his arm, or to assume particular bodily positions

(gymnastics instructor and pupil). And here is a variation of this

language-game: the pupil gives himself orders and then carries them

out.

(b) Someone observes certain regular processes—for example, the

reactions of different metals to acids—and thereupon makes predictions

about the reactions that will occur in certain particular cases.

There is an evident kinship between these two language-games, and

also a fundamental difference. In both one might call the spoken

words "predictions". But compare the training which leads to the

first technique with the training for the second one.’

in both examples – we have proposals –

and you can describe these proposals as ‘predictions’ –

and yes – as proposed here – they have different backgrounds

from a logical point of view – these predictions / proposals – are open to question – open to doubt and are uncertain

631. ‘"I am going to take two powders now, and in half-an-hour

I shall be sick."—It explains nothing to say that in the first case I am

the agent, in the second merely the observer. Or that in the first case

I see the causal connexion from inside, in the second from outside.

And much else to the same effect.

Nor is it to the point to say that a prediction of the first kind is

no more infallible than one of the second kind.

It was not on the ground of observations of my behaviour that I

said I was going to take two powders. The antecedents of this proposition

were different. I mean the thoughts, actions and so on which led

up to it. And it can only mislead you to say: "The only essential

presupposition of your utterance was just your decision."’

‘The antecedents of this proposition were different I mean the thoughts, actions and so on which led up to it. And it can only mislead you to say: "The only essential presupposition of your utterance was just your decision.’

logically speaking a so called  ‘essential’ presupposition cannot be established

for any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

and once this is understood the notion of an ‘essential’ presupposition – comes off as rhetorical

the presupposition is best seen as a pragmatic devise

we use presuppositions to pretend a ground to our proposals –

and this pretence can be useful

632. ‘I do not want to say that in the case of the expression of

intention "I am going to take two powders" the prediction is a cause—

and its fulfilment the effect. (Perhaps a physiological investigation

could determine this.) So much, however, is true: we can often predict

a man's actions from his expression of a decision. An important

language-game.’

a prediction – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and this language use – the expression of a decision – as with any language use – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

633. ‘"You were interrupted a while ago; do you still know what

you were going to say?"—If I do know now, and say it—does that

mean that I had already thought it before, only not said it? No.

Unless you take the certainty with which I continue the interrupted

sentence as a criterion of the thought's already having been completed

at that time.—But, of course, the situation and the thoughts which I

had contained all sorts of things to help the continuation of the

sentence.’

‘"You were interrupted a while ago; do you still know what you were going to say?"—

yes – if the proposal was formed – before being fully expressed – and the interruption didn’t cause you to forget what you were intending to say –

however not all our proposals are fully formed before they get launched –

you can be making up what you are going to say – as you go –

and in such a case an interruption – may have no effect – because you have not fully determined what you are going to say

also – you can – while you are speaking – be open to different views of the matter in question – and as it were – change your mind in mid-sentence

‘No. Unless you take the certainty with which I continue the interrupted sentence as a criterion of the thought's already having been completed at that time.’

any supposed ‘certainty’ – is a pretence

any propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the point is that the continuation of the sentence – can be analysed and explained in any number of ways – by the person speaking – or by any observer –

and that is to say – what is going on here – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘But, of course, the situation and the thoughts which I had contained all sorts of things to help the continuation of the sentence.’ –

or for that matter the discontinuation of it

the logical reality is –

what enables the continuation – or discontinuation – of the sentence – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

634. ‘When I continue the interrupted sentence and say that this was

how I had been going to continue it, this is like following out a line

of thought from brief notes.

Then don't I interpret the notes? Was only one continuation possible

in these circumstances? Of course not. But I did not choose between

interpretations. I remembered that I was going to say this.’

what I remembered – and what I was going to say – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

but Wittgenstein is correct – the question was basic – ‘do you still know what you were going to say?’

the question was not – ‘what interpretation do you give what you were going say?’

635. ‘"I was going to say ..... "—You remember various details.

But not even all of them together shew your intention. It is as if a

snapshot of a scene had been taken, but only a few scattered details of

it were to be seen: here a hand, there a bit of a face, or a hat—the

rest is dark. And now it is as if we knew quite certainly what the whole

picture represented. As if I could read the darkness.’

“what I was going say ….” –

whatever that is – it is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

as for what Wittgenstein calls ‘the rest’ – whatever that is – it is not in the picture – it is not what was put – not what was proposed

and as for – ‘And now it is as if we knew quite certainly what the whole picture represented’

our propositions are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there is no certain knowledge – so called ‘certain knowledge’ – is true ignorance

and the ‘whole picture’ – is only ever – the picture put – the proposal put –

and that picture – that proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘As if I could read in the darkness’ –

if Wittgenstein is here saying that the idea of certainty – amounts to something like ‘reading in darkness’ – he is right –

the idea of certainty – is philosophical darkness

636. ‘These 'details' are not irrelevant in the sense in which other

circumstances which I can remember equally well are irrelevant.

But if I tell someone "For a moment I was going to say . . . ." he does

not learn those details from this, nor need he guess them. He need

not know, for instance, that I had already opened my mouth to speak.

But he can 'fill out the picture' in this way. (And this capacity is part

of understanding what I tell him.)’

whether in relation to an interrupted sentence – or a completed sentence – or for that matter – any propositional construction – 

and whether you are the author of – or the observer of – the propositional action –

if you proceed logically –

(and I would hazard the guess that mostly most people do)

‘filling out the picture’ – through question – through doubt – and through the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

is what you do

637. ‘"I know exactly what I was going to say!" And yet I did not

say it.—And yet I don't read it off from some other process which took

place then and which I remember.

Nor am I interpreting that situation and its antecedents. For I don't

consider them and don't judge them.’

‘"I know exactly what I was going to say!" And yet I did not say it.’

perhaps you didn’t in fact know what you were going to say – and that’s why you didn’t say it – i.e. – you are kidding yourself

or perhaps – given whatever the circumstances – you decided not to say it –

or you weren’t sure about saying it

we don’t really have any context here – any propositional context – for the above statement – so what it amounts to – could be anything

so perhaps the point is – there really is nothing to say here – or nothing that can be said – as it were – ‘objectively’ – regarding the statement –

the philosophical hard fact is that we don’t actually know what’s going on here – and given that – the best we can do is consider logical possibilities – and – speculate

‘And yet I don't read it off from some other process which took place then and which I remember.’

you were going to say something and you didn’t –

the above statement – ‘I know exactly what I was going to say!’ – is a reflection on – or a reference to – the non-performance – of the statement –

no different really to any other statement about non-performance

‘Nor am I interpreting that situation and its antecedents. For I don't consider them and don't judge them.’

you may well have interpreted the situation and its antecedents – and that may be what is behind the fact that you didn’t say what you were going to say

that is possible –

to rule out interpretation here – as Wittgenstein does – misses the logical and empirical reality of propositional activity

the logical reality is that any propositional activity is open to interpretation –

that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and I would suggest that you are likely to find that actual propositional activity reflects this logical reality –

that in the main – people conduct their propositional lives – with question – with doubt – and by exploring uncertainty

638. ‘How does it come about that in spite of this I am inclined to

see an interpretation in saying "For a moment I was going to deceive

him"?

"How can you be certain that for the space of a moment you were

going to deceive him? Weren't your actions and thoughts much too

rudimentary?

"For can't the evidence be too scanty? Yes, when one follows it up

it seems extraordinarily scanty; but isn't this because one is taking no

account of the history of this evidence? Certain antecedents were

necessary for me to have had a momentary intention of pretending

to someone else that I was unwell.

If someone says "For a moment ....." is he really only describing

a momentary process?

But not even the whole story was my evidence for saying "For a

moment ....."’

‘How does it come about that in spite of this I am inclined to see an interpretation in saying "For a moment I was going to deceive him"?

it comes about because you recognise propositional uncertainty

"How can you be certain that for the space of a moment you were going to deceive him? Weren't your actions and thoughts much too rudimentary?

the space of a moment – is a space of uncertainty –

‘For a moment I was going to deceive him’ –

is only a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what you were ‘going to do’ – is a reflection on – on what may or may not have occurred

a reflection on propositional uncertainty

every proposal – every propositional action – is rudimentary –

there is nothing more rudimentary than a proposal

"For can't the evidence be too scanty? Yes, when one follows it up it seems extraordinarily scanty; but isn't this because one is taking no account of the history of this evidence? Certain antecedents were necessary for me to have had a momentary intention of pretending to someone else that I was unwell.’

the evidence is uncertain

the ‘history of the evidence’ – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the ‘antecedents’ – are an account – and explanation – for your intention

these ‘antecedents’ – and indeed the ‘intention’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘If someone says "For a moment ....." is he really only describing a momentary process?’

the matter is open to question

639. ‘One would like to say that an opinion develops. But there is a

mistake in this too.’

an opinion – from the point of view of logic – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

to say of an opinion / proposal – that it ‘develops’ – is to propose an account of it – to propose an explanation of it –

any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

there are no mistakes –

there are propositional acts – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what we deal with is uncertainties – not mistakes

640. ‘"This thought ties on to thoughts which I have had before."—

How does it do so? Through a feeling of such a tie? But how can a

feeling really tie thoughts together?—The word "feeling" is very

misleading here. But it is sometimes possible to say with certainty:

"This thought is connected with those earlier thoughts", and yet be

unable to shew the connexion. Perhaps that comes later.’

‘"This thought ties on to thoughts which I have had before."— How does it do so?’

‘this thought’ – is a proposal –

and we propose in relation to proposal

‘But it is sometimes possible to say with certainty: "This thought is connected with those earlier thoughts", and yet be unable to shew the connexion. Perhaps that comes later.’

any proposed relation between proposals – between propositions – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the connection is a proposal – a proposed relation between propositions

there is no mystery here – relating proposals – propositions – is what we do –

it is propositional activity – it is propositional life

641. ‘"My intention was no less certain as it was than it would have

been if I had said 'Now I'll deceive him'."—But if you had said the

words, would you necessarily have meant them quite seriously? (Thus

the most explicit expression of intention is by itself insufficient evidence

of intention.)’

your ‘intention’ is a proposal  – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt –

and uncertain –

the proposal – 'Now I'll deceive him' –

likewise – is open to question – open to doubt  and uncertain

evidence of intention – yes – but any proposed evidence is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

                                                                                                                                        642. ‘"At that moment I hated him."—What happened here?

Didn't it consist in thoughts, feelings, and actions? And if I were

to rehearse that moment to myself I should assume a particular

expression, think of certain happenings, breathe in a particular way,

arouse certain feelings in myself. I might think up a conversation, a whole

scene in which that hatred flared up. And I might play this scene

through with feelings approximating to those of a real occasion.

That I have actually experienced something of the sort will naturally

help me to do so.’

‘At that moment I hated him."—What happened here?’

well – it is open to question – open to doubt  – and it is uncertain – what happened here

rehearsing the moment  – will be to propose what occurred – what happened

and any such proposal – will be open to question – open to doubt  – and uncertain

‘That I have actually experienced something of the sort will naturally help me to do so.’

that you have actually experienced something of the sort  – will be a ground for question  – for doubt – and for the exploration of propositional uncertainty

643. ‘If I now become ashamed of this incident, I am ashamed of

the whole thing: of the words, of the poisonous tone, etc.’

your shame – and all that that involves – as with the proposition – in question  –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

644. ‘"I am not ashamed of what I did then, but of the intention

which I had."—And didn't the intention lie also in what I did? What

justifies the shame? The whole history of the incident.’

‘intention’ – is a propositional analysis of action – a propositional analysis – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘shame’ – is open to question

you are not a victim – a victim of your emotions –

how you respond emotionally to what you propose – what you do –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

this uncertainty is the ground of your freedom –

the freedom to critically evaluate what you think – what you feel – what you do

shame – as with any other emotional response – has a place in human propositional life –

however – as with any propositional state – it is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

645. ‘"For a moment I meant to ... ." That is, I had a particular

feeling, an inner experience; and I remember it.——And now remember

quite precisely! Then the 'inner experience' of intending seems to

vanish again. Instead one remembers thoughts, feelings, movements,

and also connexions with earlier situations.

It is as if one had altered the adjustment of a microscope. One did

not see before what is now in focus.’

‘"For a moment I meant to ... ." That is, I had a particular feeling, an inner experience; and I remember it’

the ‘inner experience’ – form a logical point of view is simply a proposal –

a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Then the 'inner experience' of intending seems to vanish again.’

this ‘intending’ – is an account – an explanation of the ’inner experience’ proposal

if it ‘vanishes’ – that is because we move on from the inner experience explanation –

presumably – it is now not as useful as it was –

this ‘inner-experience’ – is critically examined – is analysed – re-proposed – re-described

‘Instead one remembers thoughts, feelings, movements, and also connexions with earlier situations.’

‘thoughts’ – ‘feelings’ – ‘movements’ – ‘connections with earlier situations’ –

are proposals – proposals variously described

‘It is as if one had altered the adjustment of a microscope. One did not see before what is now in focus.’

with critical evaluation – question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional  uncertainty –

the initial proposal – is reconfigured – is further described –

and any such re-evaluation – re-description – re-configuration – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

this is the critical process of propositional analysis

646. ‘"Well, that only shews that you have adjusted your microscope

wrong. You were supposed to look at a particular section of the

culture, and you are seeing a different one.

"There is something right about that. But suppose that (with a

particular adjustment of the lenses) I did remember a single sensation;

how have I the right to say that it is what I call the "intention"? It

might be that (for example) a particular tickle accompanied every one of

my intentions.’

there is no ‘wrong’ adjustment – any adjustment of your microscope – is open to question

what you call the intention – is what you call the intention –

and what you call the intention – your proposal here – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

647. ‘What is the natural expression of an intention?—Look at a

cat when it stalks a bird; or a beast when it wants to escape.

((Connexion with propositions about sensations.))’

what is natural is what happens

you could well argue that action – any action is a natural expression of intention –

or even that – action is a natural expression – and there is no intention –

that one does not need to invoke the concept of intention –

to give account of human action

intention – is a proposal put – in the way of explaining action –

and clearly it has proved to be a useful proposal to this end

this proposal of intention – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

logically speaking – what is front and centre is the proposal –

the notion of ‘sensation’ – as with that of ‘intention’ – is an account – an explanation of the proposal – of the proposition – of the propositional action –

and as with intention – sensation – has proved – a useful propositional explanation –

nevertheless – logically speaking – a propositional explanation – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

648. ‘"I no longer remember the words I used, but I remember my

intention precisely; I meant my words to quiet him." What does my

memory shew me; what does it bring before my mind? Suppose it did

nothing but suggest those words to me!—and perhaps others which

fill out the picture still more exactly.—("I don't remember my words

any more, but I certainly remember their spirit.")’

we are dealing here with proposals –

logically speaking a remembered proposal – is no different to any other proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as for intention – a form of underwriting of a proposal – of a proposition

logically speaking any propositional underwriting – is – as with the proposal in question – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

so – in the end – proposing an ‘intention’ – does not get you anywhere – logically speaking

I think ‘intention’ is really just a subtle form of rhetoric

‘("I don't remember my words any more, but I certainly remember their spirit.")’

what you remember is what you propose –

if you propose ‘spirit’ – this proposal – if put to question – will require – propositional elaboration – if it is to have any propositional function – any real use

‘spirit’ – strikes me as a dummy term –

a term proposed as an explanation – which looks like an explanation – but actually doesn’t explain anything – and is really a place mark for where an explanation should be – if indeed there is to be an explanation

and I think too – proposing ‘spirit’ – is a sign of intellectual laziness –

and let’s not be too high minded here –

I suspect we are all guilty of intellectual laziness more often that we would care to admit

and you never know – perhaps there is something to be said for it –

getting through this life is not all about intellectual rigour

649. "So if a man has not learned a language, is he unable to have

certain memories?" Of course—he cannot have verbal memories,

verbal wishes or fears, and so on. And memories etc., in language, are

not mere threadbare representations of the real experiences; for is what

is linguistic not an experience?

"So if a man has not learned a language, is he unable to have certain memories?"

this is an empirical question

‘Of course—he cannot have verbal memories, verbal wishes or fears, and so on’

and what counts as a ‘verbal memory’?

could not the bare making of a sound – be the basis of a verbal memory?

do you have to have language to be verbal?

and what counts as language?

all these matters are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and as to – ‘real experience’ – I would think any ‘experience’ is real

and yes – what is linguistic – is an experience –

however – regardless of one’s view here – the nature of ‘experience’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

650. ‘We say a dog is afraid his master will beat him; but not, he is

afraid his master will beat him to-morrow. Why not?’

perhaps a dog is afraid his master will beat him tomorrow –

the thing is we just don’t know

and one reason we don’t know is that we can’t see the world from the point of view of a dog –

the best we can do is hoist our own human perceptions and responses on to the dog

and sometimes when we do just this –

the dog teaches us a lesson

651. ‘"I remember that I should have been glad then to stay still

longer."—What picture of this wish came before my mind? None at

all. What I see in my memory allows no conclusion as to my feelings.

And yet I remember quite clearly that they were there.’

the matter is not a question of ‘wishes’ and ‘pictures’ –

what we are dealing with here is proposals – propositions

what you remember is what you propose – is a proposal – and this memory / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

‘What I see in my memory allows no conclusion as to my feelings’

so called ‘feelings’ – are proposals

there is nothing to say that one proposition can’t be drawn from another –

a feeling-proposal from a memory-proposal –

it is just a question of proposing the relation

and yes – any such proposal – will be open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘And yet I remember quite clearly that they were there.’

you propose that they were there –

you propose ‘feelings’

                                                                                                                                        652. ‘"He measured him with a hostile glance and said .... "

The reader of the narrative understands this; he has no doubt in his

mind. Now you say: "Very well, he supplies the meaning, he guesses

it."—Generally speaking: no. Generally speaking he supplies nothing,

guesses nothing.—But it is also possible that the hostile glance and the

words later prove to have been pretence, or that the reader is kept in

doubt whether they are so or not, and so that he really does guess at a

possible interpretation.—But then the main thing he guesses at is a

context. He says to himself for example: The two men who are here

so hostile to one another are in reality friends, etc. etc.

(("If you want to understand a sentence, you have to imagine the

psychical significance, the states of mind involved."))’

‘But then the main thing he guesses at is a context. He says to himself for example: The two men who are here so hostile to one another are in reality friends, etc. etc.’

this is correct –

when we ‘guess at the context’ – we are putting the proposition to question – to doubt – and exploring its uncertainty –

and any proposal regarding context – is open to question

‘(("If you want to understand a sentence, you have to imagine the psychical significance, the states of mind involved."))’

the imagining here – is a result of the critical process of question – of doubt – and of the exploration of propositional uncertainty

653. ‘Imagine this case: I tell someone that I walked a certain

route, going by a map which I had prepared beforehand. Thereupon

I shew him the map, and it consists of lines on a piece of paper; but I

cannot explain how these lines are the map of my movements, I

cannot tell him any rule for interpreting the map. Yet I did follow

the drawing with all the characteristic tokens of reading a map.

I might call such a drawing a 'private' map; or the phenomenon

that I have described "following a private map". (But this expression

would, of course, be very easy to misunderstand.)

Could I now say: "I read off my having then meant to do such-and-

such, as if from a map, although there is no map"? But that means

nothing but: I am now inclined to say "I read the intention of acting

thus in certain states of mind which I remember."’

‘Thereupon I shew him the map, and it consists of lines on a piece of paper; but I

cannot explain how these lines are the map of my movements, I cannot tell him any rule for interpreting the map.’

the map is the rule – the rule proposed for getting from a to b

as a rule – the map is not open to interpretation –

if the so called rule is regarded as open to interpretation – open to question – to doubt – and uncertain – it is not a rule – it is a proposal

the lines are the map of my movement – if they represent the way I walked –

if they don’t represent the way I walked – then I didn’t follow the rule of the map

if the ‘map’ is expressed – as in i.e. lines on paper – it is not private – it is public

‘Could I now say: "I read off my having then meant to do such-and-such, as if from a map, although there is no map"? But that means nothing but: I am now inclined to say "I read the intention of acting thus in certain states of mind which I remember."’

here is a report of a private map – a private rule –

a report open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

654. ‘Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to

look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we

ought to have said: this language-game is played.’

you can ask for an explanation of a propositional use – of a propositional game – if you like –

any explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

the point of a game is to play it –

in the game mode – we follow the rule of the game – and play the game –

there are two propositional modes – the critical mode – and the game mode –

our propositional lives – are a mixture of  the critical evaluation of proposals – of propositions –

and – propositional game playing –

this is what we do – we question – and we play

                                                                                                                                        655. ‘The question is not one of explaining a language-game by

means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game.’

in one sense – there is really nothing to explain here –

the propositional game is a basic propositional activity –

we make games – we play games – and this is just something human beings do

on the other hand – yes – any propositional activity – is open to account – open to explanation –

and any explanation proffered – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

you can note a propositional game if you recognise that the activity – is rule-governed

logically speaking – if it is not rule-governed – it is not a game

656. ‘What is the purpose of telling someone that a time ago I

had such-and-such a wish?—Look on the language-game as the primary

thing. And look on the feelings, etc., as you look on a way of

regarding the language-game, as interpretation.

It might be asked: how did human beings ever come to make

the verbal utterances which we call reports of past wishes or past

intentions?’

‘What is the purpose of telling someone that a time ago I had such-and-such a wish?—Look on the language-game as the primary thing.’

a propositional game is a rule-governed propositional action

there is no rule-governed action here

what Wittgenstein here calls a ‘language-game’ – is not a language-game

telling someone that a time ago I had such and such a wish – is putting a proposal –

it is not playing a rule-governed game

Wittgenstein here confuses proposing with game playing

his notion of the language-game – amounts to nothing other than non-game propositional activity –

his concept of the language-game – is ill-defined and logically irrelevant

‘And look on the feelings, etc., as you look on a way of regarding the language-game, as interpretation.’

in a well-constructed game – there is no room for interpretation

the game is rule-governed

in non-game propositional action – what is proposed – is open to interpretation – is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘It might be asked: how did human beings ever come to make the verbal utterances which we call reports of past wishes or past intentions?’

yes – you can ask this question – and any answer proposed – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

657. ‘Let us imagine these utterances always taking this form: "I

said to myself: ‘if only I could stay longer!’" The purpose of such a

statement might be to acquaint someone with my reactions. (Compare

the grammar of "mean" and "vouloir dire".)’

the proposal – ‘I said to myself: if only I could stay longer’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and yes you could well put that the purpose of such a proposal might be to acquaint someone with my reactions –

that is one propositional option – given the logical uncertainty of the proposal

it is one amongst many possible interpretations

grammar is a theory of usage – any such theory is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

any comparison of usage of different words or phrases – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

658. ‘Suppose we expressed the fact that a man had an intention

by saying "He as it were said to himself 'I will. . . .'"—That is the

picture. And now I want to know: how does one employ the

expression "as it were to say something to oneself"? For it does

not mean: to say something to oneself.’

                                                                                                                                ‘Suppose we expressed the fact that a man had an intention by saying "He as it were said to himself 'I will. . . .'"—

‘intention’ – is an explanation of a propositional action – a proposal in explanation of an action

now if you want to then explain the explanation here – by proposing ‘he as it were said to himself’ – fair enough

any proposal – and propositional explanation – any proposed explanation of an explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the question is – is ‘He as it were said to himself’ – in whatever context it is put – useful – is it fit to purpose – does it work?

but remember – all we are doing here is explaining an explanation –

and you might well ask what is the point of that?

it’s a bit like going down the rabbit hole – when all the action is in the field –

as it were

659. ‘Why do I want to tell him about an intention too, as well as

telling him what 1 did?—Not because the intention was also something

which was going on at that time. But because I want to tell him

something about myself, which goes beyond what happened at that

time.

I reveal to him something of myself when I tell him what I was going

to do.—Not, however, on grounds of self-observation, but by way of

a response (it might also be called an intuition).’

‘Why do I want to tell him about an intention too, as well as telling him what 1 did?’

the proposal of intention – is a proposal of explanation

why do I want to explain my action?

I think doing so – is logically irrelevant – and as far as I can see ‘telling him about my intention’ – if it has any significance – can only be rhetorical

as far as ‘telling him something about myself’ – telling him what I did – does the job

and of course – if you want to – you can go on – tell him something else – about yourself

referring to ‘intention’ – at best tells him – that you want to explain yourself

‘Not, however, on grounds of self-observation, but by way of a response (it might also be called an intuition).’           

the question is whether the proposal of ‘intuition’ – explains anything

isn’t intuition rather a place term for the lack of – or the absence of – explanation?

660. ‘The grammar of the expression "I was then going to say . . . ."

is related to that of the expression "I could then have gone on."

"In the one case I remember an intention, in the other I remember

having understood.’

‘The grammar of the expression "I was then going to say . . . ." is related to that of the expression "I could then have gone on."

‘I was then going to say …’ – is a prelude – a preamble – to whatever is proposed

the logical point is what is proposed –

reference to when the proposal was formulated – is irrelevant

‘I could then have gone on ’ – is to say – I could have acted in some way –

this proposal is speculative

"In the one case I remember an intention, in the other I remember having understood.’

do you remember an intention – or do you actually remember the proposal?

the ‘intention’ here – functions as an explanation of what didn’t happen –

that is the putting of the proposal

‘I could then have gone’ – refers to what didn’t happen –

whether or not that is understood – is another matter –

a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

661. ‘I remember having meant him. Am I remembering a process

or state?—When did it begin, what was its course; etc.?’

‘I remember having met him’ – is a result of a critical process – that began with the question – who was it? – the doubt – as to who it was – and the uncertainty as to who it was –

what is being remembered is the logical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

it began with a question – a doubt – an uncertainty

and the course it took – is critical

662. ‘In an only slightly different situation, instead of silently

beckoning, he would have said to someone "Tell N. to come to me."

One can now say that the words "I wanted N. to come to me" describe

the state of my mind at that time; and again one may not say so.’

"I wanted N. to come to me’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

you can put that – ‘the words "I wanted N. to come to me" describe the state of my mind at that time’

this proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

663. ‘If I say "I meant him" very likely a picture comes to my mind,

perhaps of how I looked at him, etc.; but the picture is only like an

illustration to a story. From it alone it would mostly be impossible

to conclude anything at all; only when one knows the story does one

know the significance of the picture.’

‘If I say "I meant him" very likely a picture comes to my mind ..’

if a picture comes to mind – what comes to mind – what is put – is a proposal – a proposal described as a ‘picture’ –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘From it alone it would mostly be impossible to conclude anything at all; only when one knows the story does one know the significance of the picture’

from any proposal – alone – there is no conclusion –

a conclusion is the result of an argument

‘knowing the story’ – is proposing a propositional context

the significance of any proposal – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

664. ‘In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar'

from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us

about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the

sentence, the part of its use—one might say—that can be taken in

by the ear.——And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word

"to mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect.

No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about.’

whether dealing with the so called ‘surface’ – or the so called ‘depth’ –

we deal with proposals – proposals open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it’s actually not difficult to know your way about – if you question – if you doubt – and if you explore propositional uncertainty –

if you don’t proceed in such a manner – you run the risk of getting stuck in ruts of prejudice – pretence – and ignorance

665. ‘Imagine someone pointing to his cheek with an expression of

pain and saying "abracadabra!"—We ask "What do you mean?"

And he answers "I meant toothache".—You at once think to yourself:

How can one 'mean toothache' by that word? Or what did it mean to

mean pain by that word? And yet, in a different context, you would

have asserted that the mental activity of meaning such-and-such was

just what was most important in using language.

But—can't I say "By 'abracadabra' I mean toothache"? Of course

I can; but this is a definition; not a description of what goes on in me

when I utter the word.’

‘abracadabra!’ – is a proposal –

and as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and in this the example given it is uncertain – whether of not – it is used in a recognised context

                                                                                                                                        

a so called ‘mental activity of meaning’ – is a proposed explanation of the proposal put –

and as an explanation – as a proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if this explanation functions in some context – so be it

‘what goes on in me when I utter the word’ – may well be of interest to someone –

but it is not what is proposed – is on the table –

it is a secondary – explanatory issue – and actually irrelevant – to straight up dealing with the proposal

all we need here to deal with the proposal is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of the proposition’s uncertainty –

secondary – explanatory issues – are another matter – and not to the point

666. ‘Imagine that you were in pain and were simultaneously

hearing a nearby piano being tuned. You say "It'll soon stop.

"It certainly makes quite a difference whether you mean the pain or the

piano-tuning!—Of course; but what does this difference consist in?

I admit, in many cases some direction of the attention will correspond

to your meaning one thing or another, just as a look often does, or a

gesture, or a way of shutting one's eyes which might be called "looking

into oneself".’

‘It’ll soon stop’ – is open to question –

and what is at question – can be – the propositional context –

in this case – we can ask – which context is the proposition directed at – and which context is the proposition to be understood in terms of?

we are not really dealing with meaning here – rather propositional place – and propositional placement

and any proposal here – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

667. ‘Imagine someone simulating pain, and then saying "It'll get

better soon". Can't one say he means the pain? and yet he is not

concentrating his attention on any pain.—And what about when I

finally say "It's stopped now"?’

for this example to make sense – you must know that he is simulating pain –

how could you know this?

at best you could speculate this – and even then your speculation would be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to his concentration – that too is speculative

‘And what about when I finally say "It's stopped now"?’

it strikes me here that you are entirely disconnected from the propositional situation

you are in your own little world – making it all up as you go –

and ‘It’s stopped now’ – suggests you need psychiatric help

668. ‘But can't one also lie in this way: one says "It'll stop soon",

and means pain—but when asked "What did you mean?" one answers

"The noise in the next room"? In this sort of case one may say: "I

was going to answer.... but thought better of it and did answer ....."’

all this amounts to is that – ‘It’ll stop soon’ – as a with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

uncertain for the speaker – and uncertain for the hearer – the observer –

we make the best of it

and as for truth and lie –

there actually are no lies –

there is what you give your assent to – and what you dissent from –

the best you can say about lies – is that they are a logical confusion

‘thought better of it and did answer’ –

here is it is a question of just what you give your assent to

and any propositional action of assent or dissent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

669. ‘One can refer to an object when speaking by pointing to it.

Here pointing is a part of the language-game. And now it seems to us

as if one spoke of a sensation by directing one's attention to it. But

where is the analogy? It evidently lies in the fact that one can point

to a thing by looking or listening.

But in certain circumstances, even pointing to the object one is

talking about may be quite inessential to the language-game, to one's’

thought.’

‘And now it seems to us as if one spoke of a sensation by directing one's attention to it’

a sensation is a proposal – is a proposition –

pointing – in whatever form that takes – is a proposal – a proposition

this pointing to a sensation – if that is what is going on – is proposing a relation between propositions – between the pointing / proposal – and the sensation / proposal

but just what is going on here – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘But in certain circumstances, even pointing to the object one is talking about may be quite inessential to the language-game, to one's’ thought’

when you think you propose –

or more technically – you propose – and describe your proposal as a ‘thought’

whether you express your thought / proposal – verbally – or by some proposition / gesture – or in any other propositional form – is another matter

pointing here is an expression of your thought –

and presumably you point because you want to – and you are – expressing your thought / proposal

and whether the pointing – or any other form of propositional expression – accurately expresses your thought – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

we are not dealing with a ‘game’ here – a rule-governed propositional action –

what we have is proposals and their proposed relations –

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

670. ‘Imagine that you were telephoning someone and you said to

him: "This table is too tall", and pointed to the table. What is the

role of pointing here? Can I say: I mean the table in question by

pointing to it? What is this pointing for, and what are these words

and whatever else may accompany them for?’

‘What is the role of pointing here?’

on the face of it – in this context – pointing has no role – it is an irrelevant propositional action

‘Can I say: I mean the table in question by pointing to it?’

yes – you can say this – but again – in this context of talking to someone on the phone – the pointing has no propositional value to the person on the other end of the phone

to the person – pointing –  at best it might be a way of focusing his attention on what he is talking about – but again here it seems unnecessary – and basically irrelevant to the proposition put

‘these words and whatever else may accompany them’ – are proposals –

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

671. ‘And what do I point to by the inner activity of listening? To

the sound that comes to my ears, and to the silence when I hear

nothing.

Listening as it were looks for an auditory impression and hence

can't point to it, but only to the place where it is looking for it.’

this – I think – is taking pointing just a little too far

what I hear is what is put to me – is what is proposed to me

when I hear nothing – nothing is put – nothing is proposed

listening – as with looking – is being open to the possibility of proposal

it is a form of propositional expectation

expectation in the form of attentiveness

672. ‘If a receptive attitude is called a kind of 'pointing' to something

—then that something is not the sensation which we get by means

of it.’

the ‘something’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a ‘sensation’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and – any proposed relation between proposals – between propositions – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

673. ‘The mental attitude doesn't 'accompany what is said in the

sense in which a gesture accompanies it. (As a man can travel alone,

and yet be accompanied by my good wishes; or as a room can be

empty, and yet full of light.)’

‘The mental attitude doesn't 'accompany what is said in the sense in which a gesture accompanies it.’

 I don’t see how you can know this with any definitiveness – one way or another –

the matter is speculative – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it is possible that what is said is proposed as a public expression of a mental attitude

and it is possible that a mental attitude has nothing to do with what is said –

any proposed relation here is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and as for the relation between what is said – and a gesture –

a gesture may well occur at the same time as what is said – but the relation between the two proposals it is an open question

perhaps the proposal is that the gesture reflects what is said – but again what does this amount to?

and maybe the gesture has nothing to do with what is said?

any proposal here – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

674. ‘Does one say, for example: "I didn't really mean my pain

just now; my mind wasn't on it enough for that?" Do I ask myself,

say: "What did I mean by this word just now? My attention was

divided between my pain and the noise—"?’

"I didn't really mean my pain just now; my mind wasn't on it enough for that?"

this statement is after the fact – it is a proposed analysis

and as with whatever the proposal was – that it is an analysis of – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

"What did I mean by this word just now? My attention was divided between my pain and the noise—"?’

again – a question – a doubt – an uncertainty –

a critical analysis

675. ‘"Tell me, what was going on in you when you uttered the

words . . . .?"—The answer to this is not: "I was meaning .... ."!’

the answer here is – I don’t know – nevertheless – I will have a go – and put forward a proposal –

knowing full well that that proposal – or any other proposal put forward in answer to the question – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and therefore ‘I was meaning …’ – if that is your response – your proposal – as with any other answer – is valid – and as with any other answer – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

676. ‘"I meant this by that word" is a statement which is differently

used from one about an affection of the mind.’

not really – it is an after the fact proposal – an analytic statement –

and as with a statement about an affectation of the mind – a propositional explanation – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

677. ‘On the other hand: "When you were swearing just now, did

you really mean it?" This is perhaps as much as to say: "Were you

really angry?"—And the answer may be given as a result of

introspection and is often some such thing as: "I didn't mean it very

seriously", "I meant it half jokingly" and so on. There are differences

of degree here.

And one does indeed also say "I was half thinking of him when I

said that."’

‘On the other hand: "When you were swearing just now, did you really mean it?"

what we have here is a proposal put – and a question asked in relation to it – a doubt raised – an uncertainty suggested

this is perfectly logical –

and any answer given is just a proposal put –

and to say i.e. –‘And the answer may be given as a result of introspection’ –

is to propose an explanation of the answer –

an explanation open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

678. ‘What does this act of meaning (the pain, or the piano-tuning)

consist in? No answer comes—for the answers which at first sight

suggest themselves are of no use.—"And yet at the time I meant the

one thing and not the other." Yes,—now you have only repeated with

emphasis something which no one has contradicted anyway.’

yes – this gets it right –

this – ‘repeating with emphasis’ – this – ‘I meant’ – is nothing more than rhetoric –

and rhetoric – is logically irrelevant

the claim of meaning here – is logically irrelevant

what is relevant is the bare proposal – the proposal without any rhetorical emphasis –

and that proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

and it is so – whether or not anyone contradicts it – whether or not any question is raised

679. ‘"But can you doubt that you meant this?"—No; but neither

can I be certain of it, know it.’

‘"But can you doubt that you meant this?"

of course you can – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘No; but neither can I be certain of it, know it.’

all this pin points Wittgenstein’s logical confusion – his philosophical failure

if you can’t doubt – you can’t be uncertain

if you can’t be certain – clearly – you can doubt –

what we know is what is proposed –

what is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

680. ‘When you tell me that you cursed and meant N. as you did

so it is all one to me whether you looked at a picture of him, or

imagined him, uttered his name, or what. The conclusions from this

fact that interest me have nothing to do with these things. On

the other hand, however, someone might explain to me that cursing

was effective only when one had a clear image of the man or spoke his

name out loud. But we should, not say "The point is how the man

who is cursing means his victim."’

‘When you tell me that you cursed and meant N’

telling this is reporting after the event –

reporting a proposal –

and the proposal – any aspect of it – i.e. – it’s origin – its purpose or point – its effectiveness – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

would we say ‘the point is how the man who is cursing means his victim?’

this is an odd proposal – and I agree with Wittgenstein – we would not say it

nevertheless if it was put – we could put it to question – we could put it to doubt – and we could explore its uncertainty

 we could ask – is ‘means’ here – a question of just how the victim is being viewed in a particular context – i.e. in relation to a particular act he has committed?

and if so – might it not be – that outside of the particular circumstance – the man who is cursing has a high regard for him?

if this – or something like it was the case – then perhaps it could be said that ‘means’ here – refers to a particular way of seeing the victim in relation to a particular circumstance?

the real point here is that ‘means’ as with any other term – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

681. ‘Nor, of course, does one ask: "Are you sure that you cursed

him, that the connexion with him was established?"

Then this connexion must be very easy to establish, if one can be

so sure of it?! Can know that it doesn't fail of its object!—Well, can

it happen to me, to intend to write to one person and in fact write

to another? and how might it happen?’

‘Nor, of course, does one ask: "Are you sure that you cursed him, that the connexion with him was established?"

the curse is a proposal – it can be put to question to doubt – and its uncertainty explored

we can ask – just what constitutes a curse?

and as to ‘him’ cursed – what of the case of mistaken identity?

so – the object of the curse – logically speaking – is open to question

any so called ‘connection’ is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

you will only be ‘sure’ of any proposition – if you don’t put it to question

‘Well, can it happen to me, to intend to write to one person and in fact write

to another? and how might it happen?’

you might be writing thank you notes to different people – write one to A – and then decide it would be better suited for B

however this decision will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

682. ‘"You said, 'It'll stop soon'.—Were you thinking of the noise

or of your pain?" If he answers "I was thinking of the piano-tuning"—

is he observing that the connexion existed, or is he making it by means

of these words?—Can't I say both? If what he said was true, didn't the

connexion exist—and is he not for all that making one which did not

exist?’

‘"You said, 'It'll stop soon'.—Were you thinking of the noise

or of your pain?" If he answers "I was thinking of the piano-tuning"—

he is putting a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘is he observing that the connexion existed, or is he making it by means

of these words?—Can't I say both?’

he is proposing ‘a connection’ –

his proposal – is the connection

what the observer deals with – is what is put – and what is put is what is made public

the speaker may have proposed the connection before making it public

‘If what he said was true, didn't the connexion exist—and is he not for all that making one which did not exist?’

the connection is what is proposed –

in the absence of such a proposal – there is no ‘connection’

and yes – he is making one that did not exist –

the connection exists – only if proposed

and his connection – his proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

683. ‘I draw a head. You ask "Whom is that supposed to represent?"

— I: "It's supposed to be N."—You: "But it doesn't look like

him; if anything, it's rather like M."—When I said it represented N.—

was I establishing a connexion or reporting one? And what connexion

did exist?’

‘establishing a connexion or reporting one?’

when I say – ‘It is supposed to be N’ –

I am effectively repeating in words what I have proposed via the drawing

so – in terms of a time frame – you can say I am doing both reporting and establishing – or more correctly – proposing

‘And what connexion did exist?’

the connection – the relation of representation – exists – when proposed

we can say my drawing / proposal expresses the relation – in non-verbal terms –

and that my verbal expression – expresses the proposed relation in a non-pictorial form

in both modes or expressions – the relation is proposed –

and this relation – however expressed – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

684. ‘What is there in favour of saying that my words describe an

existing connexion? Well, they relate to various things which didn't

simply make their appearance with the words. They say, for example,

that I should have given a particular answer then, if I had been asked.

And even if this is only conditional, still it does say something about

the past.’

an existing connection – is an existing relation

a propositional relation exists – if and when it is proposed

a relation proposed – can be described –

what exists is what is proposed –

proposed in words – or in some other propositional form

‘They say, for example, that I should have given a particular answer then, if I had been asked.’

here is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in logic there is no past or future –

only the eternal present

685. ‘"Look for A" does not mean "Look for B"; but I may do

just the same thing in obeying the two orders.

To say that something different must happen in the two cases

would be like saying that the propositions "Today is my birthday"

and "My birthday is on April 26th" must refer to different days, because

they do not make the same sense.’

‘"Look for A" does not mean "Look for B"; but I may do just the same thing in obeying the two orders.’

yes – you may – or you may not –

i.e. – looking for B may be a much more complicated matter than looking for A

there is always a question of propositional context

and if context is not provided or considered  – these statements are effectively meaningless

‘To say that something different must happen in the two cases would be like saying that the propositions "Today is my birthday" and "My birthday is on April 26th" must refer to different days, because they do not make the same sense.’

"Today is my birthday" and "My birthday is on April 26th" –

they may refer to different days –

i.e. ‘today is my birthday’ – stated on the 25^th – does refer to a different day to “my birthday is on April 26’

and again – to understand these statements – one needs to consider propositional context

it is propositional context that provides us with sense

and any proposed context – any proposed sense – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

686. ‘"Of course I meant B; I didn't think of A at all!"

"I wanted B to come to me, so as to . . ."—All this points to a

wider context.’

‘I wanted B to come to me, so as to …’ –

is the beginning of an explanation for why I was looking for B

                                                                                                                                     and yes – any such elaboration involves context –

and any proposed explanation and any proposed context – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

687. ‘Instead of "I meant him" one can, of course, sometimes say

"I thought of him"; sometimes even "Yes, we were speaking of him."

Ask yourself what 'speaking of him' consists in.’

the bottom line here is that the proposal – ‘Yes, we were speaking of him.’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and any response to this proposal – as with the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

688. ‘In certain circumstances one can say "As I was speaking, I

felt I was saying it to you". But I should not say this if I were in any

case talking with you.’

these little puzzles of Wittgenstein’s – turn on an absence of propositional context –

and can quite rightly be dismissed for that reason

outside of a proposed context – a proposition has no significance –

as to the present ‘conundrum’ –

if the proposal ‘As I was speaking, I felt I was saying it to you’ – is a report of a previous statement – then it could quite sensibly be said as I was talking with you –

to make this point is to propose propositional context

the point though is that any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and when we question – when we doubt – when we explore propositional uncertainty – one central concern will be the issue of propositional context –

and any context proposed – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

689. ‘"I am thinking of N." "I am speaking of N."

How do I speak of him? I say, for instance, "I must go and see N

today"——But surely that is not enough! After all, when I say "N"

I might mean various people of this name.—"Then there must surely

be a further, different connexion between my talk and N, for otherwise

I should still not have meant HIM.

Certainly such a connexion exists. Only not as you imagine it:

namely by means of a mental mechanism.

(One compares "meaning him" with "aiming at him".)’

‘After all, when I say "N" I might mean various people of this name.’

just how you identify N – is open to question – open to doubt – it is uncertain –

whether you recognise this or not

‘Then there must surely be a further, different connexion between my talk and N, for otherwise I should still not have meant HIM.’

any other so called ‘different connection’ – is no different to any other proposal one may make to identify N –

it is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘Certainly such a connexion exists. Only not as you imagine it: namely by means of a mental mechanism.’

by all means describe your proposal as a ‘mental mechanism’ – it’s as good as any other description

and as with a any description – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘(One compares "meaning him" with "aiming at him".)’

yes – you can make this comparison – if it suits your purpose –

even so – all you have is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

690. ‘What about the case where I at one time make an apparently

innocent remark and accompany it with a furtive sidelong glance at

someone; and at another time, without any such glance, speak of

somebody present openly, mentioning his name—am I really thinking

specially about him as I use his name?’

your proposals – i.e. – the ‘apparently innocent remark’ – the ‘furtive sidelong glance’ – the ‘mention of a name’ – etc. –

are for you – and anyone observing you – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

you can only be sure of your proposals – if you don’t put them to question – raise doubts regarding them – and explore their uncertainty –

it might seem easy to operate without question  – but it is not logical – it is not rational – and it is lazy

and this it seems even Wittgenstein appreciates for in the above he finishes off with the question – ‘am I really thinking specially about him as I use his name?’

any answer here – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

we can get along quite well recognizing the uncertainty of our proposals –

we live and operate in uncertainty – it is the ground of our action –

uncertainty is only feared – if it is not understood

when we recognise the uncertainty of our proposals – we can use them most effectively

for when we question what we propose – we open ourselves to a broader context of consideration and action –

in putting our proposals to question we engage with the world of rational possibility –

and this I suggest is a healthy way to live

691. ‘When I make myself a sketch of N's face from memory, I

can surely be said to mean him by my drawing. But which of the

processes taking place while I draw (or before or afterwards) could I

call meaning him?

For one would naturally like to say: when he meant him, he aimed

at him. But how is anyone doing that, when he calls someone else's face

to mind?

I mean, how does he call HIM to mind?

How does he call him?’

what you do with you drawing is propose N –

there is no ‘meaning’ – only proposal

and yes – you can call proposing ‘aiming at’ – if you like –

and it’s not a bad description – for any aim is uncertain – which is exactly the case with proposing

‘I mean, how does he call HIM to mind?’ and ‘How does he call him?’

good questions – and any answers here – any proposals here – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

692. ‘Is it correct for someone to say: "When I gave you this rule,

I meant you to ..... in this case"? Even if he did not think of this

case at all as he gave the rule? Of course it is correct. For "to mean it”

did not mean: to think of it. But now the problem is: how are we

to judge whether someone meant such-and-such?—The fact that he

has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and

algebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion of a series in the

usual way, is such a criterion.’

"When I gave you this rule, I meant you to ..... in this case"? Even if he did not think of this case at all as he gave the rule?

the point here is that the person who didn’t do what was entailed by the rule – didn’t follow the rule – didn’t fully understand the rule

‘But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such?’

so called ‘meaning’ here – is irrelevant –

what is at issue is the proposal put – you can put the proposal to question – you can raise doubts – you can explore its uncertainty

whether anyone ‘meant it’ or not – is of no importance from a logical point of view

the claim ‘I meant it’ – or one of its grammatical variations – is – to be brutal – rhetoric – plain and simple – [J1] rhetoric trying to climb on to stilts

‘The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and

algebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion of a series in the usual way, is such a criterion.’

what this shows is that the rule in question has been followed     


693. ‘"When I teach someone the formation of the series .... I

surely mean him to write .... at the hundredth place."—Quite right;

you mean it. And evidently without necessarily even thinking of it.

This shews you how different the grammar of the verb "to mean"

is from that of "to think". And nothing is more wrong-headed

than calling meaning a mental activity! Unless, that is, one is setting

out to produce confusion. (It would also be possible to speak of an

activity of butter when it rises in price, and if no problems are

produced by this it is harmless)’

yes – this whole rigmarole of ‘meaning’ – is harmless

(c) killer press. 2020.