Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Part 1. 401-500

401. ‘You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new

object. You interpret a grammatical movement made by yourself

as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you are observing. (Think for

example of the question: "Are sense-data the material of which the

universe is made?")

But there is an objection to my saying that you have made a

'grammatical' movement. What you have primarily discovered is

a new way of looking at things. As if you had invented a new way

of painting; or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of song.— ’

an ‘object’ is a proposal

‘You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object.’

what you have is new proposal –

 ‘Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made?’

if that’s the proposal – that’s the proposal – and one open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘But there is an objection to my saying that you have made a 'grammatical' movement.’

what you have made – is a propositional movement –

and yes –

‘What you have primarily discovered is a new way of looking at things.’ –

a new proposal   

402. ‘"It's true I say 'Now I am having such-and-such an image',

but the words 'I am having' are merely a sign to someone else; the

description of the image is a complete account of the imagined world."—

You mean: the words "I am having" are like "I say! . . . ." You are

inclined to say it should really have been expressed differently. Perhaps

simply by making a sign with one's hand and then giving a description.

—When as in this case, we disapprove of the expressions of ordinary

language (which are after all performing their office), we have got a

picture in our heads which conflicts with the picture of our ordinary

way of speaking. Whereas we are tempted to say that our way of

speaking does not describe the facts as they really are. As if, for

example the proposition "he has pains" could be false in some other way

than by that man's not having pains. As if the form of expression

were saying something false even when the proposition faute de

mieux asserted something true.

For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists

look like. The one party attack the normal form of expression as if

they were attacking a statement; the others defend it, as if they were

stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being.’

‘"It's true I say 'Now I am having such-and-such an image', but the words 'I am having' are merely a sign to someone else; the description of the image is a complete account of the imagined world."’

‘the words I am having are merely a sign to someone else’ – that I am proposing

as for a complete description of anything – that is logical rubbish

any description – of anything – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘we have got a picture in our heads which conflicts with the picture of our ordinary

way of speaking.’

our ordinary way of speaking is fine –

however from a logical point of view – our ‘ordinary way of speaking’ – is propositional

which is to say we put proposal – proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists look like.’

disputes between idealists – solipsists and realists – are no different to any dispute on the street –

the proposals – the propositions put – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

403. ‘If I were to reserve the word "pain" solely for what I had

hitherto called "my pain", and others "L.W.'s pain", I should do

other people no injustice, so long as a notation were provided in which

the loss of the word "pain" in other connexions were somehow

supplied. Other people would still be pitied, treated by doctors and

so on. It would, of course, be no objection to this mode of expression

to say: "But look here, other people have just the same as you!"

But what should I gain from this new kind of account? Nothing.

But after all neither does the solipsist want any practical advantage

when he advances his view!’

‘If I were to reserve the word "pain" solely for what I had hitherto called "my pain"…’

this proposal – to my way of thinking – is fair enough –

so long as that proposal is held open to question – open to doubt – and is regarded as uncertain

‘But what should I gain from this new kind of account? Nothing. But after all neither does the solipsist want any practical advantage when he advances his view!’

there is nothing to prevent you from putting the solipsist proposal

the logical point is that any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

can a solipsist be open to question – open to doubt – and regard his philosophy as uncertain?

I don’t see why not

404. ‘"When I say 'I am in pain', I do not point to a person who is

in pain, since in a certain sense I have no idea who is." And this can be

given a justification. For the main point is: I did not say that such-and-

such a person was in pain, but "I am ....." Now in saying this I

don't name any person. Just as I don't name anyone when I groan

with pain. Though someone else sees who is in pain from the

groaning.

What does it mean to know who is in pain? It means, for example,

to know which man in this room is in pain: for instance, that it is the

one who is sitting over there, or the one who is standing in that corner,

the tall one over there with the fair hair, and so on.—What am I

getting at? At the fact that there is a great variety of criteria for

personal 'identity'.

Now which of them determines my saying that 'I' am in pain?

None.’

‘"When I say 'I am in pain', I do not point to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no idea who is."

when I say “I am in pain’ – this proposal refers to the proposer

if the proposal refers to the proposer – that reference in the proposal as with any other aspect of the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘What does it mean to know who is in pain?

our knowledge is proposal –

if the proposal is that someone is in pain – what we know is what is proposed

and what is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘What am I getting at? At the fact that there is a great variety of criteria for personal 'identity'.

Now which of them determines my saying that 'I' am in pain? None.’

if I put the proposal – ‘I am in pain’ – that’s all there is to it – a proposal is put

and yes – that proposal – and any aspect of it – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

405. ‘"But at any rate when you say 'I am in pain', you want to

draw the attention of others to a particular person."—The answer

might be: No, I want to draw their attention to myself.— ’

just what someone is doing when they say ‘I am in pain’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

406. ‘"But surely what you want to do with the words 'I am. . . .'

is to distinguish between’ yourself and other people."—Can this

be said in every case? Even when I merely groan? And even if I

do 'want to distinguish' between myself and other people—do I want

to distinguish between the person L.W. and the person N.N.?’

‘"But surely what you want to do with the words 'I am. . . .' is to distinguish between’ yourself and other people."’

perhaps – but we can’t generalize here –

what people want to do with their proposals – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

407. ‘It would be possible to imagine someone groaning out:

"Someone is in pain—I don't know who!"—and our then hurrying

to help him, the one who groaned.’

yes – odd – but possible

408. ‘"But you aren't in doubt whether it is you or someone else

who has the pain!"—The proposition "I don't know whether I

or someone else is in pain" would be a logical product, and one of its

factors would be: "I don't know whether I am in pain or not"—

and that is not a significant proposition.’

‘I don't know whether I am in pain or not’ –

as with any proposal – it’s significance is a function of propositional context –

someone who is experiencing ‘phantom pain’ and who understands the science of the phenomenon of phantom pain –

could well say – ‘I don't know whether I am in pain or not’ – perhaps with a laugh

and in that propositional context – the proposition would indeed be significant

this proposition – as with any proposition – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

I take the view that any proposition put – is to be regarded as significant –

the issue is to understand its significance –

and understanding its significance comes down to understanding its propositional context – or if you like – its use

in an everyday context – the proposition – ‘I don't know whether I am in pain or not’

would strike us as strange –

and would indeed raise questions – doubts – and uncertainties

where does such a proposition fit? – where might it be significant?

in a medical context?

or what about in a philosophical context?

in the context of a discussion of issues in philosophical logic – and the philosophy of language?

409. ‘Imagine several people standing in a ring, and me among them.

One of us, sometimes this one, sometimes that, is connected to the

poles of an electrical machine without our being able to see this. I

observe the faces of the others and try to see which of us has just been

electrified.—Then I say: "Now I know who it is; for it's myself."

In this sense I could also say: "Now I know who is getting the shocks;

it is myself." This would be a rather queer way of speaking.—But if I

make the supposition that I can feel the shock even when someone

else is electrified, then the expression "Now I know who . . . ."

becomes quite unsuitable. It does not belong to this game.’

‘But if I make the supposition that I can feel the shock even when someone else is electrified, then the expression "Now I know who . . . ." becomes quite unsuitable. It does not belong to this game.’

the point here is that my ‘feeling the shock’ – doesn’t tell me who is being shocked – just that someone is –

if when the shock is administered – I see a grimace on the face of one of the others – or some other expression I think is consistent with being shocked  – then I might well propose that that ‘I know who …’ –

this proposal though – would be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

where there is no expression of any kind – from any of the participants – when the shock

is administered – and I can’t say on the basis of what I feel who is being shocked – then I can’t say – ‘I know who …’ –

the only proposal that I can put – is that I don’t know –‘I don’t know who…’ –

a propositional game is rule-governed – 

if no rules are established – there is no game

in this example of Wittgenstein’s – there are no rules – it  is not a ‘game’

what we really have here – even though Wittgenstein has convoluted it – is just a simple case of not-knowing –

and that is where the whole story of knowledge begins

410. ‘"I" is not the name of a person, nor "here" of a place, and

"this" is not a name. But they are connected with names. Names are

explained by means of them. It is also true that it is characteristic of

physics not to use these words.’

‘I’ – is  a proposal – ‘here’ – is a proposal – ‘this’ – is a proposal – ‘names’ – are proposals – ‘explanations’ – are proposals

these proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and any proposed relation between proposals – between propositions – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what words / proposals are used in physics – is up to those engaged in the propositional activity that is physics

411. ‘Consider how the following questions can be applied, and

how settled:

(1) "Are these books my books?"

(2) "Is this foot my foot?"

(3) "Is this body my body?"

(4) "Is this sensation my sensation?

"Each of these questions has practical (non-philosophical) applications.

(2) Think of cases in which my foot is anaesthetized or paralysed.

Under certain circumstances the question could be settled by deter-mining whether I can feel pain in this foot.

(3) Here one might be pointing to a mirror-image. Under certain

circumstances, however, one might touch a body and ask the question.

In others it means the same as: "Does my body look like that?"

(4) Which sensation does one mean by 'this’ one? That is: how is

one using the demonstrative pronoun here? Certainly otherwise than

in, say, the first example! Here confusion occurs because one imagines

that by directing one's attention to a sensation one is pointing to it.’

‘my books’ – ‘my foot’ – ‘my body’ – and ‘my sensation’ – are proposals –

proposals open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

it is logically appropriate  to raise questions – regarding the use of ‘my’

Wittgenstein asks – ‘how are these questions to be settled?

from a logical point of view – no question is ever settled

yes – we propose answers to questions raised – and we proceed with the answers that strike us useful and productive –

but any answer so decided – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

we proceed in and with uncertainty – and in so doing – keep an open mind

the practical applications Wittgenstein goes on to refer to – are not ‘non-philosophical’ –

there is no consideration – on any matter – that is non-philosophical –

any consideration – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

and the examples of the anaesthetized or paralysed foot – the pointing to a mirror image – and how one uses the demonstrative pronoun – are perfect examples of genuine philosophical issues

412. ‘The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness

and brain-process: how does it come about that this does not come

into the considerations of our ordinary life? This idea of a difference in

kind is accompanied by slight giddiness,—which occurs when we are

performing a piece of logical sleight-of-hand. (The same giddiness

attacks us when we think of certain theorems in set theory.) When does

this feeling occur in the present case? It is when I, for example, turn

my attention in a particular way on to my own consciousness, and,

astonished, say to myself: THIS is supposed to be produced by a

process in the brain!—as it were clutching my forehead.—But what

can it mean to speak of "turning my attention on to my own consciousness"?

This is surely the queerest thing there could be! It was a particular act

of gazing that I called doing this. I stared fixedly in front of me—but

not at any particular point or object. My eyes were wide open, the

brows not contracted (as they mostly are when I am interested in a

particular object). No such interest preceded this gazing. My glance

was vacant; or again like that of someone admiring the illumination

of the sky and drinking in the light.

Now bear in mind that the proposition which I uttered as a paradox

(THIS is produced by a brain-process!) has nothing paradoxical

about it. I could have said it in the course of an experiment whose

purpose was to shew that an effect of light which I see is produced by

stimulation of a particular part of the brain.—But I did not utter the

sentence in the surroundings in which it would have had an everyday

and unparadoxical sense. And my attention was not such as would

have accorded with making an experiment. (If it had been, my look

would have been intent, not vacant.)’

‘THIS is supposed to be produced by a process in the brain!—as it were clutching my forehead.’

well – that is a proposal put in the service of explaining – or accounting for consciousness

no more surprising really than any other proposal –

and as with any proposal – on any matter – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘But what can it mean to speak of "turning my attention on to my own consciousness"?’

a good question – I don’t have an answer – but I would be interested in any that are proposed

and I would regard such proposals – as open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

413. ‘Here we have a case of introspection, not unlike that from

which William James got the idea that the 'self' consisted mainly of

'peculiar motions in the head and between the head and throat'.

And James' introspection shewed, not the meaning of the word "self"

(so far as it means something like "person", "human being", "he himself",

"I myself"), nor any analysis of such a thing, but the state of a

philosopher's attention when he says the word "self" to himself and

tries to analyse its meaning. (And a good deal could be learned from this.)’

here we have Wittgenstein raising questions about William James’ proposal regarding the nature of the self –

and that is as it should be –

Wittgenstein is here putting James’s proposal to question – to doubt – and is exploring its uncertainty

and what comes of this – Wittgenstein’s own proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

‘(And a good deal could be learned from this.)’

414. ‘You think that after all you must be weaving a piece of cloth:

because you are sitting at a loom—even if it is empty—and going

through the motions of weaving.’

what counts is not whether the loom is empty or not – or whether you are weaving – or not –

what counts is whether you propose – or not –

if you don’t put a proposal – there is nothing to go on with

if you do – your proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

415. ‘What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural

history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however,

but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped

remark only because they are always before our eyes.’

‘remarks’ on the natural history of human beings – are proposals

‘curiosities’ – are ‘contributed’ – if questions are asked – doubts raised – and uncertainties explored

‘observations no one has doubted’ – an odd statement –

how does Wittgenstein know his observations have never been doubted?

he doesn’t – this is just  shameless rhetoric –

any observation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what is before our eyes – is proposal –

what we propose – and what is proposed to us –

the world as proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

416. ‘"Human beings agree in saying that they see, hear, feel, and

so on (even though some are blind and some are deaf). So they are

their own witnesses that they have consciousness"—But how strange

this is! Whom do I really inform, if I say "I have consciousness"?

What is the purpose of saying this to myself, and how can another

person understand me?—Now, expressions like "I see", "I hear",

"I am conscious" really have their uses. I tell a doctor "Now I am

hearing with this ear again", or I tell someone who believes I am in a

faint "I am conscious again", and so on.’

‘I have consciousness’ – is a proposal – and as Wittgenstein shows here – a proposal – open to question

‘Whom do I really inform, if I say "I have consciousness"?’ –

perhaps no one is informed – and the proposal is best understood as simply a declarative proposition

‘What is the purpose of saying this to myself, and how can another person understand me?’

really you would need to understand any propositional context in which ‘I have consciousness’ – is put – to get an idea of its purpose

i.e. – in a philosophical context – for Descartes –‘I have consciousness’ – was an argument for existence

how can a person understand me?

well it is always open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – whether anyone understands anyone

nevertheless we generally proceed on the assumption that we are understood

perhaps ‘I have consciousness’ – is informative to a doctor – if you are in a state where there are no other signs of consciousness –

that though seems unlikely – given modern medicine

417. ‘Do I observe myself, then, and perceive that I am seeing or

conscious? And why talk about observation at all? Why not simply

say "I perceive I am conscious"?—But what are the words "I perceive"

for here?—why not say "I am conscious"?—But don't the words "I

perceive" here shew that I am attending to my consciousness?—which

is ordinarily not the case.—If so, then the sentence "I perceive I am

conscious" does not say that I am conscious, but that my attention is

disposed in such-and-such a way.

But isn't it a particular experience that occasions my saying "I am

conscious again"?—What experience? In what situations do we say it?’

‘Do I observe myself, then, and perceive that I am seeing or conscious?

here it depends on how you understand ‘observe’ – ‘perceive – ‘seeing’ – and ‘conscious’ –

these terms – these proposals – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘Why not simply say "I perceive I am conscious"?—But what are the words "I perceive" for here?—why not say "I am conscious"?—But don't the words "I

perceive" here shew that I am attending to my consciousness?—which is ordinarily not the case’

good questions –

any proposal is valid – and open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

non-standard and unusual proposals – are to be welcomed –

they invite new questions – doubts – and uncertainties –

and from a logical point of view – that is all to the good

418. ‘Is my having consciousness a fact of experience?—

But doesn't one say that a man has consciousness, and that a tree

or a stone does not?—What would it be like if it were otherwise?—

Would human beings all be unconscious?—No; not in the ordinary

sense of the word. But I, for instance, should not have consciousness

——as I now in fact have it.’

‘Is my having consciousness a fact of experience?’

I would say that having consciousness is the ground or basis of experience – i.e. without consciousness there is no experience – that would be my bet

‘But doesn't one say that a man has consciousness, and that a tree or a stone does not?’

well that is the standard view –

however Spinoza for one – it can be said – argued against this

‘No; not in the ordinary sense of the word. But I, for instance, should not have consciousness——as I now in fact have it.’

maybe – maybe not –

why would something else having consciousness – change my ‘having’ consciousness?

in any case –

consciousness – having consciousness – and who or what has it – are all matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

419. ‘In what circumstances shall I say that a tribe has a chief?

And the chief must surely have consciousness. Surely we can't have a

chief without consciousness!’

‘In what circumstances shall I say that a tribe has a chief?

you would say a tribe has a chief – if a chief is proposed in some manner

‘Surely we can't have a chief without consciousness!’

what about a tribe that regards its dead chief – as still the chief?

420. ‘But can't I imagine that the people around me are automata,

lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as

usual?—If I imagine it now—alone in my room—I see people with

fixed looks (as in a trance) going about their business—the idea is

perhaps a little uncanny. But just try to keep hold of this idea in the

midst of your ordinary intercourse with others, in the street, say!

Say to yourself, for example: "The children over there are mere

automata; all their liveliness is mere automatism." And you will either

find these words becoming quite meaningless; or you will produce

in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.

Seeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing

one figure as a limiting case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a

window as a swastika, for example.’

‘But can't I imagine that the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual?’

yes – you can imagine that –

and just that imaginative proposal – is the basis of some classic imaginative fiction

‘Seeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for example.’

how we see and understand ‘a living human being’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

421. ‘It seems paradoxical to us that we should make such a medley,

mixing physical states and states of consciousness up together in a

single report: "He suffered great torments and tossed about restlessly".

It is quite usual; so why do we find it paradoxical? Because we want

to say that the sentence deals with both tangibles and intangibles at

once.—But does it worry you if I say: "These three struts give the

building stability"? Are three and stability tangible?——Look at the

sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as its employment.’

‘He suffered great torments and tossed about restlessly’ – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in critically evaluating this proposal – Wittgenstein puts that it is paradoxical –

and his argument here is that –

‘the sentence deals with both tangibles and intangibles at once.’

he goes on to say –

‘But does it worry you if I say: "These three struts give the building stability"? Are three and stability tangible’

finally he says –

‘Look at the sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as its employment.’ –

my question is – couldn’t you accept that ‘the sentence as an instrument, and its sense its employment’ 

and still find the ‘mixing of tangibles and intangibles’ – a worry – (if it does worry you)?

point being – what is the connection between the conclusion and the argument?

in any case – regardless of the path to it –

the proposal that the sentence is an instrument and its sense its employment –  is fair enough –

and as with any such proposal – any such analysis  – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

422. ‘What am I believing in when I believe that men have souls?

What am I believing in, when I believe that this substance contains

two carbon rings? In both cases there is a picture in the foreground,

but the sense lies far in the background; that is, the application of the

picture is not easy to survey.’

‘What am I believing in when I believe that men have souls? What am I believing in, when I believe that this substance contains two carbon rings?’

what you are ‘believing in’ in either case –  is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the sense of a proposition – is open to question

there is no foreground / background to a proposition –

there is only the proposition put

this foreground / background ‘picture’ – only serves to obfuscate the logical reality of a proposition –

the logical reality is that a proposition is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the application of a proposition can only be ‘surveyed’ – critically –

the application of proposition is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

423. ‘Certainly all these things happen in you.—And now all I ask

is to understand the expression we use.—The picture is there. And I

am not disputing its validity in any particular case.—Only I also want

to understand the application of the picture.’

this ‘picture’ – is a proposal –

any proposal – is valid – is ‘disputable’ – and its application – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

the ‘picture’ view of the proposition Wittgenstein is prosecuting here  – is nothing more than a throw back and reworking of his Tractatus argument

424. ‘The picture is there; and I do not dispute its correctness. But

what is its application? Think of the picture of blindness as a darkness

in the soul or in the head of the blind man.’

the proposal is put – and if you don’t put it to question – put it to doubt – explore its uncertainty – you are a fool

we put proposals to apply them – to put them to use –

and any application – or use is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

the proposal of blindness as – ‘a darkness in the soul or in the head of a blind man’

may have an application in a poetic context –

however – outside of that – I would say – pretty useless

425. ‘In numberless cases we exert ourselves to find a picture and

once it is found the application as it were comes about of itself. In

this case we already have a picture which forces itself on us at every

turn,—but does not help us out of the difficulty, which only begins

here.

If I ask, for example: “How am I to imagine this mechanism going

into this box?"—perhaps a drawing reduced in scale may serve to

answer me. Then I can be told: "You see, it goes in like this"; or

perhaps even: "Why are you surprised? See how it goes here; it is the

same there". Of course the latter does not explain anything more: it

simply invites me to apply the picture I am given.’

where and how a picture / proposal – is applied – is up for grabs – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

we face propositional uncertainty at every turn –

and we respond and proceed with proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

426. ‘A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense

unambiguously. The actual use, compared with that suggested by the

picture, seems like something muddied. Here again we get the same

thing as in set theory: the form of expression we use seems to have been

designed for a god, who knows what we cannot know; he sees the whole

of each of those infinite series and he sees into human consciousness.

For us, of course, these forms of expression are like pontificals which

we may put on, but cannot do much with, since we lack the effective

power that would give these vestments meaning and purpose.

In the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by

side-roads. We see the straight highway before us, but of course we

cannot use it, because it is permanently closed.’

‘A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense unambiguously.’

here – it is not that a picture is ‘conjured up’ – reality is not a magic show

what happens is that a proposal is put

‘sense’ is not floating around – waiting to be ‘fixed’ –

sense is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and if the sense of a proposal is regarded as ‘unambiguous’ – that is only because it has not been critically evaluated –

sense is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The actual use, compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddied.’

‘muddied?’ –

in logical terms what this means is that the use of any proposal – any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘Here again we get the same thing as in set theory: the form of expression we use seems to have been designed for a god, who knows what we cannot know; he sees the whole of each of those infinite series and he sees into human consciousness. For us, of course, these forms of expression are like pontificals which we may put on, but cannot do much with, since we lack the effective power that would give these vestments meaning and purpose.’

this is just Pythagorean mysticism – the kind of view that Russell started out with – and found made no logical sense at all

proponents of such mystical rubbish have no claim to being called logicians

the hard reality is that set theory is a rule-governed propositional game – no different in principle to any other game

if you play the game – you play according to the rules given –

if you don’t follow the rules of the game – you don’t play the game –

the game as played – is not open to question

‘In the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by side-roads. We see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed.’

‘in the actual use of expressions’ – if we proceed logically – we put our proposals to question – to doubt – and we explore their uncertainty

the way before us is not closed –

the way before us is open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

427. ‘"While I was speaking to him I did not know what was going

on in his head." In saying this, one is not thinking of brain-processes,

but of thought-processes. The picture should be taken seriously.

We should really like to see into his head. And yet we only mean what

elsewhere we should mean by saying: we should like to know what he

is thinking. I want to say: we have this vivid picture—and that use,

apparently contradicting the picture, which expresses the psychical.’

‘"While I was speaking to him I did not know what was going on in his head." In saying this, one is not thinking of brain-processes, but of thought-processes.’

what we are dealing with is proposal –

and proposals that can be variously described – i.e. – as ‘brain-processes’ –‘thought processes’

‘we should like to see into his head’ –

is to say – we should like to know what he is proposing – that he has not made public

‘I want to say: we have this vivid picture—and that use, apparently contradicting the picture, which expresses the psychical.’

the fact is – the ‘psychical’ – if it remains private – is for others – the ‘unknown’ –

and logically speaking – it is not in the picture

428. ‘"This queer thing, thought"—but it does not strike us as

queer when we are thinking. Thought does not strike us as mysterious

while we are thinking, but only when we say, as it were retrospectively:

"How was that possible?" How was it possible for thought to deal

with the very object itself? We feel as if by means of it we had caught

reality in our net.’

what we do is propose –

and what we deal with is what is proposed

thought is proposal

‘the very object itself’ – is a proposal

we do not catch reality in a net –

reality is proposed –

our propositional net – is our reality –

our reality is our propositional net

our proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

reality is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

429. ‘The agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality consists

in this: if I say falsely that something is red, then, for all that, it isn't red

And when I want to explain the word "red" to someone, in the sentence

"That is not red", I do it by pointing to something red.’

thought is proposal – reality is proposal –

a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

thought is uncertain – reality is uncertain

the proposal – the proposition – ‘this is red’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the proposal – the proposition – ‘that is not red’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

430. ‘"Put a ruler against this body; it does not say that the body is

of such-and-such a length. Rather is it in itself—I should like to say—

dead, and achieves nothing of what thought achieves."—It is as if

we had imagined that the essential thing about a living man was the

outward form. Then we made a lump of wood in that form, and were

abashed to see the stupid block, which hadn't even any similarity to a

living being.’

it is not a question of what the ruler achieves against what thought achieves

thought is proposal –

the ruler is proposed as a tool of measurement –

of if you like – the ruler is thought of as a tool of measurement

431. ‘"There is a gulf between an order and its execution. It

has to be filled by the act of understanding."

"Only in the act of understanding is it meant that we are to do

THIS. The order——why, that is nothing but sounds, ink-marks.—"’

an act of understanding – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the order is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

                                                                                                                                       432. ‘Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?—In use

it is alive. Is life breathed into it there?—Or is the use its life?’

no – a sign by itself does not seem dead

a mark may be dead –

what transforms a mark into a sign – is proposal –

and the sign as proposed –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and the sign as used –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

433. ‘When we give an order, it can look as if the ultimate thing

sought by the order had to remain unexpressed, as there is always a

gulf between an order and its execution. Say I want someone to make

a particular movement, say to raise his arm. To make it quite clear, I

do the movement. This picture seems unambiguous till we ask: how

does he know that he is to make that movement"?—How does he know at all

what use he is to make of the signs I give him, whatever they are?—

Perhaps I shall now try to supplement the order by means of further

signs, by pointing from myself to him, making encouraging gestures,

etc. . Here it looks as if the order were beginning to stammer.

As if the signs were precariously trying to produce understanding in

us.—But if we now understand them, by what token do we understand?’

‘When we give an order, it can look as if the ultimate thing sought by the order had to remain unexpressed, as there is always a gulf between an order and its execution.’

an order is a proposal in the form of a direction

the thing sought – is its execution – the propositional action proposed in the order

‘Here it looks as if the order were beginning to stammer.’

the order is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

orders can and do ‘stammer’

‘As if the signs were precariously trying to produce understanding in us.—But if we now understand them, by what token do we understand?’

signs are logically ‘precarious’ – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

signs / tokens do not produce understanding in us –

signs / tokens represent a proposed understanding

and any proposed understanding – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

434. ‘The gesture—we should like to say—tries to portray, but cannot do it.’

the gesture – is a proposal –

and as with any proposal – what is proposed – what is portrayed – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

435. ‘If it is asked: "How do sentences manage to represent?"—the

answer might be: "Don't you know? You certainly see it, when you

use them." For nothing is concealed.

How do sentences do it?-—Don't you know? For nothing is hidden.

But given this answer: "But you know how sentences do it, for

nothing is concealed" one would like to retort "Yes, but it all goes by

so quick, and I should like to see it as it were laid open to view."’

"How do sentences manage to represent?"

how a a sentence – a proposal manages to represent – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘For nothing is concealed.’

nothing is concealed – and everything is open to question

436. ‘Here it is easy to get into that dead-end in philosophy, where

one believes that the difficulty of the task consists in our having to

describe phenomena that are hard to get hold of, the present experience

that slips quickly by, or something of the kind. Where we find ordinary

language too crude, and it looks as if we were having to do, not with

the phenomena of every-day, but with ones that "easily elude us, and,

in their coming to be and passing away, produce those others as an

average effect". (Augustine: Manifestissima et usitatissima sunt, et

eadem rusus nimis latent, et nova est inventio eorum.)’

what we deal – with logically speaking – is proposal –

‘phenomena that ‘easily elude us, and, in their coming to be and passing away, produce those others as an average effect’’ – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

failing to see this – can and does – end up in dead-end philosophy

437. ‘A wish seems already to know what will or would satisfy it;

a proposition, a thought, what makes it true—even when that thing

is not there at all! Whence this determining of what is not yet there?

This despotic demand? ("The hardness of the logical must.")’

‘wishing’ – is not knowing

what is not there – is not proposed – is unknown

‘The hardness of the logical must’ –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

438. ‘"A plan as such is something unsatisfied." (Like a wish,

an expectation, a suspicion, and so on.)

By this I mean: expectation is unsatisfied, because it is the expectation

of something; belief, opinion, is unsatisfied, because it is the opinion

that something is the case, something real, something outside the

process of believing.’

a plan is a proposal – for a future state of affairs

an expectation is a proposal – for a future state of affairs

and yes – any proposal – whether described as – a plan – an expectation – or whatever – logically speaking – is unsatisfied

a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is – uncertain

expectation is not – ‘the opinion that something is the case, something real, something outside of believing’

an expectation is a proposal for a state of affairs – a state of affairs that is not – at the time of the expectation – the case – real – or outside of believing

439. ‘In what sense can one call wishes, expectations, beliefs, etc.

"unsatisfied"? What is our prototype of nonsatisfaction? Is it a

hollow space? And would one call that unsatisfied? Wouldn't this

be a metaphor too?—Isn't what we call nonsatisfaction a feeling—say

hunger?

In a particular system of expressions we can describe an object by

means of the words "satisfied" and "unsatisfied". For example, if

we lay it down that we call a hollow cylinder an "unsatisfied cylinder"

and the solid cylinder that fills it "its satisfaction".’

‘In what sense can one call wishes, expectations, beliefs, etc. "unsatisfied"?’

you put a proposal regarding what you would like to happen

the proposal is unsatisfied – in the sense that what you would like to happen – is something that has not happened

‘What is our prototype of nonsatisfaction?’

whatever your prototype is – it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt –and uncertain

‘In a particular system of expressions we can describe an object by means of the words "satisfied" and "unsatisfied".’-

yes – the terms ‘satisfied’ and ‘unsatisfied’ can be given a technical definition – or a customary use

440. ‘Saying "I should like an apple" does not mean: I believe an

apple will quell my feeling of nonsatisfaction. This proposition is

not an expression of a wish but of nonsatisfaction.’

‘I should like an apple’ –

is to put a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to whether it is an expression of a wish – or an expression of nonsatisfaction – or of something else – cannot be even approached – independently of the propositional context in which it is put

Wittgenstein provides no propositional context for this proposal –

and consequently – he is not in a position to make any assessment

and were he in a position to make an assessment –

that assessment would be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

441. ‘By nature and by a particular training, a particular education,

we are disposed to give spontaneous expression to wishes in certain

circumstances. (A wish is, of course, not such a 'circumstance'.) In

this game the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is

fulfilled cannot arise at all And the fact that some event stops my

wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been

satisfied if my wish had been satisfied.

On the other hand the word "wish" is also used in this way: "I

don't know myself what I wish for." ("For wishes themselves are a

veil between us and the thing wished for.")

Suppose it were asked "Do I know what I long for before I get it?"

If I have learned to talk, then I do know.’

a ‘wish’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied.’

a satisfied wish – is a proposal –  

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

satisfaction – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I don't know myself what I wish for.’

if you don’t know – you don’t know

‘Do I know what I long for before I get it’

 yes

442. ‘I see someone pointing a gun and say "I expect a report".

The shot is fired.—Well, that was what you expected; so did that

report somehow already exist in your expectation? Or is it just that

there is some other kind of agreement between your expectation and

what occurred; that that noise was not contained in your expectation,

and merely accidentally supervened when the expectation was being

fulfilled?—But no, if the noise had not occurred, my expectation would

not have been fulfilled; the noise fulfilled it; it was not an accompaniment

of the fulfilment like a second guest accompanying the one I expected.—

Was the thing about the event that was not in the expectation too an

accident, an extra provided by fate?—But then what was not an extra?

Did something of the shot already occur in my expectation?—

Then what was extra? for wasn't I expecting the whole shot?"

The report was not so loud as I had expected."—"Then was there

a louder bang in your expectation?"’

‘Well, that was what you expected; so did that report somehow already exist in your expectation?’

your expectation is a proposal –

the actual occurrence of the event proposed / expected – is not your expectation –

is not an expectation –

the occurrence of the event – is a separate propositional event –

both the expectation  – and the event – are proposals – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

i.e. – yes – I said – ‘I expect a report’ – but did I really – was I expecting a report – or just the threat of one?

what was that a gunshot – or a car backfiring?

such questions may or may not be asked – such doubts may or may not be raised – and such uncertainties – may or may not be explored –

the point is that any proposal – be it an expectation / proposal – or any event / proposal

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

443. ‘"The red which you imagine is surely not the same (not the

same thing) as the red which you see in front of you; so how can you

say that it is what you imagined?"—But haven't we an analogous case

with the propositions "Here is a red patch" and "Here there isn't a

red patch"? The word "red" occurs in both; so this word cannot

indicate the presence of something red.’

‘"The red which you imagine is surely not the same (not the same thing) as the red which you see in front of you; so how can you say that it is what you imagined?"’

well you can say – you can propose that – that is what you imagined –

you may well agree that what you imagine is ‘not the same thing’ as the red which you see in front of you – but argue – it is the same colour

and your proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘But haven't we an analogous case with the propositions "Here is a red patch" and "Here there isn't a red patch"? The word "red" occurs in both; so this word cannot

indicate the presence of something red.’

‘isn’t a red patch’ –

indicates that is there is not a red patch

negating ‘a red patch’ – is not to be confused with asserting ‘a red patch’

basic – very basic – logic – I would have thought

444. ‘One may have the feeling that in the sentence "I expect he is

coming" one is using the words "he is coming" in a different sense

from the one they have in the assertion "He is coming". But if it were

so how could I say that my expectation had been fulfilled? If I wanted

to explain the words "he" and "is coming", say by means of ostensive

definitions, the same definitions of these words would go for both

sentences.

But it might now be asked: what's it: like for him to come?—-The

door opens, someone walks in, and so on.—What's it like for me to

expect him to come?—I walk up and down the room, look at the

clock now and then, and so on.—But the one set of events has not

the smallest similarity to the other! So how can one use the same

words in describing them?—But perhaps I say as I walk up and down:

"I expect he'll come in"—Now there is a similarity somewhere. But

of what kind?!’

‘If I wanted to explain the words "he" and "is coming", say by means of ostensive

definitions, the same definitions of these words would go for both sentences.’

perhaps in a certain propositional context ‘he is coming’ – can be interpreted as ‘I expect he is coming’

‘I expect he is coming’ – and ‘he is coming’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

expecting him to come – and his coming through the door – are separate events

‘So how can one use the same words in describing them?’

they are the same words – but they are used in different propositional contexts

445. ‘It is in language that an expectation and its fulfilment make contact.’

all contact is propositional – all contact is a relation between propositions –

and all propositional relations are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

446. ‘It would be odd to say: "A process looks different when it

happens from when it doesn't happen." Or "A red patch looks

different when it is there from when it isn't there—but language

abstracts from this difference, for it speaks of a red patch whether it

is there or not."’

it is not that – ‘language abstracts from this difference, for it speaks of a red patch whether it is there or not."’

the proposal ‘a red patch’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

consider – ‘there is a red patch on the dinning room table’

I say it’s a red patch – you say – no it’s not – it’s a brown patch

the proposal – ‘there is a red patch on the dinning room table’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

447. ‘The feeling is as if the negation of a proposition had to make

it true in a certain sense, in order to negate it.

(The assertion of the negative proposition contains the proposition

which is negated, but not the assertion of it.)’

a proposal is put –

a proposal of dissent – of denial – is put – in relation to – the subject proposal

two separate proposals – the proposal put – and the proposal of dissent – of denial

to dissent from a proposition – is not to assert it

448. ‘"If I say I did not dream last night, still I must know where

to look for a dream; that is, the proposition 'I dreamt', applied to

this actual situation, may be false, but mustn't be senseless."—Does

that mean, then, that you did after all feel something, as it were the

hint of a dream, which made you aware of the place which a dream

would have occupied?

Again: if I say "I have no pain in my arm", does that mean that I

have a shadow of the sensation of pain, which as it were indicates the

place where the pain might be?

In what sense does my present painless state contain the possibility

of pain?

If anyone says: "For the word 'pain' to have a meaning it is necessary

that pain should be recognized as such when it occurs"—-one can reply:

"It is not more necessary than that the absence of pain should be

recognized."’

‘Does that mean, then, that you did after all feel something, as it were the hint of a dream, which made you aware of the place which a dream would have occupied?’

a so called ‘hint’ of a dream – is not a dream

‘I have no pain in my arm", does that mean that I have a shadow of the sensation of pain’

if I say ‘I have no pain in my arm’  – ‘in my arm’ – states where a pain might be –

it doesn’t mean that I have a ‘shadow of the sensation of pain’ –

there is no such thing

‘In what sense does my present painless state contain the possibility of pain?

perhaps it does – perhaps it doesn’t – I don’t know

‘If anyone says: "For the word 'pain' to have a meaning it is necessary that pain should be recognized as such when it occurs"—-one can reply: "It is not more necessary than that the absence of pain should be recognized."’

the meaning of the word ‘pain’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

as to the absence of pain – it doesn’t tell you what pain is

449. ‘"But mustn't I know what it would be like if I were in pain?"—

We fail to get away from the idea that using a sentence involves

imagining something for every word.

We do not realize that we calculate, operate, with words, and in the

course of time translate them sometimes into one picture, sometimes

into another.—It is as if one were to believe that a written order for a

cow which someone is to hand over to me always had to be accompanied

by an image of a cow, if the order was not to lose its meaning.’

‘"But mustn't I know what it would be like if I were in pain?"—

I don’t see why

‘We fail to get away from the idea that using a sentence involves imagining something for every word.’

imagining may play a part in word usage – or it may not

often we use words – habitually – as a matter of course

and we also operate critically with our use of words –

i.e. figuring out whether a word fits – or whether it is the best word for a particular propositional context –

this is a logical activity –

a word is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

how we use a word is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘We do not realize that we calculate, operate, with words, and in the course of time translate them sometimes into one picture, sometimes into another’

what we need to realise is that it is propositional uncertainty –

that is the ground and basis of our word usage – its diversity and its creativity

450. ‘Knowing what someone looks like: being able to call up an image—

but also: being able to mimic his expression. Need one imagine

it in order to mimic it? And isn't mimicking it just as good as

imagining it?’

an imaginative proposal and a mimic proposal – are different propositional actions

as to whether imagining is as good as mimicking – the matter is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

I would think it is a matter of what works where –

and any answer here  – is open to question

451. ‘Suppose I give someone the order "Imagine a red circle here"

—and now I say: understanding the order means knowing what it is

like for it to have been carried out—or even: being able to imagine

what it is like .....?’

‘Suppose I give someone the order "Imagine a red circle here"

the one receiving the order can say ‘yes – I’ve done what you have ordered’ – or – ‘no –

I haven’t done what you have ordered’

the one giving the order has to take either response on trust –

he can’t know if it has been carried out

an order is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

understanding an order – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain  

understanding an order may mean knowing what it is like for it to have been carried out

or it may mean imagining what it is like …? –

you may understand the order – but not know how to carry it out

or you may understand the order – but be unsure of how to carry it out

452. ‘I want to say: "If someone could see the mental process of

expectation, he would necessarily be seeing what was being expected."

—But that is the case: if you see the expression of an expectation, you

see what is being expected. And in what other way, in what other sense

would it be possible to see it?’

what you ‘see’ is what is proposed –

and what is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

453. ‘Anyone who perceived my expectation would necessarily

have a direct perception of what was being expected. That is to say, he

would not have to infer it from the process he perceived!—But to say

that someone perceives an expectation makes no sense. Unless indeed

it means, for example, that he perceives the expression of an expectation.

To say of an expectant person that he perceives his expectation

instead of saying that he expects, would be an idiotic distortion of the

expression.’

an expectation is a proposal –

the expression of the proposal – is the proposal made public

an expectant person – proposes –

that proposal can be made public – or not –

the proposal can made public – verbally – or non-verbally – i.e. behaviourally

to say that an expectant person perceives his expectation – is just to say – he puts his proposal

454. ‘"Everything is already there in ... ." How does it come

about that this arrow -------->> points? Doesn’t it seem to

carry in it something besides itself? — "No, not the dead line on paper;

only the psychical thing, the meaning, can do that." — That is both

true and false. The arrow points only in the application that a living

being makes of it.

This pointing is not a hocus-pocus which can be performed only by

the soul.’

pointing is a propositional act –

how it is accounted for – how it is explained –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

455. ‘We want to say: "When we mean something, it's like going

up to someone, it's not having a dead picture (of any kind)." We go

up to the thing we mean.’

‘the thing we mean’ – is a proposal

and this proposal has meaning –

at the very least we mean it as ‘a thing’

that is we begin with a primitive or basic meaning

and to this we propose –

and our proposals develop on the basic meaning

just how meaning is understood is open to question – open to doubt

meaning is uncertain

and it is just this uncertainty – this logical uncertainty –

that gives meaning – its vitality

456. ‘"When one means something, it is oneself meaning"; so one is

oneself in motion. One is rushing ahead and so cannot also observe

oneself rushing ahead. Indeed not.’

‘When one means something, it is oneself meaning’

when one means something – one puts a proposal –

and that proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and in uncertain

likely – in most cases – you will put such proposals without reflection –

but you can be aware of your propositional actions

and likely you will be when you find you are facing questions – doubts – and exploring the uncertainty of your proposals

457. ‘Yes: meaning something is like going up to someone.’

meaning – is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the proposal – ‘meaning something is like going up to someone’ – is affair enough

and as with any such proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

458. ‘"An order orders its own execution." So it knows its execution,

then, even before it is there?—But that was a grammatical

proposition and it means: If an order runs "Do such-and-such" then

executing the order is called "doing such-and-such."’

‘If an order runs "Do such-and-such" then executing the order is called "doing such-and-such."’

yes

an order is a form of proposal –

what it proposes – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and its execution – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

459. ‘We say "The order orders this—" and do it; but also "The

order orders this: I am to ... ." We translate it at one time into a

proposition, at another into a demonstration, and at another into

action.’

the order is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

open to interpretation – and re-interpretation

460. ‘Could the justification of an action as fulfilment of an order

run like this: "You said 'Bring me a yellow flower', upon which this

one gave me a feeling of satisfaction; that is why I have brought it"?

Wouldn't one have to reply: "But I didn't set you to bring me the

flower which should give you that sort of feeling after what I said!"?’

justifying the fulfilment of an order?

an order is either obeyed – fulfilled – or it is not

so called ‘justification’ of fulfilment – is neither here nor there –

it is irrelevant

461. ‘In what sense does an order anticipate its execution? By

ordering just that which later on is carried out?—But one would have

to say "which later on is carried out, or again is not carried out."

And that is to say nothing.

"But even if my wish does not determine what is going to be the

case, still it does so to speak determine the theme of a fact, whether

the fact fulfils the wish or not." We are—as it were—surprised, not

at anyone's knowing the future, but at his being able to prophesy at

all (right or wrong).

As if the mere prophecy, no matter whether true or false, fore-

shadowed the future; whereas it knows nothing of the future and

cannot know less than nothing.’

‘In what sense does an order anticipate its execution?’

an order is a proposal – a proposal does not anticipate

the person giving the order may or may not anticipate

‘But one would have to say "which later on is carried out, or again is not carried out."

And that is to say nothing.’

a proposal in the form of an order – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

whether the order is carried out or not – is uncertain –

and that is not to say nothing

‘"But even if my wish does not determine what is going to be the case, still it does so to speak determine the theme of a fact, whether the fact fulfils the wish or not."’

your wish – one way or the other – and this so called ‘theme’ of the fact – is logically irrelevant

‘We are—as it were—surprised, not at anyone's knowing the future, but at his being able to prophesy at all (right or wrong).’

 yes – we are surprised – big deal!

‘As if the mere prophecy, no matter whether true or false, fore-shadowed the future; whereas it knows nothing of the future and cannot know less than nothing.’

it’s having a bet mate – we do this every day – every minute of every day –

it is as commonplace as dirt and sky

462. ‘I can look for him when he is not there, but not hang him

when he is not there.

One might want to say: "But he must be somewhere there if I am

looking for him."—Then he must be somewhere there too if I don't

find him and even if he doesn't exist at all.’

‘But he must be somewhere there if I am looking for him.’ –

one can say this – if one is somewhat pretentious

if you are looking for someone – and you can’t find him – then you don’t know where he is –

simple as that

‘Then he must be somewhere there too if I don't find him and even if he doesn't exist at all.’

if you don’t find him – whether he is ‘somewhere there’ – or not – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

but if he doesn’t exist – he’s not there

and if he doesn’t exist – and you are looking for him – then you are at the very least – a fool

463. ‘"You were looking for him? You can't even have known if

he was there!"—But this problem really does arise when one looks

for something in mathematics. One can ask, for example, how was it

possible so much as to look for the trisection of the angle?’

‘You were looking for him? You can't even have known if he was there!’

whether he is there or not – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘But this problem really does arise when one looks for something in mathematics. One can ask, for example, how was it possible so much as to look for the trisection of the angle?’

the proposal that an angle can be trisected – as with any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

in mathematics there are arguments for and against the trisection of an angle 

464. ‘My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised

nonsense to something that is patent nonsense.’

and which form of nonsense is the above?

465. ‘"An expectation is so made that whatever happens has to

accord with it, or not.

"Suppose you now ask: then are facts defined one way or the other

by an expectation—that is, is it defined for whatever event may occur

whether it fulfils the expectation or not? The answer has to be: "Yes,

unless the expression of the expectation is indefinite; for example,

contains a disjunction of different possibilities."’

an expectation – is a form of proposal

and as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘whatever happens’ – is whatever is proposed –

whatever is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

466. ‘What does man think for? What use is it?—Why does he

make boilers according to calculations and not leave the thickness of

their walls to chance? After all it is only a fact of experience that

boilers do not explode so often if made according to these calculations.

But just as having once been burnt he would do anything rather than

put his hand into a fire, so he would do anything rather than not

calculate for a boiler.—But as we are not interested in causes,—we

shall say: human beings do in fact think: this, for instance, is how they

proceed when they make a boiler.—Now, can't a boiler produced in

this way explode? Oh, yes.’

‘What does man think for?

a man thinks because he thinks – it is what we do

‘What use is it?’ –

whatever use it is put to

‘Why does he make boilers according to calculations and not leave the thickness of

their walls to chance? After all it is only a fact of experience that boilers do not explode so often if made according to these calculations.’

calculation is a propositional game

a game is a rule-governed propositional action

when you play rule-governed games – you pretend certainty

we calculate to pretend certainty

‘human beings do in fact think: this, for instance, is how they proceed when they make a boiler.—Now, can't a boiler produced in this way explode? Oh, yes.’

what explodes – is the pretence of certainty

467. ‘Does man think, then, because he has found that thinking

pays?—Because he thinks it advantageous to think?

(Does he bring his children up because he has found it pays?)’

look – the bottom line is – we don’t know why we do what we do

we propose – to make known

and these proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

468. ‘What would shew why he thinks?’

nothing

469. ‘And yet one can say that thinking has been found to pay.

That there are fewer boiler explosions than formerly, now that we

no longer go by feeling in deciding the thickness of the walls, but

make such-and-such calculations instead. Or since each calculation

done by one engineer got checked by a second one.’

‘And yet one can say that thinking has been found to pay.’

one can put this proposal – but as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘That there are fewer boiler explosions than formerly, now that we no longer go by feeling in deciding the thickness of the walls, but make such-and-such calculations instead.’

I don’t know how you can know this –

has anyone even done a test of this proposal?

calculation is a rule-governed propositional game –

if you play the game – you play according to its rule

the result is rule-governed –

and in the game as played – the rule – and its result – are not put to question

any confidence gained from calculation – is gained  in the absence of question – in the absence of doubt – and without any exploration of propositional uncertainty

‘Or since each calculation done by one engineer got checked by a second one.’ –

if the calculation is not correct – the rule has not been followed – then there is no calculation

if it is correct – then checking it – is no more than repeating it –

and it is quite irrelevant how may times it is repeated – or by how many

470. ‘So we do sometimes think because it has been found to pay.’

we think because it sometimes pays to think?

isn’t it rather that we think whether it pays or not?

and if it sometimes pays to think – is the pay-off – a reason for thinking?

or is it just a proposed result of thinking?

the real point here is that any proposal regarding the reason for thinking –

or for that matter any proposal regarding the nature of thinking –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

471. ‘It often happens that we only become aware of the important

facts, if we suppress the question "why?"; and then in the course of

our investigations these facts lead us to an answer.’

well if so – any ‘answer’ here – is – as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

472. ‘The character of the belief in the uniformity of nature can

perhaps be seen most clearly in the case in which we fear what we

expect. Nothing could induce me to put my hand into a flame—

although after all it is only in the past that I have burnt myself.’

this belief in the uniformity of nature is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

whether your past experience indicates your future experience –

is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

erring on the side of caution – does not change the logic of the matter

473. ‘The belief that fire will burn me is of the same kind as the

fear that it will burn me.’

the belief / proposal that the fire will burn you –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

an old magic trick is that if you pass you hand through a flame constantly – you will not be burnt

you can hold the belief without fear

474. ‘I shall get burnt if I put my hand in the fire: that is certainty.

That is to say: here we see the meaning of certainty. (What it amounts

to, not just the meaning of the word "certainty.")’

‘I shall get burnt if I put my hand in the fire’ –

is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the point is – questions can be raised as to just what this means – or can mean –

i.e. – if you pass your hand through a flame at a uniform speed – you will not get burnt –

‘(What it amounts to, not just the meaning of the word "certainty.")’

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there is no certainty – but we have the pretence of it –

a pretence manifested in delusion – prejudice and ignorance

475. ‘On being asked for the grounds of a supposition, one be-

thinks oneself of them. Does the same thing happen here as when one

considers what may have been the causes of an event?’

if one is asked – as distinct from ‘considers’ – the answer is probably – yes

any proposal – as to ‘the grounds of a supposition’ – as with any proposal as to ‘what may have been the causes of an event’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

476. ‘We should distinguish between the object of fear and the

cause of fear.

Thus a face which inspires fear or delight (the object of fear or

delight), is not on that account its cause, but—one might say—its

target.’

distinguishing between the object of fear and the cause of fear. –

is to distinguish between proposals –

cause and target?

any propositional analysis is open to question open to doubt – and uncertain

477. ‘"Why do you believe that you will burn yourself on the

hot-plate?"—Have you reasons for this belief; and do you need

reasons?’

‘"Why do you believe that you will burn yourself on the hot-plate?"’

experience – either direct – or indirect

‘Have you reasons for this belief; and do you need reasons?’

the arguments of physics and chemistry here – will underpin any experiential proposal

do you need reasons to underpin experience?

no – if you take the argument from experience on face value

if you query it – you may investigate the scientific theories that have been proposed to account for the experience

and to do this in a critical way – is to put them to question – put them to doubt – and explore their uncertainty

which is to say – to explore the logical uncertainty of the experience

478. ‘What kind of reason have I to assume that my finger will

feel a resistance when it touches the table? What kind of reason to

believe that it will hurt if this pencil pierces my hand?—When I ask

this, a hundred reasons present themselves, each drowning the voice

of the others. "But I have experienced it myself innumerable times,

and as often heard of similar experiences; if it were not so, it would

.......; etc."’

"But I have experienced it myself innumerable times, and as often heard of similar experiences; if it were not so, it would.......; etc."’

yes – experience – direct and indirect –

we propose experience – as the ground of our beliefs – and the basis of our actions

what we know is that ‘experience’ – however it is defined – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

and this – regardless of what may have occurred in the past – or what may occur in the future –

we live with this uncertainty – it is the basis of our thought and action

it is the ground of our vitality

479. ‘The question: "On what grounds do you believe this?" might

mean: "From what you are now deducing it (have you just deduced

it)?" But it might also mean: "What grounds can you produce for

this assumption on thinking it over?"’

any proposal as to the grounds of one’s belief – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

480. ‘Thus one could in fact take "grounds" for an opinion to

mean only what a man had said to himself before he arrived at the

opinion. The calculation that he has actually carried out. If it is

now asked: But how can previous experience be a ground for

assuming that such-and-such will occur later on?—the answer is:

What general concept have we of grounds for this kind of assumption?

This sort of statement about the past is simply what we call a ground

for assuming that this will happen in the future.—And if you are

surprised at our playing such a game I refer you to the effect of a past

experience (to the fact that a burnt child fears the fire).’

‘Thus one could in fact take "grounds" for an opinion to mean only what a man had said to himself before he arrived at the opinion.’

yes – the proposed grounds are any propositional underpinning of the subject proposition

any such underpinning – is a proposal –

and as with the subject proposition – the ‘ground proposal’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘But how can previous experience be a ground for assuming that such-and-such will occur later on?’

well it is a ground – if it is proposed as such

‘What general concept have we of grounds for this kind of assumption?’

propositional uncertainty

all our proposals – our propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if you think that the proposal of grounds – moves you towards certainty – you are deluded

and really we can ask – what is this proposal of grounds – but a throwback to fallacious and outdated epistemology?

really we should see the matter quite simply this way –

a proposal is put – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

grounds are a logical dead weight

481. ‘If anyone said that information about the past could not

convince him that something would happen in the future, I should not

understand him. One might ask him: What do you expect to be told,

then? What sort of information do you call a ground for such a belief?

What do you call "conviction"? In what kind of way do you expect

to be convinced?—If these are not grounds, then what are grounds?—

If you say these are not grounds, then you must surely be able to state

what must be the case for us to have the right to say that there are

grounds for our assumption.

For note: here grounds are not propositions which logically imply

what is believed.

Not that one can say: less is needed for belief than for knowledge.—

For the question here is not one of an approximation to logical

inference.’

‘What sort of information do you call a ground for such a belief?

a ground is a propositional basis for a belief –

any propositional ground is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘What do you call "conviction"? In what kind of way do you expect to be convinced’

if by ‘conviction’ is meant a belief that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain

there is no logical basis for such a belief

any such belief is illogical

I call ‘conviction’ – pig headed ignorance

‘If these are not grounds, then what are grounds?’

a ground is a propositional basis for belief – like the belief in question – the ‘grounds’

are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

really the grounds of a belief – are whatever propositional argument – you put for your belief

and what this amounts to – what ‘grounds’ amount to – is rhetoric –

you persuade by proposing grounds for your belief – persuade yourself – or someone else

‘For note: here grounds are not propositions which logically imply what is believed.’

a ground for a belief is a proposal – is a proposition –

it is a proposal that is put to underpin the belief

‘Not that one can say: less is needed for belief than for knowledge.— For the question here is not one of an approximation to logical inference.’

knowledge is proposal – belief is proposal – logical inference is proposal –

a proposal of any form  – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

482. ‘We are misled by this way of putting it: "This is a good ground, for it makes the occurrence of the event probable." That is as if we had asserted something further about the ground, which justified it as a ground; whereas to say that this ground makes the occurrence probable is to say nothing except that this ground comes up

to a particular standard of good grounds—but the standard has no grounds!’

the ground of a belief – is a proposal put – that functions as a reason for holding the

belief –

the belief and the ground for the belief – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

you may well believe that the event is probable –

any proposed ground for your belief – has nothing to do with whether the event is likely to occur

your proposed ‘ground’ may well boost your confidence in your belief –

and here the function of the ‘ground’ proposal – is rhetorical

483. ‘A good ground is one that looks like this.’

a ‘good’ ground – will be a ground that gives you confidence in the proposal it ‘grounds’

which is to say ‘a good ground’ – is a rhetorical devise –

even so – what counts as a ‘good ground’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

484. ‘One would like to say: "It is a good ground only because it

makes the occurrence really probable". Because it, so to speak, really

has an influence on the event; as it were an experiential one.’

this is just rhetoric – arguing for rhetoric

485. ‘Justification by experience comes to an end. If it did not it

would not be justification.’

any justification is a proposal –

a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there is no ‘end’ to uncertainty

there is no logical end to so called ‘justification’

there is an empirical end to it though –

it is when you stop questioning – stop putting to doubt – and stop exploring propositional uncertainty

claims of justification – are not logical – they are rhetorical –

their function is to persuade

486. ‘Does it follow from the sense-impressions which I get that

there is a chair over there?—How can a proposition follow from sense-

impressions? Well, does it follow from the propositions which describe

the sense-impressions? No.—But don't I infer that a chair is there

from impressions, from sense-data?—I make no inference!—and yet I

sometimes do. I see a photograph for example, and say "There must

have been a chair over there" or again "From what I can see here I infer

that there is a chair over there." That is an inference; but not one

belonging to logic. An inference is a transition to an assertion; and so

also to the behaviour that corresponds to the assertion. 'I draw the

consequences' not only in words, but also in action.

Was I justified in drawing these consequences? What is called a

justification here?—How is the word "justification" used? Describe

language-games. From these you will also be able to see the importance

of being justified.’

‘Does it follow from the sense-impressions which I get that there is a chair over there?

yes – if you propose that argument –

but as with any proposal – any propositional argument – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘How can a proposition follow from sense-impressions?’

sense impressions are proposals – are propositions

a proposition can follow from any other – if it is proposed that it does

and the ‘follow-on proposal’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘An inference is a transition to an assertion’

an inference is a proposal – a proposal – relating propositions –

a proposal that one proposition ‘follows from’ another –

that is the proposal

’and so also to the behaviour that corresponds to the assertion. 'I draw the consequences' not only in words, but also in action.’

behaviour is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

actions are proposals –

a proposal of whatever form – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there is no justification – in logic

justification is a rhetorical notion

language-games – or language uses – in which justification features – are rhetorical games – rhetorical uses

being justified is important – if what you are about is persuasion

487. ‘"I am leaving the room because you tell me to."

"I am leaving the room, but not because you tell me to."

Does this proposition describe a connexion between my action and his

order; or does it make the connexion?

Can one ask: "How do you know that you do it because of this, or

not because of this?" And is the answer perhaps: "I feel it"?’

‘Does this proposition describe a connexion between my action and his order; or does it make the connexion?’

I think one could argue either way –

and I think one could argue that it does both

"How do you know that you do it because of this, or not because of this?"

it is really a question of how you propose the matter to yourself –

and about recognising – that whatever proposal you put to yourself –

that proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

488. ‘How do I judge whether it is so? By circumstantial evidence?’

any judgment in any propositional context – is a a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

so – logically speaking – any judgment is circumstantial

as for evidence –

evidence is proposal –

proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

489. ‘Ask yourself: On what occasion, for what purpose, do we say

this?

What kind of actions accompany these words? (Think of a greeting.)

In what scenes will they be used; and what for?’

these thought experiments – are pretty useless

you say what you say for whatever purpose – and you act however you act – in whatever scene – you find yourself

and what you say and how you act – and the propositional context of your saying and acting – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

that is the logic of it

490. ‘How do I know that this line of thought has led me to this

action?—Well, it is a particular picture: for example, of a calculation

leading to a further experiment in an experimental investigation. It

looks like this——and now I could describe an example.’

‘How do I know that this line of thought has led me to this action?’

what you know is what you propose –

if you propose that ‘this line of thought has led me to this action’ – this is what you know

and this proposal – this knowledge – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘It looks like this’ –

‘this’ – quite clearly is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and describing any example – is of course – open to question

491. ‘Not: "without language we could not communicate with

one another"—but for sure: without language we cannot influence

other people in such-and-such ways; cannot build roads and machines,

etc. . And also: without the use of speech and writing people could

not communicate.’

language is a form of proposal

without proposal – in some form – we cannot influence others –

and yes – we need complex propositional structures to build roads and machines

people communicate without speech or writing

492. ‘To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument for

a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or consistently

with them); but it also has the other sense, analogous to that in which

we speak of the invention of a game.

Here I am stating something about the grammar of the word

"language", by connecting it with the grammar of the word "invent".’

a language of any kind – is proposal –

proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a game is a rule-governed propositional exercise

the game as played is not open to question – not open to doubt – and not uncertain

rules are followed – not questioned

we have two propositional modes – the critical mode – and the game mode –

we propose and critically evaluate our proposals – and we play rule-governed propositional games

the word ‘language’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to invention –

invention is the result of question – of doubt – and of the exploration of propositional uncertainty

493. ‘We say: "The cock calls the hens by crowing"—but doesn't a

comparison with our language lie at the bottom of this?—Isn't the

aspect quite altered if we imagine the crowing to set the hens in

motion by some kind of physical causation?

But if it were shewn how the words "Come to me" act on the person

addressed, so that finally, given certain conditions, the muscles of his

legs are innervated, and so on—should we feel that that sentence lost

the character of a sentence?’

a proposal is put – and it is responded to

and yes – you can propose explanation of what happens – what occurs

a causal account – is one such explanation

and as with any proposal – any explanatory proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘should we feel that that sentence lost the character of a sentence?’

has the proposal – lost the character of a proposal?

no

494. ‘I want to say: It is primarily the apparatus of our ordinary

language, of our word-language, that we call language; and then other

things by analogy or comparability with this.’

this is fair enough

logically speaking though – language is a form of proposal –

and proposal of any form – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

495. ‘Clearly, I can establish by experience that a human being (or

animal) reacts to one sign as I want him to, and to another not. That,

e.g., a human being goes to the right at the sign " ———> " and

goes to the left at the sign "<——— "; but that he does not react

to the sign " 0——| ", as to " <——— ".

I do not even need to fabricate a case, I only have to consider

what is in fact the case; namely, that I can direct a man who has learned

only German, only by using the German language. (For here I am

looking at learning German as adjusting a mechanism to respond to a

certain kind of influence; and it may be all one to us whether someone

else has learned the language, or was perhaps from birth constituted to

react to sentences in German like a normal person who has learned

German.)’

‘Clearly, I can establish by experience that a human being (or animal) reacts to one sign as I want him to, and to another not.’

‘establishing by experience’ –

‘experience’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

all experience ‘establishes’ – is logical uncertainty

how a human being or animal will react to a sign – to a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

that you might get the result you want does not change the logic of the situation –

the matter is uncertain

and of course there can always be doubt regarding – exactly what you wanted –

and just how what you got – fits with what you wanted –

approximation – is often where we settle –

and can you be sure that the reaction you got or didn’t get actually had anything to with the sign given?

assumptions are all you have here –

and the deeper you look into assumption –

the murkier it gets

best to run with what you have – and keep an open mind

496. ‘Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed

in order to fulfil its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect

on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of

signs.’

the grammar of a language is a proposal regarding the structure of language –

so yes – it is a description of language

a theory of grammar will explain what sign structures are valid or invalid – in terms of that theory

a theory of grammar is a use of language

to what extent any theory of grammar influences how people use language – is an open question

and whether or not a theory of grammar – a theory of sign structure – has such and such an effect on human beings – would be a subject of interest to linguists and anthropologists

a theory of grammar is a proposal – and as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

497. ‘‘The rules of grammar may be called "arbitrary", if that is to

mean that the aim of the grammar is nothing but that of the language.

If someone says "If our language had not this grammar, it could not

express these facts"—it should be asked what "could" means here.’’

‘‘The rules of grammar may be called "arbitrary", if that is to mean that the aim of the grammar is nothing but that of the language.’

any so called ‘rules of grammar’ are a propositional structure designed to describe the mechanics of a language –

any such propositional structure is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

in this logical sense – arbitrary –

as indeed is any propositional structure – of for that matter any proposition – any proposal

‘If someone says "If our language had not this grammar, it could not express these facts"—it should be asked what "could" means here.’’

grammar is a proposed description – of how language functions – how it works –

with or without any such description – language functions – language works

498. ‘When I say that the orders "Bring me sugar" and "Bring me

milk" make sense, but not the combination "Milk me sugar", that does

not mean that the utterance of this combination of words has no effect.

And if its effect is that the other person stares at me and gapes, I don't

on that account call it the order to stare and gape, even if that was

precisely the effect that I wanted to produce.’

‘milk me sugar’ – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

499. ‘To say "This combination of words makes no sense" excludes

it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of

language. But when one draws a boundary it may be for various

kinds of reason. If I surround an area with a fence or a line or other-

wise, the purpose may be to prevent someone from getting in or out;

but it may also be part of a game and the players be supposed, say, to

jump over the boundary; or it may shew where the property of one

man ends and that of another begins; and so on. So if I draw a

boundary line that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for.’

"This combination of words makes no sense"

this combination of words is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and any proposal regarding ‘sense’ – is in the same boat

‘So if I draw a boundary line that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for.’

true – unless you say what you are drawing it for

500. ‘When a sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its

sense that is senseless. But a combination of words is being excluded

from the language, withdrawn from circulation.’

if a proposal is put –

we are best to try to understand its sense –

even if it is designed to appear senseless – we should look at what the point of doing that might be

and really giving up on trying to understand – does not make the proposal senseless

and even if you can’t – with best of effort – make sense of it –

it doesn’t follow that it is senseless

it is rather pretentious to say that we ‘exclude’ a combination of words from the language

isn’t it rather that – we might decide that under the present circumstances – we have no use for that combination?

and who does this withdrawing from circulation?

the sense police?

look – the logical reality is that the sense of a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘uncertain’ is where we need to land


 (c) killer press. 2020.