Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Part 1. 501-600

501. ‘"The purpose of language is to express thoughts."—So

presumably the purpose of every sentence is to express a thought.

Then what thought is expressed, for example, by the sentence "It's

raining"? —’

the sentence – ‘It’s raining’ – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open  to doubt – and uncertain

language is proposal –

and as to the purpose of language – the purpose of proposal –

and whether or not language / proposal expresses a thought –

these are matters – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

502. ‘Asking what the sense is. Compare:

"This sentence makes sense."— "What sense?"

"This set of words is a sentence."—"What sentence?"’

the sentence makes sense – what sense?

that is the question and – any answer to it is a proposal – of sense – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

this set of words is a sentence – what sentence?

firstly – you would ask – what constitutes as sentence?

if – i.e. the answer is – a sentence is a set of words that makes sense – then the question is going to be – does this set of words make sense?

whatever the sentence – this question of sense – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

503. ‘If I give anyone an order I feel it to be quite enough to give him

signs. And I should never say: this is only words, and I have got to get

behind the words. Equally, when I have asked someone something

and he gives me an answer (i.e. a sign) I am content—that was what I

expected—and I don't raise the objection: but that's a mere answer.’

‘If I give anyone an order I feel it to be quite enough to give him signs. And I should never say: this is only words, and I have got to get behind the words.’

yes – this is to behave logically

‘to get behind the words.’ – strikes me as behaving rhetorically

‘Equally, when I have asked someone something and he gives me an answer (i.e. a sign) I am content—that was what I expected—and I don't raise the objection: but that's a mere answer.’

yes – you expected an answer –

but the logic of the situation is that the answer is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

whether you actually raise objections or not is more a matter of how you read the person concerned – and what importance you give the matter at hand –

you may decide it would not go well to object – under the circumstances – and that in any case the matter is not that important

or you may decide the matter is important – and to throw caution to the wind –

it is never an easy matter to know – when to speak – and when to be silent

504. ‘But if you say: "How am I to know what he means, when

I see nothing but the signs he gives?" then I say: "How is he to know

what he means, when he has nothing but the signs either?"’

‘How am I to know what he means, when I see nothing but the signs he gives?’

your knowledge of what he means – is the interpretation you give his signs

‘How is he to know what he means, when he has nothing but the signs either’

his knowledge of what he means – is the interpretation he gives his signs

these interpretations – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

your knowledge – and his knowledge – and any so called mutual understanding – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

505. ‘Must I understand an order before I can act on it?—Certainly,

otherwise you wouldn't know what you had to do!—But isn't there in

turn a jump from knowing to doing?— ’

you need to have an understanding of an order before you act on it –

that understanding – as with any understanding – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

from knowing to doing?

knowing and doing are two different propositional actions

with knowing you propose the action – or have it proposed to you

and with doing – you act on the proposal

both knowing and doing – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

506. ‘The absent-minded man who at the order "Right turn!"

turns left, and then, clutching his forehead, says "Oh! right turn" and

does a right turn.—What has struck him? An interpretation?’

it seems he understood the order –

but he got right and left confused –

it is not an interpretation that has struck him

after he turns left –

he recognises – that in terms of the order –

he has made the wrong move –

and then he corrects – by turning right

507. ‘"I am not merely saying this, I mean something by it."—

When we consider what is going on in us when we mean (and don't

merely say) words, it seems to us as if there were something coupled

to these words, which otherwise would run idle.—As if they, so to

speak, connected with something in us.’

yes – that is the impression – that one wants to convey

and the conveying of that impression is rhetorical

508. ‘I say the sentence: "The weather is fine"; but the words are

after all arbitrary signs—so let's put "a b c d" in their place. But now

when I read this, I can't connect it straight away with the above sense.—

I am not used, I might say, to saying "a" instead of "the", "b" instead

of "weather", etc. . But I don't mean by that that I am not used to

making an immediate association between the word "the" and "a",

but that I am not used to using "a" in the place of "the"—and therefore

in the sense of "the". (I have not mastered this language.)

(I am not used to measuring temperatures on the Fahrenheit scale.

Hence such a measure of temperature 'says' nothing to me.)’

yes – you can play a translation game –

and clear cut and definitive as any translation rules may appear to be –

we can still put the rules – the result – and indeed the enterprise itself – to question – to doubt – and in so doing – explore the propositional uncertainties involved

and as to not being used to a proposition – or a propositional model –

such provides a perfect opportunity to question – to doubt – and to explore possible ways of understanding –

and from this – perhaps – possible uses

509. ‘Suppose we asked someone "In what sense are these words a

description of what you are seeing?"—and he answers: "I mean this

by these words." (Say he was looking at a landscape.) Why is this

answer "I mean this . . . ." no answer at all?

How does one use words to mean what one sees before one?

Suppose I said "a b c d" and meant: the weather is fine. For as I

uttered these signs I had the experience normally had only by someone

who had year-in year-out used "a" in the sense of "the", "b" in the

sense of "weather", and so on.—Does "a b c d" now mean: the weather

is fine?

What is supposed to be the criterion for my having had that

experience?’

‘Suppose we asked someone "In what sense are these words a description of what you are seeing?"—and he answers: "I mean this by these words." (Say he was looking at a landscape.) Why is this answer "I mean this . . . ." no answer at all?’

it is no answer – because there is no question here –

the words are put as a description – that is the proposal

the proposal is that that the words describe what you are seeing –

and this proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

saying – ‘I mean this . . . .’ – at best – is only to reinforce the proposition

‘I mean this . . . .’ – is rhetorical –

rhetoric has no bearing on the logic of the proposition

‘How does one use words to mean what one sees before one?’

one proposes them

‘Does "a b c d" now mean: the weather is fine?’

it does if you propose that it does

‘What is supposed to be the criterion for my having had that experience?’

having proposed it

510. ‘Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean

"It's warm here". Can you do it?—And what are you doing as you do

it? And is there only one way of doing it?’

saying – ‘It's cold here’ – and meaning – ‘It's warm here’ –

yes – you can do this – and in so doing – be making an ironical statement

the logical point here is that the proposal ‘it’s cold here’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

and this ‘it’s cold here / its warm here’ – really points to the fact that you can’t get the meaning of a proposal – without consideration – if not immersion – in the propositional situation in which the proposal is put

there can be no ‘objective’ analysis of the meaning of a proposal – of a proposition

you can’t determine or evaluate a proposition’s use – independent of the propositional context in which it is put

and this propositional context –  is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

511. ‘What does "discovering that an expression doesn't make

sense" mean?—and what does it mean to say: "If I mean something by

it, surely it must make sense"?—If I mean something by it?—If I

mean what by it?!—One wants to say: a significant sentence is one

which one can not merely say, but also think.’

‘What does "discovering that an expression doesn't make sense" mean? —’

it means you can’t use it – or you don’t know how to use it’

‘and what does it mean to say: "If I mean something by it, surely it must make

sense"?— If I mean something by it?—’

‘meaning something’ – is about persuading – yourself – or others of the proposal you put

‘meaning something’ – is rhetorical

whether a proposition makes sense or not – is a logical issue –

rhetoric – if it makes sense – is an endorsement of the proposition put

if the rhetoric – is not some form of endorsement of the proposition –

then you have a mismatch of persuasion and proposition  

‘One wants to say: a significant sentence is one which one can not merely say, but also think.’

any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

512. ‘It looks as if we could say: "Word-language allows of senseless

combinations of words, but the language of imagining does not

allow us to imagine anything senseless."—Hence, too, the language

of drawing doesn't allow of senseless drawings? Suppose they were

drawings from which bodies were supposed to be modelled. In this

case some drawings make sense, some not.—What if I imagine

senseless combinations of words?’

‘It looks as if we could say: "Word-language allows of senseless combinations of words, but the language of imagining does not allow us to imagine anything’ senseless."— ’

if word language allows of senseless combinations of words –

then – clearly we can imagine senseless combinations of words –

we can imagine the senseless

in any case – what counts as sensible – and what counts as senseless – is not given in some platonic realm

what is sensible and what is senseless – is open to question – open to doubt – and is – uncertain

what makes sense in one propositional context – may be regarded as senseless – in another

and even in such a case – the matter is still open to question

513. ‘Consider the following form of expression: "The number of

pages in my book is equal to a root of the equation x3 + 2x -3 = 0."

Or: "I have n friends and n2 + 2n + 2 = 0". Does this sentence

make sense? This cannot be seen immediately. This example shews

how it is that something can look like a sentence which we understand,

and yet yield no sense.

(This throws light on the concepts 'understanding' and 'meaning'.)’

‘The number of pages in my book is equal to a root of the equation x3 + 2x -3 = 0.’

and – ‘I have n friends and n2 + 2n + 2 = 0’ –

are proposals –

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

their sense is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

this is the logical reality with any proposal – any understanding – and any meaning

that I cannot make sense of a proposal – does not change the logical reality – that its sense – or no sense – is an uncertain matter

514. ‘A philosopher says that he understands the sentence "I am

here", that he means something by it, thinks something—even when

he doesn't think at all how, on what occasions, this sentence is used.

And if I say "A rose is red in the dark too" you positively see this red

in the dark before you.’

I don’t have to say – ‘I mean something by it’ – for it to be a proposal – a genuine proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

if someone asks what I mean by it – they are asking me to supplement my proposal with a further proposal – a proposal that will function as some kind of explanation of the original proposal

in my answer it might be that I do not consider at all – how or on what occasion the sentence is used 

I may be proposing a new use –

philosophers do this –

however – philosopher or not – the new use – or for that matter any use – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

when someone says ‘I am here’ – I expect that whoever hears this will make some sense of it –

just as they will make some sense of ‘A rose is red in the dark too’

having a positive image – is not the be all and end all – of making sense of a proposition

515. ‘Two pictures of a rose in the dark. One is quite black; for

the rose is invisible. In the other, it is painted in full detail and

surrounded by black. Is one of them right, the other wrong? Don't

we talk of a white rose in the dark and of a red rose in the dark? And

don't we say for all that that they can't be distinguished in the dark?’

if one rose is invisible – where do you get two roses?

and if both roses are in the dark – and the dark is such that you can’t see anything –

where do you get two roses?

if there are two pictures of roses and you can see the pictures – and the roses in the pictures are of different colour –

then they will be distinguishable by their colour – if not by some details in the pictures

no two roses are the same

you can have a picture of a rose that is duplicated

then you have two pictures

516. ‘It seems clear that we understand the meaning of the question:

"Does the sequence 7777 occur in the development of p ?" It is

an English sentence; it can be shewn what it means for 415 to occur

in the development of TT ; and similar things. Well, our understanding

of that question reaches just so far, one may say, as such explanations

reach.’

an explanation – any explanatory proposal – will ‘reach just so far’ as our questions go – just so far as we are prepared to doubt – and just so far as we are prepared to explore the uncertainty of that explanation / proposal

just how far you are prepared to go  – is not a logical matter – it is a contingent matter

the logic of the situation – is that any proposal – any explanatory proposal – is open

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any explanation is uncertain

517. ‘The question arises: Can't we be mistaken in thinking that

we understand a question?

For many mathematical proofs do lead us to say that we cannot

imagine something which we believed we could imagine. (E.g., the

construction of the heptagon.) They lead us to revise what counts as

the domain of the imaginable.’

‘The question arises: Can't we be mistaken in thinking that we understand a question?’

any response to a question – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

and any so called ‘mistake’ – is in the same boat

‘For many mathematical proofs do lead us to say that we cannot imagine something which we believed we could imagine. (E.g., the construction of the heptagon.) They lead us to revise what counts as the domain of the imaginable.’

so called ‘mathematical proofs’ – are rule-governed propositional games

any such games do not bare on the imaginable

518. ‘Socrates to Theaetetus: "And if someone thinks mustn't he

think something?"—Th: "Yes, he must."—Soc.: "And if he thinks

something, mustn't it be something real?"—Th.: "Apparently."

And mustn't someone who is painting be painting something—and

someone who is painting something be painting something real!—

Well, tell me what the object of painting is: the picture of a man (e.g.),

or the man that the picture portrays?’

anything anyone does – at any time – is real

the object of the painting – is open to question

519. ‘One wants to say that an order is a picture of the action

which was carried out on the order; but also that it is a picture of the

action which is to be carried out on the order.’

an order is a proposal –

any description of an order is a proposal

the order and any description of the order –

are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

520. ‘"If a proposition too is conceived as a picture of a possible

state of affairs and is said to shew the possibility of the state of affairs,

still the most that the proposition can do is what a painting or relief

or film does: and so it can at any rate not set forth what is

not the case. So does it depend wholly on our grammar what will be

called (logically) possible and what not,—i.e. what that grammar

permits?"—But surely that is arbitrary!—Is it arbitrary?—It is not

every sentence-like formation that we know how to do something with,

not every technique has an application in our life; and when we are

tempted in philosophy to count some quite useless thing as a proposition,

that is often because we have not considered its application

sufficiently.’

‘the possibility of the state of affairs’

the proposition is a proposal – what the proposition shows – is open to question

our grammar – any grammar – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to application –

any application is a proposal

and what is seen as useless in one propositional context – may well be regarded as useful in another

utility is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain

521. ‘Compare 'logically possible' with 'chemically possible'. One

might perhaps call a combination chemically possible if a formula

with the right valencies existed (e.g. H-O-O-O-H). Of course

such a combination need not exist; but even the formula HO2 cannot

have less than no combination corresponding to it in reality.’

what is logically possible – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what is chemically possible – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to HO2 –

the formula – is a proposal – and one that has function and use –

and as with any formula – is open to question – open to doubt – and from a logical point of view – uncertain

522. ‘If we compare a proposition to a picture, we must think

whether we are comparing it to a portrait (a historical representation)

or to a genre-picture. And both comparisons have point.

When I look at a genre-picture, it 'tells' me something, even though

I don't believe (imagine) for a moment that the people I see in it really

exist, or that there have really been people in that situation. But

suppose I ask: "What does it tell me, then?"’

comparing a proposition – to a picture –

is to compare two propositions – two propositions of different form

what does a genre picture tell you?

there just isn’t any ‘objective’ as in clear-cut answer to this question –

you will get different answers from different people

and whatever answer is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

523. ‘I should like to say "What the picture tells me is itself.

"That is, its telling me something consists in its own structure, in its

own lines and colours. (What would it mean to say "What this musical

theme tells me is itself"?)’

well – the picture – is a picture – yes

and a musical theme is a musical theme

‘in itself’ – tells you nothing

whatever the picture – or the musical theme – or any other proposal for that matter – tells you – or anybody else –

whatever that amounts to –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

524. ‘Don't take it as a matter of course, but as a remarkable fact,

that pictures and fictitious narratives give us pleasure, occupy our

minds.

("Don't take it as a matter of course" means: find it surprising,

as you do some things which disturb you. Then the puzzling aspect

of the latter will disappear, by your accepting this fact as you do the

other.)

((The transition from patent nonsense to something which is

disguised nonsense.))’

‘patent nonsense to disguised nonsense’

this strikes me as patent – undisguised – pretentiousness on Wittgenstein’s part

who is he to pontificate on nonsense?

any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

putting that a proposal is nonsense – is itself a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

525. ‘"After he had said this, he left her as he did the day before."

—Do I understand this sentence? Do I understand it just as I should

if I heard it in the course of a narrative? If it were set down in isolation

"I should say, I don't know what it's about. But all the same I should

know how this sentence might perhaps be used; I could myself invent

a context for it.

(A multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words in every

direction.)’

                                                                                                                                        yes – exactly –

a multitude of familiar – and unfamiliar paths lead off from these words in every direction –

when the words are put to question – when they are put to doubt – and when their uncertainty is explored

526. ‘What does it mean to understand a picture, a drawing?

Here too there is understanding and failure to understand. And here

too these expressions may mean various kinds of thing. A picture is

perhaps a still-life; but I don't understand one part of it: I cannot

see solid objects there, but only patches of colour on the canvas.—

Or I see everything as solid but there are objects that I am not

acquainted with (they look like implements, but I don't know their

use).—Perhaps, however, I am acquainted with the objects, but

in another sense do not understand the way they are arranged.’

a picture is a proposal – a drawing is a proposal –

to understand a picture / proposal – a drawing / proposal – is not just to have an understanding –

it is to have a critical understanding –

and that is to put the picture / proposal – the drawing / proposal – to question – to doubt – and to explore its uncertainty –

it is to be able to see different interpretations – and to critically evaluate them

there is no failure to understand –

any understanding is logically valid – even if it is an understanding that you are not happy with –

 ‘but I don’t understand one part of it’ – is only to say – the ‘part of it’ – in the propositional context of the picture – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

being uncertain – is to understand

527. ‘Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding

a theme in music than one may think. What I mean is that understanding

a sentence lies nearer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called

understanding a musical theme. Why is just this the pattern of variation

in loudness and tempo? One would like to say "Because I know

what it's all about." But what is it all about? I should not be able to

say. In order to 'explain' I could only compare it with something else

which has the same rhythm (I mean the same pattern). (One says

"Don't you see, this is as if a conclusion were being drawn" or "This

is as it were a parenthesis", etc. How does one justify such

comparisons?—There are very different kinds of justification here.)’

understanding a sentence – a proposal – is putting the sentence / proposal to question to doubt – and exploring its uncertainty

and yes – exactly the same critical approach is what is required for understanding a musical theme

and yes – there can be comparison of a sentence to a musical theme – or via versa

and whatever comes out of such a comparison – whatever that proposal may be –

from a logical point of view – that proposal will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

from a logical point of view – there is no issue of justification here

justification is not a concept of logic

justification is rhetoric

528. ‘It would be possible to imagine people who had something

not quite unlike a language: a play of sounds, without vocabulary or

grammar. ('Speaking with tongues.')’

a play of sounds – without vocabulary or grammar – speaking in tongues?

proposals – primitive proposals – and possibly – propositional systems –

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

529. ‘"But what would the meaning of the sounds be in such

a case?"—What is it in music? Though I don't at all wish to say

that this language of a play of sounds would have to be compared

to music.’

‘what would be the meaning of the sounds be in such a case?’

the sounds are proposals

and any proposal regarding the meaning of the sounds  – will be open to question – open to doubt – and will be uncertain

and as to the meaning of music –

this too is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

530. ‘There might also be a language in whose use the 'soul' of the

words played no part. In which, for example, we had no objection to

replacing one word by another arbitrary one of our own invention.’

words have no ‘soul’ – they have uses and functions

and as for ‘replacing one word by another arbitrary one of our own invention’ –

this is what poets – for one – do all the time –

all to the service of – use and function

531. ‘We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it

can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense

in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one

musical theme can be replaced by another.)

In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common

to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only

by these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.)’

you replace one sentence with another – to say something different

you can replace a musical theme with another – but then you have two different themes

when you understand a poem – you put the poem as proposed – to question – to doubt

and explore its uncertainty

532. ‘Then has "understanding" two different meanings here?—I

would rather say that these kinds of use of "understanding" make up

its meaning, make up my concept of understanding.

For I want to apply the word "understanding" to all this.’

to understand – to understand any proposal –

is to put it to question – to doubt – and to explore its uncertainty

533. ‘But in the second case how can one explain the expression,

transmit one's comprehension? Ask yourself: How does one lead

anyone to comprehension of a poem or of a theme? The answer to

this tells us how meaning is explained here.’

‘But in the second case how can one explain the expression, transmit one's comprehension?

what one does is propose –

and if an explanation is called for – what one does is propose in relation to the original proposal

‘How does one lead anyone to comprehension of a poem or of a theme?’

you ‘lead’ with your proposal

your proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

as is anyone’s comprehension of your proposal –

the meaning of a proposal – put – or received / comprehended – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

534. ‘Hearing a word in a particular sense. How queer that there

should be such a thing!

Phrased like this, emphasized like this, heard in this way, this sentence

is the first of a series in which a transition is made to these sentences,

pictures, actions.

((A multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words in every

direction.))’

yes – and if you look at the matter critically – you may also discover a multitude of unfamiliar paths

535. ‘What happens when we learn to feel the ending of a church

mode as an ending?’

to feel – is to propose

if we feel the ending of a church mode as an ending – we propose an ending –

and what happens when we propose?

that – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

536. ‘I say: "I can think of this face (which gives an impression of

timidity) as courageous too." We do not mean by this that I can

imagine someone with this face perhaps saving someone's life (that,

of course, is imaginable in connexion with any face). I am speaking

rather of an aspect of the face itself. Nor do I mean that I can imagine

that this man's face might change so that, in the ordinary sense, it looked

courageous; though I may very well mean that there is a quite definite

way in which it can change into a courageous face. The reinterpretation

of a facial expression can be compared to the reinterpretation

of a chord in music, when we hear it as a modulation first into this,

then into that key.’

reinterpretation is a critical activity –

imaging someone with this face perhaps saving someone’s life –

here the reinterpretation of the face is a critical action –

where the proposal of the face – the proposition of the face – is proposed in a new or different propositional context

and where we might imagine that the man’s face might change into a courageous face

we propose a different propositional context for the proposal of the face

‘the reinterpretation of a chord in music, when we hear it as a modulation first into this, then into that key.’

when we hear a modulation – from a logical point of view what happens is – a new or different propositional context for the chord is put – is proposed –

to understand this – as proposed – to hear it properly – as it were –

we need to understand that the chord – as with any proposal – is from a logical point of view – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

that is to say – we have to understand the critical possibilities of the proposed chord –

hearing is a critical activity

537. ‘It is possible to say "I read timidity in this face" but at all

events the timidity does not seem to be merely associated, outwardly

connected, with the face; but fear is there, alive, in the features. If the

features change slightly, we can speak of a corresponding change in the

fear. If we were asked "Can you think of this face as an expression of

courage too?"—we should, as it were, not know how to lodge courage

in these features. Then perhaps I say "I don't know what it would

mean for this to be a courageous face." But what would an answer to

such a question be like? Perhaps one says: "Yes, now I understand:

the face as it were shews indifference to the outer world." So we

have somehow read courage into the face. Now once more, one might

say, courage fits this face. But what fits what here?’

‘I read timidity in this face’ –

if I ‘read timidity into his face’ – I am dealing with a proposal – his face – and proposing in relation to it – proposing that it expresses timidity –

my proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

someone else may well say – no – you got that wrong – his face does not express timidity – you have misinterpreted his face

"Can you think of this face as an expression of courage too?"—we should, as it were, not know how to lodge courage in these features. Then perhaps I say "I don't know what it would mean for this to be a courageous face." But what would an answer to

such a question be like?’

an answer to such a question – if you have an answer – is a proposal –

an interpretative / imaginative proposal  – where the face / proposal is seen – reinterpreted – as expressing courage –

presumably you would have to imaginatively redesign the face in question – in line with some model you have of what you regard as exhibiting courage –

easier said than done

making a drawing might be a good way of getting into it

and a way too of putting your proposal to question – to doubt – and of just exploring the very uncertainty of such an exercise

for it is likely that you would have to make a number of sketches to get at what you think represents an expression of courage in the face in question

and after some trial and error – you may be satisfied – or you may decide – you have not so far been successful

‘Now once more, one might say, courage fits this face. But what fits what here?’

a proposal fits a proposal – is what fits what here –

which is to say one proposal reinterprets another

and just whether the interpretive proposal – ‘fits the bill’ – has function – is useful –

will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

538. ‘There is a related case (though perhaps it will not seem so)

when, for example, we (Germans) are surprised that in French the

predicative adjective agrees with the substantive in gender, and when

we explain it to ourselves by saying: they mean: "the man is a good

one.”’

a proposal – a proposition – given an interpretation

an interpretation – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

539. ‘I see a picture which represents a smiling face. What do I

do if I take the smile now as a kind one, now as malicious? Don't I

often imagine it with a spatial and temporal context which is one

either of kindness or malice? Thus I might supply the picture with the

fancy that the smiler was smiling down on a child at play, or again on

the suffering of an enemy.

This is in no way altered by the fact that I can also take the at first

sight gracious situation and interpret it differently by putting it into a

wider context.—If no special circumstances reverse my interpretation

I shall conceive a particular smile as kind, call it a "kind" one, react

correspondingly.

((Probability, frequency.))’

yes – this is a good representation of the matter –

a kind one – now a malicious one?

different proposals – different propositional interpretations

what you have to begin with is a proposal – the smile – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and in response to this proposal – to its uncertainty – to its logical possibilities  – different proposals – interpretations –

interpretations – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

we propose / interpret – and in so doing we may well propose context

and if a new or different  interpretation – is put – this may well involve proposing a new or different propositional context

propositional uncertainty is the ground and engine of propositional action – of propositional vitality

it is the ground of conscious life

540. ‘"Isn't it very odd that I should be unable—even without the

institution of language and all its surroundings—to think that it will

soon stop raining?"—Do you want to say that it is queer that you

should be unable to say these words and mean them without those

surroundings?

Suppose someone were to point at the sky and come out with a

number of unintelligible words. When we ask him what he means

he explains that the words mean "Thank heaven, it'll soon stop

raining." He even explains to us the meaning of the individual words.

—I will suppose him suddenly to come to himself and say that the

sentence was completely senseless, but that when he spoke it it

had seemed to him like a sentence in a language he knew. (Positively

like a familiar quotation.)—What am I to say now? Didn't he

understand the sentence as he was saying it? Wasn't the whole

meaning there in the sentence?’

to think is to propose –

a thought or thinking – can remain private – or can be made public –

the question is not whether you can think without language – but rather can you think without proposing?

the answer is no

to use language is to propose

can you use language and mean what you say – without proposing?

no

‘the institutions of language and all its surroundings’ – is propositional use – and propositional context

we always propose in some propositional context – whether the context is stated or not –

just what that propositional context is – and how it is to be understood – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

in the case of the person who points at the sky and comes out with a number of unintelligible words – which he goes on to explain means – ‘it will soon stop raining’

that person has put a proposal – a proposal open to interpretation

and as Wittgenstein has makes clear in his discussion on this point –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

541. ‘But what did his understanding, and the meaning, consist in?

He uttered the sounds in a cheerful voice perhaps, pointing to the

sky, while it was still raining but was already beginning to clear

up; later he made a connexion between his words and the English

words.’

‘But what did his understanding, and the meaning, consist in?

any answer to this question – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

542. "But the point is, the words felt to him like the words of a

language he knew well."—Yes: a criterion for that is that he later said

just that. And now do not say: "The feel of the words in a language we

know is of a quite particular kind." (What is the expression of this

feeling?)’

‘(What is the expression of this feeling?)’

the expression ‘of this feeling’ – is a proposal –

and whatever that proposal – whatever it might be – and amount to –

from a logical point of view – it is open to question – open to doubt – and is –

uncertain

543. ‘‘Can I not say: a cry, a laugh, are full of meaning?’

And that means, roughly: much can be gathered from them.’

‘Can I not say: a cry, a laugh, are full of meaning?’

of course you can say this – propose this

‘And that means, roughly: much can be gathered from them.’

and if that is what you propose – fair enough

logically speaking though – these proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

544. ‘When longing makes me cry "Oh, if only he would come!"

the feeling gives the words 'meaning'. But does it give the individual

words their meanings?

But here one could also say that the feeling gave the words truth.

And from this you can see how the concepts merge here. (This recalls the

question: what is the meaning of a mathematical proposition?)’

‘When longing makes me cry "Oh, if only he would come!" the feeling gives the words 'meaning'. But does it give the individual words their meanings?’

‘Oh, if only he would come!’ – a proposal – in the form of an exclamation –

and is – as with any proposal – from a logical point of view – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

Wittgenstein in critically evaluating this proposal puts that – ‘the feeling gives the words meaning’

now this proposal – as with the initial proposal – is open to question

if the feeling gives the words meaning – and the feeling here is one of longing –

does this mean the words have no meaning without this – or some feeling?

what Wittgenstein calls ‘feeling’ – I call ‘propositional context’

my point is that the words themselves will have no meaning – without a propositional context – be that made explicit – or be it assumed

this is not to say that those who hear the words spoken – are guaranteed to get the propositional context of the speaker

perhaps they will if the propositional context is indicated in gesture – but maybe not

the reality is – we propose context for the propositions put to us

and further that the propositions – and any proposed context – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘But here one could also say that the feeling gave the words truth.’

is to say that a propositional context gives a proposition truth – makes it true

a true proposition is one that is affirmed – for whatever reason

and a true propositional context – is a propositional context – affirmed – for whatever reason –

any proposal of affirmation – (or denial) – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

that is to say – any claim of truth – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘(This recalls the question: what is the meaning of a mathematical proposition?)’

again context is relevant here

the logical context of mathematical propositions is the game – the propositional game

the propositional game is a rule-governed propositional action

mathematical propositions are rule-governed

mathematical propositions are tokens in mathematical / rule-governed games

do we really say a game has meaning?

or is it just that that the game has rules – and you play the game –

and play in accordance with rules?

I think so

545. ‘But when one says "I hope he'll come"—doesn't the feeling

give the word "hope" its meaning? (And what about the sentence

"I do not hope for his coming any longer"?) The feeling does perhaps

give the word "hope" its special ring; that is, it is expressed in that

ring.—If the feeling gives the word its meaning, then here "meaning"

means point. But why is the feeling the point?

Is hope a feeling? (Characteristic marks.)’

what Wittgenstein calls ‘feeling’ here – I call ‘a propositional context’

and the point is – a proposal – will have significance – will have function – in terms of whatever propositional context it is given

different propositional contexts can be put to give a proposal significance – and function

and any propositional context proposed – as with any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘hope’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

546. ‘In this way I should like to say the words "Oh, let him

cornel" are charged with my desire. And words can be wrung from

us,—like a cry. Words can be hard to say: such, for example, as are

used to effect a renunciation, or to confess a weakness. (Words are

also deeds.)’

‘charged with my desire’ – is a propositional context –

a propositional context – one among many possible – that give the proposal – the proposition – "Oh, let him cornel" – significance and function –

in this case to the speaker – but it may well be communicated to others who witness the proposal –

and it is possible that while the speaker understands his proposal – as ‘charged with desire’ – others may have a different reading – and understand the proposal in terms of different propositional contexts

the proposal itself – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

which is to say – propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

words are proposals – deeds are proposals

547. ‘Negation: a 'mental activity'. Negate something and observe

what you are doing.—Do you perhaps inwardly shake your head? And

if you do—is this process more deserving of our interest than, say,

that of writing a sign of negation in a sentence? Do you now know

the essence of negation?’

a proposal – a proposition is put –

it can be assented to or dissented from

if you dissent from a proposition – yes – you can shake your head – you can write a sign of negation – to indicate dissent –

negation is a propositional action

the point of dissent – of negation –

is that – for whatever reason – you do not proceed with that proposition

and the decision not to proceed – is to propose in relation to the proposition in question

and any proposal of dissent – as indeed any proposal of assent – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

548. ‘What is the difference between the two processes: wishing that

something should happen—and wishing that the same thing should not

happen?

If we want to represent it pictorially, we shall treat the picture of the

event in various ways: cross it out, put a line round it, and so on. But

this strikes us as a crude method of expression. In word-language

indeed we use the sign "not". But this is like a clumsy expedient.

We think that in thought it is arranged differently.’

‘What is the difference between the two processes: wishing that something should happen—and wishing that the same thing should not happen?’

to wish is to propose – it is to propose what you want – to propose what you want in the future

wishing that something will happen – is to want a future state of affairs to eventuate

wishing that something will not happen – is to want that a future state of affairs will not eventuate

the difference between these proposal – is that they propose different states of affairs

there is no logical difference between these two proposals –

they are both open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘If we want to represent it pictorially, we shall treat the picture of the event in various ways: cross it out, put a line round it, and so on. But this strikes us as a crude method of expression. In word-language indeed we use the sign "not". But this is like a clumsy expedient. We think that in thought it is arranged differently.’

how you propose that you want that a state of affairs will not occur – makes no logical difference

and how it is ‘arranged in thought’ – is open to question open to doubt – and uncertain

549. ‘"How can the word 'not' negate?"—"The sign 'not' indicates

that you are to take what follows negatively." We should like to say:

The sign of negation is our occasion for doing something—possibly

something very complicated. It is as if the negation-sign occasioned

our doing something. But what? That is not said. It is as if it only

needed to be hinted at; as if we already knew. As if no explanation

were needed, for we are in any case already acquainted with the

matter.’

we have a logical choice to accept or deny – we use the word ‘not’ as a sign of denial – of non-acceptance –

any such proposal of denial – of non-acceptance – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

550. ‘Negation, one might say, is a gesture of exclusion, of rejection.

But such a gesture is used in a great variety of cases!’

negation is the propositional action of denial –

any proposal – of any form – in any context – can affirmed – can be denied – can be left undecided

and any proposal affirmed – denied – or undecided – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

551. "Does the same negation occur in: 'Iron does not melt at a

hundred degrees Centigrade' and 'Twice two is not five'?" Is this to

be decided by introspection; by trying to see what we are thinking

as we utter the two sentences?’

‘Iron does not melt at a hundred degrees Centigrade’ –

is the proposition – ‘Iron does melt at a hundred degrees Centigrade’ – denied

‘Twice two is not five’ –

is the proposition – ‘Twice two is five’ – denied –

denial is a propositional action –

when a proposition is denied – we decide not to proceed with it

any such propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what form the propositional action of denial takes – is logically irrelevant

552. ‘Suppose I were to ask: is it clear to us, while we are uttering

the sentences "This rod is one yard long" and "Here is one soldier",

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(a) "The fact that three negatives yield a negative again must

already be contained in the single negative that I am using now."

(The temptation to invent a myth of 'meaning'.)

It looks as if it followed from the nature of negation that a double

negative is an affirmative. (And there is something right about this.

What? Our nature is connected with both.)

(b) There cannot be a question whether these or other rules are

the correct ones for the use of "not". (I mean, whether they accord

with its meaning.) For without these rules the word has as yet no

meaning; and if we change the rules, it now has another meaning (or

none), and in that case we may just as well change the word too.

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that we mean different things by "one", that "one" has different

meanings?—Not at all.—Say e.g. such a sentence as "One yard is

occupied by one soldier, and so two yards are occupied by two

soldiers." Asked "Do you mean the same thing by both 'ones'?"

one would perhaps answer: "Of course I mean the same thing: one!"

(Perhaps raising one finger.)’

when you say – ‘this rod is one yard long’ and ‘here is one soldier’ – ‘of course I mean the same thing by one’ –

what you do is take ‘one’ out of its proposed context(s) – and place it in a different  logical / propositional context

the different logical context here is the mathematical context –

the mathematical context is a rule-governed propositional context

and in this context – ‘one’ has a rule-governed signification and function

in a non-game context –‘one’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in ordinary usage – we may combine or conflate logical contexts or forms

that is as it is – the point is though – different logical contexts – different logical forms – have different logical bases and different logical analyses

as to (a) –

that three negatives yield a negative – or that a double negative is an affirmation –

are rule-governed games – rule-governed game plays

and yes – it is of our nature to construct games – and to play games

as to (b) –

if you play a game – you play in accordance with its rules –

if you don’t play in accordance with its rules – there is no game

if you change the rules – you play a different game –

and if you change the words in a propositional game – you change the tokens of play

553. ‘Now has "ı" a different meaning when it stands for a measure

and when it stands for a number? If the question is framed in this

way, one will answer in the affirmative.’

‘ı’ – is a proposal

what we have here is a question – a doubt – an uncertainty – regarding the use of this proposal –

and the reason for this – is that the sign ‘ı’ is used in different propositional contexts

‘ı’ – here – has different propositional uses

you can fall back on a one fits all definition of ‘ı’ –

and that will probably function ok –

however the logical reality is that any proposal – the use of any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

554. ‘We can easily imagine human beings with a 'more primitive'

logic, in which something corresponding to our negation is applied

only to certain sorts of sentence; perhaps to such as do not themselves

contain any negation. It would be possible to negate the proposition

"He is going into the house", but a negation of the negative proposition

would be meaningless, or would count only as a repetition of the

negation. Think of means of expressing negation different from ours

:by the pitch of one's voice, for instance. What would a double negation

be like there?’

a proposal of any form – can be affirmed or denied

so Wittgenstein’s little game here – of a more ‘primitive logic’ – in which negation is only applied to a certain sort of sentence – a certain sort of proposal – makes no sense in the context of functioning human beings

in some artificial game – perhaps

and the propositional actions of affirmation and denial – can take any number of forms – the pitch of one’s voice might be one expression of denial

as to the double negative being expressed via pitch – that too might have expression in the form of pitch

however negation is proposed – and whatever form the proposal takes – it will only have significance – it will only have effect – if the form – be it standard – or non-standard – is recognised and understood as expressing / proposing negation

555. ‘The question whether negation had the same meaning to these

people as to us would be analogous to the question whether the figure

"5" meant the same to people whose numbers ended at 5 as to us.’

‘The question whether negation had the same meaning to these people …’

the negation sign ‘~’ – might well have a different meaning to different people – to different cultures –

however the logical action it represents – or if not it – some other sign – is no more than a representation of the propositional action of dissent –

this action in whatever form it takes – is one of three basic logical responses to any proposal – to any proposition

when a proposal is put – we can affirm it – deny it – or leave it undecided

‘… whether the figure "5" meant the same to people whose numbers ended at 5 as to us.’

here you are talking about two different propositional games

tokens in a game – the action of tokens in a game – in any game – are rule-governed

‘meaning’ is not rule-governed

556. ‘Imagine a language with two different words for negation,

"X" and "Y". Doubling "X" yields an affirmative, doubling "Y"

a strengthened negative. For the rest the two words are used alike.—

Now have "X" and "Y" the same meaning in sentences where they

occur without being repeated?—We could give various answers to

this.

(a) The two words have different uses. So they have different

meanings. But sentences in which they occur without being repeated

and which for the rest are the same make the same sense.

(b) The two words have the same function in language-games,

except for this one difference, which is just a trivial convention. The

use of the two words is taught in the same way, by means of the same

actions, gestures, pictures and so on; and in explanations of the words

the difference in the ways they are used is appended as something

incidental, as one of the capricious features of the language. For this

reason we shall say that "X" and "Y" have the same meaning.

(c) We connect different images with the two negatives. "X" as it

turns the sense through 180°. And that is why two such negatives

restore the sense to its former position. "Y" is like a shake of the

head. And just as one does not annul a shake of the head by shaking

it again, so also one doesn't cancel one "Y" by a second one. And so

even if, practically speaking, sentences with the two signs of negation

come to the same thing, still "X" and "Y" express different ideas.’

‘Imagine a language with two different words for negation, "X" and "Y". Doubling

"X" yields an affirmative, doubling "Y" a strengthened negative.’

doubling “Y’ – ‘strengthening a negative’?

in logic there is no ‘strengthening’ a negative – a negative is a negative

any so called strengthening here is not logical – it is rhetorical

‘Now have "X" and "Y" the same meaning in sentences where they occur without being repeated?—We could give various answers to this.’

do they have the same ‘meaning’ – that is function?

yes – they are different signs for the same logical / propositional / action

and that you have two signs for the one logical action – means your logical system is overblown with redundancy – it’s flabby

‘(a) The two words have different uses. So they have different meanings. But sentences in which they occur without being repeated and which for the rest are the same make the same sense.’

the two words do not have different uses – they have the same use

‘X’ – is not ‘X’ doubled – ‘Y’ is not ‘Y’ doubled

‘X’ doubled – has a different logical function to ‘Y’ doubled

‘… the difference in the ways they are used is appended as something incidental, as one of the capricious features of the language. For this reason we shall say that "X" and "Y" have the same meaning.’

correct

‘And so even if, practically speaking, sentences with the two signs of negation come to the same thing, still "X" and "Y" express different ideas.’

‘X’ – and I am not talking about ‘XX’ – and ‘Y’ and not ‘YY” – do not express different ideas at all –

they express the same propositional action – negation

557. ‘Now, when I uttered the double negation, what constituted my

meaning it as a strengthened negative and not as an affirmative?

There is no answer running: "It consisted in the fact that ....."

In certain circumstances instead of saying "This duplication is meant

as a strengthening," I can pronounce it as a strengthening. Instead of

saying "The duplication of the negative is meant to cancel it" I can

e.g. put brackets.—"Yes, but after all these brackets may themselves

have various roles; for who says that they are to be taken as brackets”?

"No one does. And haven't you explained your own conception in

turn by means of words? The meaning of the brackets lies in the

technique of applying them. The question is: under what circumstances

does it make sense to say "I meant . . . .", and what circumstances

justify me in saying "He meant . . . ."?’

‘The question is: under what circumstances does it make sense to say "I meant . . . .", and what circumstances justify me in saying "He meant . . . ."?’

saying ‘I meant’ – could be a preface to an explanatory proposal – in response to a question – a doubt – an uncertainty – regarding my original proposal

saying ‘He meant’ – could be a preface to an explanatory proposal – in response to a question – a doubt – an uncertainty – regarding his original proposal

558. ‘What does it mean to say that the "is" in "The rose is red"

has a different meaning from the "is" in "twice two is four"? If it is

answered that it means that different rules are valid for these two

words, we can say that we have only one word here.—And if all I am

attending to is grammatical rules, these do allow the use of the word

"is" in both connexions.—But the rule which shews that the word

"is" has different meanings in these sentences is the one allowing us

to replace the word "is" in the second sentence by the sign of equality,

and forbidding this substitution in the first sentence.’

the ‘is’ in ‘the rose is red’ – is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘twice two is four’ – is a word representation of a rule-governed propositional / mathematical game

the ‘is’ in this game signifies equality –

and the equality game – represented formally by ‘=’ – is a game of substitution – i.e. ‘twice two’ is equal to – can be substituted for – ‘four’

the ‘is’ in ‘the rose is red’ – is not rule-governed

the ‘is’ in ‘twice two is four’ – is rule-governed – and if you play this game – you play in accordance with its rule – and as played – the game – and its rule are not open to question

what you have with ‘the rose is red’ and ‘twice two is four’ – is propositional representations of the two propositional forms – the critical form – and the game form

one reason for mathematical symbolism – i.e. ‘2 x 2 = 4’ – is to make clear and precise the difference between these two forms –

and thus to avoid the question of the apparent ambiguity of ‘is’ – the ambiguity that Wittgenstein here explores

559. ‘One would like to speak of the function of a word in this

sentence. As if the sentence were a mechanism in which the word

had a particular function. But what does this function consist in?

How does it come to light? For there isn't anything hidden—don't

we see the whole sentence? The function must come out in operating

with the word. ((Meaning-body.))’

you can propose a ‘mechanical view’ of the sentence – and a ‘functional analysis’ of the word –

any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

now saying that the function of a word comes out in the operating of the word – strikes me as just saying – the function is the operation – or the operation is the function –

I don’t see that calling a function an operation – or visa versa – is to advance the analysis at all –

you may as well just talk about the ‘function’ – or just talk about the ‘operation’ –

‘function’ doesn’t add anything to ‘operation’ – and ‘operation’ doesn’t add anything to ‘function’ –

and as to any proposal regarding how the function – operation – or use – of a word – ‘comes out’ –

any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

560. ‘"The meaning of a word is what is explained by the explanation

of the meaning." I.e.: if you want to understand the use of the

word "meaning", look for what are called "explanations of meaning".’

‘"The meaning of a word is what is explained by the explanation of the meaning."’

the word is a proposal – the explanation of the meaning of the word – is a proposal

a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the proposal / ‘explanation’ – of meaning is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain-

meaning is uncertain

561. ‘Now isn't it queer that I say that the word "is" is used with

two different meanings (as the copula and as the sign of equality),

and should not care to say that its meaning is its use; its use, that is,

as the copula and the sign of equality?

One would like to say that these two kinds of use do not yield a

single meaning; the union under one head is an accident, a mere

inessential.’

words are used – this is no great revelation

if the question is one of meaning

saying that the meaning is the use – really knocks out the question of meaning –

all you have is use –

so the idea of meaning as use – really takes us nowhere

in a sense it is an analytic argument – just a play of words

the question of meaning – is still there

and any proposal of meaning – any theory of meaning – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

what we deal with here is propositional uncertainty

and given that – you have the option to explore it –

and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

is all that meaning can be – is what meaning is

562. ‘But how can I decide what is an essential, and what an inessential,

accidental, feature of the notation? Is there some reality lying

behind the notation, which shapes its grammar?

Let us think of a similar case in a game: in draughts a king is marked

by putting one piece on top of another. Now won't one say it is

inessential to the game for a king to consist of two pieces?’

notation is proposal –

and whether its features are described as ‘essential’ or ‘in-essential’ – is not logically relevant –

its ‘features’ – however proposed – are open to question – open to doubt and are uncertain

‘Is there some reality lying behind the notation, which shapes its grammar?’ –

such can be proposed

and presumably someone would put such a proposal – if it served their purpose

and any such proposal – as with notation itself – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

in the case of a game – the features – the tokens of the game – their structure – relation and function – are rule-governed

here – again – the essential / inessential distinction is irrelevant

in the game of draughts – the king is marked by putting one piece on another – that is the rule

a game where the king is not one piece on another – is not draughts

563. ‘Let us say that the meaning of a piece is its role in the game.—Now let it be decided by lot which of the players gets white before any game of chess begins. To this end one player holds a king in each closed fist while the other chooses one of the two hands at random.

Will it be counted as part of the role of the king in chess that it is used to draw lots in this way?’

‘Let us say that the meaning of a piece is its role in the game.’

the ‘meaning’ of a piece’ – is the rule that governs its function – its play

‘Will it be counted as part of the role of the king in chess that it is used to draw lots in this way?’’

no – ‘drawing lots in this way’ – is a separate game – to the game of chess –

it may well be a game played as a prelude to chess – but it is a different game to the game of chess

564. ‘So I am inclined to distinguish between the essential and the

inessential in a game too. The game, one would like to say, has not

only rules but also a point.’

a game is a rule-governed propositional action –

if you play the game you play in accordance with its rules

once you understand that a game is a rule-governed propositional action –

this essential / inessential distinction category or description has no relevance

the point of the game is its play

its play is rule-governed

if you don’t understand this – you don’t understand the logic of the game – the nature of the game –

you don’t understand the game

565. ‘Why the same word? In the calculus we make no use of this

identity!—Why the same piece for both purposes?—But what does it

mean here to speak of "making use of the identity"? For isn't it a

use, if we do in fact use the same word?’

‘Why the same word?’

it really doesn’t matter why – the issue is to recognise different usages

‘In the calculus we make no use of this identity!’

we make no use of this identity in the calculus – because it has no use in the calculus

the logical reality here is that it is not the word – but the propositional form – in which the word occurs that is relevant – that is logically significant –

if the word is used in a critical propositional context – the word is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in the a propositional game context – the word is not open to question – the word is rule-governed

‘But what does it mean here to speak of "making use of the identity"? For isn't it a

use, if we do in fact use the same word?’

we make use of this identity – in this kind of discussion – a philosophical discussion –

where the question is how to distinguish and understand different uses of the one word

566. ‘And now it looks as if the use of the same word or the same

piece, had a purpose—if the identity is not accidental, inessential. And

as if the purpose were that one should be able to recognize the piece

and know how to play.—Are we talking about a physical or a logical

possibility here? If the latter then the identity of the piece is something

to do with the game.’

the ‘identity’ here – is logically irrelevant

what is logically relevant is recognizing that the word can be used in a critical context

or in a game context

the piece – or the ‘identity of the piece’ – as in the king in draughts – only has significance in the game context – a rule-governed propositional context –

our propositional life falls into two propositional modes –

the critical mode where a proposal – be it a word – a piece – or whatever – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and the game mode – where we deal with rule-governed propositional actions

when we play these games – be they games of formal logic – or games of draughts – or whatever else –

in play – the rules that determine the game – are not open to question

if you play – you play in accordance with the rules –

if you don’t play in accordance with the rules – you don’t play the game –

if you question the game – or the rules – or the tokens of the game – you are not playing the game – you are engaged in a critical activity

you can question – and you can play –

but questioning is not play – play is not questioning

567. ‘But, after all, the game is supposed to be defined by the rules!

So, if a rule of the game prescribes that the kings are to be used for

drawing lots before a game of chess, then that is an essential part of

the game. What objection might one make to this? That one does not

see the point of this prescription. Perhaps as one wouldn't see the point

either of a rule by which each piece had to be turned round three times

before one moved it. If we found this rule in a board-game we should

be surprised and should speculate about the purpose of the rule.

("Was this prescription meant to prevent one from moving without

due consideration?")’

‘But, after all, the game is supposed to be defined by the rules! So, if a rule of the game prescribes that the kings are to be used for drawing lots before a game of chess, then that is an essential part of the game. What objection might one make to this?’

if you are talking about a rule-governed propositional action – that is – a game – there is no place for objection

in a non-game context – a critical context – any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

in the game mode – the point just is to follow the rules of the game

the game is designed as it is –

if you redesign it – you have a different game

and if you ‘don’t like’ the rule – ‘don’t like’ the game – don’t play it

‘That one does not see the point of this prescription. Perhaps as one wouldn't see the point either of a rule by which each piece had to be turned round three times before one moved it.’

the rule determines the game – determines the play –

what is the point of play?

the point of play is play – isn’t it?

and what is play?

as I see it – play is relief from critical activity – the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

‘If we found this rule in a board-game we should be surprised and should speculate about the purpose of the rule.’

the purpose of the rule – of any rule – is the game – without the rule there is no game 

and if there is no game – there is no play

568. ‘If I understand the character of the game aright—I might

say—then this isn't an essential part of it.

((Meaning is a physiognomy.))’

if you understand the logic of the game aright – you understand that it is a rule-governed propositional action

a physiognomy is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a physiognomy is a not a rule-governed propositional action

a physiognomy is not a game

the meaning of any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

meaning is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a game as played – is not open to question –

a game has no meaning

569. ‘Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments.

Now perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which

concepts we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet

and inches as well as in metres and centimetres; the difference is

merely one of convenience. But even this is not true if, for instance,

calculations in some system of measurement demand more time and

trouble than it is possible for us to give them.’

‘Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments.’

language is proposal – its ‘concepts’ are proposals –

‘Now perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which concepts we employ.’

well of course it makes a difference which proposals / concepts  one employs –

if you don’t employ an appropriate proposal /concept in a particular propositional setting – you will be talking nonsense

‘As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet and inches as well as in metres and centimetres; the difference is merely one of convenience.’

yes – you can use different propositional structures – you can play different propositional games –

and convenience may be the reason you choose one propositional system rather than another

‘But even this is not true if, for instance, calculations in some system of measurement demand more time and trouble than it is possible for us to give them.’

if so – we need to devise new methods of calculation – new calculation games –

and this we have done and continue to do with the growth of science and technology

a growth that can come – that does come – as a result of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

570. ‘Concepts lead us to make investigations; are the expression

of our interest, and direct our interest.’

concepts are proposals

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – proposals – open to investigation

our interests are proposals –

proposals – made public – in whatever form of expression  – or proposals that remain private

whether made public or not  – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what directs our interests  is critical evaluation –

question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

571. ‘Misleading parallel: psychology treats of processes in the

psychical sphere, as does physics in the physical.

Seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, willing, are not the subject of

psychology in the same sense as that in which the movements of bodies,

the phenomena of electricity etc., are the subject of physics. You can

see this from the fact that the physicist sees, hears, thinks about, and

informs us of these phenomena, and the psychologist observes the

external reactions (the behaviour) of the subject.’

psychology treats of proposals – physics treats of proposals

the ‘psychical sphere’ – is a proposal – a propositional construct

the ‘physical sphere’ is a proposal – a propositional construct

any description of a proposal – of a propositional construct is a proposal –

a proposal however described is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the proposals described as psychical and the proposals described as physical –

are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the proposals of psychology – and the proposals of physics – have exactly the same logical status – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

572. ‘Expectation is, grammatically, a state; like: being of an

opinion, hoping for something, knowing something, being able to do

something. But in order to understand the grammar of these states

it is necessary to ask: "What counts as a criterion for anyone's being in

such a state?" (States of hardness, of weight, of fitting.)’

‘What counts as a criterion for anyone's being in such a state?’ –

any answer here – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

my point is – there will be no definitive answer to such a question – or for that matter any question –

we work with what we propose – in whatever context we find ourselves in

and as best we can – we keep an open mind

573. ‘To have an opinion is a state.—A state of what? Of the soul?

Of the mind? Well, of what object does one say that it has an opinion?

Of Mr. N.N. for example. And that is the correct answer.

One should not expect to be enlightened by the answer to that

question. Others go deeper: What, in particular cases, do we regard

as criteria for someone's being of such-and-such an opinion? When

do we say: he reached this opinion at that time? When: he has altered

his opinion? And so on. The picture which the answers to these

questions give us shews what gets treated grammatically as a state here.’

‘To have an opinion is a state’

an opinion is a proposal –

‘A state of what? Of the soul? Of the mind? Well, of what object does one say that it has an opinion? Of Mr. N.N. for example. And that is the correct answer.’

a proposal of what? – of the soul? – of the mind? – of Mr. N.N? –

the point is – the proposal – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘One should not expect to be enlightened by the answer to that question. Others go deeper: …’

however ‘deep’ – or not – any answers to these questions – are open to question –

open to doubt – and uncertain

 ‘The picture which the answers to these questions give us shews what gets treated grammatically as a state here.’

a state is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

574. ‘A proposition, and hence in another sense a thought, can be

the 'expression' of belief, hope, expectation, etc. But believing is

not thinking. (A grammatical remark.) The concepts of believing,

expecting, hoping are less distantly related to one another than they are

to the concept of thinking.’

a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a proposition is a proposal – open to interpretation –

the interpretation put above is that the proposal / proposition can be regarded as a thought – can be an expression of belief – hope – expectation – etc. –

and a further proposal is put –

and it is that believing is not thinking – and that the concepts of believing – expecting – hoping are less distantly related to one another than they are to the concept of thinking

what we have here is the makings of a propositional construct – the makings of a propositional argument

and one would assume that this propositional construct – this propositional argument – serves a purpose – has a use

in any case – it proposes a reality – a reality of proposed relations –

a reality – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

575. ‘When I sat down on this chair, of course I believed it would

bear me. I had no thought of its possibly collapsing.

But: "In spite of everything that he did, I held fast to the belief. . . ."

Here there is thought, and perhaps a constant struggle to renew an

attitude.’

‘When I sat down on this chair, of course I believed it would bear me. I had no thought of its possibly collapsing.’

what this statement shows – is that on reflection – the possibility is revealed

so if the proposal ‘sitting on the chair’ – is put to question – is put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored – the possibility of the chair collapsing is or can be raised      

‘But: "In spite of everything that he did, I held fast to the belief. . . ." Here there is thought, and perhaps a constant struggle to renew an attitude.’

the rational approach – the logical approach – is to put one’s beliefs to question –

to doubt – and to recognise their uncertainty

the ‘constant struggle to renew an attitude’ – is the constant struggle to maintain ignorance

576. ‘I watch a slow match burning, in high excitement follow

the progress of the burning and its approach to the explosive. Perhaps

I don't think anything at all or have a multitude of disconnected

thoughts. This is certainly a case of expecting.’

expecting is a form of and expression of inductive inference

on the basis of an observed event / state of affairs we infer a future event / state of affairs

logically speaking expecting is a propositional action –

and one quite clearly – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

577. ‘We say "I am expecting him", when we believe that he will

come, though his coming does not occupy our thoughts. (Here "I am

expecting him" would mean "I should be surprised if he didn't come"

and that will not be called the description of a state of mind.) But

we also say "I am expecting him" when it is supposed to mean:

I am eagerly awaiting him. We could imagine a language in which

different verbs were consistently used in these cases. And similarly

more than one verb where we speak of 'believing', 'hoping' and so on.

Perhaps the concepts of such a language would be more suitable for

understanding psychology than the concepts of our language.’

the ‘concepts’ of our language – that is the propositional constructs of our language –

are as suitable as any – of any language – natural – or artificial

the issue is not the suitability of the ‘concepts’ – of  the propositional constructs –

the issue is understanding that any concept – any propositional construct – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

we deal with – and we deal in – uncertainty – in any propositional context –

and it is through question – doubt and the exploration of uncertainty – that we make language work for us –

our world is propositional –

and the ground of all propositional life –

is question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

578. ‘Ask yourself: What does it mean to believe Goldbach's

theorem? What does this belief consist in? In a feeling of certainty as

we state, hear, or think the theorem? (That would not interest us.)

And what are the characteristics of this feeling? Why, I don't even

know how far the feeling may be caused by the proposition itself.

Am I to say that belief is a particular colouring of our thoughts?

Where does this idea come from? Well, there is a tone of belief, as of

doubt.

I should like to ask: how does the belief connect with this proposition?

Let us look and see what are the consequences of this belief,

where it takes us. "It makes me search for a proof of the proposition."

—Very well; and now let us look and see what your searching really

consists in. Then we shall know what belief in the proposition amounts

to.’

‘Ask yourself: What does it mean to believe Goldbach' theorem? What does this belief consist in? In a feeling of certainty as we state, hear, or think the theorem? (That would not interest us.) And what are the characteristics of this feeling? Why, I don't even know how far the feeling may be caused by the proposition itself.’

what does it mean to believe?

I think it means whatever anyone says it means

and whatever is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘Am I to say that belief is a particular colouring of our thoughts? Where does this idea come from? Well, there is a tone of belief, as of doubt.’

you can say this – you can propose this – and if it suits your purpose – it will probably

be useful

but whatever you propose – is open to question –

and this is the best way to see it

‘I should like to ask: how does the belief connect with this proposition? Let us look and see what are the consequences of this belief, where it takes us. "It makes me search for a proof of the proposition." —Very well; and now let us look and see what your searching really consists in. Then we shall know what belief in the proposition amounts to.’

first up the belief – is a proposal – is a proposition

how does it connect with a stated proposition – is to ask what is the relation between the belief proposition and the stated proposition?

it is a question of the relation between proposals

is it a relation of consistency – or are the two proposals in some way out of sync?

i.e. – the proposition expressed may not represent my belief – in its totality

we often end up not quite expressing ourselves in the way we wanted to

and is possible – that what we say – misses the point of what we believe

in any case – such matters are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

as to the consequences of belief –

well – that is a matter open to question

as to proof – the proof of a proposition –

a proposition – a proposal – of any kind – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there is no proof

the idea of proof – is not logical – it is rhetorical

proof is a rhetorical game

and what does our searching consist in?

our searching consists in question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

and if we believe in a proposition – our belief will be rational – if we put it to question – put it to doubt – and explore its uncertainty

579. ‘The feeling of confidence. How is this manifested in behaviour?’

how the feeling of confidence is manifested in behaviour – is open to question –

open to doubt – and is uncertain

580. ‘An 'inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria.’

any classification of proposals – i.e. as ‘inner’ – as ‘outer’ – is propositional

such propositional classifications – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what we deal with – from a logical point of view is propositions – proposals open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

581. ‘An expectation is imbedded in a situation, from which it arises. The expectation of an explosion may, for example, arise from a situation in which an explosion is to be expected.’

you can say that any proposal – is ‘embedded’ – in the ‘situation’ – the propositional situation – from which it arises

and even were you to propose that a proposition is unique – and has no propositional background –

all this is just propositional packaging and logically irrelevant –

any claim about a proposal – i.e. – a claim regarding its origin – is a proposal –

and as with the subject proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what counts logically is that a proposal – any proposal – is put to question – put to doubt – and is regarded as uncertain

as to expectation –

an expectation is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

582. ‘If someone whispers "It'll go off now", instead of saying "I

expect the explosion any moment", still his words do not describe a

feeling; although they and their tone may be a manifestation of his

feeling.’

whether his words describe a feeling or not – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

as indeed is the proposal of ‘a feeling’

that ‘they and their tone may be a manifestation of his feeling’ – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

583. ‘"But you talk as if I weren't really expecting, hoping, now—

as I thought I was. As if what were happening now had no deep

significance."—What does it mean to say "What is happening now has

significance" or "has deep significance"? What is a deep feeling?

Could someone have a feeling of ardent love or hope for the space of

one second—no matter what preceded or followed this second?——

What is happening now has significance—in these surroundings.

The surroundings give it its importance. And the word "hope"

refers to a phenomenon of human life. (A smiling mouth smiles only

in a human face.)’

‘"But you talk as if I weren't really expecting, hoping, now— as I thought I was. As if what were happening now had no deep significance."’

that’s right – it has no deep significance – there is no deep significance – there is no deep

the only significance is – propositional

and the proposal – the proposition has no depth – it is – if you like – pure surface

this notion of ‘depth’ is really just rhetorical packaging –

it has no basis in logic

what is put – is what is put – there is nothing behind it –

yes – you can pretend that there is –

but this pretence has no place in logic

‘What does it mean to say "What is happening now has significance" or "has deep significance"? What is a deep feeling?’

‘What does it mean to say "What is happening now has significance"’

I don’t know –

‘what has significance’ – is what is signed –

but unless the sign or signs are actually proposed – or put – we are with – "What is happening now has significance"’ – left in the dark

it strikes me as a statement that says nothing at all – except that it alerts us to the possibility of signs

‘has deep significance"?’ –

‘deep significance’–

‘deep’ here – is just rhetorical packaging

a sign is a sign – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘What is a deep feeling?’

a ‘feeling’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a so called ‘deep’ feeling – is a proposal that is given a rhetorical emphasis

‘Could someone have a feeling of ardent love or hope for the space of one second—no matter what preceded or followed this second?’

love is a proposal – and one variously described –

any description is valid – love is whatever anyone says it is –

and however anyone proposes love – that proposal is open to question – open to doubt

and is uncertain

yes – you can propose ‘a feeling of ardent hope or love for the space of one second no matter what preceded or followed this second’ –

Wittgenstein has done just this in the above

the proposal has been put – what it amounts to is open to question – open to doubt –

and uncertain

‘What is happening now has significance—in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance’

‘these surroundings’ – propositional context

importance is rhetoric

‘And the word "hope" refers to a phenomenon of human life. (A smiling mouth smiles only in a human face.)’

any word – any proposal – can be proposed to refer to the ‘phenomenon of human life’ –

‘A smiling mouth smiles only in a human face.’

yes – and a smile is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

584. ‘Now suppose I sit in my room and hope that N.N. will come

and bring me some money, and suppose one minute of this state could

be isolated, cut out of its context; would what happened in it then not

be hope?—Think, for example, of the words which you perhaps utter

in this space of time. They are no longer part of this language. And

in different surroundings the institution of money doesn't exist either.

A coronation is the picture of pomp and dignity. Cut one minute

of this proceeding out of its surroundings: the crown is being placed

on the head of the king in his coronation robes.—But in different

surroundings gold is the cheapest of metals, its gleam is thought

vulgar. There the fabric of the robe is cheap to produce. A crown is

a parody of a respectable hat. And so on.’

any proposal – any propositional situation – is open to interpretation –

which is to say – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

585. ‘When someone says "I hope he'll come"—is this a report

about his state of mind, or a manifestation of his hope?—I can, for

example, say it to myself. And surely I am not giving myself a report.

It may be a sigh; but it need not. If I tell someone "I can't keep

my mind on my work today; I keep on thinking of his coming"—

this will be called a description of my state of mind.’

as Wittgenstein’s discussion here shows –

‘I hope he'll come’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

586. ‘"I have heard he is coming; I have been waiting for him all

day." That is a report on how I have spent the day.——In

conversation I came to the conclusion that a particular event

is to be expected, and I draw this conclusion in the words:

"So now I must expect him to come". This may be called the

first thought, the first act, of this expectation.——The exclamation

"I'm longing to see him!" may be called an act of expecting.

But I can utter the same words as the result of self-observation,

and then they might mean: "So, after all that has happened,

I am still longing to see him." The point is: what led up

to these words?’

the point – is not what led up to these words – the point is – the words – the proposal

and the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what led up to these words – is a matter open to speculation – open to question –

but whatever one comes up with here – is not what is proposed –

what led up to the words is not the logical focus

587. ‘Does it make sense to ask "How do you know that you

believe?"—and is the answer: "I know it by introspection"?

In some cases it will be possible to say some such thing, in most

not.

It makes sense to ask: "Do I really love her, or am I only pretending

to myself?" and the process of introspection is the calling up of

memories; of imagined possible situations, and of the feelings that one

would have if ....’

what you know is what you propose –

if you propose that you believe – you know you believe

whatever you propose – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and yes – you can propose introspection – and then get about explaining what introspection is –

a fertile ground for question – for doubt – and uncertainty

‘Do I really love her, or am I only pretending to myself?’

proposing memories – proposing imagined possible situations – proposing feelings that one might have if …

all this is to explore one’s proposed love – and to do this is to put the proposed love to question – to doubt – and to explore its uncertainty

588. ‘"I am revolving the decision to go away to-morrow." (This

may be called a description of a state of mind.)——"Your arguments

don't convince me; now as before it is my intention to go away to-

morrow." Here one is tempted to call the intention a feeling. The

feeling is one of a certain rigidity; of unalterable determination. (But

there are many different characteristic feelings and attitudes here.)——

I am asked: "How long are you staying here?" I reply: "To-morrow

I am going away; it's the end of my holidays."—But over against this:

I say at the end of a quarrel "All right! Then I leave to-morrow!";

I make a decision.’

the ‘intention’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if one is tempted to call it a ‘feeling’ – fair enough –

and yes the feeling can be described as ‘one of a certain rigidity’ – ‘of unalterable determination’

these descriptions though – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and yes – ‘there are many different characteristic feelings and attitudes here’ –

these too are open to question

‘I make a decision’ –

and the decision  – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

589. ‘"In my heart I have determined on it." And one is even

inclined to point to one's breast as one says it. Psychologically

this way of speaking should be taken seriously. Why should

it be taken less seriously than the assertion that belief is a

state of mind? (Luther: "Faith is under the left nipple.")’

‘In my heart I have determined on it.’ –

the proposal – ‘I have determined on it’ – is loaded with the rhetoric – ‘in my heart’ –

‘Psychologically this way of speaking should be taken seriously’ –

the proposal – the ‘determination’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘belief is a state of mind’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in so far as faith is not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain –

‘faith’ is a synonym for ‘ignorance’ –

‘Luther: "Faith is under the left nipple’ –

this – ‘under the left nipple’ – is rhetoric – rhetoric – I would say – without indulgence

590. ‘Someone might learn to understand the meaning of the

expression "seriously meaning what one says" by means of a gesture

of pointing at the heart. But now we must ask: "How does it come

out that he has learnt it?"’

‘Someone might learn to understand the meaning of the expression "seriously meaning what one says" by means of a gesture of pointing at the heart’

‘seriously meaning what one says’

is a rhetorical prelude to whatever one says – whatever one proposes

‘gesture of pointing at the heart’ –

is – in relation to the expression – a rhetorical gesture – that gives added emphasis to the expression

"How does it come out that he has learnt it?"’

I would think he has observed someone else using the expression with the gesture –

and been impressed by this

591. ‘Am I to say that any one who has an intention has an experience

of tending towards something? That there are particular

experiences of 'tending'?—Remember this case: if one urgently wants

to make some remark, some objection, in a discussion, it often happens

that one opens one's mouth, draws a breath and holds it; if one then

decides to let the objection go, one lets the breath out. The experience

of this process is evidently the experience of veering towards saying

something. Anyone who observes me will know that I wanted to

say something and then thought better of it. In this situation, that is.—

In a different one he would not so interpret my behaviour, however

characteristic of the intention to speak it may be in the present situation.

And is there any reason for assuming that this same experience could

not occur in some quite different situation—in which it has nothing

to do with any 'tending'?’

what is observed is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘one opens one's mouth, draws a breath and holds it’ –

could well be interpreted as the person concerned – ‘veering towards saying something’

but it could just as well be interpreted as the person concerned having a respiratory difficulty

592. ‘"But when you say 'I intend to go away', you surely mean it!

Here again it just is the mental act of meaning that gives the sentence

life. If you merely repeat the sentence after someone else, say in order

to mock his way of speaking, then you say it without this act of

meaning."—When we are doing philosophy it can sometimes look

like that. But let us really think out various different situations and

conversations, and the ways in which that sentence will be uttered in

them.—"I always discover a mental undertone; perhaps not always

the same one." And was there no undertone there when you repeated

the sentence after someone else? And how is the 'undertone' to be

separated from the rest of the experience of speaking?’

what this discussion illustrates – is that any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

when we propose – in whatever form that takes – we deal with and operate in – propositional uncertainty –

and it is just this propositional uncertainty – that gives the sentence – the proposal – life

our propositional life is a life of uncertainty

593. ‘A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one

nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example.’

there are no philosophical diseases –

you can focus on one example –

and if you operate logically and rationally – you will put that example to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty –

now really – does any philosopher not do this?

594. ‘"But the words, significantly uttered, have after all not only

a surface, but also the dimension of depth!" After all, it just is the

case that something different takes place when they are uttered

significantly from when they are merely uttered.—How I express

this is not the point. Whether I say that in the first case they have

depth; or that something goes on in me, inside my mind, as I utter

them; or that they have an atmosphere—it always comes to the same

thing.

“Well, if we all agree about it, won't it be true?"

(I cannot accept someone else's testimony, because it is not testimony.

It only tells me what he is inclined to say.)’

‘"But the words, significantly uttered, have after all not only a surface, but also the dimension of depth!" After all, it just is the case that something different takes place when they are uttered significantly from when they are merely uttered.’

‘also the dimension of depth’?

and this ‘dimension of depth’ – occurs – as a result of ‘significant utterance’

no ‘significant utterance’ – no depth –

and so this ‘depth’ is rhetoric – huff and puff –

and let’s be quite clear here –

this rhetorical depth – is not a characteristic of the utterance – of the proposal –

it is a property – a feature – of the utterer – of the proposer –

it has nothing to do with the logic of the proposal

the proposal – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘How I express this is not the point. Whether I say that in the first case they have

depth; or that something goes on in me, inside my mind, as I utter them; or that they have an atmosphere—it always comes to the same thing."’

yes – that is correct – what it comes down to is rhetoric

“Well, if we all agree about it, won't it be true?"

a true proposition is one that you affirm – truth is affirmation

that ‘we all agree about it’ – might be cosy – but it is logically irrelevant

and more to the point – any proposal of affirmation – of  agreement – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘(I cannot accept someone else's testimony, because it is not testimony. It only tells me what he is inclined to say.)’

well you can accept someone else’s ‘testimony’ – someone else’s proposal –

you can affirm it

and your affirmation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

595. ‘It is natural for us to say a sentence in such-and-such

surroundings, and unnatural to say it in isolation. Are we to say that

there is a particular feeling accompanying the utterance of every

sentence when we say it naturally?’

well you can put the proposal that there is a particular feeling accompanying the utterance of every sentence when we say it naturally

it should be noted too that it is an empirical claim

and really how can it be verified?

the utterance of every sentence?

how can you make any empirical claim about every sentence?

and how would you falsify it?

can feelings – or their absence be observed?

yes – someone can claim there was no feeling when he uttered that sentence

but really – how do you test that?

now if it is not verifiable – or falsifiable – but it is on the face of it – an empirical claim –

what do we make of it?

it seems to me that it has no logical basis – that its only possible value is rhetorical

and to what end – I don’t know

so it’s more of an annoyance than anything else

596. ‘The feeling of 'familiarity' and of 'naturalness'. It is easier

to get at a feeling of unfamiliarity and of unnaturalness. Or, at feelings.

For not everything which is unfamiliar to us makes an impression of

unfamiliarity upon us. Here one has to consider what we call

"un-familiar". If a boulder lies on the road, we know it for a boulder,

but perhaps not for the one which has always lain there. We recognize

a man, say, as a man, but not as an acquaintance. There are feelings of

old acquaintance: they are sometimes expressed by a particular way

of looking or by the words: "The same old room!" (which I occupied

many years before and now returning find unchanged). Equally

there are feelings of strangeness. I stop short, look at the object or

man questioningly or mistrustfully, say "I find it all strange."—

But the existence of this feeling of strangeness does not give us a

reason for saying that every object which we know well and which

does not seem strange to us gives us a feeling of familiarity.—We

think that, as it were, the place once filled by the feeling of strangeness

must surely be occupied somehow. The place for this kind of atmosphere

is there, and if one of them is not in possession of it, then another is.’

‘We think that, as it were, the place once filled by the feeling of strangeness must surely be occupied somehow. The place for this kind of atmosphere is there, and if one of them is not in possession of it, then another is.’

‘the place once occupied by the feeling of strangeness’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘must surely be occupied somehow’ –

a reaction to a propositional situation exists – only if there is a reaction – a propositional response to it

‘this kind of atmosphere is there’ –

the ‘atmosphere’ does not exist as some kind of independent ontological state –

it only exists if and when it is proposed –

and when proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

597. ‘Just as Germanisms creep into the speech of a German who

speaks English well although he does not first construct the German

expression and then translate it into English; just as this makes him

speak English as if he were translating 'unconsciously' from the German

—so we often think as if our thinking were founded on a thought-

schema: as if we were translating from a more primitive mode of

thought into ours.’

this proposal of propositional action as translation from a thought-schema –

is a proposed explanation of the proposed action

and as with any explanation it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

598. ‘When we do philosophy, we should like to hypostatize

feelings where there are none. They serve to explain our thoughts

to us.

'Here explanation of our thinking demands a feeling!' It is as if our

conviction were simply consequent upon this requirement.’

‘When we do philosophy, we should like to hypostatize feelings where there are none. They serve to explain our thoughts to us.’

any explanation of a thought – or of a feeling for that matter – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if you are to put that feeling explains thought – then just asserting it has no value at all

the claim requires argument – and we have no argument from Wittgenstein here

'Here explanation of our thinking demands a feeling!' It is as if our conviction were simply consequent upon this requirement.’

what you have here is the claim that thinking can only be explained by feeling

and it is not just a claim – it is according to Wittgenstein – a ‘demand’ –

‘demands’ – play no part in explanation

what you have from Wittgenstein here is plain unabashed rhetoric –

any proposed explanation – any proposed explanation of thinking – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

conviction – as in a proposal that is not open to question – not open to doubt – and held to be certain – is not logical

conviction is irrational –

conviction is the mark of a fool

599. ‘In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. "But it must be

like this!" is not a philosophical proposition. Philosophy only states

what everyone admits.’

of course we draw conclusions in philosophy –

‘But it might be like this!” –

yes well this proposal – may be a straightforward statement – but isn’t it more likely to be a conclusion?

it sounds like one –

‘But it might be like this!” – however regarded – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Philosophy only states what everyone admits.’ –

this is a stupid statement –

as if you can determine what everyone admits – in every propositional context –

furthermore – philosophy is not statement

philosophy is the critical process

the process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

any proposal can be subject to this critical analysis –

if you question – if you doubt – if you explore propositional uncertainty – with the proposals – with the propositions you use – that is any proposal – any proposition that you use –

that critical activity can be regarded as ‘philosophical’

600. ‘Does everything that we do not find conspicuous make an

impression of inconspicuousness? Does what is ordinary always

make the impression of ordinariness?’

it is rather pointless talking about ‘everything’ and ‘always’ –

what we can say is that a description proposed – a description used – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain



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