Russell: introduction to mathematical philosophy:
descriptions
Russell begins by saying there are basically two kinds of descriptions – definite and indefinite
a definite description is a phrase of the form ‘a so-and-so’
an indefinite description a phrase of the form ‘the so-and-so’ – in the singular
we begin with the former –
consider the description – ‘I met a man’
what do I really assert?
it is clear that what I assert is not – ‘I met Jones’?
Russell says that in such a case – not only Jones – but no actual man enters into the statement
and he says the statement would remain significant if there were no man at all – as in ‘I met a unicorn’
he argues – it is only the concept that enters into the proposition
in the case of unicorn – there is only the concept
this he says has led some logicians to believe in unreal objects
probably the same lot that bang on about infinite numbers and classes
Meinong argued that we can speak about ‘the golden mountain’ and ‘the round square’ – and hence that they must have some kind of logical being
Russell’s view is that to say unicorns must have existence in heraldry or literature or the imagination is to make a pitiful evasion of the issue
he says –
‘In obedience to the feeling of reality, we shall insist that, that in the analysis of proposition, nothing “unreal” shall be admitted. But after all, if there is nothing unreal, how it may be asked could we admit anything unreal?’
his answer is that with propositions we are dealing firstly with symbols – and if we attribute meaning to groups of symbols that have no meaning we will end up with unrealities – in the sense of objects described
the first point I would like to make here is that it is rather artificial and frankly a little stupid to think that a sentence or proposition can be taken in isolation from its context and use – and regarded as significant
we do not operate with individual sentences in some kind of metaphysical void
to understand ‘I met a man’ or ‘I met a unicorn’ – or for that matter ‘I met Jones’ – one needs a lot more information
or one needs to assume a lot more than what is contained in the proposition
one could go so far as to say that to understand Tammy when she says ‘I met Jones’ you would need a complete analysis of Tammy’s use of that statement at that time –
and such of course would be to call for a complete understanding of the inherent metaphysics or world view of the speaker – at that time
now that is not about to happen – it is not even theoretically feasible
unless you think you have some indubitable like principles as the basis of your analysis
and to claim such I would submit is to talk rot
nevertheless when propositions are uttered by a speaker and received by a hearer much is assumed
you could say to cut to the quick - reality is assumed and within that any number of other secondary assumptions come into play
now what this actually means is that what is assumed is technically unknown – in the sense of a definitive analysis
but as I argued in the previous post in relation to propositional functions – this is the actual reality we are in and that we deal with –
we operate in the unknown
when I speak I assume some degree of definitiveness
when you hear me speak you assume some degree of definitiveness
this is not because I have logical grounds for definitiveness – or because you do
it is rather that without the assumption of definitiveness – we would not be able to assert
anything at all
and therefore not be able to communicate in language
so what I am saying is that in order to act propositionally – the assumption of defintiveness (of some degree) is necessary
and this necessity is no more than a practical necessity – the necessity to act
on this view all propositions are technically indefinite – but their form in practise is definite
one could be cynical and say well this suggests all language is fraudulent – or in common slang parlance say – every one is talking shit
strictly speaking this is correct
but given that there actually is no alternative – it becomes the gold standard
what I am saying is that ‘I met a man’ or ‘I met Jones’ or ‘I met a unicorn’ are all indefinite propositions – even when understood in some wider context of the user and the usage
it is just that I assume you understand what I am saying – and you assume that what I say is understandable
it is an assumption based on ignorance – but a necessary one
Russell it seems slips in and out of what he calls ‘unreality’ quite seamlessly and indeed elegantly
he has no scruples it appears in basing his philosophy of mathematics on the unreality of infinite numbers and classes – but baulks at unicorns
unicorns I would suggest have a better chance of making it
we need to get the bottom of all this -
we describe in order – and only to deal with – to get a handle on – the unknown
and if you accept this you will see that any description is no more than a shot in the dark
but that is where we are – and that is what we have to do
so that’s Kansas Toto
Russell seems to think that because we have as the first cab off the rank – objective language – language that refers to objects
an object world is what we have – and there is no where else to go
and this for Russell is the object world of common sense and perhaps science
the object language is the starting point simply because it has proved to be so successful
and by this I mean humans have been enabled by such a platform
nevertheless though – it is only a platform – and it is not successful or useful in all circumstances
we ask ‘what do you mean by that? when the simplicity of object language seems not to be up to the job
and here – it is not the nature of things that is being questioned – rather the appropriateness of the description – in a particular context
the nature of things for human beings is a function of description – which of course is a function of need
clearly ‘I met a unicorn’ – is a statement that though it appears to be an assertion describing an object in the physical world – is a statement describing something else
and it is all very well for Russell to dismiss other ways of describing as ‘pitiful’ and ‘paltry’
but what is behind Russell’s view is that there is only one way to describe the world – and further that language can be taken out of its context and use and regarded as some kind of specimen under a microscope
the ‘pitiful and paltry evasion argument’ – is actually no argument at all
it’s the kind of comment that might be made when some one doesn’t like a point of view – but doesn’t want to address it – just in case it might turn out to be on the money
and there goes the neighborhood
Russell doesn’t actually address the possibility of the indefiniteness of all description
and he doesn’t seem to get that we have developed alternative ontologies simply because the starting point – is just that – a starting point
objective – as in physical object description is most useful – and clearly we couldn’t get on without it – but the actual reality of human behaviour shows it is not taken as universally applicable – never has been
because physical object language has been so useful – the fact is we often describe in its terms – when even a preliminary analysis shows it is not what is required
which is to say physical object language cast a long shadow – and most of the time we are quite happy to play in the shadow – knowing full well that other players understand this
I think the hidden truth of human beings is that they know that their humanity is based on not knowing
human beings have developed alternative ways of seeing the world and of describing it because they have needed to – and that’s the end of it
if you are going to operate ‘in obedience to the feeling of reality’ – then you ought to have a look at what’s going on – and has been since the beginning of recorded history
still I don’t want to be too hard on the old boy – at the time he was trying to ‘describe descriptions’ – he was doing a stretch at Brixton
prison can do that to you
Russell goes on to consider definite descriptions
‘We have two things to compare: (1) a name, which is a simple symbol, designating an individual which is its meaning, and having this meaning in its own right independently of the meaning of all other words; (2) a description, which consists of several words, whose meanings are already fixed, and from which results whatever is to be taken as the “meaning” of the description.’
a name does identify – it is an identification act
a description – makes known the identification – it is an act on the act of identification
we operate in description –
the world as known is the world described
our descriptions are the platform for our actions
descriptions are in that sense meta-actions
they are what enable us to proceed – to act on –
in propositions where names occur – as in ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ – you have a neat example of the logic of descriptive behaviour
for essentially what you have here is an identification (‘Scott’) described (‘is the author of Waverley’)
Russell says the name designates an individual – which is its meaning – and that it is a simple symbol
a name does designate – true – but what does it designate?
in my view what it designates is a particular unknown
it is an act that is designed to focus attention – focus consciousness on a particular
or you could even say it is an act that particularizes
granted as a matter of course we are aware – conscious of particulars –
and in general we operate in a world already – and well described – so in most cases our particulars come with description
but to get to the bottom of this we need to look at the logic of the situation – and this requires that we make a step back from the obvious
I would suggest that the act of naming singles out a particular
and it singles it out for description –
in the proposition ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ – we have the name described
that is to say a bare particular is singled out and then given some clothes
Russell argues the meaning of the name is the individual designated
the view I put is that the name is empty
and what I mean by that is that the name is a description place
that the name identifies an unknown – and is then the place for description –
it is the name that is then described – or if you like – made known
the act of description – gives the name meaning
which is really just to say – it makes the name functional – that is it makes it active
so when we talk about meaning – what we are talking about is not some inherent quality that some propositions have and others do not –
rather what it amounts to is making symbols functional
meaning is about ‘getting on with it’
you could then say well what you have is symbols (words) making symbols operational
yes – this is essentially it
and the symbolic platform so created - becomes a basis for physical / mental action
you might ask how is it exactly that symbols make symbols functional?
in the case of ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ what you essentially have is a decision to make one set of symbols ‘is the author of Waverley’ function in place of ‘Scott’
in principle this substitution could go on indefinitely
the point of all such propositions is to make the original identification functional (known)
one might be tempted to argue that there is a logical relation between any such set of propositions – i.e. that the last proposition in the series ‘contains’ or entails all that came before
no doubt with a bit of patience it could be written up like that
but no –
the point is that each proposition serves its own purpose
and each purpose would or could itself be the subject of indefinite description
there is no doubt that we seek definite descriptions
however the reality is not that we find them
it is rather that we make constructions that appear to be definite
and the appearance is what we run with
for in non-reflective action we need the illusion of the definite
and we need non-reflective action to function and survive
language is a very functional platform – and the fact that it creates or enables the illusion of definitiveness is its principle function
‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ is a proposition which analysed correctly shows that a particular is identified and given a description
a particular is only made known through description – through some description
‘Scott’ identifies the particular – or to be more precise – it marks the particular for description
and the whole point of description is just to make the unknown – supposedly known
which means setting up a structure so that the particular named or described can be functional
just because the particular in itself – the original state of things is in itself unknown - (which is the reason for description) there cannot be a definite description of it –
there is no definite description of any feature of the world or our experience of it
nevertheless we must and do proceed as if there is
we operate in illusion – and this is necessary given the reality we face
it is the fact of consciousness in the world - consciousness facing the unknown
© greg. t. charlton. 2008.
