Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Part II. 1-14

i

‘One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy,

startled. But hopeful? And why not?’

if we are really talking about imagination – and imagining – then the fact is we can imagine a dog being hopeful –

you might see this expressed in fictional stories – and artistic representations such as story books for children – or cartoons

any proposition is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

one can propose whatever one likes –

as to whether it is understood – or how it is understood – that is another matter –

should I propose that that the dog is hopeful – yes – I will be using a turn of phrase that is likely to be regarded as unusual

and it might be asked – what is it for a dog to be hopeful?

and here I would have to explain myself – explain what I mean by ‘hopeful’ – and what I mean by hopeful in the context of dog

now of course my use of the term ‘hopeful’ here is logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

but this is the case with any proposal

‘A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his

master will come the day after to-morrow?—And what can he not do

here?—How do I do it?—How am I supposed to answer this?’

and what can he not do here?—how do I do it?— how am I supposed to answer this?

here we deal primarily in speculation –

and any answer to these questions – is open to question

you answer these questions by putting proposals – and recognizing that from a logical point of view – any answer put is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘Can only those hope who can talk? (Only those who have mastered

the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes

of this complicated form of life. (If a concept refers to a character of

human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write.)’

‘Can only those hope who can talk?’

this question cannot be answered definitively one way or the other

there is no ‘definitive’ in language use – in propositional use or behaviour

the matter is open to question

‘(If a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has

no application to beings that do not write.)’

a concept and its application – as with any proposal – is open to question

the fact is that if a concept is applied – is proposed – however unusual that application is – that proposal – as with any proposal – it is open to question

our knowledge is propositional – our world is propositional – our knowledge is uncertain – our world is uncertain –

we operate with what we propose – whether ‘standard’ or idiosyncratic – and what we propose – logically speaking – is never a settled matter

‘"Grief" describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations,

in the weave of our life. If a man's bodily expression of sorrow and

of joy alternated, say with the ticking of a clock, here we should not

have the characteristic formation of the pattern of sorrow or of the

pattern of joy.’

grief – as a pattern?

well if that is proposed – fair enough

what we have with any use of the term ‘grief’ – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question

yes – we experience grief – and we witness behaviour that we term as the experience of grief – but can anyone give a definitive account of ‘grief’ – that is not open to question?

bear in mind – we might propose ‘grief’ to describe an experience – but find on reflection that the experience – is better termed something else – i.e. depression –

every proposal is open – open to account – open to interpretation

"For a second he felt violent pain."—Why does it sound queer

to say: "For a second he felt deep grief"? Only because it so seldom

happens?’

imagine someone who has lost their life partner – and has by and large recovered from the loss – but sees something quite by accident – let us say a particular and rare rose that his partner loved – and that this experience brings home to him the full magnitude of his loss –

here it might be said that for a second he felt deep grief –?

‘But don't you feel grief now? ("But aren't you playing chess now?

"The answer may be affirmative, but that does not make the concept

of grief any more like the concept of a sensation.—The question

was really, of course, a temporal and personal one, not the logical

question which we wanted to raise.’

well it is actually a logical question

if you were to say you have a ‘sensation of grief’ – what you are doing is proposing an account of grief –

now the matter is logical – just because any proposal – and any proposal of explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and being put to question – it might be asked – does the concept of ‘sensation’ fit well with that of ‘grief’ –

this is Wittgenstein’s question here –

granted ‘a sensation of grief’ – is an unusual phrase –

this does not mean though that it is ‘illogical’ or in invalid –

there is the question too – just what are we to make of the proposal ‘sensation’?

there will be different views here – and different views of its application

if a phrase does not sit well with those who hear it – or see it written – it is likely it will not gain any currency – it will for all intents and purposes be dropped

or it might be that such a phrase functions in some limited context

‘"I must tell you: I am frightened."

"I must tell you: it makes me shiver."—

And one can say this in a smiling tone of voice too.

And do you mean to tell me he doesn't feel it? How else does he

know it?—But even when he says it as a piece of information he does

not learn it from his sensations.’

what he knows is what he proposes

how does he learn what he proposes?

well the matter is open to question –

but our focus should be primarily on what is proposed –

explanations – or back stories – are a secondary-matters

‘For think of the sensations produced by physically shuddering:

the words "it makes me shiver" are themselves such a shuddering

reaction; and if I hear and feel them as I utter them, this belongs among

the rest of those sensations. Now why should the wordless shudder

be the ground of the verbal one?’

we have two primary proposals here – the verbal proposal – and the non-verbal proposal – the shuddering –

‘sensation’ – however it is cashed out – is an explanatory proposal –

the proposal – be it verbal or non-verbal – is the ground of – or the reason for the explanatory proposal –

in propositional life – propositional activity – often we bring explanation into play

but we should be wary of missing the trees for the forest –

we can get bogged down and lost – in explanation –

when the issue is – dealing – in a straightforward manner – with the subject proposal – the proposal put

in any case propositional activity can be – and more often than not is – complex –

the point is though – that any proposal – a primary / veridical proposal – or an explanatory proposal – is – logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

ii

‘In saying "When I heard this word, it meant .... to me" one

refers to a point of time and to a way of using the word. (Of course, it is

this combination that we fail to grasp.)’

this ‘combination’ – this explanatory proposal – is not hard to grasp at all –  if you understand propositional logic

any proposition is a proposal – and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

and that includes this proposal –

yes – it makes sense – but as with any proposal – it is open to question –

furthermore – there is overwhelming evidence for this –

just check the history of propositional logic –

it is a history of uncertainty

‘And the expression "I was then going to say .... ." refers to a

point of time and to an action.’

yes – you might say this

however – ‘I was just going to say …’ – to a user – may not in fact refer to a point of time or action – though it might seem to do so to an observer

and the phrase may in fact be used without the intention of any reference at all

in the hands of our speaker here – it might just be a turn of phrase that is habitually used as a prelude to proposal

perhaps our speaker uses such an expression to give the impression of knowing something before they say it –

the point is – ‘I was going to say …’ – could be regarded as purely rhetorical

‘I speak of the essential references of the utterance in order to distinguish

them from other peculiarities of the expression we use. The

references that are essential to an utterance are the ones which would

make us translate some otherwise alien form of expression into this,

our customary form.’

translation is a rule governed language-game

and when we translate – we follow the rules to get our result

be that as it may though – any translation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

the rules of translation are open to question

furthermore – there is nothing ‘essential’ in language use – if by ‘essential’ we mean some property that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain

reference – from a logical point of view – is always up for grabs –

we can always ask – is there a reference – and if so – how is it be defined?

reference is uncertain

‘If you were unable to say that the word "till" could be both a verb

and a conjunction, or to construct sentences, in which it was now the

one and now the other, you would not be able to manage simple

schoolroom exercises. But a schoolboy is not asked to conceive the

word in one way or another out of any context, or to report how he

has conceived it.’

a schoolboy might well be asked how to conceive the word in one way or another out of any context – or report how he has conceived it – if he has been taught the grammar of the word

however – he might well have just picked up by observation and experience –

how the word is used in different contexts

by either method he has learnt different uses of the word

‘The words "the rose is red" are meaningless if the word "is" has the

meaning "is identical with".—Does this mean: if you say this sentence

and mean the "is" as the sign of identity, the sense disintegrates?’

this is a question of context and usage

in a poetic context the ‘is’ in ‘the rose is red’ – could well be the identity ‘is’ –

i.e. the idea being all redness is in or comes from the rose –

meaning is always open to question – logically speaking it is never a settled matter

‘We take a sentence and tell someone the meaning of each of its

words; this tells him how to apply them and so how to apply the

sentence too. If we had chosen a senseless sequence of words instead

of the sentence, he would not learn how to apply the sequence. And if we

explain the word "is" as the sign of identity, then he does not learn

how to use the sentence "the rose is red".’

he does not learn to use the sentence in a standard or prosaic context

here Wittgenstein is talking about learning language use from direction – in terms of rules of application in a particular context

that is all very well – but language use in a logical sense – is an open field

the point being no sentence or word is necessarily confined to any one context

and the fact is in sophisticated usage we are often confronted with what relative to one context is a rogue usage

the general point is that language use in any context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘And yet there is something right about this 'disintegration of the

sense'. You get it in the following example: one might tell someone:

if you want to pronounce the salutation "Hail!" expressively, you had

better not think of hailstones as you say it.’

this ‘disintegration of sense’ – is a rather dramatic way of putting it

and it seems to assume that sense is in some sense stable

this is not the case – sense is open to question – open to doubt –

sense is uncertain

and if you understand this – there is no ‘disintegration’ – there is only logical uncertainty – which is not a form of disintegration

and telling a user who wants to pronounce the salutation ‘hail’ – not to think of hailstones – is merely to distinguish contexts

‘Experiencing a meaning and experiencing a mental image. "In

both cases", we should like to say, "we are experiencing something,

only something different. A different content is proffered—is present—

to consciousness."—What is the content of the experience of imagining?

The answer is a picture, or a description. And what is the content

of the experience of meaning? I don't know what I am supposed to

say to this.—If there is any sense in the above remark, it is that the

two concepts are related like those of 'red' and 'blue'; and that is wrong.’

the ‘content of meaning’ is whatever it is proposed to be

and whatever it is proposed to be – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Can one keep hold of an understanding of meaning as one can keep

hold of a mental image? That is, if one meaning of a word suddenly

strikes me,—can it also stay there in my mind?"’

yes – if you concentrate your attention on it –

but meaning – unlike a mental image – is a problem –

we ask the question – i.e. – what is the meaning of that word? –

and if we come up with an answer – the problem – for all intents and purposes – is solved –

and there is then no reason to focus on the solution – on the ‘meaning’ –

the point is to then to use it and to move forward with it –

of course – logically speaking – the question of meaning can always be revisited

an image is a propositional presentation –

it is not a propositional problem

‘The whole scheme presented itself to my mind in a flash and stayed

there like that for five minutes." Why does this sound odd? One

would like to think: what flashed on me and what stayed there in my

mind can't have been the same.’

again – if we are dealing with a problem – once resolved – we move on

‘I exclaimed "Now I have it!"—a sudden start, and then I was able

to set the scheme forth in detail. What is supposed to have stayed

in this case? A picture, perhaps. But "Now I have it" did not mean,

I have the picture.’

what you have is not a propositional picture – rather a propositional solution

‘If a meaning of a word has occurred to you and you have not forgotten

it again, you can now use the word in such-and-such a way.’

yes – meaning is use

‘If the meaning has occurred to you, now you know it, and the knowing

began when it occurred to you. Then how is it like an experience

of imagining something?’

it’s not –

meaning is knowing how to use a word in a particular propositional context –

it is not an act of imagination

and ‘knowing how to use a word in a particular propositional context’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and indeed – uncertain

and we proceed with what we have – at least until a question is raised

‘If I say "Mr. Scot is not a Scot", I mean the first "Scot" as a proper

name, the second one as a common name. Then do different things

have to go on in my mind at the first and second "Scot"? (Assuming

that I am not uttering the sentence 'parrot-wise'.)—Try to mean the

first "Scot" as a common name and the second one as a proper name.—

How is it done? When I do it, I blink with the effort as I try to parade

the right meanings before my mind in saying the words.—But do I

parade the meanings of the words before my mind when I make the

ordinary use of them?’

no – there is no ‘parade of meanings’

what you have is a critical understanding of uses in context

‘When I say the sentence with this exchange of meanings I feel that

its sense disintegrates.—Well, I feel it, but the person I am saying it to

does not. So what harm is done?——"But the point is, when one

utters the sentence in the usual way something else, quite definite,

takes place."—What takes place is not this 'parade of the meanings

before one's mind'.’

what takes place is a critical understanding of different uses of the word – of different contexts within a sentence – within a proposal 

iii

‘What makes my image of him into an image of him?

Not its looking like him.

The same question applies to the expression "I see him now vividly

before me" as to the image. What makes this utterance into an utterance

about him?—Nothing in it or simultaneous with it ('behind it').

If you want to know whom he meant, ask him.

(But it is also possible for a face to come before my mind, and even

for me to be able to draw it, without my knowing whose it is or

where I have seen it.)

Suppose, however, that someone were to draw while he had an

image or instead of having it, though it were only with his finger in

the air. (This might be called "motor imagery.") He could be asked:

"Whom does that represent?" And his answer would be decisive.—

It is quite as if he had given a verbal description: and such a description

can also simply take the place of the image.’

I propose my image as an image of him – and as with any proposal – this proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

iv

‘"I believe that he is suffering."——Do I also believe that he isn't

an automaton?’

yes – if you believe automatons don’t suffer

‘It would go against the grain to use the word in both connexions.’

yes

‘(Or is it like this: I believe that he is suffering, but am certain that

he is not an automaton? Nonsense!)’

you can’t be certain that he is not an automaton

and you can’t be certain that he is suffering

you can believe he is suffering – and believe he is not an automation –

but your beliefs are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Suppose I say of a friend: "He isn't an automaton".—What information

is conveyed by this, and to whom would it be information? To

a human being who meets him in ordinary circumstances? What

information could it give him? (At the very most that this man always

behaves like a human being, and not occasionally like a machine.)’

yes –

and again – ‘he isn’t an automaton’ – and ‘any information conveyed’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘"I believe that he is not an automaton", just like that, so far makes

no sense.’

well ‘just like that’ – is without any context –

any statement without context – will not make sense

 

‘My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of

the opinion that he has a soul.’

yes – you can have that opinion –

but ‘what information is conveyed’?

and what account do you give of this proposal ‘soul’?

‘Religion teaches that the soul can exist when the body has disintegrated.

Now do I understand this teaching?—Of course I understand

it——I can imagine plenty of things in connexion with it. And

haven't pictures of these things been painted? And why should such

a picture be only an imperfect rendering of the spoken doctrine? Why

should it not do the same service as the words? And it is the service

which is the point.’

yes – by all means go with the soul – and it’s ‘imperfect rendering’ – if that serves your purpose –

bearing in mind that anything proposed in this ‘imperfect rendering’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘If the picture of thought in the head can force itself upon us, then

why not much more that of thought in the soul?’

yes – well this just digs the hole deeper really

I think Wittgenstein is moving into strange theology – or at least imaginative fiction –

look you can go where you want to go – for whatever purpose –

but logically speaking – you never leave propositional uncertainty –

that is the point

‘The human body is the best picture of the human soul.’

a touch of Spinoza here – if you substitute ‘mind’ for ‘soul’

‘And how about such an expression as: "In my heart I understood

when you said that", pointing to one's heart? Does one, perhaps, not

mean this gesture? Of course one means it. Or is one conscious of

using a mere figure? Indeed not.—It is not a figure that we choose,

not a simile, yet it is a figurative expression.’

yes – one means this gesture – but just what the gesture means – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

v

‘Suppose we were observing the movement of a point (for example,

a point of light on a screen). It might be possible to draw important

consequences of the most various kinds from the behaviour of this

point. And what a variety of observations can be made here!—The

path of the point and certain of its characteristic measures (amplitude

and wave-length for instance), or the velocity and the law according

to which it varies, or the number or position of the places at which it

changes discontinuously, or the curvature of the path at these places,

and innumerable other things.—Any of these features of its behaviour

might be the only one to interest us. We might, for example, be

indifferent to everything about its movements except for the number of

loops it made in a certain time.—And if we were interested, not in just

one such feature, but in several, each might yield us special information,

different in kind from all the rest. This is how it is with the behaviour

of man; with the different characteristic features which we observe in

this behaviour.

Then psychology treats of behaviour, not of the mind?

What do psychologists record?—What do they observe? Isn't it

the behaviour of human beings, in particular their utterances? But

these are not about behaviour.’

the behaviour of human beings is propositional –

behaviour is the action of proposal

and such propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

there is no relevant logical distinction between utterances – and behaviour

one’s behaviour is propositional – one’s utterances are propositional

what do psychologists record?

psychologists record their interpretations of propositional action

"I noticed that he was out of humour." Is this a report about his

behaviour or his state of mind? ("The sky looks threatening": is

this about the present or the future?) Both; not side-by-side, however,

but about the one via the other.’

it is an interpretation of his propositional state –

and such an interpretation can be variously termed – i.e. in terms of ‘behaviour’ – in terms of ‘mind’ – or in any other terms that might be regarded as relevant –

and any interpretation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘A doctor asks: "How is he feeling?" The nurse says: "He is

groaning". A report on his behaviour. But need there be any question

for them whether the groaning is really genuine, is really the expression

of anything? Might they not, for example, draw the conclusion "If he

groans, we must give him more analgesic"—without suppressing a

middle term? Isn't the point the service to which they put the description

of behaviour?’

yes – they might draw that conclusion – but that conclusion is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to the service to which they put the conclusion –

that service – that application of the conclusion – is as with any propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

"But then they make a tacit presupposition." Then what we do in

our language-game always rests on a tacit presupposition.’

yes – and our presuppositions – are open to question

‘I describe a psychological experiment: the apparatus, the questions of

the experimenter, the actions and replies of the subject—and then I say

that it is a scene in a play.—Now everything is different. So it will be

said: If this experiment were described in the same way in a book on

psychology, then the behaviour described would be understood as

the expression of something mental just because it is presupposed

that the subject is not taking us in, hasn't learnt the replies by heart,

and other things of the kind.—So we are making a presupposition?’

yes

‘Should we ever really express ourselves like this: "Naturally I am

presupposing that .... ."?—Or do we not do so only because the

other person already knows that?’

presuppositions can be expressed – can be articulated

‘Doesn't a presupposition imply a doubt? And doubt may be entirely

lacking. Doubting has an end.’

yes – presuppositions speak to doubt

really what they do is put to question the propositions that are in play – and this is good logical behaviour

logically speaking – doubt is never lacking –

where doubt is lacking – or apparently lacking – what you are dealing with is prejudice – not proposition

doubting has an end – when people stop questioning – stop putting to doubt – and take refuge in the delusion of certainty

‘It is like the relation: physical object—sense-impressions. Here we

have two different language-games and a complicated relation between

them.—If you try to reduce their relations to a simple formula you go

wrong.’

any relation between propositions of any kind – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

vi

‘Suppose someone said: every familiar word, in a book for example,

actually carries an atmosphere with it in our minds, a 'corona' of

lightly indicated uses.—Just as if each figure in a painting were

surrounded by delicate shadowy drawings of scenes, as it were in

another dimension, and in them we saw the figures in different contexts.

—Only let us take this assumption seriously!—Then we see that

it is not adequate to explain intention.’

you can play the game where you take a word out of context – out of contexts – and then ask the question – what possible uses does this word have – i.e. – in what different contexts can it function?

you can’t know all the possible contexts – or uses it might have – but you can make a start –

this is a critical activity – it has nothing to do with ‘atmosphere’

as for intention –

exploration of possible uses – could be seen as a mapping out of possible intentions –

actual use – is actual intention

‘For if it is like this, if the possible uses of a word do float before us

in half-shades as we say or hear it—this simply goes for us. But we

communicate with other people without knowing if they have this

experience too.’

the possible use of a word – is a critical activity –

to speak of ‘atmosphere’ here – is to poeticize the matter

‘But we communicate with other people without knowing if they have this

experience too.’

yes – exactly – we don’t know what they experience –

and we don’t know if we communicate –

whether we communicate or not –  is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain

in general – short of a negative sign of some kind – we proceed as if we do communicate –

though in reality – in propositional reality – the matter is hopelessly uncertain

‘How should we counter someone who told us that with him understanding

was an inner process?——How should we counter him if he

said that with him knowing how to play chess was an inner process?—

We should say that when we want to know if he can play chess we

aren't interested in anything that goes on inside him.—And if he replies

that this is in fact just what we are interested in, that is, we are interested

in whether he can play chess—then we shall have to draw his attention

to the criteria which would demonstrate his capacity, and on the other

hand to the criteria for the 'inner states'.’

the proposal – ‘understanding as an inner process’ –

‘we should want to know if he can play chess, we aren’t interested in anything inside him’

if you are not ‘interested in’ anything inside him – then you void the issue of inner process

the criteria for inner states?

an inner state on the face of it – is not observable – it is by definition – not public –

and if what you want is observable criteria – then you don’t understand what is meant by an inner state or inner process –

you can dismiss the ‘inner process / state proposal’ – on the grounds that it is not observable –

but did anyone claim that an inner process – an inner state – is observable?

no

the observable criteria argument – you could say – misses the point – and by a country mile

I don’t have a problem with the ‘inner process’ proposal –

as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

the issue is really does it have a use – and in what contexts does it have a use?

and if you are ‘not interested’ in the inner process idea – fair enough

stay clear of it

‘Even if someone had a particular capacity only when, and only as

long as, he had a particular feeling, the feeling would not be the

capacity.’

yes – easy to say – but how would you distinguish the two?

‘The meaning of a word is not the experience one has in hearing or

saying it, and the sense of a sentence is not a complex of such experiences.

—(How do the meanings of the individual words make up

the sense of the sentence "I still haven't seen him yet"?) The sentence

is composed of the words, and that is enough.’

the meaning of a word – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and we can ask – can there be any meaning – without an experience?

the sense of a sentence – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

whatever is proposed as the sense of sentence – the words will be there

‘Though—one would like to say—every word has a different character

in different contexts, at the same time there is one character it always

has: a single physiognomy. It looks at us.—But a face in a painting

looks at us too.’

there are poets and artists who alter the physiognomy of words

we look at the face in a painting – it doesn’t look at us

‘Are you sure that there is a single if-feeling, and not perhaps several?

Have you tried saying the word in a great variety of contexts? For

example, when it bears the principal stress of the sentence, and when

the word next to it does.’

sorry to say – this comes downs to what people report on the matter

‘Suppose we found a man who, speaking of how words felt to him,

told us that "if" and "but" felt the same.—Should we have the right

to disbelieve him? We might think it strange. "He doesn't play our

game at all", one would like to say. Or even: "This is a different

type of man.’

he could make that claim – but as with any proposal – it is open to question –

as is any response to that claim

‘If he used the words "if" and "but" as we do, shouldn't we think

he understood them as we do?’

it’s a fair enough assumption – but as with any assumption – open to question

‘One misjudges the psychological interest of the if-feeling if one

regards it as the obvious correlate of a meaning; it needs rather to be

seen in a different context, in that of the special circumstances in which

it occurs.’

perhaps meaning also

‘Does a person never have the if-feeling when he is not uttering

the word "if"? Surely it is at least remarkable if this cause alone

produces this feeling. And this applies generally to the 'atmosphere'

of a word;—why does one regard it so much as a matter of course

that only this word has this atmosphere?’

the feeling without uttering the word?

yes – quite possible

could not uttering the word – cause the feeling?

it’s possible

this ‘atmosphere argument’ is out of place here –

the ‘atmosphere of word’ might have a place in a literary discussion

in a philosophical context – the nature and function of words is a critical issue –

a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The if-feeling is not a feeling which accompanies the word "if".’

I mean – who’s to say what feeling accompanies what word in whatever context?

‘The if-feeling would have to be compared with the special 'feeling’

which a musical phrase gives us. (One sometimes describes such a

feeling by saying "Here it is as if a conclusion were being drawn", or

"I should like to say ‘hence .....'", or "Here I should always like to

make a gesture—" and then one makes it.)’

here we have from Wittgenstein – one context for this ‘if-feeling’ proposal – and that’s ok –

the point being it is just one view of the matter –

which again might be of interest in an English department or in a music department

‘But can this feeling be separated from the phrase? And yet it is not

the phrase itself, for that can be heard without the feeling.’

you would think no-one will hear the phrase – without feeling something

‘Is it in this respect like the 'expression' with which the phrase is

played?’

however expressed – there will be associated feelings –

‘We say this passage gives us a quite special feeling. We sing it to

ourselves, and make a certain movement, and also perhaps have some

special sensation. But in a different context we should not recognize

these accompaniments—the movement, the sensation—at all. They are

quite empty except just when we are singing this passage.’

that may well be the case

‘"I sing it with a quite particular expression." This expression is

not something that can be separated from the passage. It is a different

concept. (A different game.)’

what if you were to sing a different piece – with the same expression?

‘The experience is this passage played like this (that is, as I am doing

it, for instance; a description could only hint at it).’

yes – but just what ‘doing it’ – amounts to – how it is to be accounted for – how it is described – is what is at issue –

and any response to this issue will be a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Thus the atmosphere that is inseparable from its object—is not an

atmosphere.’

we can drop this atmosphere rubbish –

any description of an object – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

in the absence of description – of proposal – the object is unknown

‘Closely associated things, things which we have associated, seem to fit

one another. But what is this seeming to fit? How is their seeming to

fit manifested? Perhaps like this: we cannot imagine the man who had

this name, this face, this handwriting, not to have produced these works

but perhaps quite different ones instead (those of another great man).’

‘seeming to fit’ is about it –

of course we can imagine that the man who had this name – this face – this handwriting – not to have produced these works –

we can imagine that in fact these works have been wrongly attributed to him –

what ‘fits’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘We cannot imagine it? Do we try?—

Here is a possibility: I hear that someone is painting a picture

"Beethoven writing the ninth symphony". I could easily imagine the

kind of thing such a picture would shew us. But suppose someone

wanted to represent what Goethe would have looked like writing the

ninth symphony? Here I could imagine nothing that would not be

embarrassing and ridiculous.’

the idea would only be embarrassing or ridiculous –

if you have zero imagination – and no artistic flair

vii

‘People who on waking tell us certain incidents (that they have been

in such-and-such places, etc.). Then we teach them the expression

"I dreamt", which precedes the narrative. Afterwards I sometimes

ask them "did you dream anything last night?" and am answered

yes or no, sometimes with an account of a dream, sometimes not. That

is the language-game. (I have assumed here that I do not dream myself.

But then, nor do I ever have the feeling of an invisible presence;

other people do, and I can question them about their experiences.)’

a game is a rule governed propositional activity –

when you play a game – you play in accordance with its rules –

in the game as played the rules are not open to question – the game is not open to question-

as to people reporting what they dreamed – and someone asking whether they dreamed last night – and accounts of dreams –

there is no game here – there are no rules here –

what you have here is proposals –

propositions – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

of course you can question others regarding their experience – and you should put your own experiences to question too

‘Now must I make some assumption about whether people are

deceived by their memories or not; whether they really had these

images while they slept, or whether it merely seems so to them on

waking? And what meaning has this question?—And what interest?

Do we ever ask ourselves this when someone is telling us his dream?

And if not—is it because we are sure his memory won't have deceived

him? (And suppose it were a man with a quite specially bad

memory?—)’

there is no good reason to assume deception here –

proposals – propositions – have been put –

these proposals / propositions – are open to question open to doubt – and uncertain

the meaning of this question – as with any question – is logical

and what interest does this question have?

we ask this question – because our interest is to investigate the relation between dreaming and waking

do we ever ask ourselves this question when someone is telling us his dream?

I don’t know the answer to this – I can’t speak for everyone here – nevertheless it is a valid question

the issue here is not a question of whether memory deceives –

memory proposals – as with any other proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Does this mean that it is nonsense ever to raise the question whether

dreams really take place during sleep, or are a memory phenomenon

of the awakened? It will turn on the use of the question.’

it is never ‘nonsense’ to raise a question – nonsense persists in the absence of question

as to – whether dreams really take place during sleep – or are a memory phenomenon of the waking –

it’s an interesting question

and it might turn out to be a useful question – i.e. – in a scientific investigation of sleep – or of memory – a study of consciousness – or indeed just as it is here –

as a philosophical question

‘"The mind seems able to give a word meaning"—isn't this as if I

were to say "The carbon atoms in benzene seem to lie at the corners of

a hexagon"? But this is not something that seems to be so; it is a

picture.’

if there was no benzene – the question of where its carbon atoms lie – would not arise

in a world without minds – there would be no question of meaning

‘The evolution of the higher animals and of man, and the awakening

of consciousness at a particular level. The picture is something like

this: Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is dark.

But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light.

What this language primarily describes is a picture. What is to be

done with the picture, how it is to be used, is still obscure. Quite

clearly, however, it must be explored if we want to understand the

sense of what we are saying. But the picture seems to spare us

this work: it already points to a particular use. This is how it takes

us in.’

logically speaking – a picture is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the picture points to a particular use? –

this is just to say that people do use language unreflectively – and uncritically

this doesn’t change the logic of the situation –

any use of any proposal – of any form – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

you might be taken-in if you don’t put the propositions you use – or the propositions – put to you – to question – to doubt –

you might be taken-in – if you don’t recognise and investigate propositional uncertainty

viii

‘"My kinaesthetic sensations advise me of the movement and position

of my limbs.’

one’s awareness of the position and movement of parts of the body is propositional –

we explain a kinaesthetic proposition – by means of sensation

sensation is a propositional explanation –

and as with the subject proposition – open to question

that is to say it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

"I let my index finger make an easy pendulum movement of small

amplitude. I either hardly feel it, or don't feel it at all. Perhaps a

little in the tip of the finger, as a slight tension. (Not at all in the

joint.) And this sensation advises me of the movement?—for I can

describe the movement exactly.’

yes – the sensation explanation – is open to question –

any description is uncertain – not exact

‘exactness’ – is rhetorical – not logical

‘"But after all, you must feel it, otherwise you wouldn't know

(without looking) how your finger was moving." But "knowing"

it only means: being able to describe it.—I may be able to tell the direction

from which a sound comes only because it affects one ear more

strongly than the other, but I don't feel this in my ears; yet it has its

effect: I know the direction from which the sound comes; for instance,

I look in that direction.’

to know is to propose – description is proposal

and any proposal / proposition put is open to question –

our ‘knowledge’ is uncertain –

our knowing – is uncertain

‘It is the same with the idea that it must be some feature of our pain

that advises us of the whereabouts of the pain in the body, and some

feature of our memory image that tells us the time to which it belongs.’

‘pain’ – as with sensation – is propositional –

open to question –

the ‘whereabouts of pain the body’ – as any physician will attest – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a memory proposition – regarding time – is of course – open to question

there is no certainty in memory proposals

‘A sensation can advise us of the movement or position of a limb.

(For example, if you do not know, as a normal person does, whether

your arm is stretched out, you might find out by a piercing pain in the

elbow.)—In the same way the character of a pain can tell us where

the injury is. (And the yellowness of a photograph how old it is.)’

we propose location –

any such proposal – is open to question

pain may be a proposal – as to where the injury is –

but any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

this is where medical diagnosis comes in – and that too – is open to question –

not every doctor concurs

and in certain conditions – pain – does not tell us where the injury actually is –

and further there is the phenomenon of phantom pain

‘What is the criterion for my learning the shape and colour of an

object from a sense-impression?

What sense-impression? Well, this one; I use words or a picture to

describe it.’

the shape of an object is a proposal – the colour of an object – is a proposal –

these proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the ‘sense impression’ is an analytical explanatory proposal regarding sense knowledge

and as twentieth century epistemology attests – this notion is open to question – to doubt – and despite the efforts of some – uncertain

‘And now: what do you feel when your fingers are in this position?—

"How is one to define a feeling? It is something special and indefinable.

"But it must be possible to teach the use of the words!’

what do you feel when your fingers are in this position?

possible answers – ‘I don’t feel anything’ – ‘I feel a strain’ – ‘I feel comfortable’ – ‘I feel uncomfortable’ etc. – etc –

and any proposed answer here – will be open to question

how is one to define a feeling?

however one does

is feeling something special and indefinable?

feeling is a proposal – and as with any proposal – any proposition – it is open to further proposal –

any definition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘What I am looking for is the grammatical difference.’

propose a grammatical difference by all means –

and any such proposal can be put to question

‘Let us leave the kinaesthetic feeling out for the moment.—I want to

describe a feeling to someone, and I tell him "Do this, and then you’ll

get it," and I hold my arm or my head in a particular position. Now

is this a description of a feeling? and when shall I say that he has understood

what feeling I meant?—He will have to give a further description

of the feeling afterwards. And what kind of description must it be?’

when shall I say he has understood what feeling I meant?

all you can go on is his response – which you can accept – or not

you cannot know with any certainty whether anyone understands anything you say or do

you make assumptions – yea or nay – and go with them

further description – most likely will play a part in all this

‘And what kind of description must it be?’

what we can say here is that any description – will be uncertain

‘I say "Do this, and you'll get it". Can't there be a doubt here?

Mustn't there be one, if it is a feeling that is meant?’

‘Do this and you’ll get it’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘This looks so; this tastes so; this feels so. "This" and "so" must be

differently explained.’

yes – they will be – they are different proposals

‘Our interest in a 'feeling' is of a quite particular kind. It includes,

for instance, the 'degree of the feeling', its 'place', and the extent to

which one feeling can be submerged by another. (When a movement

is very painful, so that the pain submerges every other slight sensation

in the same place, does this make it uncertain whether you have really

made this movement? Could it lead you to find out by looking?)’

 

the proposal of feeling – can involve propositional complexities

the proposal of movement can be put to question –

the propositional action of looking is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain                                    

ix

‘If you observe your own grief, which senses do you use to observe

it? A particular sense; one that feels grief? Then do you feel it differently

when you are observing it? And what is the grief that you are observing

—is it one which is there only while it is being observed?'

grief is a proposal –

you can keep your grief private – or you can make it public

if made public – you can observe how it is proposed – you can observe your propositional behaviour

you can propose that you ‘feel’ grief –

and what that amounts to will be a matter for further proposal –

is the grief there only while it is being observed?

the grief is there as long as it is being proposed – and in whatever propositional form it is proposed

‘Observing' does not produce what is observed. (That is a conceptual

statement.)’

it depends here on how you propose ‘observing’ –

i.e. – is what is observed – independent of the senses – or do the senses fashion what is observed?

‘Again: I do not 'observe' what only comes into being through

observation. The object of observation is something else.’

the issue here is best understood not in terms of observation – but in terms of proposal

you can propose that the object of observation is something else –

but this will require further proposal – further argument –

and whatever is proposed here – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘A touch which was still painful yesterday is no longer so today.

Today I feel the pain only when I think about it, (That is: in certain

circumstances.)’

yes – circumstances change – proposals / propositions – change

‘My grief is no longer the same; a memory which was still unbearable

to me a year ago is now no longer so.

That is a result of observation.’

we propose differently – in different circumstances

‘When do we say that any one is observing? Roughly: when he

puts himself in a favourable position to receive certain impressions in

order (for example) to describe what they tell him.’

when do we say someone is observing?

general speaking – when they make what we regard as – observation proposals

and of course – what is regarded as an observation proposal – is up for question

different accounts will be put in different circumstances –

and nothing is set in stone here

‘If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of

something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on

for other colours, still he would not yet be describing objects by

their colours. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description.

A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in

that of time, for instance).’

the emitting of different sounds at the sight of different colours – is propositional

such could be interpreted as a form of propositional description

a description is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and yes – description can be further described

‘If I let my gaze wander round a room and suddenly it lights on

an object of a striking red colour, and I say "Red!"—that is not a

description.’

“red!” – is a proposal – and if further proposed as a description –

it’s a description –

and as with any proposal / description – open to question

‘Are the words "I am afraid" a description of a state of mind?

I say "I am afraid"; someone else asks me: "What was that? A cry

of fear; or do you want to tell me how you feel; or is it a reflection on

your present state?"—Could I always give him a clear answer? Could

I never give him one?’

yes – you can always give a ‘clear’ answer – but as the above shows – any answer is open to question

‘We can imagine all sorts of things here, for example:

"No, no! I am afraid!""

I am afraid. I am sorry to have to confess it."

"I am still a bit afraid, but no longer as much as before."

"At bottom I am still afraid, though I won't confess it to myself."

"I torment myself with all sorts of fears."

"Now, just when I should be fearless, I am afraid!"’

yes – various proposals

‘To each of these sentences a special tone of voice is appropriate,

and a different context.

It would be possible to imagine people who as it were thought much

more definitely than we, and used different words where we use only

one.

We ask "What does 'I am frightened' really mean, what am I

referring to when I say it?" And of course we find no answer, or

one that is inadequate. –’

what we find is a proposal – open to question –

logically speaking – any answer to any question – is inadequate – is uncertain

this is not a fault – it is the logical reality

‘The question is: "In what sort of context does it occur?"

I can find no answer if I try to settle the question "What am I

referring to?" "What am I thinking when I say it?" by repeating the

expression of fear and at the same time attending to myself, as it were

observing my soul out of the corner of my eye. In a concrete case

I can indeed ask "Why did I say that, what did I mean by it?"—

and I might answer the question too; but not on the ground of

observing what accompanied the speaking. And my answer would

supplement, paraphrase, the earlier utterance.’

‘I can find no answer if I try to settle the question’ –

correct – if by ‘settle’ – you mean an answer that is not open to question

‘And my answer would supplement, paraphrase, the earlier answer’ –

yes – and that answer – as with earlier answer – is open to question – open to doubt - uncertain

‘What is fear? What does "being afraid" mean? If I wanted to define

it at a single shewing—I should play-act fear.’

‘fear’ – is what it is proposed ‘fear’ is

and what ‘being afraid’ means – is whatever it is proposed to mean

a ‘play-act’ – is a proposal

‘Could I also represent hope in this way? Hardly. And what about

belief?’

‘hope’ is whatever it is proposed that it is – as indeed is belief

and any such proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Describing my state of mind (of fear, say) is something I do in a

particular context. (Just as it takes a particular context to make a

certain action into an experiment.)’

any proposal can be explained in a propositional context

‘Is it, then, so surprising that I use the same expression in different

games? And sometimes as it were between the games?’

surprising? – no – because ‘the expression’ is open to question – open to interpretation –

and the expression may have different propositional uses

‘And do I always talk with very definite purpose?—And is what I say

meaningless because I don't?’

‘talking with a definite purpose’ – is rhetoric

a meaningful expression – is an expression that has some use

‘When it is said in a funeral oration "We mourn our . . . ." this is

surely supposed to be an expression of mourning; not to tell anything

to those who are present. But in a prayer at the grave these words

would in a way be used to tell someone something.’

yes – quite possibly

‘But here is the problem: a cry, which cannot be called a description,

which is more primitive than any description, for all that serves as a

description of the inner life.’

a ‘cry’ – is a proposal –

how it is further accounted for – we will have to see

‘A cry is not a description. But there are transitions. And the words

"I am afraid" may approximate more, or less, to being a cry. They may

come quite close to this and also be far removed from it.’

yes – the matter is open to question

‘We surely do not always say someone is complaining, because he

says he is in pain. So the words "I am in pain" may be a cry of

complaint, and may be something else.’

yes

‘But if "I am afraid" is not always something like a cry of complaint

and yet sometimes is, then why should it always be a description of a

state of mind?’

no good reason

x

‘How did we ever come to use such an expression as "I believe . . . "?

Did we at some time become aware of a phenomenon (of belief)?’

we propose – and we propose in relation to our propositions – we can and do operate with propositional constructs – with propositional complexes

‘belief’ – is a name for such propositional constructs

‘Did we observe ourselves and other people and so discover belief?’

we proposed belief

and we proposed it to name – to identify a form of our propositional activity

‘Moore's paradox can be put like this: the expression "I believe that

this is the case" is used like the assertion "This is the case"; and yet the

hypothesis that I believe this is the case is not used like the hypothesis

that this is the case.’

the distinction put here is between an expression – and a hypothesis –

these are different proposals – different propositional uses

there is no paradox – here

Moore’s paradox – Moore’s confusion

‘So it looks as if the assertion "I believe" were not the assertion of

what is supposed in the hypothesis "I believe"!

Similarly: the statement "I believe it's going to rain" has a meaning

like, that is to say a use like, "It's going to rain", but the meaning of"

I believed then that it was going to rain", is not like that of "It did

rain then".’

correct – different proposals

‘"But surely 'I believed' must tell of just the same thing in the past

as 'I believe' in the present!"—Surely Ö-i  must mean just the same in

relation to -i, as Öi   means in relation to i! This means nothing at all.’

‘I believed’ and ‘I believe’ – are different proposals – different propositions

a proposition about the past – is not a proposition about the present

you might have the same belief now that you once had –

such is best seen as a logical coincidence –

and let’s be clear – you can put such a proposal to question – to doubt –

for a lot of reasons – it is uncertain

with Ö-i and Öi –   there is a formal – a structural – similarity

as in – ‘the cat sat on the mat’ – and ‘the dog sat on the mat’ –

they don’t mean the same thing

‘"At bottom, when I say 'I believe . . .' I am describing my own

state of mind—but this description is indirectly an assertion of the

fact believed."—As in certain circumstances I describe a photograph

in order to describe the thing it is a photograph of.’

logically speaking – all that is relevant – is the statement – is the proposal

prefacing the proposal with ‘I believe’ – is logically irrelevant

the only function or value of ‘I believe’ – here – is rhetorical

‘I believe’ – gives some measure of authority or provenance – to the assertion

‘But then I must also be able to say that the photograph is a good

one. So here too: "I believe it's raining and my belief is reliable, so I

have confidence in it."—In that case my belief would be a kind of

sense-impression.’

the confidence here is rhetorical

‘One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own belief.’

this is baloney

one’s belief – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

our senses are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘If there were a verb meaning 'to believe falsely', it would not have

any significant first person present indicative.’

a false belief / proposal – is one you dissent from –

you don’t affirm – what you dissent

‘Don't look at it as a matter of course, but as a most remarkable

thing, that the verbs "believe", "wish", "will" display all the inflexions

possessed by "cut", "chew", "run".’

ok

‘The language-game of reporting can be given such a turn that a

report is not meant to inform the hearer about its subject matter but

about the person making the report.’

this is report ad hominem

‘It is so when, for instance, a teacher examines a pupil. (You can

measure to test the ruler.)’

here – what is examined is the pupil’s knowledge – not the pupil as such

and as to what the pupil knows – questions are put – doubts raised – and uncertainties explored

‘Suppose I were to introduce some expression—"I believe", for

instance—in this way: it is to be prefixed to reports when they serve

to give information about the reporter. (So the expression need not

carry with it any suggestion of uncertainty. Remember that the uncertainty

of an assertion can be expressed impersonally: "He might come

today".)—"I believe . . . ., and it isn’t so" would be a contradiction.’

an expression – is a proposal – however introduced –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

"I believe . . . ." throws light on my state. Conclusions about my

conduct can be drawn from this expression. So there is a similarity

here to expressions of emotion, of mood, etc, .’

really all ‘I believe’ here does – is identify the author of the proposition –

which is actually unnecessary – and further – logically irrelevant

‘If, however, "I believe it is so" throws light on my state, then so

does the assertion "It is so". For the sign "I believe" can't do it, can

at the most hint at it.’

if ‘I believe it is so’ – does ‘throw light on my state’ – that is neither here nor there –

the same is true of ‘it is so’ –

both prefaces – only have rhetorical function

what is logically relevant – is what is proposed –

and how it is put to question – to doubt – and how its uncertainty is explored

‘Imagine a language in which "I believe it is so" is expressed only

by means of the tone of the assertion "It is so". In this language they

say, not "He believes" but "He is inclined to say . . .” and there

exists also the hypothetical (subjunctive) "Suppose I were inclined

etc.", but not the expression "I am inclined to say".’

these prefaces are logically irrelevant

‘Moore's paradox would not exist in this language; instead of it,

however, there would be a verb lacking one inflexion.’

Moore’s paradox – is propositional confusion

‘But this ought not to surprise us. Think of the fact that one can

predict one's own future action by an expression of intention.’

one can propose one’s future –

and any such proposal is open to question

‘I say of someone else "He seems to believe . . . ." and other people

say it of me. Now, why do I never say it of myself, not even when

others rightly say it of me?—Do I myself not see and hear myself,

then?—That can be said.’

well – you could say it of yourself –

i.e. “yes – I seem to believe that – true – but on reflection – given the questions you  put – the doubts you raised – and the uncertainties you have  explored – I can now see that the matter is much deeper – and it is that deeper understanding that I now hold to”

this would be a case – where someone – through a critical approach to what I have proposed – has revealed to me the complexities or depth of my belief –

and thus what seemed to me – and to him to be the case – is in fact a different understanding

‘"One feels conviction within oneself, one doesn't infer it from one's

own words or their tone."—What is true here is: one does not infer

one's own conviction from one's own words; nor yet the actions

which arise from that conviction.’

conviction is a proposal of psychological certainty –

it comes about when someone decides – not to put their proposals to question – not to doubt – and not to explore the logical uncertainty of their proposals –

conviction only has rhetorical value –

it has no logical value

it is a form of determined ignorance –

and it is pretentious

‘"Here it looks as if the assertion 'I believe' were not the assertion of

what is supposed in the hypothesis."—So I am tempted to look for a

different development of the verb in the first person present indicative.

This is how I think of it: Believing is a state of mind. It has duration;

and that independently of the duration of its expression in a sentence,

for example. So it is a kind of disposition of the believing person.

This is shewn me in the case of someone else by his behaviour; and

by his words. And under this head, by the expression "I believe . . .'

as well as by the simple assertion.—What about my own case: how do I

myself recognize my own disposition?—Here it will have been necessary

for me to take notice of myself as others do, to listen to myself talking,

to be able to draw conclusions from what I say!’

what we have here from Wittgenstein is an explanation of – a propositional analysis of – the assertion –‘I believe’

and that is fair enough –

the logical point here is that this analysis – this proposal  – like the subject proposal ‘I believe’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

                                                                                 

‘My own relation to my words is wholly different from other people's.’

no – it is not –

your words – as with those of other people – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it is quite irrelevant who says what – what is relevant is what is said

‘That different development of the verb would have been possible,

if only I could say "I seem to believe".’

well ‘I seem to believe’ – will only be regarded as ‘not possible’ – if ‘I believe’ – is seen to be beyond question –

‘I believe’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

and someone could well have a reflective moment where he or she realises that what they have proposed in ‘I believe’ – appears to be one thing to others – when in fact it is quite another

‘If I listened to the words of my mouth, I might say that someone

else was speaking out of my mouth.’

the point here is that logically speaking – authorship of any proposal – of any proposition – is logically irrelevant –

it doesn’t matter who says what – only what is said

"Judging from what I say, this is what I believe." Now, it is possible

to think out circumstances in which these words would make sense.

And then it would also be possible for someone to say "It is raining

and I don't believe it", or "It seems to me that my ego believes this,

but it isn't true." One would have to fill out the picture with behaviour

indicating that two people were speaking through my mouth.’

sorry – this doesn’t work –

you don’t need to invoke body snatchers to account for propositional uncertainty – and the recognition of propositional uncertainty

‘Even in the hypothesis the pattern is not what you think.

When you say "Suppose I believe . . . ." you are presupposing the

whole grammar of the word "to believe", the ordinary use, of which

you are master.—You are not supposing some state of affairs which,

so to speak, a picture presents unambiguously to you, so that you can

tack on to this hypothetical use some assertive use other than the

ordinary one.—You would not know at all what you were supposing

here (i.e. what, for example, would follow from such a supposition),

if you were not already familiar with the use of "believe".’

‘suppose I believe’ – is to propose a propositional state of affairs

that proposed hypothetical state of affairs – is logically no different to any other form of proposal – or proposal

it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Think of the expression "I say . . . .", for example in "I say it will

rain today", which simply comes to the same thing as the assertion

"It will . . . .". "He says it will . . . ." means approximately "He

believes it will . . . .". "Suppose I say . . . ." does not mean: Suppose

it rains today.’

yes – ‘Suppose I say …’ – does not mean ‘suppose it rains today’

‘suppose I say’ – might be put in a light hearted exchange – where the point of it would be to gage another’s reaction

it is effectively to put a proposal – a proposition –

and to put it in a rather mischievous manner

‘Different concepts touch here and coincide over a stretch. But

you need not think that all lines are circles.

Consider the misbegotten sentence "It may be raining, but it isn't".

And here one should be on one's guard against saying that "It

may be raining" really means "I think it'll be raining." For why not

the other way round, why should not the latter mean the former?’

‘it may be raining, but it isn’t’ – is a corruption of the logical disjunction

i.e. ‘it is raining or it is not raining’

yes – it is to make a misbegotten sentence – but who isn’t guilty of that?

‘Don't regard a hesitant assertion as an assertion of hesitancy.’

hesitancy is neither here nor there – (and you can take that as you will!)

the point is not hesitancy – the issue is propositional uncertainty

xi

‘Two uses of the word "see".

The one: "What do you see there?"—"I see this" (and then a description,

a drawing, a copy). The other: "I see a likeness between these

two faces"—let the man I tell this to be seeing the faces as clearly as I

do myself.

The importance of this is the difference of category between the two

'objects' of sight.

The one man might make an accurate drawing of the two faces,

and the other notice in the drawing the likeness which the former did

not see.’

the accuracy of any drawing will be a matter open to question –

any proposal of likeness will be open to question

we have here different proposals – the drawings – and the noticing of likeness –

different proposals –

nevertheless – logically speaking they are in the same boat – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to

another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call

this experience "noticing an aspect".

Its causes are of interest to psychologists.

We are interested in the concept and its place among the concepts of experience.’

‘noticing an aspect’ – is a result of a critical focus

its causes are open to question

the ‘concepts of experience’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘You could imagine the illustration

appearing in several places in a book, a text-book for instance. In the

relevant text something different is in question every time: here a glass

cube, there an inverted open box, there a wire frame of that shape,

there three boards forming a solid angle. Each time the text supplies

the interpretation of the illustration.

But we can also see the illustration now as one thing now as another.

—So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.

Here perhaps we should like to reply: The description of what is

got immediately, i.e. of the visual experience, by means of an interpretation

—is an indirect description. "I see the figure as a box" means:

I have a particular visual experience which I have found that

I always have when I interpret the figure as a box or when I look at

a box. But if it meant this I ought to know it. I ought to be

able to refer to the experience directly, and not only indirectly. (As

I can speak of red without calling it the colour of blood.)’

even ‘red’ is open to interpretation –

it may be described quite differently by different observers – i.e. – ‘dark red’ – ‘crimson’ – ‘light red’ – ‘dark pink’ etc. etc.

so ‘red’ – as with any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

here the term ‘red’ – is a logical placemat – to which questions are put – doubts raised – uncertainties explored

what Wittgenstein calls ‘direct experience’ – is the result of unreflective – uncritical propositional action –

there is nothing wrong with this – but it is what it is –

in logic where you begin is not the end

‘I shall call the following figure, derived from Jastrow1, the duck-rabbit.

It can be seen as a rabbit's head or as a duck's.

And I must distinguish between the 'continuous seeing' of an aspect

and the 'dawning' of an aspect.

The picture might have been shewn me, and I never have seen

anything but a rabbit in it.’

the ‘duck-rabbit’ is a proposal – and as with any other – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the point of this proposal is to illustrate propositional uncertainty

‘Here it is useful to introduce the idea of a picture-object. For

instance

would be a 'picture-face'.

In some respects I stand towards it as I do towards a human face.

I can study its expression, can react to it as to the expression of the

human face. A child can talk to picture-men or picture-animals, can

treat them as it treats dolls.

I may, then, have seen the duck-rabbit simply as a picture-rabbit

from the first. That is to say, if asked "What's that?" or "What do

you see here?" I should have replied: "A picture-rabbit". If I had

further been asked what that was, I should have explained by pointing

to all sorts of pictures of rabbits, should perhaps have pointed to real

rabbits, talked about their habits, or given an imitation of them.

I should not have answered the question "What do you see here?"

by saying: "Now I am seeing it as a picture-rabbit". I should simply

have described my perception: just as if I had said "I see a red circle

over there."—'

the ‘picture object’ from a logical point of view is a proposal – a proposal – open to question

and yes – to the question – ‘what do you see here?’ – you might well answer ‘a picture-rabbit’ – but logically that is neither here nor there –

the proposal is open to question – whether or not a question is asked

the proposal – is uncertain – whether or not its uncertainty is explored

‘Nevertheless someone else could have said of me: "He is seeing the

figure as a picture-rabbit.”    

if the proposal is put to question – if doubts are raised – and if its uncertainty is explored –

you may well answer ‘now I am seeing it as a ‘picture- rabbit’’

"It would have made as little sense for me to say "Now I am seeing

it as ..." as to say at the sight of a knife and fork "Now I am seeing

this as a knife and fork". This expression would not be understood.—

Any more than: "Now it's a fork" or "It can be a fork too".’

here you have to consider context

in an art installation – you may be presented with a fork – that in the full artistic context – let us say in a work of abstract expressionism – has a different meaning – whatever that might be

I could well imagine someone stepping back and being controversial or humorous – in that context – saying ‘now I see it as a fork’

in a ‘normal context’ – ‘now I see a fork’ – would be odd –

but surely – if the matter was of interest – you would ask whoever put that proposal – why they put it that way

‘One doesn't 'take' what one knows as the cutlery at a meal for

cutlery; any more than one ordinarily tries to move one's mouth as

one eats, or aims at moving it.’

yes – ‘ordinarily’ that is true –

the point is ‘ordinarily’ is a context – and in propositional life – contexts change –

and further – logically speaking – any propositional context – is open to question –

and that is the case whether or not – a question is asked

‘If you say "Now it's a face for me", we can ask: "What change are

you alluding to?’

a change of propositional context

"I see two pictures, with the duck-rabbit surrounded by rabbits in

one, by ducks in the other. I do not notice that they are the same.

Does it follow from this that I see something different in the two cases?—

It gives us a reason for using this expression here.

your ‘seeing’ – is what you propose

"I saw it quite differently, I should never have recognized it!

"Now, that is an exclamation. And there is also a justification for it.’

the exclamation is a mark of surprise – surprise at the change of context

surprise at uncertainty

‘I should never have thought of superimposing the heads like that,

of making this comparison between them. For they suggest a different

mode of comparison.’

perhaps it is something you hadn’t thought of – but now it has been put to you – and you are thinking about it

‘Nor has the head seen like this the slightest similarity to the head

seen like this——although they are congruent.’

‘they are congruent’ – a propositional relationship has been put – has been proposed

‘I am shewn a picture-rabbit and asked what it is; I say "It's a rabbit".

Not "Now it's a rabbit". I am reporting my perception.—I am shewn

the duck-rabbit and asked what it is; I may say "It's a duck-rabbit".

But I may also react to the question quite differently.—The answer

that it is a duck-rabbit is again the report of a perception; the answer

"Now it's a rabbit" is not. Had I replied "It's a rabbit", the ambiguity

would have escaped me, and I should have been reporting my

perception.’

I see no problem with ‘now it’s a rabbit’ – as a perception

i.e. – ‘now – I see it – perceive it – as a rabbit’

our perceptions change

‘The change of aspect. "But surely you would say that the picture

is altogether different now!’

‘the change of aspect’ – is a change in the way of seeing – a change of propositional context

the picture is a proposal – a proposal – open to question open to doubt – and uncertain

different understandings are the possibilities of propositional uncertainty

‘But what is different: my impression? my point of view?—Can I

say? I describe the alteration like a perception; quite as if the object

had altered before my eyes.’

the ‘object’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

describing it as ‘altering before your eyes’ – is just to point to its logical uncertainty

"Now I am seeing this", I might say (pointing to another picture, for

example). This has the form of a report of a new perception.’

it is a new proposal

‘The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new

perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged.’

a new proposal – is a different proposal

and this proposal as with any other is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if you argue that the perception is unchanged – what exactly are you saying?

what does ‘unchanged amount to?

as far as I can see it is now – to say- to propose – nothing –

the matter is left – up in the air –

it just brings us back to the question – ‘what are you going to say here – what is your proposal?’

‘I suddenly see the solution of a puzzle-picture. Before, there were

branches there; now there is a human shape. My visual impression

has changed and now I recognize that it has not only shape and colour

but also a quite particular 'organization'.—My visual impression has

changed;—what was it like before and what is it like now?—If I

represent it by means of an exact copy—and isn't that a good

representation of it?—no change is shewn.’

what was it like before – and what is it like now?

‘before’ and ‘now’ – here – are different propositions –

nevertheless – both proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘And above all do not say "After all my visual impression isn't the

drawing; it is this——which I can't shew to anyone."—Of course it is

not the drawing, but neither is it anything of the same category,

which I carry within myself.’

‘my visual impression’ – is a proposal – a proposal I can make public – or leave as private

a drawing is a proposal – make public –

both proposals – private – and public – are open to question

‘The concept of the 'inner picture' is misleading, for this concept

uses the 'outer picture' as a model; and yet the uses of the words for

these concepts are no more like one another than the uses of 'numeral'

and 'number'. (And if one chose to call numbers 'ideal numerals', one

might produce a similar confusion.)’

let’s say the concept of the ‘inner picture’ uses the ‘outer picture’ as a model

what’s misleading about this?

but even so – is this always the case?

a creative artist may well use his ‘inner picture’ – as a model for the ‘outer picture’

isn’t it rather that we can have two proposals – two propositions – one inner – as in not made public – and one outer – as in public?

all we are really talking about here – is two proposals – and their relation

these proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and their relation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘If you put the 'organization' of a visual impression on a level with

colours and shapes, you are proceeding from the idea of the visual

impression as an inner object. Of course this makes this object into a

chimera; a queerly shifting construction. For the similarity to a picture

is now impaired.’

the visual impression can be proposed as stable – and function as stable – in a proposed propositional context –

in any case the visual impression is a different proposal to the picture proposal

and any proposed relation between the two proposals – is open to question

it could also be a question of context and utility –

i.e. – it might well be that in some contexts the visual impression as an inner object proposal – has more functionality than the colours and shapes proposal – and in other contexts – the reverse is true

‘If I know that the schematic cube has various aspects and I want to

find out what someone else sees, I can get him to make a model of

what he sees, in addition to a copy, or to point to such a model; even

though he has no idea of my purpose in demanding two accounts.

But when we have a changing aspect the case is altered. Now the

only possible expression of our experience is what before perhaps

seemed, or even was, a useless specification when once we had the

copy.

And this by itself wrecks the comparison of 'organization' with

colour and shape in visual impressions.’

any ‘specification’ – any ‘organisation’ – is really a determination – a pragmatic decision –  to use – to operate with – a particular impression – for a particular purpose – even in the face of a ‘changing aspect’ –

and when such a decision is taken a comparison is possible

‘If I saw the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then I saw: these shapes and

colours (I give them in detail)—and I saw besides something like this:

and here I point to a number of different pictures of rabbits.—This

shews the difference between the concepts.’

yes – different concepts – different proposals

'Seeing as . . . .' is not part of perception. And for that reason it is

like seeing and again not like.

any perception is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I look at an animal and am asked: "What do you see?" I answer:"

A rabbit".—I see a landscape; suddenly a rabbit runs past. I exclaim

"A rabbit!"

Both things, both the report and the exclamation, are expressions of

perception and of visual experience. But the exclamation is so in a

different sense from the report: it is forced from us.—It is related to the

experience as a cry is to pain.’

the report and the exclamation – are proposals

in the case of the exclamation –  what happens is you propose ‘a rabbit’ – where you did not expect to

‘But since it is the description of a perception, it can also be called the

expression of thought.——If you are looking at the object, you need

not think of it; but if you are having the visual experience expressed by

the exclamation, you are also thinking of what you see.’

what you have is a proposal –

how you account for the proposal – describe it / explain it – i.e. – a ‘perception’ – a  ‘thought’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Hence the flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience,

half thought.

any proposal is open to question

‘Someone suddenly sees an appearance which he does not recognize

(it may be a familiar object, but in an unusual position or lighting); the

lack of recognition perhaps lasts only a few seconds. Is it correct to say

he has a different visual experience from someone who knew the

object at once?’

if what is proposed is unknown  –

that will be a different proposal to one where what is proposed – is known

the visual experience is a proposal – and whether known or known – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘For might not someone be able to describe an unfamiliar shape

that appeared before him just as accurately as I, to whom it is familiar?

And isn't that the answer?—Of course it will not generally be so.

And his description will run quite differently. (I say, for example,

"The animal had long ears"—he: "There were two long appendages",

and then he draws them.)’

description is proposal – proposal – is knowledge –

our knowledge – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I meet someone whom I have not seen for years; I see him clearly,

but fail to know him. Suddenly I know him, I see the old face in the

altered one. I believe that I should do a different portrait of him now

if I could paint.’

what you ‘see’ – is open to question –

what you know – is open to question

‘Now, when I know my acquaintance in a crowd, perhaps after

looking in his direction for quite a while,—is this a special sort of

seeing? Is it a case of both seeing and thinking? or an amalgam of the

two, as I should almost like to say?’

here I propose my acquaintance –

how such a proposal is accounted for – is explained – is open to question

‘The question is: why does one want to say this?’

if one says this – presumably they do because it suits them to do so – and there could any number of reasons as to why it suits them

‘The very expression which is also a report of what is seen, is here

a cry of recognition.’

what you have is a proposal of recognition

recognition is a propositional relation –

what I recognise – is what I have seen – what I have proposed in the past –

I identify my present proposal with the past proposal –

and any such proposal of recognition – is open to question

‘What is the criterion of the visual experience?—The criterion?

What do you suppose?

The representation of 'what is seen'.’

what is seen is what is represented – what is represented – is what is seen

‘The concept of a representation of what is seen, like that of a copy,

is very elastic, and so together with it is the concept of what is seen.

The two are intimately connected. (Which is not to say that they are

alike.)’

they are not alike – they are one in the same

‘How does one tell that human beings see three-dimensionally?—

I ask someone about the lie of the land (over there) of which he has a

view. "Is it like this?" (I shew him with my hand)—"Yes."—"How

do you know?"—"It's not misty, I see it quite clear."—He does not

give reasons for the surmise. The only thing that is natural to us

is to represent what we see three-dimensionally; special practice and

training are needed for two-dimensional representation whether in

drawing or in words. (The queerness of children's drawings.)’

‘how does one tell that human beings see three-dimensionally?’

yes – we assume three-dimensional seeing –

however logically speaking – the assumption – as with any assumption – can be put to question – to doubt – and its uncertainty explored

‘If someone sees a smile and does not know it for a smile, does not

understand it as such, does he see it differently from someone who

understands it?—He mimics it differently, for instance.’

it is hard to know –

it might be argued that he sees it the same – but describes it differently –

or that his description represents a different seeing

the matter is open to question – is uncertain

‘Hold the drawing of a face upside down and you can't recognize

the expression of the face. Perhaps you can see that it is smiling, but

not exactly what kind of smile it is. You cannot imitate the smile or

describe it more exactly.

And yet the picture which you have turned round may be a most

exact representation of a person's face.’

well you have different pictures – different proposals –

proposing that they have a certain relation to each other – is a different matter

‘The figure (a)      is the reverse of the figure (b)

As (c)     is the reverse of the figure (d)

But — I should like to say — there is a different difference between my

impressions of (c) and (d) and between those of (a) and (b). (d),

for example, looks neater than (c). (Compare a remark of Lewis

Carroll’s.) (d) is easy, (c) hard to copy.’

different proposals – simple as that –

and yes – you can carry on about what’s neater – what’s easier

‘Imagine the duck-rabbit hidden in a tangle of lines. Now I suddenly

notice it in the picture, and notice it simply as the head of a rabbit.

At some later time I look at the same picture and notice the same

figure, but see it as the duck, without necessarily realizing that it was

the same figure both times.—If I later see the aspect change—can I say

that the duck and rabbit aspects are now seen quite differently from

when I recognized them separately in the tangle of lines? No.’

yes – the difference is that in the second case you the aspect change – whereas in the first case – there is no aspect change

you can’t just cancel out the aspect change – as if it didn’t happen – as if is not a fact of the second sighting

we are dealing here with different proposals – different propositional actions

‘But the change produces a surprise not produced by the recognition.’

yes – that is the point – different proposals – different propositional experiences

‘If you search in a figure (1) for another figure (2), and then find it,

you see (1) in a new way. Not only can you give a new kind of description

of it, but noticing the second figure was a new visual experience.’

yes

‘But you would not necessarily want to say "Figure (1) looks quite

different now; it isn't even in the least like the figure I saw before,

though they are congruent!"’

what we have here is two proposals regarding figure 1 – and the two proposals are related

how the relationship is described – is open to question

‘There are here hugely many interrelated phenomena and possible

concepts.’

no it’s quite simple – what we have here is propositions – and their relations

‘Then is the copy of the figure an incomplete description of my visual

experience? No.—But the circumstances decide whether, and what,

more detailed specifications are necessary.—It may be an incomplete

description; if there is still something to ask.’

the issue is not incompleteness – rather uncertainty – and yes – there is always something to ask

‘Of course we can say: There are certain things which fall equally

under the concept 'picture-rabbit' and under the concept 'picture-

duck'. And a picture, a drawing, is such a thing.—But the impression

is not simultaneously of a picture-duck and a picture-rabbit.’

yes

"What I really see must surely be what is produced in me by the

influence of the object"—Then what is produced in me is a sort of

copy, something that in its turn can be looked at, can be before

one; almost something like a materialisation.’

what I see is what is proposed

now do we explain this by the further proposal that what I see is produced in me –

or perhaps what is given to me – or is what is proposed – a relation between the inner and the outer?

the matter – the explanation – is open to question

‘And this materialization is something spatial and it must be possible

to describe it in purely spatial terms. For instance (if it is a face)

it can smile; the concept of friendliness, however, has no place in an

account of it, but is foreign to such an account (even though it may

subserve it).’

yes – the sort of copy – that becomes a materialization?

if you are going down this path – perhaps leave it at ‘a sort of copy’ – vague bas that is –

I mean is the matter really progressed by the further elaboration – ‘materialization’?

if this materialization is a copy of what is seen – smile – friendliness  etc – all you have is duplication – and duplication is not explanation

if it is not an accurate copy – and something is left out – i.e. – friendliness etc. –

the ‘explanation’ – if you can call it that – fails

explanation – is the propositional action of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

it does not come to a logical end

‘If you ask me what I saw, perhaps I shall be able to make a sketch

which shews you; but I shall mostly have no recollection of the way

my glance shifted in looking at it.’

any description of what I see – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The concept of 'seeing' makes a tangled impression. Well, it is

tangled.—I look at the landscape, my gaze ranges over it, I see

all sorts of distinct and indistinct movement; this impresses itself

sharply on me, that is quite hazy. After all, how completely ragged

what we see can appear! And now look at all that can be meant by

"description of what is seen".—But this just is what is called description

of what is seen. There is not one genuine proper case of such

description—the rest being just vague, something which awaits

clarification, or which must just be swept aside as rubbish.’

any description is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Here we are in enormous danger of wanting to make fine distinctions.

—It is the same when one tries to define the concept of a material

object in terms of 'what is really seen'.—What we have rather to do is

to accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of

the matter as false. The primitive language-game which children are

taught needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be

rejected.’

yes – accept everyday language – and any other propositional form

any proposal is open to question –

a so called false account – is an account you dissent from – for whatever reason –

and any propositional dissent is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any so called ‘justification’ – is the decision – to stop questioning – to put an end to doubt – to pretend certainty

justification is a rhetorical game

there is no justification in logic

‘Take as an example the aspects of a triangle. This triangle

can be seen as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing;

as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain,

as a wedge, as an arrow or pointer, as an overturned object which is

meant to stand on the shorter side of the right angle, as a half parallelogram,

and as various other things.

"You can think now of this now of this as you look at it, can regard

it now as this now as this, and then you will see it now this way, now

this" — What way? There is no further qualification.’

the triangle – the object – any object – is open to question

which is to say – how we regard it – how we propose it – how we use it – is at base uncertain

this uncertainty is the ground of possibility

what determines how we will propose it – how we will use it?

circumstance

which is to say – whatever propositional context – whatever propositional construct –

we are operating in

and even here matters will be uncertain

nevertheless we proceed –

we proceed with questions – with doubts – with uncertainties

‘But how is it possible to see an object according to an interpretation? —

The question represents it as a queer fact; as if something were being

forced into a form it did not really fit. But no squeezing, no forcing

took place here.’

correct – there is no squeezing – there is no forcing

and we are not dealing with a ‘queer fact’

the fact we deal with here is as natural and as common – as dirt

it is the everyday – everywhere reality of uncertainty – propositional uncertainty

your interpretation is your decision to use the object in a propositional context

simple as that

and any decision you take – is – as with the object itself – open to question

‘When it looks as if there were no room for such a form between

other ones you have to look for it in another dimension. If there is

no room here, there is room in another dimension.’

any so called ‘form’ is a  proposal – a proposal – open to interpretation

and any interpretation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘(It is in this sense too that there is no room for imaginary numbers

in the continuum of real numbers. But what this means is: the application

of the concept of imaginary numbers is less like that of real

numbers than appears from the look of the calculations. It is necessary

to get down to the application, and then the concept finds a different

place, one which, so to speak, one never dreamed of.)’

the ‘continuum of real numbers’ is a propositional game – (as indeed is all of mathematics)

that is to say it is a rule governed propositional action

when you play this game – the rules – and the concepts of the game – are not open to question – open to doubt – or uncertain

if you put the rules – or the concepts – to question – you don’t play the game – you have no game

in our propositional life we have two logical modes –

the critical mode – and the rule-governed or game mode

human beings critically evaluate propositions – and they play propositional games

what Wittgenstein is doing here is confusing one with the other –

a game is not open to interpretation – it is rule governed –

how you interpret an object is not rule governed – it is not a game –

an object is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to the continuum of real numbers – yes – you have to get down to the application – and it is the application – the playing of the game that will determine the numbers in the continuum

and yes – you might find numbers you never dreamed of – but in terms of the playing of the game – they are not imaginary – they are real – if unexpected

and like any other number in the continuum – rule governed

‘How would the following account do: "What I can see something

as, is what it can be a picture of"?’

what it can be a picture of – is what it can be seen as

the ‘picture’ here – is no more than a demonstration of an interpretation

‘What this means is: the aspects in a change of aspects are those

ones which the figure might sometimes have permanently in a picture.’

well a picture may be so constructed – but logically speaking it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘A triangle can really be standing up in one picture, be hanging in

another, and can in a third be something that has fallen over.—That is,

I who am looking at it say, not "It may also be something that has

fallen over", but "That glass has fallen over and is lying there in

fragments". This is how we react to the picture.’

if we are talking about three different pictures – we are talking about three different proposals –

proposals – open to question

‘Could I say what a picture must be like to produce this effect?

No. There are, for example, styles of painting which do not convey

anything to me in this immediate way, but do to other people. I

think custom and upbringing have a hand in this.’

the ‘effect’ of any proposal – is open to question

‘What does it mean to say that I 'see the sphere floating in the air' in a

picture?

Is it enough that this description is the first to hand, is the matter-

of-course one? No, for it might be so for various reasons. This might,

for instance, simply be the conventional description.’

what you ‘see’ – is what you see – and what you see is open to question

‘What is the expression of my not merely understanding the picture in

this way, for instance, (knowing what it is supposed to be), but seeing

it in this way?—It is expressed by: "The sphere seems to float", "You

see it floating", or again, in a special tone of voice, "It floats!"

This, then, is the expression of taking something for something.

But not being used as such.’

it is to propose – what is – 

and any such proposal – is open to question

‘Here we are not asking ourselves what are the causes and what

produces this impression in a particular case.

And is it a special impression?—"Surely I see something different

when I see the sphere floating from when I merely see it lying there."—

This really means: This expression is justified!—(For taken literally

it is no more than a repetition.)’

yes – something different – a different proposal

there is no question of justification –

what is proposed – is what is proposed –

and whatever is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘(And yet my impression is not that of a real floating sphere either.

There are various forms of 'three-dimensional seeing'. The three-

dimensional character of a photograph and the three-dimensional

character of what we see through a stereoscope.)’

yes – different three-dimensional proposals

“And is it really a different impression?” In order to answer this

I should ask myself whether there is really something different

there in me. But how can I find out?——I describe what I am seeing

differently.’

the ‘impression’ – if you want to call it that – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what we have is different proposals in relation to the impression –

which amounts to saying – we have different proposals – and it is the proposals that we deal with – that we critically evaluate

‘Certain drawings are always seen as flat figures, and others sometimes,

or always, three-dimensionally.

Here one would now like to say: the visual impression of what is

seen three-dimensionally is three-dimensional; with the schematic cube,

for instance, it is a cube. (For the description of the impression is

the description of a cube.)’

And then it seems queer that with some drawings our impression

should be a flat thing, and with some a three-dimensional thing. One

asks oneself "Where is this going to end?"’

what we operate with – what we deal with is proposals – and here – different proposals

this notion of ‘impression’ is a proposed explanatory concept – and as with any proposal – open to question

‘where is this going to end?’ –

logically speaking – it doesn’t

‘When I see the picture of a galloping horse—do I merely know that

this is the kind of movement meant? Is it superstition to think I see

the horse galloping in the picture?——And does my visual impression

gallop too?’

the picture as a representation of movement – is  a representational proposal –

however the picture may represent something other than movement to you –

it may i.e. represent fine artistic work

the picture is a proposal – and as with any proposal – from a logical point of view –

what it represents – is open to question

and does my visual impression gallop too – that is does my proposal gallop too?

well this could be proposed – but what would it mean?

a proposal is put

‘What does anyone tell me by saying "Now I see it as .... ."?

What consequences has this information? What can I do with it?’

‘now I see it as …’ – really reports that the speaker has a new understanding of what it is – a new interpretation

what consequences does it have?

that will depend on propositional reactions to the report / proposal

perhaps it shows that the speaker has critically evaluated what has been put to him

what can I do with it?

put it it to question

‘People often associate colours with vowels. Someone might find

that a vowel changed its colour when it was repeated over and over

again. He finds a 'now blue—now red', for instance.

The expression "Now I am seeing it as . . ." might have no more

significance for us than: "Now I find a red".

(Linked with physiological observations, even this change might

acquire importance for us.)’

yes – that is possible

‘Here it occurs to me that in conversation on aesthetic matters we

use the words: "You have to see it like this, this is how it is meant";

"When you see it like this, you see where it goes wrong"; "You have

to hear this bar as an introduction"; "You must hear it in this key";"

You must phrase it like this" (which can refer to hearing as well as to

playing).’

‘you have to see it like this’ and ‘when you see it like this – you see where it goes wrong’ etc. – strike me as pretentious statements –

but hey – that’s the art world

‘This figure

is supposed to represent a convex step and to be used in some kind

of topological demonstration. For this purpose we draw the straight

line a through the geometric centres of the two surfaces.—Now if

anyone's three-dimensional impression of the figure were never more

than momentary, and even so were now concave, now convex, that

might make it difficult for him to follow our demonstration. And

if he finds that the flat aspect alternates with a three-dimensional one,

that is just as if I were to shew him completely different objects in

the course of the demonstration.’

the figure – the proposal – can be variously interpreted –

and is in effect deigned to be variously interpreted

what you have here is a figurative demonstration of propositional uncertainty

‘What does it mean for me to look at a drawing in descriptive

geometry and say: "I know that this line appears again here, but I

can't see it like that"? Does it simply mean a lack of familiarity in

operating with the drawing; that I don't 'know my way about' too

well?—This familiarity is certainly one of our criteria. What tells

us that someone is seeing the drawing three-dimensionally is a certain

kind of 'knowing one's way about'. Certain gestures, for instance,

which indicate the three-dimensional relations: fine shades of behaviour.

I see that an animal in a picture is transfixed by an arrow. It has

struck it in the throat and sticks out at the back of the neck. Let the

picture be a silhouette.—Do you see the arrow—or do you merely know

that these two bits are supposed to represent part of an arrow?

(Compare Kohler's figure of the interpenetrating hexagons.)’

our looking – our seeing – our knowing – is always open to question – is uncertain

‘"But this isn't seeing!"——"But this is seeing I"—It must be possible

to give both remarks a conceptual justification.’

what you have here is different proposals –

different proposals – that require further propositional explanation

what this shows is that the proposal ‘seeing’ – is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘But this is seeing! In what sense is it seeing?

"The phenomenon is at first surprising, but a physiological explanation

of it will certainly be found."—

Our problem is not a causal but a conceptual one.’

the problem is not causal – and not conceptual – the problem is propositional – is critical

‘If the picture of the transfixed beast or of the interpenetrating

hexagons were shewn to me just for a moment and then I had to

describe it, that would be my description; if I had to draw it I should

certainly produce a very faulty copy, but it would shew some sort of

animal transfixed by an arrow, or two hexagons interpenetrating. That

is to say: there are certain mistakes that I should not make.’

whatever is drawn is what is proposed –

there are no ‘mistakes’ – what is proposed is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The first thing to jump to my eye in this picture is: there are two

hexagons.

Now I look at them and ask myself: "Do I really see them as hexagons?"

—and for the whole time they are before my eyes? (Assuming

that they have not changed their aspect in that time.)—And I should

like to reply: "I am not thinking of them as hexagons the whole time."’

well the fact that the question – ‘do I really see them as hexagons?’ – is asked

indicates that that the initial proposal of two hexagons – is open to question – and is questioned

‘Someone tells me: "I saw it at once as two hexagons. And that's

the whole of what I saw." But how do I understand this? I think he

would have given this description at once in answer to the question

"What are you seeing?", nor would he have treated it as one among

several possibilities. In this his description is like the answer "A face"

on being shewn the figure’

yes – he has his proposal – and by the sounds of it – he is not prepared to put his proposal to question

this is pretty common – but it is not rational – it is not logical

‘The best description I can give of what was shewn me for a moment

is this: .....’

yes – fair enough – but that doesn’t mean that the description – this ‘best description’ – is not open to question

"The impression was that of a rearing animal." So a perfectly

definite description came out.—Was it seeing, or was it a thought?’

what it was – is a proposal – and if it suits your purposes – you can further elaborate – further propose – in terms of ‘seeing’ – in terms of ‘thought’ – or whatever else

‘Do not try to analyse your own inner experience.’

your ‘inner experience’ – is whatever you propose it to be –

and as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

analysis is critical evaluation

if you don’t critically evaluate – you don’t operate logically – you are not rational

‘Of course I might also have seen the picture first as something

different, and then have said to myself "Oh, it's two hexagons!"

So the aspect would have altered. And does this prove that I in fact

saw it as something definite?’

it is not the aspect that has altered – a different proposal has been put

there is no ‘definite description’ – and description is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Is it a genuine visual experience?" The question is: in what sense

is it one?’

from a logical point of view – any proposal put is genuine

‘Here it is difficult to see that what is at issue is the fixing of concepts.’

what is at issue is critical evaluation

‘A concept forces itself on one. (This is what you must not forget.)’

our world is propositional –

what the world puts to us – and what we put to the world – is proposal – proposition

a ‘concept’ is a proposal – the point of which is to give a propositional background to whatever proposal we are operating with

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘For when should I call it a mere case of knowing, not seeing?—'

knowing – is proposing –

seeing is proposing

not all proposing is seeing

‘Perhaps when someone treats the picture as a working drawing,

reads it like a blueprint. (Fine shades of behaviour.—Why are they

important* They have important consequences.)’

how a picture is read – is open to question

we recognise ‘fine shades of behaviour’ – when we put behaviours to question

why are they important?

they are important because they reveal propositional / logical – uncertainty

to explore propositional uncertainty – is to understand

"To me it is an animal pierced by an arrow." That is what I treat

it as; this is my attitude to the figure. This is one meaning in calling it

a case of 'seeing'.

But can I say in the same sense: "To me these are two hexagons"?

Not in the same sense, but in a similar one.

You need to think of the role which pictures such as paintings (as

opposed to working drawings) have in our lives. This role is by no

means a uniform one.’

it is not pictures per se that we are concerned with – rather it is proposals – propositions

a picture is a proposal – is a proposition –

and of course the ‘role’ propositions play in our lives – is not uniform

our life is propositional

propositions are every role

‘A comparison: texts are sometimes hung on the wall. But not

theorems of mechanics. (Our relation to these two things.)’

if a theorem of mathematics is hung on a wall – we are likely to put the context to question – i.e. – are we to see this as we are used to seeing the theorem – in a mathematical context – or is this context something different – i.e. an artistic context?

‘If you see the drawing as such-and-such an animal, what I expect

from you will be pretty different from what I expect when you merely

know what it is meant to be.’

‘when you merely know what it I meant to be’ – is typical of a non-critical approach to a proposal –

and such an approach is not logical

‘Perhaps the following expression would have been better: we

regard the photograph, the picture on our wall, as the object itself

(the man, landscape, and so on) depicted there.’

more likely that the photograph is regarded as a likeness of the object itself

‘This need not have been so. We could easily imagine people who

did not have this relation to such pictures. Who, for example, would

be repelled by photographs, because a face without colour and even

perhaps a face reduced in scale struck them as inhuman.’

yes – the fact is we just don’t how anyone regards anything

yes – we propose – to cover our lack of knowledge – and we proceed with our proposals

and if we are logical about the matter – we will keep an open mind

‘I say: "We regard a portrait as a human being,"—but when do we do

so, and for how long? Always, if we see it at all (and do not, say, see it

as something else)?’

look I don’t think anyone does regard a portrait as a human being – not that is – anyone in their right mind

that being said – however it is regarded – it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I might say yes to this, and that would determine the concept of

regarding-as.—The question is whether yet another concept, related

to this one, is also of importance to us: that, namely, of a seeing-as

which only takes place while I am actually concerning myself with the

picture as the object depicted.’

‘seeing as’ – is a propositional action – where the object / proposal in question – is being considered critically

‘I might say: a picture does not always live for me while I am seeing it.

"Her picture smiles down on me from the wall." It need not always

do so, whenever my glance lights on it.’

whether it ‘lives’ or not depends on how it is viewed – how it is proposed –

the matter is open to question

‘The duck-rabbit. One asks oneself: how can the eye—this dot—

be looking in a direction?—"See, if is looking!” (And one 'looks' one-

self as one says this.) But one does not say and do this the whole time

one is looking at the picture. And now, what is this "See, it's looking!"

—does it express a sensation?’

what it expresses is a proposal – a proposition

‘(In giving all these examples I am not aiming at some kind of

completeness, some classification of psychological concepts. They are

only meant to enable the reader to shift for himself when he encounters

conceptual difficulties.)’

there is no completeness to aim at – only uncertainties to explore

and there are no ‘conceptual difficulties’ – there are just different – and conflicting propositional responses

‘"Now I see it as a ... ." goes with "I am trying to see it as a ... ."

or "I can't see it as a .... yet". But I cannot try to see a conventional

picture of a lion as a lion, any more than an F as that letter. (Though

I may well try to see it as a gallows, for example.)’

you see what you see – you propose what you propose – there is no ‘trying’ in this –

you either do it or you don’t

however – what you see – what you propose – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘Do not ask yourself "How does it work with me?"—Ask "What do I

know about someone else?‘’

‘how does it work with me?’ – really – is to question your own understanding of whatever proposals you are dealing with –

a perfectly rational thing to do

‘what do I know about someone else?’ – is to put to question – any proposals you have regarding another –

again – a rational approach

‘How does one play the game: "It could be this too"? (What a figure

could also be—which is what it can be seen as—is not simply another

figure. If someone said "I see

he might still be meaning very different things.)’

how does one play this game?

it is not really a game – it is not rule governed

what it is – is a critical exercise

I guess all you can really say here is that it could be interesting – amusing – whatever – to see what people come up with

‘Here is a game played by children: they say that a chest, for example,

is a house; and thereupon it is interpreted as a house in every detail.

A piece of fancy is worked into it.

And does the child now see the chest as a house?

"He quite forgets that it is a chest; for him it actually is a house."

(There are definite tokens of this.) Then would it not also be

correct to say he sees it as a house?’

whenever we imagine something to be something else – in order to do that we have to hold the imagined proposal – alongside the original proposal –

that is to say – we hold them together

(it’s chewing gum and walking at the same time)

otherwise – there is no imagining

‘And if you knew how to play this game, and, given a particular

situation, you exclaimed with special expression "Now it's a house!"—

you would be giving expression to the dawning of an aspect.’

you would be giving expression to an imaginative proposal

‘If I heard someone talking about the duck-rabbit, and now he spoke

in a certain way about the special expression of the rabbit's face I

should say, now he's seeing the picture as a rabbit.’

yes

‘But the expression in one's voice and gestures is the same as if the

object had altered and had ended by becoming this or that.’

the expression in one’s voice and gestures – are logically irrelevant –

whatever it is or becomes – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I have a theme played to me several times and each time in a slower

tempo. In the end I say "Now it's right", or "Now at last it's a march",

"Now at last it's a dance".—The same tone of voice expresses the

dawning of an aspect.’

let’s be clear – there is no ‘dawning of an aspect’ –

this notion of ‘aspect’ here – completely misses the point

what we are dealing with is proposal – and different proposals –

if you like – seeing – and different ways of seeing

the object in question – is not a collection of aspects – aspects to be separated out

the object in question is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and logically speaking – uncertain

it is this uncertainty that is the ground of possibility – the ground of different ways of seeing

and as for ‘tone of voice’ – that is best understood from the point of view of rhetoric –

it has nothing to do with critical evaluation –

and frankly – as a philosophical argument – scrapping the bottom of the barrel

‘Fine shades of behaviour.'—When my understanding of a theme is

expressed by my whistling it with the correct expression, this is an

example of such fine shades.’

‘a fine shade of behaviour’ – is no more than a proposal – an interpretation

‘The aspects of the triangle: it is as if an image came into contact,

and for a time remained in contact, with the visual impression.

In this, however, these aspects differ from the concave and convex

aspects of the step (for example). And also from the aspects of the

figure

(which I shall call a "double cross") as a white cross on a black

ground and as a black cross on a white ground.

You must remember that the descriptions of the alternating aspects

are of a different kind in each case.’

different proposed perceptions – and different proposed uses

‘(The temptation to say "I see it like this", pointing to the same thing

for "it" and "this".) Always get rid of the idea of the private object

in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not

notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you.’

it is not a matter of the ‘private object’ – the issue is proposal – and alternative or different proposals

if you do not notice a change – you won’t propose it

‘Those two aspects of the double cross (I shall call them the aspects

A) might be reported simply by pointing alternately to an isolated

white and an isolated black cross.’

alternate proposals

‘One could quite well imagine this as a primitive reaction in a child

even before it could talk.’

primitive proposals

‘(Thus in reporting the aspects A we point to a part of the double

cross.—The duck and rabbit aspects could not be described in an

analogous way.)’

yes – they could

‘You only 'see the duck and rabbit aspects' if you are already conversant

with the shapes of those two animals. There is no analogous condition

for seeing the aspects A.’

you can point out difference – without being conversant with shape

‘It is possible to take the duck-rabbit simply for the picture of a

rabbit, the double cross simply for the picture of a black cross, but not

to take the bare triangular figure for the picture of an object that has

fallen over. To see this aspect of the triangle demands imagination.’

yes – and an imaginative proposal – will be based on a non-imaginative proposal

‘The aspects A are not essentially three-dimensional; a black cross

on a white ground is not essentially a cross with a white surface in the

background. You could teach someone the idea of the black cross on

a ground of different colour without shewing him anything but crosses

painted on sheets of paper. Here the 'background' is simply the

surrounding of the cross.’

yes – you can do this

‘The aspects A are not connected with the possibility of illusion

in the same way as are the three-dimensional aspects of the drawing of

a cube or step.’

you can construct models of propositional uncertainty

‘I can see the schematic cube as a box;—but can I also see it now as a

paper, now as a tin, box?—What ought I to say, if someone assured me

he could?—I can set a limit to the concept here.’

there is no logical limit as to how any proposed object can be seen –

the matter is logically uncertain

‘Yet think of the expression "felt" in connexion with looking at a

picture. ("One feels the softness of that material") (Knowing in dreams."

And I knew that . . . was in the room.")’

different accounts of experience – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘How does one teach a child (say in arithmetic) "Now take these

things together!" or "Now these go together"? Clearly "taking

together" and "going together" must originally have had another

meaning for him than that of seeing in this way or that.—And this is a

remark about concepts, not about teaching methods.’

how a child learns propositional relations – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘One kind of aspect might be called 'aspects of organization'. When

the aspect changes parts of the picture go together which before did

not.’

yes – you could propose this

‘In the triangle I can see now this as apex, that as base—now this as

apex, that as base.—Clearly the words "Now I am seeing this as the

apex" cannot so far mean anything to a learner who has only just

met the concepts of apex, base, and so on.—But I do not mean this

as an empirical proposition.’

it is an empirical proposition – a report of an experience

and it is open to question – i.e. – why that as the base – and not this?

"Now he's seeing it like this", "now like that" would only be said of

someone capable of making certain applications of the figure quite

freely.’

yes

‘The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique.’

and it is the critical technique – the logical technique

‘But how queer for this to be the logical condition of someone's

having such-and-such an experience! After all, you don't say that one

only 'has toothache' if one is capable of doing such-and-such.—From

this it follows that we cannot be dealing with the same concept of

experience here. It is a different though related concept.’

a critical technique – a logical technique – is not queer – it is rational –

a toothache like any other experience is open to question

‘It is only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such,

that it makes sense to say he has had this experience.’

if he proposes the experience – he has the experience –

and of course – his proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘And if this sounds crazy, you need to reflect that the concept of seeing

is modified here. (A similar consideration is often necessary to get

rid of a feeling of dizziness in mathematics.)’

the concept of seeing – is open to interpretation

dizziness in mathematics – is a response to – or reaction to – the playing of the game

it is likely a result of of being proficient – and forgetting that you are in fact playing a rule governed exercise

‘We talk, we utter words, and only later get a picture of their life.’

any picture of their life will be a result of further proposal

‘For how could I see that this posture was hesitant before I knew

that it was a posture and not the anatomy of the animal?’

you propose that the posture as hesitant –

how you explain this is another matter –

a matter for additional proposal

‘But surely that only means that I cannot use this concept to describe

the object of sight, just because it has more than purely visual reference?—

Might I not for all that have a purely visual concept of a hesitant

posture, or of a timid face?’

any propositional action is open to question – open to modification

a purely visual proposal of a hesitant posture or face is possible – if it is put –

and if put – is open to question

‘Such a concept would be comparable with 'major' and 'minor' which

certainly have emotional value, but can also be used purely to describe

a perceived structure.’

‘major’ and ‘minor’ – different proposals – can be and are used in different propositional contexts

‘The epithet "sad", as applied for example to the outline face,

characterizes the grouping of lines in a circle. Applied to a human

being it has a different (though related) meaning. (But this does not

mean that a sad expression is like the feeling of sadness!)’

‘a sad expression’ – and ‘the feeling of sadness’ – prime facie – are different proposals

‘Think of this too: I can only see, not hear, red and green,—but

sadness I can hear as much as I can see it.’

would it be possible to teach a blind person colours – and different colours –

with sounds?

‘Think of the expression "I heard a plaintive melody". And now the

question is: "Does he hear the plaint?"’

the best you could do here – would be to ask him – and take it from there

‘And if I reply: "No, he doesn't hear it, he merely has a sense of it"—

where does that get us? One cannot mention a sense-organ for this

'sense'.’

ok – but then the question – what does ‘having a sense of it’ mean?

there could be various answers to this – and they would be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Some would like to reply here: "Of course I hear it!"—Others:

"I don't really hear it.”’

both responses are open to question

‘We can, however, establish differences of concept here.’

‘differences of concept’ – here – are different proposals

‘We react to the visual impression differently from someone who does

not recognize it as timid (in the full sense of the word).—But I do not

want to say here that we feel this reaction in our muscles and joints

and that this is the ‘sensing’. – No, what we have here is a modified

concept of sensation.’

sure – you can put this proposal – and be ready for it to put to question

‘One might say of someone that he was blind to the expression of a

face. Would his eyesight on that account be defective?’

the health of his eyesight – might be relevant here – or it might not be –

it would depend on what ‘blind to the expression of a face’ – is supposed to mean

the proposal is open to question

‘This is, of course, not simply a question for physiology. Here the

physiological is a symbol of the logical.’

the physiology is a proposal – the logic of the matter is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

‘If you feel the seriousness of a tune, what are you perceiving?—

Nothing that could be conveyed by reproducing what you heard.’

this proposal of ‘feeling the seriousness a of tune’ – as with any other – is open to question –

reproducing the sound – might well figure in how you explain the perception / proposal

‘I can imagine some arbitrary cipher—this, for instance:

to be a strictly correct letter of some foreign alphabet. Or again, to

be a faultily written one, and faulty in this way or that: for example,

it might be slap-dash, or typical childish awkwardness, or like the

flourishes in a legal document. It could deviate, from the correctly

written letter in a variety of ways.—And I can see it in various

aspects according to the fiction I surround it with. And here there is a

close kinship with 'experiencing the meaning of a word.’

‘I can see it in various aspects according to the fiction I surround it with’

here we are talking about how we propose in relation to sign

when it comes to words – we propose in relation to use

and any such proposal – even when adopted is open to question

‘I should like to say that what dawns here lasts only as long as I am

occupied with the object in a particular way. ("See, it's looking!")——

'I should like to say'—and is it so?——Ask yourself "For how long

am I struck by a thing?"—For how long do I find it new?’

a proposal is ‘new’ – I would think when discovered – and until it becomes integrated into a propositional use

‘The aspect presents a physiognomy which then passes away. It

is almost as if there were a face there which at first I imitate, and then

accept without imitating it.—And isn't this really explanation enough?

—But isn't it too much?’

the ‘aspect’ – so called here – is a proposal –

and as to the ‘physiognomy which passes away’ – this is just metaphysical guff

an explanation is a propositional account –

that is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

"I observed the likeness between him and his father for a few

minutes, and then no longer."—One might say this if his face were

changing and only looked like his father's for a short time. But it can

also mean that after a few minutes I stopped being struck by the

likeness.’

yes

‘"After the likeness had struck you, how long were you aware of it?"’

‘What kind of answer might one give to this question?—"I soon

stopped thinking about it", or "It struck me again from time to time",

or "I several times had the thought, how like they are", or! "I marvelled

at the likeness for at least a minute"—That is the sort of answer

you would get.’

if you are struck by a likeness – that is if you propose a likeness – you propose a propositional relation

how long are you aware of it – how long are you aware of the relation?

as long as you need to be – as long as it has propositional function for you

‘I should like to put the question "Am I aware of the spatial character,

the depth of an object (of this cupboard for instance), the whole time

I am seeing it?" Do I, so to speak, feel it the whole time?—But put the

question in the third person.—When would you say of someone that he

was aware of it the whole time, and when the opposite?—Of course,

one could ask him,—but how did he learn how to answer such a

question?—He knows what it means "to feel pain continuously".

But that will only confuse him here (as it confuses me).’

you are aware of the spatial character – the depth of an object – when you propose the spatial character – the depth of an object – and for as long as that proposal is useful to you

‘If he now says he is continuously aware of the depth—do I believe

him? And if he says he is aware of it only occasionally (when talking

about it, perhaps)—do I believe that? These answers will strike me as

resting on a false foundation.—It will be different if he says that the

object sometimes strikes him as flat, sometimes as three-dimensional.’

whatever he says is open to question

the only foundation to any propositional action – to any propositional sue – is uncertainty –

‘sometimes flat – sometimes three-dimensional’ – is about right

‘Someone tells me: "I looked at the flower, but was thinking of

something else and was not conscious of its colour." Do I understand

this?—I can imagine a significant context, say his going on: "Then I

suddenly saw it, and realized it was the one which ......".’

“do I understand this?’ – yes

‘Or again: "If I had turned away then, I could not have said what

colour it was."’

yes – an odd way of putting it – a bit convoluted for mine – but understandable

"He looked at it without seeing it."—There is such a thing. But

what is the criterion for it?—Well, there is a variety of cases here.’

yes

"Just now I looked at the shape rather than at the colour." Do not

let such phrases confuse you. Above all, don't wonder "What can

be going on in the eyes or brain?"

the proposal is put – and it is open to question – that is all there is to it

‘The likeness makes a striking impression on me; then the impression

fades.

It only struck me for a few minutes, and then no longer did.

What happened here?—What can I recall? My own facial expression

comes to mind; I could reproduce it. If someone who knew me had

seen my face he would have said "Something about his face struck you

just now".—There further occurs to me what I say on such an occasion,

out loud or to myself. And that is all.—And is this what being

struck is? No. These are the phenomena of being struck; but they are

'what happens'.

yes – and how we understand the phenomenon – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Is being struck looking plus thinking? No. Many of our concepts

cross here.('Thinking' and 'inward speech'—I do not say 'to oneself’—are

different concepts’

‘is being struck looking plus thinking?’

perhaps

thinking and inward speech?

if ‘thinking’ and ‘inward speech’ – are critical propositional activities –

they share the same characteristic – they are logical activities

‘The colour of the visual impression corresponds to the colour of

the object (this blotting paper looks pink to me, and is pink)—the

shape of the visual impression to the shape of the object (it looks

rectangular to me, and is rectangular)—but what I perceive in the dawning

of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation

between it and other objects.’

all relations are propositional – all propositional relations are external

‘It is almost as if 'seeing the sign in this context' were an echo of a

thought.’

seeing the sign in this context – is proposing –

is proposing the sign in this context

‘"The echo of a thought in sight"—one would like to say.’

no – rather a proposal put

‘Imagine a physiological explanation of the experience. Let it be

this: When we look at the figure, our eyes scan it repeatedly, always

following a particular path. The path corresponds to a particular

pattern of oscillation of the eyeballs in the act of looking. It is possible

to jump from one such pattern to another and for the two to alternate.

(Aspects A.) Certain patterns of movement are physiologically

impossible; hence, for example, I cannot see the schematic cube as two interpenetrating prisms. And so on. Let this be the explanation.—

"Yes, that shews it is a kind of seeing"—You have now introduced a

new, a physiological, criterion for seeing. And this can screen the old

problem from view, but not solve it.—The purpose of this paragraph

however, was to bring before our view what happens when a physiological explanation is offered. The psychological concept hangs out of

reach of this explanation. And this makes the nature of the problem

clearer.’

‘seeing’ – as with any proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

and what this means is that there will be any number of different proposals to account for ‘seeing’

the physiological explanation is one such perspective –

and as with any proposal / explanation – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a psychological explanation will be another perspective on ‘seeing’ –

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

these different perspectives – will have different uses

‘Do I really see something different each time, or do I only interpret

what I see in a different way? I am inclined to say the former. But

why?—To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state.’

what you ‘see’ each time is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

any proposal you make in relation to what you see – is open to question open to doubt – and uncertain

yes you can describe ‘seeing’ as a ‘state’ – if that suits your purpose – however that description – as with any is open to question –

in any case – however you describe ‘seeing’ – if you think about it – you will be engaged in a critical examination of it – out of which may well emerge a proposal – or proposals

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

proposals nevertheless – which may well have a function in some propositional context – proposals that may be of use

‘Now it is easy to recognize cases in which we are interpreting. When

we interpret we form hypotheses, which may prove false.—"I am

seeing this figure as a ....." can be verified as little as (or in the same

sense as) "I am seeing bright red". So there is a similarity in the use

of "seeing" in the two contexts. Only do not think you knew in

advance what the "state of seeing" means here! Let the use teach you

the meaning.’

yes – by all means ‘let the use teach you the meaning’ – the point is that one use is not all uses – and further – any use is open to question – is uncertain

‘We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not

find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough.

If you look at a photograph of people, houses and trees, you do not

feel the lack of the third dimension in it. We should not find it easy

to describe a photograph as a collection of colour-patches on a flat

surface; but what we see in a stereoscope looks three-dimensional in

a different way again’

.

yes – the whole point – uncertainty

‘(It is anything but a matter of course that we see 'three-dimension-ally'

with two eyes. If the two visual images are amalgamated, we

might expect a blurred one as a result.)’

yes – we see that seeing – is open to question

‘The concept of an aspect is akin to the concept of an image. In

other words: the concept 'I am now seeing it as . . . .' is akin to 'I am

now having this image'.’

what we deal with – all we deal with is proposals – propositions –

‘aspect’ – may well be put forward as an of a proposal –

‘image’ – like wise

‘aspect’ and ‘image’ – become names for proposals – for propositions – for propositional usages

philosophers go astray when they reify descriptions

‘Doesn't it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a

particular theme? And yet one is perceiving something in so hearing it.’

one proposes a variation on a particular theme

it really is as straight forward and simple as that –

and any such proposition – is open to question

‘"Imagine this changed like this, and you have this other thing."

One can use imagining in the course of proving something.’

what you are doing here is proposing –

and if you want to then propose it as ‘imagining’ for whatever reason – ok

‘‘Seeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will. There is

such an order as "Imagine this", and also: "Now see the figure like

this"; but not: "Now see this leaf green".’

the ‘will’ is one of the may explanations that can be offered – as the ground of proposing –

and such an explanation as the ‘will’ – suits certain perspectives – certain world views

but it is really just a name we give – to what we don’t know – it’s a token for our ignorance – for our not-knowing –

and the trick is to see that the unknown – is the ground of our knowing

‘The question now arises: Could there be human beings lacking in

the capacity to see something as something—and what would that be

like? What sort of consequences would it have?—Would this defect

be comparable to colour-blindness or to not having absolute pitch?—

We will call it "aspect-blindness"—and will next consider what might

be meant by this. (A conceptual investigation.) The aspect-blind man

is supposed not to see the aspects A change. But is he also supposed

not to recognize that the double cross contains both a black and a

white cross? So if told "Shew me figures containing a black cross

among these examples" will he be unable to manage it? No, he should

be able to do that; but he will not be supposed to say: "Now it's a

black cross on a white ground!"

‘The question now arises: Could there be human beings lacking in

the capacity to see something as something—and what would that be

like?’

an artist may put that his abstract work shows C –

and yet no one in his audience ‘sees’ this –

they are blind to it – and so they take the proposal of C on his say so –

any account of ‘capacity’ – will be open to question

what anyone ‘sees’ – is open to question

the best we can do is go on what is proposed – and take it from there –

yes – you can set up experiments like the black cross on the white background –

such experiments at base only illustrate the logical reality of different propositional responses

‘Is he supposed to be blind to the similarity between two faces?—

And so also to their identity or approximate identity? I do not want

to settle this. (He ought to be able to execute such orders as "Bring

me something that looks like this")’

well if he can he can – if he can’t he can’t

‘Ought he to be unable to see the schematic cube as a cube?—It

would not follow from that that he could not recognize it as a

representation (a working drawing for instance) of a cube. But for him it

would not jump from one aspect to the other.—Question: Ought he

to be able to take it as a cube in certain circumstances, as we do?—

If not, this could not very well be called a sort of blindness.’

no it’s not blindness – it’s propositional difference

‘The 'aspect-blind' will have an altogether different relationship to

pictures from ours.

(Anomalies of this kind are easy for us to imagine.)

Aspect-blindness will be akin to the lack of a 'musical ear'.’

there is – logically speaking – no ‘lacking’ here – only – difference

and yes – you can end up being in a propositional minority –

so what?

‘The importance of this concept lies in the connexion between the

concepts of 'seeing an aspect' and 'experiencing the meaning of a

word'. For we want to ask "What would you be missing if you

did not experience the meaning of a word?’

this ‘experiencing the meaning of the word’ – is woolly – is vague

a word functions for you – or it doesn’t

you use it or you don’t

‘What would you be missing, for instance, if you did not understand

the request to pronounce the word "till" and to mean it as a verb,—or

if you did not feel that a word lost its meaning and became a mere

sound if it was repeated ten times over?’

you would not understand particular accepted usages –

matters easily fixed

‘In a law-court, for instance, the question might be raised how

someone meant a word. And this can be inferred from certain facts.—

It is a question of intention. But could how he experienced a word—

the word "bank" for instance—have been significant in the same way?’

I knew on old bank robber – who would say to anyone who said they were short of money –“just go to a bank and take it”

‘Suppose I had agreed on a code with someone; "tower" means

bank. I tell him "Now go to the tower"—he understands me and

acts accordingly, but he feels the word "tower" to be strange in this

use, it has not yet 'taken on' the meaning.’

any propositional use that you are not familiar with – or that does not have widespread currency – might well feel strange

‘"When I read a poem or narrative with feeling, surely something

goes on in me which does not go on when I merely skim the lines for

information."—What processes am I alluding to?—The sentences have

a different ring. I pay careful attention to my intonation. Sometimes

a word has the wrong intonation, I emphasize it too much or too little.

I notice this and shew it in my face. I might later talk about my

reading in detail, for example about the mistakes in my tone of voice.

Sometimes a picture, as it were an illustration, comes to me. And this

seems to help me to read with the correct expression. And I could

mention a good deal more of the same kind.—I can also give a word

a tone of voice which brings out the meaning of the rest, almost as if

this word were a picture of the whole thing. (And this may, of course,

depend on sentence-formation.)’  

all this – is propositional – propositional action – propositional exploration –

and – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘When I pronounce this word while reading with expression it is

completely filled with its meaning.—"How can this be, if meaning

is the use of the word?" Well, what I said was intended figuratively.

Not that I chose the figure: it forced itself on me.—But the figurative

employment of the word can't get into conflict with the original one.’

the meaning of a word is a proposal – a proposal of use – and open to question

there is no conflict between different proposals of meaning –

meaning is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Perhaps it could be explained why precisely this picture suggests

itself to me. (Just think of the expression, and the meaning of the

expression: "the word that hits it off".)’

even so – form a logical point of view – this picture / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘the word that hits it off’ – one day – may not ‘hit it off’ – the next –

‘But if a sentence can strike me as like a painting in words, and the

very individual word in the sentence as like a picture, then it is no such

marvel that a word uttered in isolation and without purpose can seem

to carry a particular meaning in itself.’

any word uttered – will be uttered in a propositional context –

and any such utterance will be open to question –

whether or not a question is asked

‘Think here of a special kind of illusion which throws light on these

matters.—I go for a walk in the environs of a city with a friend.

As we talk it comes out that I am imagining the city to lie on our right.

Not only have I no conscious reason for this assumption, but some

quite simple consideration was enough to make me realize that the

city lay rather to the left ahead of us. I can at first give no answer

to the question why I imagine the city in this direction. I had no reason

to think it. But though I see no reason still I seem to see certain

psychological causes for it. In particular, certain associations and

memories. For example, we walked along a canal, and once before

in similar circumstances I had followed a canal and that time the city

lay on our right.—I might try as it were psychoanalytically to discover

the causes of my unfounded conviction.’

yes – a propositional inquiry – in the face of uncertainty

‘"But what is this queer experience?"—Of course it is not queerer

than any other; it simply differs in kind from those experiences which

we regard as the most fundamental ones, our sense impressions for

instance.’

sense impressions are proposals – and ‘this queer experience’ – a proposal

logically – there is no difference –

any proposal that doesn’t seem to fit a particular propositional context – will invite question – doubt – and uncertainty

‘"I feel as if I knew the city lay over there."—"I feel as if the name

'Schubert' fitted Schubert's works and Schubert's face."’

ok – just a proposal –

‘You can say the word "March" to yourself and mean it at one time

as an imperative at another as the name of a month. And now say

"March!"—and then "March no further!"—Does the same experience

accompany the word both times—are you sure?’

the same word in different contexts

different propositional contexts – different propositional experiences

‘If a sensitive ear shews me, when I am playing this game, that I

have now this now that experience of the word—doesn't it also shew

me that I often do not have any experience of it in the course of talking?

—For the fact that I then also mean it, intend it, now like this now

like that and maybe also say so later is, of course, not in question.’

different uses in different propositional contexts

logically speaking – any propositional use – is open to question

‘But the question now remains why, in connexion with this game of

experiencing a word, we also speak of 'the meaning' and of 'meaning

it'.—This is a different kind of question.——It is the phenomenon

which is characteristic of this language-game that in this situation we

use this expression: we say we pronounced the word with this meaning

and take this expression over from that other language-game.’

why do we speak of ‘the meaning ‘and ‘meaning it’?

we have an instinctive understanding – that a word – at base – is an uncertainty –

this is the logical instinct

we defy or cover this logical uncertainty – with rhetoric –

‘the meaning’ and ‘meaning it’ – are rhetorical expressions –

the point of which is to persuade – ourselves or others – that the word has a definite function and use

from a logical point of view – any word is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what is ‘meaning’? – meaning is pretence –

pretence is a staple of propositional life – of propositional reality

it has function – and it has use

there is no one who has – or does – or will – get by – live a life – without it –

who lives without meaning?

however – it should be seen for what it is –

the attempt to defy logical reality –

and we spend a great deal of time – and expend a great deal of energy – doing just this

‘Call it a dream. It does not change anything.’

yes – a ‘dream’ – is just a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Given the two ideas 'fat' and 'lean', would you be rather inclined

to say that Wednesday was fat and Tuesday lean, or vice versa?

(I incline decisively towards the former.) Now have "fat" and

"lean" some different meaning here from their usual one?—They

have a different use.—So ought I really to have used different

words? Certainly not that.—I want to use these words (with their

familiar meanings) here.—Now, I say nothing about the causes of this

phenomenon. They might be associations from my childhood. But that

is a hypothesis. Whatever the explanation,—the inclination is there.’

and really it is a poetic inclination

‘Asked "What do you really mean here by 'fat' and 'lean'?"—I

could only explain the meanings in the usual way. I could not point

to the examples of Tuesday and Wednesday.

Here one might speak of a 'primary' and 'secondary' sense of a

word. It is only if the word has the primary sense for you that you

use it in the secondary one.

Only if you have learnt to calculate—on paper or out loud—can

you be made to grasp, by means of this concept, what calculating in

the head is.

The secondary sense is not a 'metaphorical' sense. If I say "For me

the vowel e is yellow" I do not mean: 'yellow' in a metaphorical

sense,—for I could not express what I want to say in any other way

than by means of the idea 'yellow'.’

a word is open to question – open to exploration – and indeed – open to creative exploration –

and with this comes the realisation of different propositional contexts –

as indeed we see in poetry –

and the joy of poetry can be seen in terms of witnessing the poet’s skill in changing and manipulating propositional contexts

‘Someone tells me: "Wait for me by the bank". Question: Did you,

as you were saying the word, mean this bank?—This question is of the

same kind as "Did you intend to say such-and-such to him on your

way to meet him?" It refers to a definite time (the time of walking, as

the former question refers to the time of speaking)—but not to an

experience during that time. Meaning is as little an experience as

intending.’

you put your proposal – and assume – or hope – it registers as you intended –

if not – you would expect a question

‘But what distinguishes them from experience?—They have no

experience-content. For the contents (images for instance) which

accompany and illustrate them are not the meaning or intending.’

experience is propositional – it is what happens – what occurs – to you and to others

‘experience’ – is open to question open to doubt – and uncertain

if you intend – you propose a propositional outcome – you propose an experience

when you say ‘I mean … ‘ – you pre-empt  any critical approach to experience – any question – any doubt – or exploration of uncertainty – with a rhetorical ploy

‘The intention with which one acts does not 'accompany' the action

any more than the thought 'accompanies' speech. Thought and intention

are neither 'articulated' nor 'non-articulated'; to be compared

neither with a single note which sounds during the acting or speaking,

nor with a tune.’

propositional intention pre-empts propositional action

a thought is a proposal – speech – is proposal –

does it make any sense to speak of one proposal accompanying another?

I think not –

a thought proposal – a private proposal – may well be said to lead to – a speech proposal – a public proposal –

and the speech proposal may well be seen as an expression of the thought proposal –

but this is not accompaniment

thought proposals – and intention proposals can be articulated – or not

if you are dealing with what is put – publicly –

thought proposals and intention proposals – as private proposals – do not figure –

however – they can be made public

ultimately what it all comes down to is proposal –

we propose different descriptions of proposal – i.e. ‘intention’ – ‘thought’ – ‘speech’

these are really meta-geographical descriptions – meta-geographical proposals

descriptions we use to plot – to map – to navigate our propositional landscape –

our propositional reality –

there is nothing absolute in any plotting – in any mapping – in any navigating –

all is contingent – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

'Talking' (whether out loud or silently) and 'thinking' are not

concepts of the same kind; even though they are in closest connexion.’

what they are is propositional actions –

propositional actions – given different descriptions

‘The interest of the experiences one has while speaking and of the

intention is not the same. (The experiences might perhaps inform

a psychologist about the 'unconscious' intention.)’

logically speaking all we have is proposal –

there is no hidden – ‘sub-propositional’ reality

if it is proposed – it is there – if it is not – it is not

experience is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

"At that word we both thought of him." Let us assume that each

of us said the same words to himself—and how can it mean MORE

than that?—But wouldn't even those words be only a germ? They

must surely belong to a language and to a context, in order really to

be the expression of the thought of that man.’

yes – each of us – ‘said the same words to himself ‘– put the same proposal –

but that proposal – regardless of who or what put it – is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

open to critical exploration

‘If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to

see there whom we were speaking of.’

if God looked into our minds – he would be faced with question – with doubt – with uncertainty

‘"Why did you look at me at that word, were you thinking of. . . .?"

—So there is a reaction at a certain moment and it is explained by

saying "I thought of. . . ." or "I suddenly remembered . . . ."’

a question asked – a proposal put

‘In saying this you refer to that moment in the time you were

speaking. It makes a difference whether you refer to this or to that

moment.’

yes

‘Mere explanation of a word does not refer to an occurrence at the

moment of speaking.’

no

‘The language-game "I mean (or meant) this" (subsequent explanation

 of a word) is quite different from this one: "I thought of .... as I

said it." The latter is akin to "It reminded me of... ."’

‘I mean (or meant) this’ – is a rhetorical prelude to a proposal – and explanatory proposal

‘I thought I said’ –

again – the ‘I thought’ – a rhetorical prelude –

designed to give some weight to what is to be proposed

‘"I have already remembered three times today that I must write to

him." Of what importance is it what went on in me then?—On the

other hand what is the importance, what the interest, of the statement

itself?—It permits certain conclusions.’

the proposal is ‘I must write to him’

stating that you have remembered this statement – is logically irrelevant

any proposal can ‘permit certain conclusions’

"At these words he occurred to me."—What is the primitive reaction

with which the language-game begins—which can then be translated

into these words? How do people get to use these words?’

there is no game here – there is proposal –

language is – and begins with proposal –

proposal is primitive

how do people get to use these words?

that is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The primitive reaction may have been a glance or a gesture, but it

may also have been a word.’

a glance – is a proposal –

a gesture a proposal

‘"Why did you look at me and shake your head?"—"I wanted to give

you to understand that you ....." This is supposed to express not a

symbolic convention but the purpose of my action.’

‘I wanted to give you to understand that you …’

is a rhetorical proposal – a proposal – designed to persuade

‘Meaning it is not a process which accompanies a word. For no

process could have the consequences of meaning.’

meaning is a propositional stand – a stand which at the first instance is a determination –

a determination against question – against doubt – against uncertainty

when you say ‘I mean …’ – or ‘the meaning is ..’ –

your statements are rhetorical –

when you statement is put to question – put to doubt – when its uncertainty is explored –

the stand you take for meaning – evaporates –

and when you question – doubt – and explore propositional uncertainty –

what you do is consider possible uses of the proposal in question – and possible propositional contexts for its use

when you ‘mean’ something – you proceed rhetorically – without question – without doubt – and with certainty

‘(Similarly, I think, it could be said: a calculation is not an experiment,

 for no experiment could have the peculiar consequences of a

multiplication.)’

a calculation is a propositional game – a rule governed propositional exercise

an experiment is a propositional exercise –

an exercise – where everything involved – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘There are important accompanying phenomena of talking which are

often missing when one talks without thinking, and this is characteristic

of talking without thinking. But they are not the thinking.’

what is logically relevant is the proposition put –

any explanation of this – i.e. so called ‘important accompanying phenomena’ –

is essentially – logically irrelevant – is by the by –

rhetorical packaging

"Now I know!" What went on here?————So did I not know, when

I declared that now I knew?’

apparently

‘You are looking at it wrong.’

I don’t think so

‘(What is the signal for?)’

what we have here is a proposal

what’s it for?

that is open to question –

but you can start by seeing how it is used –

and take it from there

‘And could the 'knowing' be called an accompaniment of the

exclamation?’

the ‘knowing is the proposal –

in whatever form the proposal is put

‘The familiar physiognomy of a word, the feeling that it has taken up

its meaning into itself, that it is an actual likeness of its meaning—there

could be human beings to whom all this was alien. (They would not

have an attachment to their words.)—And how are these feelings

manifested among us?—By the way we choose and value words.’

words are proposals put – proposals put to use – constantly

no surprise that we see a likeness in their physiognomy to their ‘meaning’ – their unreflective – non-critical use

this ‘phenomena’ though is pre-critical – and in actual propositional use and engagement – mostly – has a short half life

‘How do I find the 'right' word? How do I choose among words?

Without doubt it is sometimes as if I were comparing them by fine

differences of smell: That is too ....... that is too ....... —this is

the right one.—But I do not always have to make judgments, give

explanations; often I might only say: "It simply isn't right yet". I am

dissatisfied, I go on looking. At last a word comes: "That's it!"

Sometimes I can say why. This is simply what searching, this is what

finding, is like here.’

how do I find the right word?

question – doubt – exploration of propositional uncertainty

and any find – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘But doesn't the word that occurs to you somehow 'come' in a special

way? Just attend and you'll see I—Careful attention is no use to me. All

it could discover would be what is now going on in me.’

how a word – or any proposal occurs – to you – or to others – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘And how can I, precisely now, listen for it at all? I ought to have to

wait until a word occurs to me anew. This, however, is the queer

thing: it seems as though I did not have to wait on the occasion, but

could give myself an exhibition of it, even when it is not actually

taking place. How?—I act it.—But what can I learn in this way?

What do I reproduce?—Characteristic accompaniments. Primarily:

gestures, faces, tones of voice.’

there is nothing to this – our lives are propositional – our world is propositional –

all we do is propose – one way or another

‘It is possible—and this is important—to say a great deal about a fine

aesthetic difference.—The first thing you say may, of course, be just:

"This word fits, that doesn't"—or something of the kind. But then

you can discuss all the extensive ramifications of the tie-up effected

by each of the words. That first judgment is not the end of the matter,

for it is the field of force of a word that is decisive.’

yes – finally – from Wittgenstein – the logic of question – of doubt – of propositional uncertainty

‘"The word is on the tip of my tongue." What is going on in my

consciousness? That is not the point at all. Whatever did go on was not

what was meant by that expression. It is of more interest what went

on in my behaviour.—"The word is on the tip of my tongue" tells

you: the word which belongs here has escaped me, but I hope to find it

soon. For the rest the verbal expression does no more than certain

wordless behaviour.’

‘the word is on the tip of my tongue’ –

I am looking for – searching for a verbal proposal –

that’s all

‘wordless behaviour’ – is proposal

‘James, in writing of this subject, is really trying to say: "What a

remarkable experience! The word is not there yet, and yet in a certain

sense is there,—or something is there, which cannot grow into anything

but this word."—But this is not experience at all. Interpreted as

experience it does indeed look odd. As does intention, when it is

interpreted as the accompaniment of action; or again, like minus one

interpreted as a cardinal number.’

what is there – is a proposal – unstated and private –

and that proposal may be subsequently proposed as a word – or it may well be subsequently proposed in a different form with a different expression

‘the experience’ – of the word – is what it is to whoever experiences it –

and however that ‘experience’ is described – that description will – from a logical point of view – be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The words "It's on the tip of my tongue" are no more the expression

of an experience than "Now I know how to go on!"—We use them in

certain situations, and they are surrounded by behaviour of a special

kind, and also by some characteristic experiences. In particular they

are frequently followed by finding the word. (Ask yourself: "What

would it be like if human beings never found the word that was on the

tip of their tongue?")’

‘it’s on the tip of my tongue’ – is a proposal –

and what it amounts to and involves is open to question

what would it be like if human beings never found the word that was on the tip of their tongue?

human beings would never make a ‘word’ proposal

‘Silent 'internal' speech is not a half hidden phenomenon which is

as it were seen through a veil. It is not hidden at all, but the concept

may easily confuse us, for it runs over a long stretch cheek by jowl

with the concept of an 'outward' process, and yet does not coincide

with it.’

internal – private proposal – and external public proposal – are different modes of proposal

they are different – ontologically speaking – they do not coincide

any proposal may lead to another – that is as close as it gets

‘(The question whether the muscles of the larynx are innervated in

connexion with internal speech, and similar things, may be of great

interest, but not in our investigation.)

The close relationship between 'saying inwardly' and 'saying' is

manifested in the possibility of telling out loud what one said inwardly,

and of an outward action's accompanying inward speech. (I can sing

inwardly, or read silently, or calculate in my head, and beat time with

my hand as I do so.)

"But saying things inwardly is surely a certain activity which I

have to learn!" Very well; but what is 'doing' and what is 'learning'

here?’

yes – you learn to propose – and how you learn to propose is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what we ‘do’ – is propose

‘Let the use of words teach you their meaning. (Similarly one can

often say in mathematics: let the proof teach you what was being

proved.)

"So I don't really calculate, when I calculate in my head?"—After all,

you yourself distinguish between calculation in the head and perceptible

calculation! But you can only learn what 'calculating in the head' is

by learning what 'calculating' is; you can only learn to calculate in your

head by learning to calculate.’

calculation – calculating – is a rule governed propositional activity – a propositional game

you can only play a game – of any kind – if you make the rules for your game – or if you are taught the rules of a game

where you play the game – in your head – on a board – as with where you put a proposal – privately or publicly – is logically irrelevant –

the point is to play the game

‘One can say things in one's head very 'distinctly', when one reproduces

the tone of voice of one's sentences by humming (with closed

lips). Movements of the larynx help too. But the remarkable thing is

precisely that one then hears the talk in one's imagination and does not

merely feel the skeleton of it, so to speak, in one's larynx. (For human

beings could also well be imagined calculating silently with movements

of the larynx, as one can calculate on one's fingers.)’

when ‘one says things in one’s head’ – one puts a proposal –

how this may be experienced / described – may be of interest –

but the logical point is that the proposal is put –

it really is as simple and straightforward as that

‘A hypothesis, such as that such-and-such went on in our bodies

when we made internal calculations, is only of interest to us in that it

points to a possible use of the expression "I said .... to myself";

namely that of inferring the physiological process from the expression.

That what someone else says to himself is hidden from me is part

of the concept 'saying inwardly'. Only "hidden" is the wrong word

here; for if it is hidden from me, it ought to be apparent to him, he

would have to know it. But he does not 'know' it; only, the doubt

which exists for me does not exist for him."

I can’t see that saying that such and such went on in our bodies when we made internal calculations points to a possible use of the proposal ‘I said to myself’

the possible use of the proposal – is a logical issue – an issue of question – of doubt – of uncertainty

nothing is hidden – what is – is what is proposed

proposals / propositions – can be private – or public –

what we know is what is proposed –

I will only know of another’s proposal if I witness it –

any private proposal the other puts –  is not anything I can I have access to

‘What anyone says to himself within himself is hidden from me"

might of course also mean that I can for the most part not guess it,

nor can I read it off from, for example, the movements of his throat

(which would be a possibility.)’

well – if you have any sign – that you interpret as indicative of a proposal put –

you can have a guess – but that is all it will be – a speculation –

and one to be regarded with much scepticism

"I know what I want, wish, believe, feel, ......." (and so on

through all the psychological verbs) is either philosophers' nonsense,

or at any rate not a judgment a priori.’

“I know what I want etc.’ – is no more than a claim to knowledge – and is best seen as rhetorical

knowledge is not the claim of knowledge – knowledge is what is in fact proposed –

and what is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘"I know . . ." may mean "I do not doubt. . ." but does not mean

that the words "I doubt. . ." are senseless, that doubt is logically

excluded.’

‘I know’ = ‘I propose’

what I propose is what I know –

and what I propose is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what ‘I know’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘One says "I know" where one can also say "I believe" or "I suspect";

where one can find out. (If you bring up against me the case of people's

saying "But I must know if I am in pain!", "Only you can know what

you feel", and similar things, you should consider the occasion and

purpose of these phrases. "War is war" is not an example of the law

of identity, either.)’

whatever one proposes – is knowledge –

 knowledge open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘but I must know if I am in pain’ –

this might fit in a discussion between philosophers on the question of sensation

where some expresses doubt about their feelings – you might get from another – the response – ‘only you can know what you feel’ –

as far as I can see – on the face of it – ‘war is war’ – proposes nothing –

logically speaking – it is a dummy – or fraudulent – proposition – a pretend proposition –

but perhaps someone could think up a use for it

‘It is possible to imagine a case in which I could find out that I had two

hands. Normally, however, I cannot do so. "But all you need is to hold

them up before your eyes!"—If I am now in doubt whether I have two

hands, I need not believe my eyes either. (I might just as well ask a

friend.)’

yes – the proposal – ‘I have two hands’ – as with any proposal – is open to question

‘With this is connected the fact that, for instance, the proposition

"The Earth has existed for millions of years" makes clearer sense than

"The Earth has existed in the last five minutes". For I should ask

anyone who asserted the latter: "What observations does this

proposition refer to; and what observations would count against it?"—

whereas I know what ideas and observations the former proposition

goes with."’

how long the earth has existed – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the proposal that ‘the earth has existed for millions of years’ – is the currently held scientific and common view –

but it wasn’t always so

the ideas and observations that are proposed to support this view – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to the proposal – ‘the earth has existed in the last five minutes’

this proposal is open to question

does it mean that five minutes ago the earth was existing?

does it mean that the earth has only existed for five minutes?

if the latter is what is being proposed – we would want to know – is the proposal meant as a literal proposal – or is it an imaginative proposal – or is it a poetic proposal?

context for the proposal is crucial

if what is being put is that ‘the earth has only existed for five minutes’ –

we would be interested to see what argument is put forward for such a view – a view that runs contrary to common accepted knowledge

‘A new-born child has no teeth."—"A goose has no teeth."—"A

rose has no teeth."—This last at any rate—one would like to say—is

obviously true! It is even surer than that a goose has none.—And yet

it is none so clear. For where should a rose's teeth have been? The

goose has none in its jaw. And neither, of course, has it any in its

wings; but no one means that when he says it has no teeth.—Why,

suppose one were to say: the cow chews its food and then dungs the rose

with it, so the rose has teeth in the mouth of a beast. This would not

be absurd, because one has no notion in advance where to look for

teeth in a rose. ((Connexion with 'pain in someone else's body'.))’

‘teeth in a rose’ – just what is being put in this proposition – is – as with any proposition – open to question

the proposition is open to doubt – and regardless of how you interpret it –

regardless of this – uncertain

and as to pain in another’s body –

any physician will tell you – the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking.’

‘It is correct to say "I know what you are thinking", and wrong to

say "I know what I am thinking."’

I can witness another’s proposal – I can make my own proposal –

what I ‘know’ – is what is proposed –

and what I know – is open to question

‘(A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar.)’

a proposal – open to question

‘"A man's thinking goes on within his consciousness in a seclusion

in comparison with which any physical seclusion is an exhibition to

public view."’

‘thinking’ is an explanation put for the act of proposing –

for the action of proposition

and as with any explanation – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

any ‘explanation’ – is a back story –

we run the risk of focusing on the back story – and failing to deal directly with the proposal put

this is how people miss the world

any ‘exhibition in public view’ – is a proposal

‘If there were people who always read the silent internal discourse

of others—say by observing the larynx—would they too be inclined

to use the picture of complete seclusion?’

any proposed ‘reading’ of propositional action – is open to question –

in so far as any proposal is open – open to a question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the notions of ‘completeness’ and ‘seclusion’ are illogical

‘If I were to talk to myself out loud in a language not understood by

those present my thoughts would be hidden from them.’

your thoughts would be interpreted – in such a circumstance –

just as they would be if you spoke in a language understood

and any interpretation – and interpretive proposal – would be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Let us assume there was a man who always guessed right what I

was saying to myself in my thoughts. (It does not matter how he

manages it.) But what is the criterion for his guessing right? Well,

I am a truthful person and I confess that he has guessed right.—But

might I not be mistaken, can my memory not deceive me? And might it

not always do so when—without lying—I express what I have thought

within myself?——But now it does appear that 'what went on within

me' is not the point at all. (Here I am drawing a construction-line.)’

it is not a matter of being ‘mistaken’ –

logically speaking – there are no mistakes – just as there is no ‘guessing right’ –

what we deal with is proposals / propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

we deal in uncertainties – at every turn

Wittgenstein is correct – ‘what went on within me is not the point of it all’ –

the point of it all is the proposal

‘The criteria for the truth of the confession that I thought such-and-such

are not the criteria for a true description of a process. And the importance

of the true confession does not reside in its being a correct and

certain report of a process. It resides rather in the special consequences

which can be drawn from a confession whose truth is guaranteed by

the special criteria of truthfulness.’

a ‘true’ proposition is one you give your assent to – for whatever reason –

and this proposal of assent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a false proposition is one you dissent from for whatever reason –

and your proposal of dissent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any criteria you use to determine the truth or otherwise of a proposal – is open to question

the truth of a confession – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘(Assuming that dreams can yield important information about the

dreamer, what yielded the information would be truthful accounts of

dreams. The question whether the dreamer's memory deceives him

when he reports the dream after waking cannot arise, unless indeed

we introduce a completely new criterion for the report's 'agreeing'

with the dream, a criterion which gives us a concept of 'truth' as

distinct from 'truthfulness' here.)’

from a logical point of view – a dream is a proposal –

and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and as to whether a dream is ‘true’ – or ‘truthful’ –

a proposal is true or truthful – if it is assented to – for whatever reason –

and any proposal of assent is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘There is a game of 'guessing thoughts'. A variant of it would be

this: I tell A something in a language that B does not understand.

B is supposed to guess the meaning of what I say.—Another variant:

I write down a sentence which the other person cannot see. He has to

guess the words or their sense.—Yet another: I am putting a jig-saw

puzzle together; the other person cannot see me but from time to time

guesses my thoughts and utters them. He says, for instance, "Now

where is this bit?"—"Now I know how it fits!"—"I have no idea what

goes in here,"—"The sky is always the hardest part" and so on—-but I

need not be talking to myself either out loud or silently at the time.

All this would be guessing at thoughts; and the fact that it does not

actually happen does not make thought any more hidden than the

unperceived physical proceedings.’

what you are guessing at here is – proposals –

‘thought’ – is an explanation of proposal –

whether the proposal is put publicly or not – logically speaking it is open – not hidden – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘"What is internal is hidden from us."—The future is hidden from us.

But does the astronomer think like this when he calculates an eclipse of

the sun?

If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think:

all the same, his feelings are hidden from me.’

I can put a proposal – without making it public – it is still open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

making it public – does not change the logic of the matter –

the proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is,

however, important as regards this observation that one human being

can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come

into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is

more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not

understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are

saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them.’

we propose against the unknown –

and it is the proposing that makes known –

knowledge – is proposal – as fragile as that is –

in logical terms whatever – wherever – however – we propose – we deal in and with uncertainty

‘"I cannot know what is going on in him" is above all a picture. It is

the convincing expression of a conviction. It does not give the

reasons for the conviction. They are not readily accessible.’

‘I cannot know what is going on with him’ – is not a picture of anything

if you think that knowledge amounts to propositional certainty – then yes – you cannot know what is going on with him –

and the reason is that there is no propositional certainty –

all knowledge – all proposal – is uncertain –

what you know is what you propose – and what you propose – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

as for ‘conviction’ – conviction is ignorance

‘If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.’

what can Wittgenstein mean by ‘talk’ here – except ‘use a language’?

I don’t speak or understand German – and I can’t say when I hear Germans speak I understand them

it is possible I might get a vague sense of what they are on about – by interpreting their propositional expressions and gestures –

would it be any different with a lion that uses a language?

maybe – maybe not

‘It is possible to imagine a guessing of intentions like the guessing

of thoughts, but also a guessing of what someone is actually going to do.’

yes – but the guess is just a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘To say "He alone can know what he intends" is nonsense: to say

"He alone can know what he will do", wrong. For the prediction

contained in my expression of intention (for example "When it strikes

five I am going home") need not come true, and someone else may

know what will really happen.’

logically speaking – his intention – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and for him – uncertain

I can guess his intention

whether the prediction ‘contained in the intention’ comes true or not – is irrelevant

‘when it strikes five I am going to go home’ – doesn’t mean – that is what I will do – what happens

someone else – can only speculate on what will happen

and my intention – is no different – a propositional speculation

‘Two points, however, are important: one, that in many cases someone

else cannot predict my actions, whereas I foresee them in my

intentions; the other, that my prediction (in my expression of intention)

has not the same foundation as his prediction of what I shall do,

and the conclusions to be drawn from these predictions are quite

different.’

what I foresee – is what I propose

what I shall – in fact do – is unknown

‘I can be as certain of someone else's sensations as of any fact. But

this does not make the propositions "He is much depressed",

"25 x 25 = 625" and "I am sixty years old" into similar instruments. The

explanation suggests itself that the certainty is of a different kind.—

This seems to point to a psychological difference. But the difference is

logical.’

this is rubbish

another’s sensations – however one proposes them – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

as indeed is the proposal – ‘he is much depressed’

’25 x 25 = 625 – is a game proposition –

a rule governed – sign game

and ‘I am sixty years old’ – again is a proposal that is open question – open to doubt – and as such uncertain

why do we have birth certificates?

 and is anyone going to claim – they are beyond question?

the claim of certainty is not logical – it is illogical –

any claim that a proposal put is not open to question – not open to doubt – and is certain – is best seen as a prejudice – and a stand for ignorance

‘"But, if you are certain, isn't it that you are shutting your eyes in face

of doubt?"—They are shut.’

what do we say of a philosopher whose eyes are shut?

‘Am I less certain that this man is in pain than that twice two is

four?—Does this shew the former to be mathematical certainty?——

'Mathematical certainty' is not a psychological concept.’

‘this man is in pain’ – is a proposal – and one open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘twice two is four’ – is a mathematical game – a rule governed propositional action

certainty is a game

a game – a rule governed propositional action – is not open to question – open to doubt – is not uncertain

‘The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game.’

yes – we play games – we play propositional games –

game playing is a propositional mode

and while we have and play games in life – life is not a game – not a rule governed propositional action

our lives – our propositional lives – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

that is the ‘main game’ –

game playing can be seen as a relief from the critical business of living in this world – of the philosophical problem

the critical and game modes of propositional activity should never be confused –

it is just this confusion that is at the heart of the philosophical problem –

it is the confusion that has led many philosophers – including Wittgenstein – astray

‘"He alone knows his motives"—that is an expression of the fact

that we ask him what his motives are.—If he is sincere he will tell us

them; but I need more than sincerity to guess his motives. This is

where there is a kinship with the case of knowing.’

motives are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

from a logical point of view –‘his motives’ – his proposals – are open to his question – open to his doubt – and are for him – uncertain –

what we know – is what we propose –

his knowledge of his own motives – is uncertain

and his motives are open to anyone else’s proposal – of his motives –

to anyone else’s question – doubt – and uncertainty

‘Let yourself be struck by the existence of such a thing as our

language-game of: confessing the motive of my action.

We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the

everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes

everything alike.

Something new (spontaneous, 'specific') is always a language-game.’

we are not dealing with ‘language-games’ here –

language games are rule governed propositional activities –

they are propositional constructions –

constructions – not spontaneities

what is ‘spontaneous’ and ‘specific’ – are proposals –

it is proposals that are the everyday propositional actions –

and as to ‘everything alike’ –

we operate in diverse propositional complexes –

propositional complexes that are constantly changing – and constantly interacting

‘What is the difference between cause and motive?—How is the

motive discovered, and how the cause?’

proposal – is discovery

‘cause’ and ‘motive’ – are different explanatory proposals –

how they are different – is open to question –

in general – we can say that they function in different explanatory / propositional constructs

they have different uses

‘There is such a question as: "Is this a reliable way of judging people's

motives?" But in order to be able to ask this we must know what

"judging a motive" means; and we do not learn this by being told

what ''motive' is and what 'judging’ is.’

any judgment of another’s motives – however that may be explained – or described – is a proposal –

a reliable judgment / proposal?

‘reliability’ – is really just a weak rhetoric –

a judgment is a critical propositional action –

and one – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘One judges the length of a rod and can look for and find some

method of judging it more exactly or more reliably. So—you say—

what is judged here is independent of the method of judging it. What

length is cannot be defined by the method of determining length.—

To think like this is to make a mistake. What mistake?—To say "The

height of Mont Blanc depends on how one climbs it" would be queer.

And one wants to compare 'ever more accurate measurement of

length' with the nearer and nearer approach to an object. But in

certain cases it is, and in certain cases it is not, clear what "approaching

nearer to the length of an object" means. What "determining the

length" means is not learned by learning what length and determining

are; the meaning of the word "length" is learnt by learning, among

other things, what it is to determine length.’

yes – and any ‘learning’ here – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘(For this reason the word "methodology" has a double meaning.

Not only a physical investigation, but also a conceptual one, can be

called "methodological investigation".)’

a ‘methodological investigation’ – is a propositional investigation –

and the methodological investigation – any methodological investigation – is the critical analysis of whatever proposal is being considered

the investigation is logical – it is putting the proposal to question – to doubt –

it is a matter of exploring its uncertainty

‘We should sometimes like to call certainty and belief tones, colourings,

of thought; and it is true that they receive expression in the tone

of voice. But do not think of them as 'feelings' which we have in

speaking or thinking.’

a belief is an operating proposal – often in the propositional background – but it can be up front – in your face –

and any such proposal is open to question

as to certainty –

certainty has no basis in logic – it is a rhetorical concept –

a rhetorical concept that is based in ignorance – and trumpets prejudice

‘Ask, not: "What goes on in us when we are certain that . . . .?"—

but: How is 'the certainty that this is the case' manifested in human

action?"

it manifests in dogmatism and prejudice

‘While you can have complete certainty about someone else's state

of mind, still it is always merely subjective, not objective, certainty."—

These two words betoken a difference between language-games.’

this idea of a difference between so called ‘language-games’ is a complete cop-out on the issue of certainty

whether a proposal is described as ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ – is logically irrelevant –

a proposal – however described or explained – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ – are descriptive categories – that function in different propositional contexts – have different propositional uses

also – we are not dealing with games –

a game is a rule-governed propositional action or activity –

propositional descriptions / explanations – are not rule -governed – they are proposals – open to critical evaluation

I find it disturbing and sad when any ‘philosopher’ peddles certainty –

the notion of certainty has no logical or epistemological basis

it is a purely rhetorical notion – and its progeny is dogmatism – pretence – and ignorance

to run with certainty as a genuine philosophical concept – is to turn your back on the very activity you are engaged in

it degrades and denies philosophy

‘There can be a dispute over the correct result of a calculation (say

of a rather long addition). But such disputes are rare and of short

duration. They can be decided, as we say, 'with certainty'.’

here – again – the ides of certainty – is out of place

a calculation is a rule-governed propositional action –

a calculation is game

if you play a game – you play in accordance with its rules –

if you don’t play in accordance with the rules – there is no game

a rule-governed action is a game – a game is neither certain – or uncertain –

it is rule-governed

there are two modes to our propositional life – the critical mode – and the game mode

that is to say we question – we doubt – we explore uncertainty –

and – we play games

‘Mathematicians do not in general quarrel over the result of a

calculation. (This is an important fact.)—If it were otherwise, if for

instance one mathematician was convinced that a figure had altered

unperceived, or that his or someone else's memory had been deceived,

and so on—then our concept of 'mathematical certainty' would not

exist.’

the point here is that mathematics is not a rule-governed propositional activity –

mathematics is a logical game –

mathematics per se – is not a critical activity

the invention – the construction of a game – mathematical or otherwise – will be a critical activity – the history of mathematics shows this clearly enough –

however – the play of the game is not critical – it is rule-governed –

what is mistakenly called ‘mathematical certainty’ –

is rule-governed play

‘Even then it might always be said: "True we can never know what

the result of a calculation is, but for all that it always has a quite

definite result. (God knows it.) Mathematics is indeed of the highest

certainty—though we only have a crude reflection of it.’

Pythagorean and Platonic –

hate to bring it all down to earth –

a calculation is a propositional game – a rule-governed propositional action

the result of the calculation is rule governed –

for if it was not rule-governed – there would be no calculation –

no result

you play the game to get to the result

‘certainty’ is a rhetorical notion –

and in relation to mathematics – it is put forward by those who do not understand mathematics –

and this is the result you get – if you don’t understand logic – propositional logic –

the logic of critical evaluation – the logic of the propositional game

‘"But am I trying to say some such thing as that the certainty of

mathematics is based on the reliability of ink and paper? No. (That would be

a vicious circle.)—I have not said why mathematicians do not quarrel,

but only that they do not.’

I will tell you why ‘they do not quarrel’ –

they do not quarrel because – doing mathematics – is playing a game – playing a propositional game –

it is not a critical propositional activity

the rules of a mathematical game – indeed – of any ‘game’ – determine the play –

and if you don’t follow the rules – there is no play – there is no game –

if you don’t follow the rules of a mathematical game – you don’t do mathematics

mathematicians also invent games – make rules – construct games –

it is straightforward – if you don’t like the rules of a game – don’t play it –

find a game that suits you

as to the rules themselves – and any questioning of the rules – this is not game-playing

such is a critical activity –

questioning the rules of a mathematical game – or indeed any proposed rules of mathematics itself – is not mathematics per se –

it is rather meta-mathematics – philosophy of mathematics

and the history of pure mathematics is a history of question of doubt – of uncertainty

it’s a slow-moving ship – but it does turn

‘It is no doubt true that you could not calculate with certain sorts

of paper and ink, if, that is, they were subject to certain queer changes—

but still the fact that they changed could in turn only be got from

memory and comparison with other means of calculation. And how

are these tested in their turn?’

if certain queer changes with certain sorts of paper and ink – made it impossible to calculate – to play the game – with that paper and ink –

then you would look for other means by which to do your calculation – to play the game –

if none were found – then there would be no calculation – no game

how do you test memory and comparison in relation to calculation?

you do the calculation – you play the game –

if the calculation cannot be performed – if the game cannot be played – as you remember doing it –

then as you remember doing it – is wrong

‘What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of

life.’

our life – our reality – is propositional –

there are two forms or modes to this propositional life – to this propositional reality – the critical form – the game form

‘Does it make sense to say that people generally agree in their

judgments of colour? What would it be like for them not to?—One

man would say a flower was red which another called blue, and so on.—

But what right should we have to call these people's words "red"

and "blue" our 'colour-words'?"—’

How would they learn to use these words? And is the language-

game which they learn still such as we call the use of 'names of colour'?

There are evidently differences of degree here.’

whether or not people agree in their judgments of colour – is an empirical matter –

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what we call what – from a logical point of view – is a contingent matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

how people learn to use these words – is open to question – however the empirical / propositional fact is – they do learn the use of these words

in any propositional explanation – distinctions will be drawn – if they have a use –

and any propositional distinctions drawn will be open to question

‘This consideration must, however, apply to mathematics too. If

there were not complete agreement, then neither would human beings

be learning the technique which we learn. It would be more or less

different from ours up to the point of unrecognizability.’

it is not a question of ‘complete agreement’ – it is recognising the propositional game

mathematics is a rule-governed propositional game

and as with any propositional game – you can be a player or not

if you don’t like the rules proposed – then leave the game to those who want to play

‘"But mathematical truth is independent of whether human beings

know it or not!"—Certainly, the propositions "Human beings believe

that twice two is four" and "Twice two is four" do not mean the

same. The latter is a mathematical proposition; the other, if it makes

sense at all, may perhaps mean: human beings have arrived at the

mathematical proposition. The two propositions have entirely different

uses.—But what would this mean: "Even though everybody believed

that twice two was five it would still be four"?—For what would it be

like for everybody to believe that?—Well, I could imagine, for instance,

that people had a different calculus, or a technique which we should

not call "calculating". But would it be wrong? (Is a coronation wrong?

To beings different from ourselves it might look extremely odd.)’

‘Human beings believe that twice two is four’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Twice two is four’ – in our culture – is a rule-governed proposition – a game proposition

‘Even though everybody believed that twice two was five it would still be four?’

perhaps there is no’4’ in this calculus – in this game

“would it be wrong? –

no – there is no ‘right game’ – ‘wrong game’ – there are different games

‘twice two is five’ – would be a different game

‘Of course, in one sense mathematics is a branch of knowledge,—

but still it is also an activity. And 'false moves' can only exist as the

exception. For if what we now call by that name became the rule, the

game in which they were false moves would have been abrogated.’

knowledge is proposal –

proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a ‘game’ – is a rule governed propositional activity –

the game as played is not open to question – open to doubt – or uncertain

mathematics is a rule governed proposition activity –

mathematics is a game –

mathematics as played – is not open to question – open to doubt – or uncertain

mathematics is not knowledge

as to ‘false moves’ in propositional games-

the rules of the game determine the play

the rules determine the correct moves

the game is not played – if the moves made in it are not correct

‘"We all learn the same multiplication table." This might, no doubt,

be a remark about the teaching of arithmetic in our schools,—but also

an observation about the concept of the multiplication table. ("In

a horse-race the horses generally run as fast as they can.")’

we are taught the rules of the game – how to play the game

‘There is such a thing as colour-blindness and there are ways of

establishing it. There is in general complete agreement in the

judgments of colours made by those who have been diagnosed normal.

This characterizes the concept of a judgment of colour.’

a judgment is one thing –

any judgment not put to question – not put to doubt – its uncertainty left unexplored – will stand –

and stand as an uncritical judgment

‘There is in general no such agreement over the question whether

an expression of feeling is genuine or not.’

any proposal regarding colour – as with any proposal regarding feeling – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I am sure, sure, that he is not pretending; but some third person is

not. Can I always convince him? And if not is there some mistake in

his reasoning or observations?"

the business of ‘convincing’ – is rhetoric

‘‘You're all at sea!"—we say this when someone doubts what we

recognize as clearly genuine—but we cannot prove anything.’

correct –

the best you can do is put your proposal –

and as for arguing your case – there you go into the rhetorical mode

‘Is there such a thing as 'expert judgment' about the genuineness of

expressions of feeling?—Even here, there are those whose judgment is

'better' and those whose judgment is 'worse'.’

well there are those whose judgment is regarded as ‘better’ and those whose judgment is regarded as ‘worse’

any judgment is uncertain

people pretend authority – and there are others who more than happy to bow to the pretence

‘Correcter prognoses will generally issue from the judgments of

those with better knowledge of mankind.’

who is to say what leads to a correct prognosis – or indeed just what counts as a correct prognosis?

on thing is clear –

a rational prognosis – will be the result of a critical examination of symptoms and treatments –

as for a ‘better knowledge of mankind’ –

that is just rhetorical waffle – and waffle I think even the most pretentious of clinicians would avoid

‘Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however,

by taking a course in it, but through 'experience'.—Can someone else

be a man's teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him

the right tip.—This is what 'learning' and 'teaching' are like here.—

What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments.

There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only

experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating-rules.’

can one learn this ‘knowledge’?

yes – one can learn pretention and rhetoric

it is not a matter of learning or teaching – ‘correct judgment’

genuine leaning is a critical process –

a good teacher teaches his or her pupils to question – to doubt – to explore propositional uncertainty –

‘experienced people – are open-minded people – people with a critical outlook

this critical approach is not like game playing – where the game and its play are rule determined

‘What is most difficult here is to put this indefiniteness, correctly

and unfalsified into words.’

this indefiniteness – is propositional uncertainty –

it is not difficult to understand that any proposition is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

"The genuineness of an expression cannot be proved; one has to

feel it."—Very well,—but what does one go on to do with this

recognition of genuineness? If someone says "Voila ce que peut dire

un coeur vraiment epris"—and if he also brings someone else to the

same mind,—what are the further consequences? Or are there none,

and does the game end with one person's relishing what another does

not?’

(‘Voila ce que peut dire un coeur vraiment epris’ – ‘this is what a truly loving heart can say’)

proof is a propositional game – a rule-governed propositional action

logically speaking – ‘feeling it’ is irrelevant – what is relevant is that the proposal is put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty – explored

‘feeling it’ – may have rhetorical – that is persuasive – significance

any proposal put – from a logical point of view – is genuine –

what are the consequences if ‘he brings someone else to the same mind’ – that is if he persuades another to accept his proposal?

the consequence – presumably – is agreement –

further consequences? – they could be anything

persuasion – rhetoric – is not a ‘game’– is not a rule-governed propositional action

rhetoric – has no logical basis –

as to ‘one person relishing what another does not’ –

get real – that is how the world works

‘There are certainly consequences, but of a diffuse kind. Experience,

that is varied observation, can inform us of them, and they too are

incapable of general formulation; only in scattered cases can one arrive

at a correct and fruitful judgment, establish a fruitful connexion.

And the most general remarks yield at best what looks like the

fragments of a system.’

well yes – a proposal is put – there will be consequences – and until those consequences are proposed – we don’t know what they are

experience – is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

yes – we make judgments – and we run with those judgments –

they are nevertheless – no more logically sound than any other proposal –

the fact is we proceed – and do so pragmatically – and in uncertainty

I think Wittgenstein here is just skirting around the obvious – the obvious being – propositional uncertainty –

I can’t for the life of me understand why he didn’t take the plunge –

all he is saving – by avoiding a full embrace of propositional uncertainty – is a faulty and weak philosophical structure – that is not worth propping up –

it has had a long-convoluted history – but it’s had its day –

time for the dust bin

‘It is certainly possible to be convinced by evidence that someone

is in such-and-such a state of mind, that, for instance, he is not

pretending. But 'evidence' here includes 'imponderable' evidence.’

‘convincing’ is rhetoric – not logic

evidence is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘imponderable evidence’ – if it means anything means an imponderable proposal – an imponderable proposition –

effectively a proposition that makes no sense – a proposition – no one can make sense of –

a proposal that makes no sense – that no one can make sense of – proposes nothing

the imponderable proposition – is not in fact a proposal – a proposition at all –

it’s a fake proposal – a fake proposition

and really – we have better things to do than waste our time and energy on such rubbish

‘The question is: what does imponderable evidence accomplish'?

Suppose there were imponderable evidence for the chemical

(internal) structure of a substance, still it would have to prove itself

to be evidence by certain consequences which can be weighed.

(Imponderable evidence might convince someone that a picture was

a genuine .... But it is possible for this to be proved right by

documentary evidence as well.)

Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of glance, of gesture, of

tone.’

‘imponderable evidence’ – is a contradiction in terns

evidence – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

evidence is – ‘ponderable’ –

imponderable evidence is not evidence – and would not convince anyone of anything

the best you can say for ‘imponderable evidence’ is that it is rhetorical rubbish –

and people can be coned – if not convinced – by rhetorical rubbish

this notion of imponderable evidence – is just metaphysical obscurantism

and the fact Wittgenstein champions it – so late in the day – shows clearly – in my view that he has come to the end of his philosophical tether – and effectively abandoned ship

‘subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone.’ – are just that – subtleties –

a subtlety is not ‘imponderable’ – it is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a

pretended one (and here there can, of course, be a 'ponderable'

confirmation of my judgment). But I may be quite incapable of

describing the difference. And this not because the languages I know

have no words for it. For why not introduce new words?—If I were

a very talented painter I might conceivably represent the genuine and

the simulated glance in pictures.’

yes – you might not be able – at the time – to describe a perceived – a proposed –

difference –

we all know what that is like –

that doesn’t mean though – that there is no difference – or a difference cannot be described –

in another place – at another time – you might have more luck

‘Ask yourself: How does a man learn to get a 'nose' for something?

And how can this nose be used?’

one can develop a deep and comprehensive understanding of propositional contexts – and thus have more luck at reading what is going on – and what might occur

here though – there is no certainty –

                                                                                         

any well developed or thought out proposal – is – as with any other proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Pretending is, of course, only a special case of someone's producing

(say) expressions of pain when he is not in pain. For if this is possible

at all, why should it always be pretending that is taking place—this

very special pattern in the weave of our lives?’

interesting that Wittgenstein in the last throws of his book is putting an argument for pretension –

the logical point is this – a proposal – any proposal – indeed any propositional pattern – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

if you understand this – you will not be pretentious

‘A child has much to learn before it can pretend. (A dog cannot be a

hypocrite, but neither can he be sincere.)’

if by ‘pretend’ here – you mean ‘imagine’ – then – yes you need – a child needs –

a propositional base from which to imagine – from which to put imaginative proposals

the descriptions ‘hypocrite’ and ‘sincere’ – are only applicable to human beings

‘There might actually occur a case where we should say "This man

believes he is pretending.’

if there is such a case – what is it?

or is this ‘suggestion’ – the final pretence?

xii

‘If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature,

should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in

nature which is the basis of grammar?—Our interest certainly includes

the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature.

(Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.)

But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the

formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet

natural history—since we can also invent fictitious natural history for

our purposes.’

this question of the ‘formation of concepts’ –

is the question of the origin and formation of proposals – of the proposal –

for a ‘concept’ is nothing more than a proposal

there will be proposals regarding the origin and formation of the proposal –

any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

beyond proposal – is the unknown

‘I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different

people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis).

But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct

ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something

that we realize—then let him imagine certain very general facts

of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation

of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to

him.’

there are no ‘absolutely correct’ concepts / proposals –

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

concept / proposal formation – is open to question –

yes – you can propose that concepts / proposals – originate or form from a certain view of the facts of nature – or indeed of another view of the facts of nature –

whatever the case here – and there are many other possible ways of explaining the origin and formation of concepts – whatever the case – any view – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

different views here will function in different propositional systems –

and in different propositional systems – the world will be proposed differently – the world will be ‘seen’ differently

‘Compare a concept with a style of painting. For is even our style of

painting arbitrary? Can we choose one at pleasure? (The Egyptian,

for instance.) Is it a mere question of pleasing and ugly?’

it could be for someone somewhere at sometime

xxiii

‘When I say: "He was here half an hour ago"—that is, remembering

it—this is not the description of a present experience.’

it is a present proposal –

‘Memory-experiences are accompaniments of remembering.’

remembering – is propositional –

the ‘experience’ of remembering – is propositional

‘Remembering has no experiential content.—Surely this can be seen

by introspection? Doesn't it shew precisely that there is nothing there,

when I look about for a content?—But it could only shew this in this

case or that. And even so it cannot shew me what the word "to

remember" means, and hence where to look for a content!’

the ‘content’ – if you want to call it that – is whatever is put – proposed –

and whatever is put – proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

introspection is not a search for content – it is a search for proposal – for proposition

‘I get the idea of a memory-content only because I assimilate psychological

concepts. It is like assimilating two games. (Football has

goals, tennis not.)’

‘content’ – is propositional

‘Would this situation be conceivable: someone remembers for the

first time in his life and says "Yes, now I know what 'remembering' is,

what it feels like to remember".—How does he know that this feeling

is 'remembering'? Compare: "Yes, now I know what 'tingling' is".

(He has perhaps had an electric shock for the first time.)—Does he

know that it is memory because it is caused by something past? And

how does he know what the past is? Man learns the concept of the

past by remembering.’

whether you know what to call it – and how you learn to know what it is called – is a secondary issue –

the logical point is that – regardless of whatever description you give to a proposal – to a proposition – the proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘And how will he know again in the future what remembering feels

like?’

yes – remembering – remembering –

and remembering remembering – is a propositional act

(On the other hand one might, perhaps, speak of a feeling "Long,

long ago", for there is a tone, a gesture, which go with certain narratives

of past times.)

‘long long ago’ – a proposal –

‘tones’ – come and go – they are rhetorical devices

xiv

‘The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained

by calling it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of

physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain

branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are

experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case

conceptual confusion and methods of proof.)’

any so-called ‘science’– is proposal – proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

this is the logic of proposal – of proposition – it applies as equally to physics as it does to psychology – or for that matter – any other ‘science’

the issue is not conceptual confusion – rather propositional uncertainty

and methodology – i.e. – experimental – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘proof’ is a rule governed propositional game –

proof is a propositional game – a language-game

physics is not a rule-governed propositional game – physics is an exercise in critical proposition thinking and experimentation –

critical propositional thinking and experimentation – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

physics and psychology are different propositional activities –

physics is broader in scope and subject matter than psychology –

you might say physics is concerned with the behaviour of everything –

and psychology – only with the behaviour of human beings – and perhaps other animals

physics and psychology are different propositional constructs – with different propositional foci –

that one is not the other – is to state the obvious –

however – both activities are propositional – and from a logical point of view – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have

the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem

and method pass one another by.’

the ‘experimental method’ – is a means of exploring propositional uncertainty

‘An investigation is possible in connexion with mathematics which

is entirely analogous to our investigation of psychology. It is just as

little a mathematical investigation as the other is a psychological one.

It will not contain calculations, so it is not for example logistic.

It might deserve the name of an investigation of the 'foundations of

mathematics'.

yes – exactly –

there are two modes of propositional activity in the realm of mathematics

what commonly goes for mathematics – is the game mode – the mode of rule governed propositional action

what is referred to here as the foundations of mathematics – is meta-mathematics – the investigation of mathematical theory and principles –

this is the critical mode – where theory and principles are put to question – put to doubt

and their uncertainty – explored

© killer press. 20020.