Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Part 1. 201-300

201. ‘This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined

by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to

accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out

to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it.

And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact

that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after

another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we

thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that

here is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which

is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it"

in actual cases.

Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the

rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation"

to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.’

‘This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.’

the way I would look at is like this –

if every course of action can be made to accord with the rule –

then yes – a course of action can be determined by a rule

‘The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it.’

you could propose and argue that every course of action is in conflict with the rule –

so what?

‘And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.’?

no agreement – no disagreement?

all that means is –

if – nothing happens – nothing happens

what you have here is an argument that goes – nowhere

‘"obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.’ –

you need to understand the logical place of the rule – or the logical context of the rule

the rule is a function of the propositional game

if you choose to play the game – you play in accordance with its rule – if you don’t play in accordance with the rule – there is no game

so the issue is the game – to play or not to play?

‘Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.’

if you play the game – your plays are rule-governed – they are not –– open to interpretation –

or the only valid ‘interpretation’ – is in terms of the rule

if there is an issue with the interpretation of the rule – a decision must be made as to which interpretation to go with

for if the rule is undecided – there can be no game

202. ‘And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one

is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey

a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be

the same thing as obeying it.’

forget this ‘obeying a rule’ –

you ‘obey’ an authority if you obey anything

a rule is not an authority

it is not about obeying a rule  – it is about following a rule

and of course it is possible to follow a rule privately –

i.e. – you might be plotting a play in chess – before actually playing the game

or you might be following a line of thought in mathematics – before doing the calculation with pen and paper –

a Benedictine monk might well play out the rule of St. Benedict in his morning meditation – seeing how it will apply to his day

and there are countless other examples of  following a rule privately

203. ‘Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one

side and know your way about; you approach the same place from

another side and no longer know your way about.’

language is proposal –

language / proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

we know our way about – we propose our way about

our way about is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

204. ‘As things are I can, for example, invent a game that is never

played by anyone.—But would the following be possible too: mankind

has never played any games; once, however, someone invented a game

—which no one ever played?’

there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode – and the rule-governed mode

human beings question – doubt – and explore propositional uncertainty –

and human beings construct rule-governed propositional games – and play these games –

that is the reality – the propositional reality

as to when these propositional modes came into play – that is an empirical question –

a question for anthropologists

I could invent a game now – that no one plays –

so of course it is possible that in the past someone has done just that

205. "But it is just the queer thing about intention, about the

mental process, that the existence of a custom, of a technique, is not

necessary to it. That, for example, it is imaginable that two people

should play chess in a world in which otherwise no games existed; and

even that they should begin a game of chess—and then be interrupted.

"But isn't chess defined by its rules? And how are these rules present

in the mind of the person who is intending to play chess?’

‘how are these rules present in the mind of the person who is intending to play chess?’

various proposals can be put forward in answer to this question

any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

206. ‘Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are

trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if

one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and

the training? Which one is right?

Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a

language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you

say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them,

rebelled against them, and so on?

The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by

means of which we interpret an unknown language.’

‘But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and

the training? Which one is right?’

there is no ‘right’ here – there are different reactions –

whatever the reaction to it – what counts is that the rule is followed

‘Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on?’

all you can do – in understanding propositional behaviour – whether it is in a language you are familiar with – or not – is propose in relation to it –

and any proposal you put – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and the same applies with regard to the ‘common behaviour of mankind’ –

human behaviour – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

207. ‘Let us imagine that the people in that country carried on the

usual human activities and in the course of them employed, apparently,

an articulate language. If we watch their behaviour we find it intelligible,

it seems 'logical'. But when we try to learn their language we

find it impossible to do so. For there is no regular connexion between

what they say, the sounds they make, and their actions; but still these

sounds are not superfluous, for if we gag one of the people, it has the

same consequences as with us; without the sounds their actions fall

into confusion—as I feel like putting it.

Are we to say that these people have a language: orders, reports,

and the rest?

There is not enough regularity for us to call it "language"’

language is proposal –

if these people propose – they have a language –

but just what this language amounts to – how it compares with our language – how it is to be understood – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

Wittgenstein says –

‘for if we gag one of the people, it has the same consequences as with us; without the sounds their actions fall into confusion’

there are people who are dumb – and those who are deaf and dumb –

and their actions are no more or no less confused than those of us who are not so disabled

to get a handle on this language – you would look for regularity – for a regular relationship ‘between what they say, the sounds they make, and their actions’ –

however the fact you don’t see a regularity doesn’t mean it’s not there –

perhaps your notion of regularity is not sophisticated enough – or is too sophisticated?

or you just simply don’t see it

a job for linguists and anthropologists – I would say –

and even then there is no guarantee that such work would yield the result you are looking for

208. ‘Then am I defining "order" and "rule" by means of"

regularity"?—How do I explain the meaning of "regular", "uniform"

same" to anyone?—I shall explain these words to someone who, say,

only speaks French by means of the corresponding French words.

But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the

words by means of examples and by practice.—And when I do this I

do not communicate less to him than I know myself.

In the course of this teaching I shall shew him the same colours,

the same lengths, the same shapes, I shall make him find them and

produce them, and so on. I shall, for instance, get him to continue an

ornamental pattern uniformly when told to do so.—And also to

continue progressions. And so, for example, when given: . . . ... to

go on: .... ..... ...... .

I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of

agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his

way, or hold him back; and so on.

Imagine witnessing such teaching. None of the words would be

explained by means of itself; there would be no logical circle.

The expressions "and so on", "and so on ad infinitum" are also

explained in this teaching. A gesture, among other things, might serve

this purpose. The gesture that means "go on like this", or "and so

on" has a function comparable to that of pointing to an object or a

place.

We should distinguish between the "and so on" which is, and the

"and so on" which is not, an abbreviated notation. "And so on ad inf."

is not such an abbreviation. The fact that we cannot write down all the

digits of p is not a human shortcoming, as mathematicians sometimes

think.

Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the examples

given is different from that which 'points beyond' them.’

‘Then am I defining "order" and "rule" by means of "regularity"?—How do I explain the meaning of "regular", "uniform" same" to anyone?—'

any term is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any explanation of any term – again – open to question

to proceed – where there is a question of definition – you need agreement – and any agreement here is open to question – a matter of argument –

nevertheless you can proceed – recognizing that you proceed in logical uncertainty

‘We should distinguish between the "and so on" which is, and the "and so on" which is not, an abbreviated notation. "And so on ad inf." is not such an abbreviation. The fact that we cannot write down all the digits of p is not a human shortcoming, as mathematicians sometimes think.’

"And so on ad inf." – is a propositional game rule – a game rule for the infinity game

what we should be teaching is the logical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

209. ‘"But then doesn't our understanding reach beyond all the

examples?"—A very queer expression, and a quite natural one!—

But is that all? Isn't there a deeper explanation; or mustn't at least

the understanding of the explanation be deeper?—Well, have I myself

a deeper understanding? Have I got more than I give in the explanation?

—But then, whence the feeling that I have got more?

Is it like the case where I interpret what is not limited as a length

that reaches beyond every length?’

an example is a proposal – a proposal for consideration

does our understanding reach beyond all examples – beyond all proposals?

no

beyond proposal – is the unknown

our understanding – is what we propose – and what we propose – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a deeper understanding?

there is no depth to a proposal –

a proposal is put – an understanding proposed –

this proposal – this understanding – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

and in response to this propositional uncertainty – we propose – we further propose –

and we critically evaluate these  proposals

all propositional action is on the same level – it is what is put

have I got more than I give in the explanation?

what you’ve got in the explanation – is what you propose

as to the feeling that you have got more –

logically – all that this ‘more’ can be – is – question – doubt – and uncertainty

‘Is it like the case where I interpret what is not limited as a length that reaches beyond every length?’

no

210. ‘"But do you really explain to the other person what you

yourself understand? Don't you get him to guess the essential thing?

You give him examples,—but he has to guess their drift, to guess your

intention."—Every explanation which I can give myself I give to him

too.—"He guesses what I intend" would mean: various interpretations

of my explanation come to his mind, and he lights on one of

them. So in this case he could ask; and I could and should answer him.’

the hard reality here is – we don’t know

I don’t know if you get what I say – or understand what I explain

the matter is complex – but if you indicate your assent to what I propose –

if you indicate your assent to my explanation –

then I assume we are on the same page

I can make this assumption – and still have a question in my mind as to whether you understand me

as you can have a question as to whether I understand you

still – if we have assent – if we have agreement in some form – we are likely to proceed

there is no certainty at any point here

everything is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

propositional uncertainty is not a fault – it is not a failing – it is rather the common and natural ground of our propositional lives

we live in propositional uncertainty – and we act in propositional uncertainty

and what this means is that our lives and our actions – and indeed our interactions – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

I would put that propositional uncertainty – is the ground of all action

211. ‘How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself—

whatever instruction you give him?—Well, how do I know?——If

that means "Have I reasons?" the answer is: my reasons will soon

give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.’

‘How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself’ –

his knowing here is uncertain

‘Well, how do I know?——'

my knowing here is uncertain

‘If that means "Have I reasons?" the answer is: my reasons will soon

give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.’

no –  you will still have reasons and you will still act with reasons

however your reasons are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

your reasons do not ‘give out’ – because they are uncertain –

you only understand your reasons if you understand their uncertainty

however it may be the case that you decide to change your reasons –

or it may be the case that you decide to drop the proposal that they are a response to

whatever the case – any decision here – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

212. ‘When someone whom I am afraid of orders me to continue

the series, I act quickly, with perfect certainty, and the lack of reasons

does not trouble me.’

yes – you act without thinking

you act without critically evaluating the order –

you act irrationally

213. ‘"But this initial segment of a series obviously admitted of

various interpretations (e.g. by means of algebraic expressions) and

so you must first have chosen one such interpretation."—Not at all.

A doubt was possible in certain circumstances. But that is not to say

that I did doubt, or even could doubt. (There is something to be said,

which is connected with this, about the psychological 'atmosphere' of a

process.)

So it must have been intuition that removed this doubt?—If intuition

is an inner voice—how do 1 know how I am to obey it? And how do I

know that it doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can

also guide me wrong.

((Intuition an unnecessary shuffle.))’

‘"But this initial segment of a series obviously admitted of various interpretations (e.g. by means of algebraic expressions) and so you must first have chosen one such interpretation." ."—Not at all. A doubt was possible in certain circumstances. But that is not to say that I did doubt, or even could doubt.’

here we are dealing with a propositional game – a rule-governed propositional action

in any such propositional action – the primary issue is following the rule –

in this case – algebraic expressions are a means to this end

doubt over which algebraic expression to use – is just the question of which method to use – in order to follow the rule

it is a secondary issue – and is incidental to the primary issue

a move in chess may be explained by different stratagems –

the issue is the move

 ‘the psychological atmosphere of a process’ – is irrelevant

‘atmospheres’ – are this or that – they come and go –

the point is to play the game – to follow the rule – whatever the atmosphere

‘So it must have been intuition that removed this doubt?’

logically speaking doubt is never ‘removed’ –

a decision is made – and made for whatever reason – and the decision – in this case a decision as to which algebraic expression to proceed with – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

still we make a call – and we proceed

‘If intuition is an inner voice—how do 1 know how I am to obey it? And how do I

know that it doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong.’ –

logically speaking – this ‘inner voice’ is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and it is not a question of ‘obeying’ –

a proposal is open – open to question –

a rule is not ‘obeyed’ – it is followed –

and that is the point of the game – to follow the rule –

if you don’t follow the rule – you don’t play the game

‘((Intuition an unnecessary shuffle.))’

‘intuition’ might have something going for it – if you understand it as a synonym for the ‘unknown’

a good deal of the time we make decisions without knowing – or understanding their basis –

call it intuition?

214. ‘If you have to have an intuition in order to develop the series

1 2 3 4 ... you must also have one in order to develop the series

2 2 2 2 ... .’

the series 1 2 3 4 … – is a rule-governed propositional game 

the series 22222 …  – is a rule-governed propositional game –

developing a game – is proposing a rule

there could be any number of reasons for developing a game –

and any number of ways of describing the process of  developing a game

the point is to play it

215. ‘But isn't the same at least the same?

We seem to have an infallible paradigm of identity in the identity

of a thing with itself. I feel like saying: "Here at any rate there can't

be a variety of interpretations. If you are seeing a thing you are

seeing identity too."

Then are two things the same when they are what one thing is?

And how am I to apply what the one thing shews me to the case of

two things?’

‘We seem to have an infallible paradigm of identity in the identity of a thing with itself.’

this so called ‘infallible paradigm of identity’ theory  – is logical rubbish –

identity is a substitution game

if x = y – then can be substituted for y –  and y can be substituted for x

identity is this game of substitution

it is obvious that for this game to be played – there must be at least two different tokens

there is no identity game – if there is only one token – there is no substitution if there is only one token

if there is only one token – there is nothing for it to be substituted with

to suggest that a thing can be substituted for itself – is to not understand substitution – or is to corrupt it

substitution is a game played with different tokens

identity – is a relation between different things –

to suggest that a thing is identical with itself – is to propose a relation where there is none –

is to propose a game – where there can be no game

‘Then are two things the same when they are what one thing is? And how am I to apply what the one thing shews me to the case of two things?’

Wittgenstein has got himself in a tangled up mess here

a game is a rule-governed propositional action

all games are rule-governed – but of course – this doesn’t mean – there is only one game – or that all games are the same –

all games are in fact – different –

the 1 2 3 4 ... game – is a different game to the 22222 … game 

216. "A thing is identical with itself."—There is no finer example

of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play

of the imagination. It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its

own shape and saw that it fitted.

We might also say: "Every thing fits into itself." Or again: "Every

thing fits into its own shape." At the same time we look at a thing

and imagine that there was a blank left for it, and that now it fits into

it exactly.

Does this spot  .  fit into its white surrounding?—But that is just

how it would look if there had been a hole in its place and it then

fitted into the hole. But when we say "it fits" we are not simply

describing this appearance; not simply this situation.

"Every coloured patch fits exactly into its surrounding" is a rather

specialized form of the law of identity.’

"A thing is identical with itself."—There is no finer example of a useless proposition’

correct

"Every coloured patch fits exactly into its surrounding" is a rather specialized form of the law of identity.’

if its surrounding – is a different colour – you can see the coloured patch as a substitution for the other colour of the surrounding –

however – it seems to me to make more sense to say that we have a picture that is not monochrome but is multi-coloured

and really it is not as if a picture is a game – it’s a proposal

217. ‘"How am I able to obey a rule?"—if this is not a question

about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the

rule in the way I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and

my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I

do."

(Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not

of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural

one; the definition a kind of ornamental coping that supports

nothing.)’

yes – exactly –

put it this way – any claim of justification – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

so much for justification

the real point here is that justification – is pretence –

and while we can shoot pretence down with logic –

the reality is – who leaves home without it?

‘how am I to obey a rule?’ –

well you either do or you don’t –

but if we are talking about the rule of a propositional game –

you follow the rule – if you want to play the game –

if don’t want to play the game – take a hike

218. ‘Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible

section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? Well, we might imagine

rails instead of a rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to the

unlimited application of a rule.’

yes – here we are talking about a propositional game – the infinity game –

the unlimited application of a rule

219. ‘"All the steps are really already taken" means: I no longer

have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning,

traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole

of space.——But if something of this sort really were the case, how

would it help?

No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood

symbolically.—I should have said: This is how it strikes me.

When I obey a rule, I do not choose.

I obey the rule blindly.’

"All the steps are really already taken"

proposing a rule – does not mean that the rule has been followed – has been executed

‘This is how it strikes me.’

if that’s how it strikes you – then you’ve got it wrong

‘When I obey a rule, I do not choose.’

for a start – you don’t ‘obey’ a rule – if you obey – you obey an authority – a rule is not an authority – a rule is a proposal

you don’t ‘obey’ a rule – you follow a rule

‘I obey the rule blindly.’ –

no – you follow the rule – and you follow the rule in order to play the game –

and you play the game – because you choose to

220. ‘But what is the purpose of that symbolical proposition? It

was supposed to bring into prominence a difference between being

causally determined and being logically determined.’

a causal determination is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the ‘symbolic proposition’ – is a game proposition

a logical determination – is a propositional rule determination – a game determination

the difference Wittgenstein was trying to make prominent – is quite clear if you understand the difference between propositions – open to question – and rule-governed propositions

221. ‘My symbolical expression was really a mythological description

of the use of a rule’

yes - exactly

222. ‘"The line intimates to me the way I am to go." — But that is

of course only a picture. And if I judged that it intimated this or that as

it were irresponsibly, I should not say that I was obeying it like a rule.’

the line as a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

where you judge ‘that it intimates this or that’ – responsibly or irresponsibly – you are not playing a game – you are engaged in a critical process

if on the other hand you are playing the game – the line is a rule – and to play the game – you follow the rule

if you put a rule to question – you are not playing a game

223. ‘One does not feel that one has always got to wait upon the

nod (the whisper) of the rule. On the contrary, we are not on tenter-

hooks about what it will tell us next, but it always tells us the same,

and we do what it tells us.

One might say to the person one was training: "Look, I always do

the same thing: I ....."’

rules do not exist – or come to be – in a propositional vacuum

rules are functions of propositional games

if you play a game – you play in accordance with it’s rule –

if you don’t play in accordance with the rule – you don’t play the game

where there is a rule – there is a game –

where there is no rule – there is no game

"Look, I always do the same thing: I ....." – is ok

I would prefer to say –

“this is how I play the game”

224. ‘The word "agreement" and the word "rule" are related to

one another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one

word, he learns the use of the other with it.’

only if you ‘teach it’ – uncritically

the most important thing that we can teach anyone – is to question – to doubt – and to explore propositional uncertainty

if you just ‘teach’ agreement’ – all you teach is ignorance and pretence

225. ‘The use of the word "rule" and the use of the word "same" are

interwoven. (As are the use of "proposition" and the use of "true".)’

‘interwoven’ – amounts to nothing

a rule is a game function

any proposal using the term ‘same’ – is open to question

a proposition – is a proposal – open to question – open to  doubt and uncertain

a proposition is true – if assented to – and false if dissented from

any proposal of assent or any proposal of dissent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

226. ‘Suppose someone gets the series of numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, .... by

working out the series 2x + 1¹. And now he asks himself: "But am I

always doing the same thing, or something different every time?"

If from one day to the next you promise: "To-morrow I will come

and see you" — are you saying the same thing every day, or every day

something different?’

 ‘‘Suppose someone gets the series of numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, .... by working out the series 2x + 1¹. And now he asks himself: "But am I always doing the same thing, or something different every time?"’

if you play the same game with the same rule – you can be said to be doing the same thing

the only difference might be where you play the game

‘If from one day to the next you promise: "To-morrow I will come and see you" — are you saying the same thing every day, or every day something different?’

we use the same proposals – the same propositions – all the time –

the proposal – the proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – regardless of how many times it is used – or where it is used

227. ‘Would it make sense to say "If he did something different everyday

we should not say he was obeying a rule"? That makes no sense.’

his rule might just be to do something different every day

228. ‘"We see a series in just one way!" — All right, but what is

that way? Clearly we see it algebraically, and as a segment of an

expansion. Or is there more in it than that? — "But the way we see it

surely gives us everything!" — But that is not an observation about the

segment of the series; or about anything that we notice in it; it gives

expression to the fact that we look to the rule for instruction and do

something, without appealing to anything else for guidance.’

‘we look to the rule for instruction and do something, without appealing to anything else for guidance.’

yes

229. ‘I believe that I perceive something drawn very fine in a

segment of a series, a characteristic design, which only needs the

addition of "and so on", in order to reach to infinity.’

the addition of ‘and so on’ in order to reach infinity –

is to create a propositional game

230. ‘"The line intimates to me which way I am to go" is only a

paraphrase of: it is my last arbiter for the way I am to go.’

the point is not the line – but the rule –

if there isn’t a rule –  if there isn’t a game –

the line can mean whatever you propose

and if there is a game and rule – the next question is –

do you want to play the game?

231. "But surely you can see . . . .?" That is just the characteristic

expression of someone who is under the compulsion of a rule.’

well maybe so – but it is a rhetorical and pretentious response

the logical response – and appropriate response – is to state the rule – and if necessary explain it

232. ‘Let us imagine a rule intimating to me which way I am to

obey it; that is, as my eye travels along the line, a voice within me says:

"This way!"—What is the difference between this process of obeying

a kind of inspiration and that of obeying a rule? For they are surely

not the same. In the case of inspiration I await direction. I shall not

be able to teach anyone else my 'technique' of following the line.

Unless, indeed, I teach him some way of hearkening, some kind of

receptivity. But then, of course, I cannot require him to follow the line

in the same way as I do.

These are not my experiences of acting from inspiration and according

to a rule; they are grammatical notes.’

a rule – if indeed it is a rule – does not ‘intimate’ –

a rule is not a suggestion

a rule is a precise direction – a precise direction for play

acting on ‘a kind of inspiration’ – is not following a rule

an inspiration – is a proposal – open to question

a rule – if it is a rule – is not open to question

the game that the rule determines – is not open to question

you play the game – or you don’t

you follow the rule – or you don’t

if you want to question the rule – fair enough

if you question the rule – you are engaged in a critical process

playing a game – following a rule – is not a critical process –

if you engage in a critical process – you are not following a rule –

you are not playing a game

233. ‘It would also be possible to imagine such a training in a sort

of arithmetic. Children could calculate, each in his own way—as long

as they listened to their inner voice and obeyed it. Calculating in this

way would be like a sort of composing.’

‘composing’ is making a game

and this might be what happens when someone doesn’t get the rule – or only partly gets it

so here you could have in effect the making of a game in a game –

and the result might could be the same –

but making a  game – is not playing the game –

it is trying to work it out

234. ‘Would it not be possible for us, however, to calculate as we

actually do (all agreeing, and so on), and still at every step to have a

feeling of being guided by the rules as by a spell, feeling astonishment

at the fact that we agreed? (We might give thanks to the Deity for our

agreement.)’

you can have any feeling you like – and rabbit on about deities if you wish –

the point is that a propositional game is a rule-governed exercise –

if you what to play the game – you play in accordance with the rule

if you don’t want to play – don’t

235.‘This merely shews what goes to make up what we call

"obeying a rule" in everyday life.’

obeying a rule in ‘everyday life’ – is following a rule –

it is to play the game that the rule represents

playing the game – is acting in accordance with rule

it is not questioning the rule – is executing it –

you can do this without ‘astonishment’ – or sacrifices to the gods –

it is straightforward and it is plain

236. ‘Calculating prodigies who get the right answer but cannot say

how. Are we to say that they do not calculate? (A family of cases.)’

I would say no –

if what is at play is a calculation game –

then the game can only be played as a calculation –

if someone gets the right answer but cannot say how –

this is just to say –

they cannot explain the calculation they have performed –

nothing exceptional here –

a good deal of what we do – or indeed of what happens to us –

we can’t explain

237. ‘Imagine someone using a line as a rule in the following

way: he holds a pair of compasses, and carries one of its points along

the line that is the 'rule', while the other one draws the line that follows

the rule. And while he moves along the ruling line he alters the opening

of the compasses, apparently with great precision, looking at the

rule the whole time as if it determined what he did. And watching him

we see no kind of regularity in this opening and shutting of the

compasses. We cannot learn his way of following the line from it. Here

perhaps one really would say: "The original seems to intimate to him

which way he is to go. But it is not a rule."’

what following the rule amounts to must be stated – and stated clearly –

otherwise there is no rule-governed propositional action – no rule-governed play – no game

and a rule does not ‘intimate’ – it determines

Wittgenstein says someone is using a line as a rule –

but he does not tell us what following this rule amounts to – what the rule determines

so in effect there is no rule – no genuine rule – just the pretence of one

this is a bit of a set up –

Wittgenstein has left a hole in this account – I think with the intention of confusing 

either that or –

he really doesn’t understand rule-governed propositional action –

and thus doesn’t understand the propositional game and how it works

238. ‘The rule can only seem to me to produce all its consequences

in advance if I draw them as a matter of course. As much as it is a matter

of course for me to call this colour "blue". (Criteria for the fact that

something is 'a matter of course' for me.)’

drawing the consequences of a rule – is a logical exercise –

any proposal as to the consequences of a rule –

is a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

what goes as ‘a matter of course’ – is what is not put to question – not put to doubt – and is not regarded as uncertain

239. ‘How is he to know what colour he is to pick out when he

hears "red"?—Quite simple: he is to take the colour whose image

occurs to him when he hears the word.—But how is he to know which

colour it is 'whose image occurs to him'? Is a further criterion needed

for that? (There is indeed such a procedure as choosing the colour

which occurs to one when one hears the word "....")

" 'Red' means the colour that occurs to me when I hear the word

‘red' "—would be a definition. Not an explanation of what it is to use

a word as a name.’

the proposal ‘red’ – is put to him –

‘how is he to know what colour he is to pick out when he hears the word ‘red’?’

the proposal ‘red’ is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if he acts in response to the proposal – i.e. – he chooses a colour sample –

his action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

if an image occurs to him – that image is open to question

what is it to use a word as a name?

it is to identify one proposal – with another –

what is it to identify one proposal with another – i.e. the word ‘red’ with the colour sample?

it is to put that one proposal can be substituted for the other

it is to say that the word proposal can be substituted for the colour sample proposal –

and visa versa

it is a proposal for propositional substitution –

and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

240. ‘Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over

the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People don't

come to blows over it, for example. That is part of the framework

on which the working of our language is based (for example, in giving

descriptions)’

there is an empirical question here –

does Wittgenstein know that there have been no disputes among mathematicians over whether a rule has been obeyed or not?

it’s a big claim if we are talking about the history of mathematics

and have mathematicians never come to blows over their work?

again – who’s to know?

really all we have from Wittgenstein here is rhetoric

what this rhetoric is proffering is an extreme epistemological conservatism –

the idea that mathematics is not open to question – open to doubt – and is not uncertain

mathematics did not begin and end with Pythagoras – or anyone else for that matter –

it is an evolving propositional activity

and propositional evolution in any propositional context can only occur as a result of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

mathematics is a propositional game – a rule-governed propositional action

mathematicians design and play mathematical games –

this – if you like is the face of mathematics

however as the history of mathematic clearly demonstrates – the propositional concepts on which such games are based – are concepts which are grounded in uncertainty – and have been developed in uncertainty

yes – part of the framework on which the working of our language is based – is the framework of propositional games – be they mathematical or otherwise –

and when we play these games – we play in accordance with the rules proposed –

and in the playing of these games we do not question the rules in use –

if we do this we are not playing the game – we are involved in a critical logical activity

however the ground or basis of any game is to be found in propositional uncertainty

that is to say the proposals – the propositions – the concepts – on which the rules are based – have been and are the subject of critical analysis

the concepts of mathematics – are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain

‘giving descriptions’ –

any description given – is a proposal put – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is

true and what is false?"—It is what human beings say that is true and

false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in

opinions but in form of life.’

a proposal – a proposition is true – if it is assented to –

a proposal – a proposition is false – if dissented from –

any proposal of assent or dissent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

where human beings agree – they affirm the proposal / proposition put

an opinion is a proposal –

a ‘form of life’?

this is really to just ‘dress up’ the agreement – for whatever reason

this ‘form of life’ – is itself a proposal

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

242. ‘If language is to be a means of communication there must

be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may

sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.—

It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to

obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring"

is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.’

there is agreement in definitions and judgments – and there is disagreement –

language is this – agreement and disagreement

what agreement and disagreement point to is the propositional reality of question – of doubt – and of propositional uncertainty

‘for language to be a means of communication there must be’ –

question doubt and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

you will have ‘a certain constancy in results of measuring’ – as measurement is a rule-governed propositional game 

243. ‘A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders,

obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and

answer it. We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in

monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves.

—An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might

succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable

him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them

making resolutions and decisions.)

But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write

down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings,

moods, and the rest—for his private use?——Well, can't we do so

in our ordinary language?—But that is not what I mean. The

individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be

known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.

So another person cannot understand the language.’

‘(This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)’

you can hear resolutions and decisions – and you can make predications regarding actions –

however any prediction will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.’

‘what can only be known to the person speaking’ – his ‘immediate private sensations’

if that is the case – it will be the case – whatever language he uses

however what is known to the person speaking – is what he proposes – to himself –

and what he proposes to himself – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain 

‘his immediate private sensations’ –  are proposals – whether put to word or not –

and these proposals are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

when I hear someone speaking in a language I understand – if I react logically –

what they say raises questions – doubts – and uncertainties

when I hear someone speaking in a language I don’t understand –

I am left with questions – doubts – and uncertainties

244. ‘How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn't seem to

be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day, and

give them names? But how is the connexion between the name and

the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a

human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?—of the

word "pain" for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected

with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in

their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk

to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach

the child new pain-behaviour.

So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"—

On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does

not describe it.’

‘But how is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?—of the word "pain" for example.’

if I make a statement about sensations – I propose sensations

the meaning of the names of sensations?

the names of sensations are proposals –

how we learn the names – is open to question

the word ‘pain’ for example – how  do we learn the word ‘pain’?

again there will be any number of proposals put in answer to this question

and any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.’

as Wittgenstein says – this is one possibility

‘So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"—On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.’

perhaps –

the logical point here is that ‘pain’ – in any and all of its uses – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

                                                                                                                                        245. ‘For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get

between pain and its expression?’

the expression of pain – in whatever form that it takes – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

246. ‘In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can

know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise

it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using

the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to

use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.—

Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it

myself I—It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I

know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that

I am in pain?

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my

behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.

The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they

doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.’

‘In what sense are my sensations private?’

any proposal I put – be it what I think or how I feel – is private – if I don’t make it public – if I don’t in some manner express it

‘Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise

it’

my knowledge is what I propose – and any proposition I put – whether to myself or to others – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

and any description that I give of how I feel – what sensation I am experiencing – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

i.e. – am I in pain – if what I experience is diagnosed as a phantom pain?

in such a case is the proposal / description ‘I am in pain’ – without question – without doubt – and certain?

and in standard cases – is the description  ‘I am in pain’ – the only – or even the best description – that can be offered?

‘What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?’

a doctor or a medical scientists will give different account of what I am experiencing

and indeed – you go to the doctor for a different account – a different description

‘I am in pain’ – as with any proposal – will serve certain purposes – but as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and from a logical point of view –

uncertain

‘Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.’

‘I have them’ – when I propose them – to myself or to others –

and if I put my proposals / descriptions to question – to doubt – and explore their uncertainty – I might well learn something

‘The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.’

you can pretend to be certain about what you propose – the descriptions you use –

be they proposals / descriptions of yourself – or of others –

and you will maintain this certainty – if you don’t put your proposals / descriptions to question – to doubt –

if you don’t explore their uncertainty

however in so doing you make a stand for pretence and ignorance

247. ‘"Only you can know if you had that intention." One might

tell someone this when one was explaining the meaning of the word

"intention" to him. For then it means: that is how we use it.

(And here "know" means that the expression of uncertainty is

senseless.)’

‘this is how we use it’ – says who?

the point is the word ‘intention’ – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

how the term is in fact used – is an empirical issue – not a matter that can be determined by fiat

Wittgenstein I suspect realises that his argument for certainty is logically hopeless –

however certainty is what he wants – what he thinks he needs –

so he is going to try and ram it though

and here he resorts to nothing more than a rhetorical slap down of uncertainty

perhaps like ‘pain’ – he thinks only he knows his certainty –

I think he has fallen into logical and self – delusion

and I would argue that epistemologically he has not advanced one iota from the central argument he put in the Tractatus – the argument for certainty

and that all he is doing in the Investigations is giving this argument of the Tractatus a different form – repackaging it – giving it a different spin

in the introduction to the Investigations Wittgenstein says he considered publishing the Tractatus and the Investigations together as a single volume – and there is a logic to this

two faces of the one coin

248. ‘The proposition "Sensations are private" is comparable to:

"One plays patience by oneself".’

the playing of patience is a public action – if it is played with cards – and is not just played as a mind game

sensations – may have a public manifestation –

or they may not

249. ‘Are we perhaps over-hasty in our assumption that the smile

of an unweaned infant is not a pretence?—And on what experience is

our assumption based?

(Lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other

one.)’

any smile – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

can the unweaned infant deceive?

perhaps – but to argue this one way or the other would involve complex scientific  argument –

perhaps in this case it makes more sense to just see the smile as a smile – and enjoy it

is lying a propositional game – that is a rule-governed propositional action?

well I suppose the rule involved would be to ‘not tell the truth’ – with idea of doing so convincingly’?

do we learn this propositional game – or does it come as natural as telling the truth?

people lie – but I wonder if in so doing they regard themselves as playing a game?

and if you don’t think you are playing a game – are you playing a game?

the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

250. ‘Why can't a dog simulate pain? Is he too honest? Could one

teach a dog to simulate pain? Perhaps it is possible to teach him to

howl on particular occasions as if he were in pain, even when he is

not. But the surroundings which are necessary for this behaviour to be

real simulation are missing.’

any observed behaviour – be it of man – of the animal world – of nature –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

251. ‘What does it mean when we say: "I can't imagine the opposite

of this" or "What would it be like, if it were otherwise?"—For example,

when someone has said that my images are private, or that only I

myself can know whether I am feeling pain, and similar things.

Of course, here "I can't imagine the opposite" doesn't mean: my

powers of imagination are unequal to the task. These words are a

defence against something whose form makes it look like an empirical

proposition, but which is really a grammatical one.

But why do we say: "I can't imagine the opposite"? Why not:

"I can't imagine the thing itself"?

Example: "Every rod has a length." That means something like: we

call something (or this} "the length of a rod"—but nothing "the

length of a sphere." Now can I imagine 'every rod having a length'?

Well, I simply imagine a rod. Only this picture, in connexion with this

proposition, has a quite different role from one used in connexion with

the proposition "This table has the same length as the one over there".

For here I understand what it means to have a picture of the opposite

(nor need it be a mental picture).

But the picture attaching to the grammatical proposition could only

shew, say, what is called "the length of a rod". And what should the

opposite picture be?

((Remark about the negation of an a priori proposition.))’

‘What does it mean when we say: "I can't imagine the opposite of this" or "What would it be like, if it were otherwise?"’

here we have a propositional game – the opposite game – and the question is where is this game applied or where can it be applied?

and here we are talking about propositional practice

i.e. we say the opposite of hot is cold – the opposite of good is bad

where  the opposite of something can’t be imagined – it is not a failure of imagination

as Wittgenstein notes here the issue is better described as grammatical –

which is to say it is an issue of propositional practice

‘But why do we say: "I can't imagine the opposite"? Why not: "I can't imagine the thing itself"?’

the ‘thing in itself’ – is best known in metaphysical contexts

where the ‘thing in itself’ is proposed – it is proposed as a logical notion – a logical construction – or perhaps deconstruction

‘Every rod has a length’ –

is to apply a measurement game to the proposal of a rod –

it is to apply a propositional game to a proposal –

as to the length of a sphere – if we are to apply a measurement game to the sphere proposal –

we play a different game –

a different proposition – a different game

‘Now can I imagine 'every rod having a length'?’ –

is to put that  –

the measurement game of length – can be applied to any proposed rod

‘This table has the same length as the one over there’ –

is a calculation game

‘For here I understand what it means to have a picture of the opposite’?

I don’t see this –

you measure two things – you get a result –

what is the opposite of this result?

do we have a propositional game for the opposite of a calculation?

no calculation?

it is a question of how you define ‘opposite’ – how the term is used – or how you want to use it –

‘((Remark about the negation of an a priori proposition.))’

the negation of an a priori proposition?

a propositions is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

if you are putting that a so called ‘a priori proposition’ is not open to question – not open to doubt – and not uncertain –

then you are not dealing with a proposition – you are dealing with a prejudice

so – the negation of an a priori statement – is what it is not –

and what it is not is  – a proposition

252. "This body has extension." To this we might reply: "Nonsense!"

—but are inclined to reply "Of course!"—Why is this?’

for certain uses of the term ‘body’ – ‘extension’ functions as a synonym – i.e. – the body as an extended thing

and ‘extension’ can function as a formal characterization of anything termed a ‘body’

i.e. – if x is extended – x is a body

here we are talking about different propositional uses – and different propositional contexts

253. "Another person can't have my pains."—Which are my

pains? What counts as a criterion of identity here? Consider what

makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of "two

exactly the same", for example, to say "This chair is not the one you

saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it".

In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is

also possible for us both to have the same pain. (And it would also be

imaginable for two people to feel pain in the same—not just the

corresponding—place. That might be the case with Siamese twins,

for instance.)

I have seen a person in a discussion on this subject strike himself

on the breast and say: "But surely another person can't have THIS

pain!"—The answer to this is that one does not define a criterion of

identity by emphatic stressing of the word "this". Rather, what the

emphasis does is to suggest the case in which we are conversant with

such a criterion of identity, but have to be reminded of it.’

‘"Another person can't have my pains."—Which are my pains? What counts as a criterion of identity here?’

I knew a girl who had an operation on her leg which caused her acute pain – this operation  occurred in Australia – and her twin brother in Israel who did not know of the operation – rang their mother not long after the surgery – to ask if there was anything wrong with his sister’s leg – for he had experienced acute pain in his leg – and when his mother asked where in his leg he had the pain – he described exactly the same place on in his leg as on his sister’s leg

the brother experienced pain – his pain?  –

but did he surmise that it was his sister’s pain?

his pain and her pain?

or just her pain?

any proposed criterion of identity – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

identity is uncertain

NB

our notion of identity comes from rule-governed propositional games

and in these games identity is substitution –

the identity game is the game of substitution – rule-governed substitution

i.e. – where x = y – the rule is x can be substituted for y – y can be substituted for x

outside of the game context – outside of  the rule-governed propositional context –

identity is a proposal –  a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

254. ‘The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance)

is another typical expedient in philosophy. As if we were talking about

shades of meaning and all that were in question were to find words

to hit on the correct nuance. That is in question in philosophy only

where we have to give a psychologically exact account of the temptation

to use a particular kind of expression. What we 'are tempted to say'

in such a case is, of course, not philosophy; but it is its raw material.

Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the

objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of

mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.’

‘The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance) is another typical expedient in philosophy. As if we were talking about shades of meaning and all that were in question were to find words to hit on the correct nuance.’

the substitution of ‘identical’ for ‘same’ – may well be seen as an appropriate substitution – in certain propositional contexts

the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

nothing wrong with trying to hit on the right nuance

what we are tempted to say – is what we might propose –

in logic temptation is good – for it readily leads to question – to doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

what a mathematician proposes about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts

as with any proposal – is open to question

and I see no reason at all to say that such a proposal cannot be viewed as a proposal in the philosophy of mathematics

Wittgenstein’s idea that such a proposal is something for philosophical treatment –

is only to say that such a proposal can be critically evaluated

from a logical point of view – any proposal from any quarter – is open to question –open to doubt – and uncertain

the tags ‘philosophical’ – ‘mathematical’ – whatever – have no logical relevance –

they are just useful designations in a division of logical labour

255. ‘The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment

of an illness.’

a question is not an illness –

and anyone who thinks it is – is philosophically sick

256. ‘Now, what about the language which describes my inner

experiences and which only I myself can understand? How do I use

words to stand for my sensations?—As we ordinarily do? Then are my

words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensation?

In that case my language is not a 'private' one. Someone else might

understand it as well as I.—But suppose I didn't have any natural

expression for the sensation, but only had the sensation? And now

I simply associate names with sensations and use these names in

descriptions.— ’

‘Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand?

if it is ‘language’ only I understand – then it will be proposal – that is of no use to anyone else

‘Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensation?

In that case my language is not a 'private' one.’

correct

‘But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the sensation, but only had the sensation? And now I simply associate names with sensations and use these names in

descriptions.— ’

yes – you could do this –

but are they names only you understand?

and if so – what is the point?

why?

257. ‘"What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward

signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible

 to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'."—Well, let's

assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the sensation!

—But then, of course, he couldn't make himself understood when he

used the word.—So does he understand the name, without being able

to explain its meaning to anyone?—But what does it mean to say

that he has 'named his pain'?—How has he done this naming of pain?!

And whatever he did, what was its purpose?—When one says "He

gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a great deal of stage-

setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to

make sense. And when we speak of someone's having given a name

to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the

word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed.’

‘"What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)?’

‘outward signs of pain’ – be they – groans – grimaces – statements – are proposals –

in the absence of such proposals – of any such proposal at all – we would not know that human beings experience pain

pain would be unknown

‘When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the

existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed.’

yes – to name – whether anyone else understands the name of not – you need to have the facility of naming – so you need to have an understanding of how language works

you are involved in language – whether you communicate or not

and if your objective is to not to be understood –

it might make more sense to just be silent

this argument about private languages – doesn’t make any sense to me

does anyone actually hold the view that language – language facility – language capacity is private?

sure you could have a private language – in the sense of making up your own words – your own structures – but if it was truly private – what would be the point?

Wittgenstein argues successfully against the notion of a private language – but is it just a straw man argument?

we will see

258. ‘Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary

about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate

it with the sign "S" and write this sign in a calendar for every day

on which I have the sensation.——I will remark first of all that a

definition of the sign cannot be formulated.—But still I can give myself

a kind of ostensive definition.—How? Can I point to the sensation?

Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and

at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation—and so,

as it were, point to it inwardly.—But what is this ceremony for?

for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish

the meaning of a sign.—Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating

of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion

between the sign and the sensation.—But "I impress it on myself"

can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the

connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion

of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right

to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about

'right'.’

you mark the occurrence of the sensation with the sign ‘S’ – with the proposal ‘S’ –

which is to say you mark the proposal of the sensation – with proposal ‘S’ –

the meaning of the sign is the occurrence of the sensation –

you don’t need to ‘impress upon yourself’ the  connection between the sensation and the sign –

you simply propose the relation –

and the idea is  – you remember the relation – in the future –

no – you have no criterion of correctness – because there is none –

what you have here is a  series of proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘whatever is going to seem right to me is right’ –

well perhaps in practice – that is how it goes –

nevertheless – there is no certainty here – and therefore no point in looking for it

no – we don’t talk about ‘right’ here –

rather we simply operate with our proposals –

and with the understanding – that they are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

259. ‘Are the rules of the private language impressions of rules?—

The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the impression

of a balance.’

a rule is a rule is a rule – private or public – is just a question of proposed propositional context

impressions are proposals –

we don’t ‘weigh’ proposals – we critically evaluate them

proposals of any description – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

impressions are uncertain

260. ‘"Well, I believe that this is the sensation S again."—Perhaps

you believe that you believe it!

Then did the man who made the entry in the calendar make a note

of nothing whatever?—Don't consider it a matter of course that a person

is making a note of something when he makes a mark—say in a

calendar. For a note has a function, and this "S" so far has none.

(One can talk to oneself.—If a person speaks when no one else is

present, does that mean he is speaking to himself?)’

"Well, I believe that this is the sensation S again."—Perhaps you believe that you believe it!

‘believe that you believe’ ? – in any case you have put a proposal –

 ‘Then did the man who made the entry in the calendar make a note of nothing whatever?’

perhaps –

the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘For a note has a function, and this "S" so far has none.’ –

whether or not this ‘S’ has a function – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘(One can talk to oneself.—If a person speaks when no one else is present, does that mean he is speaking to himself?)’

what it means is –  proposals are put

261. ‘What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation?

For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible

to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification

which everybody understands.—And it would not help either to

say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S", he has

something—and that is all that can be said. "Has" and "something"

also belong to our common language.—So in the end when one is

doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to

emit an inarticulate sound.—But such a sound is an expression only

as it occurs in a particular language-game, which should now be

described.’

‘What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation?’

‘S’ – here is a proposal – and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

most likely the point of it is that ‘S’ is to function as an abbreviation for ‘sensation’

in any case if ‘S’ is to function – why it is proposed would have to be explained to anyone involved in its use –

and any reason given – would be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

262. ‘It might be said: if you have given yourself a private definition

of a word, then you must inwardly undertake to use the word in such-

and-such a way. And how do you undertake that? Is it to be assumed

that you invent the technique of using the word; or that you found it

ready-made?’

invented or ready-made?

in general I would go with ready-made

however there is propositional invention –

and where there is propositional invention – it emerges out of  question – out of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

there are plenty examples of this –

symbolic logic – is one that comes to mind

263. ‘"But I can (inwardly) undertake to call THIS 'pain' in the

future."—"But is it certain that you have undertaken it? Are you sure

that it was enough for this purpose to concentrate your attention on

your feeling?"—A queer question.— ’

calling THIS pain – is to put a proposal

inwardly – outwardly – is logically irrelevant – it is the proposal – regardless of how it is further described that is – or should be – the focus

as to the future – well you can propose the future – but as with any proposal – such a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

you can concentrate on whatever you like – again logically irrelevant – the point is the proposal put

‘a queer question’?

any question is valid

264. ‘"Once you know what the word stands for, you understand it,

you know its whole use."’

what a word stands for – and your understanding of it – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

to claim that you can know its whole use – as in every actual and possible use –

is plainly ridiculous –

what you will know is – how you use the word – and you will know other uses – uses that that have been put to you

and this ‘knowing’ – this ‘knowledge’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

265. ‘Let us imagine a table (something like a dictionary) that

exists only in our imagination. A dictionary can be used to justify

the translation of a word X by a word Y. But are we also to call it

a justification if such a table is to be looked up only in the imagination?—

"Well, yes; then it is a subjective justification."—But justification

consists in appealing to something independent.—"But surely I can

appeal from one memory to another. For example, I don't know if I

have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check

it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked. Isn't it the same

here?"—No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is

actually correct. If the mental image of the time-table could not itself

be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the

first memory? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the

morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true.)

Looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table

than the image of the result of an imagined experiment is the result of

an experiment.’

‘Looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table than the image of the result of an imagined experiment is the result of an experiment.’

here we have two different propositional contexts – a private / subjective context – and a public / objective context

in the private / subjective context – the justification is different to that in the public / objective context

are we to say the public / objective context justification – is preferable – superior?

well – really only if you decide it is superior – as it were beforehand

even when faced with a public / objective justification that contradicts my private / subjective / justification I might still hold  the public / objective justification – is wrong – and that my private / subjective justification – is correct –

so what makes the public / objective justification superior?

well – it can be checked by others – that is true –

but what if the experiment is wrong?

or you think the others observing it – misinterpret it?

and really how do you establish its correctness beyond any doubt?

I don’t think you can –

any aspect of an experiment is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

interpretations are open to question

the same point of course applies to any private / subjective claim

any proposed ‘justification’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

so how do you decide which form of justification to endorse and go with?

the point is – you do decide –

and any decision you make here will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

I suspect we use both kinds of justification – and we use one and then the other – depending on the circumstances that we face –

and as for ‘justification’ itself

if you are looking for ‘final’ justification – for any methodology adopted  – for any decision taken  – for any action performed  – you are looking in vain

logically speaking there is no justification

justification is best seen as a rhetorical ploy – at the service of pragmatism

decisions have to be made – and we have to get on with it – and we tell ourselves – and maybe others that we have ‘got it right’ –

justification as a rhetorical confidence booster

there is no problem here – it is what we do

however if we regard our decisions and our actions rationally –

we see that they are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and we see that any rhetoric accompanying our decisions and actions is no more than the attempt to persuade ourselves or others to take the path decided on

266. ‘I can look at the clock to see what time it is: but I can also

look at the dial of a clock in order to guess what time it is; or for the

same purpose move the hand of a clock till its position strikes me as

right. So the look of a clock may serve to determine the time in more

than one way. (Looking at the clock in imagination.)’

the clock is a propositional construct – the idea of which is to determine time –

it’s a prop – and perhaps ‘prop’ – is the true meaning of ‘proposition’ –

in any case – as with any proposition – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and yes – ‘the look of the clock may serve to determine the time in more than one way’

further – any determination – of anything – is open to question

we use whatever proposition – or whatever propositional construct we regard as useful –

knowing full well that any use of any proposition – is open to question

267. ‘Suppose I wanted to justify the choice of dimensions for a

bridge which I imagine to be building, by making loading tests on

the material of the bridge in my imagination. This would, of course,

be to imagine what is called justifying the choice of dimensions for a

bridge. But should we also call it justifying an imagined choice of

dimensions?’

justification – doesn’t come into it –

justification is not logically relevant –

justification is rhetoric

what is relevant is the proposal – the proposition put –

where it ‘comes from’ – i.e. – the ‘imagination’ – or wherever – is just a back story – propositional packaging – a side issue –

again not logically relevant to the critical assessment of the proposal

what is logically relevant – what is to the point – is that the proposal – the proposition – is put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored

 268. ‘Why can't my right hand give my left hand money?—My

right hand can put it into my left hand. My right hand can write a

deed of gift and my left hand a receipt.—But the further practical

consequences would not be those of a gift. When the left hand has

taken the money from the right, etc., we shall ask: "Well, and what of

it?" And the same could be asked if a person had given himself a

private definition of a word; I mean, if he has said the word to himself

and at the same time has directed his attention to a sensation.’

‘Why can't my right hand give my left hand money?’

well in a comedy show this might just happen – might just work –

which is say – whether or not a proposal works well – or works at all – will depend on the propositional context in which it is put

 ‘And the same could be asked if a person had given himself a private definition of a word; I mean, if he has said the word to himself and at the same time has directed his attention to a sensation.’

we give ourselves definitions all the time –

and any definition – private – or public – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

269. ‘‘Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man's

behaviour for the fact that he does not understand a word: that it

means nothing to him, that he can do nothing with it. And criteria

for his 'thinking he understands', attaching some meaning to the word,

but not the right one. And, lastly, criteria for his understanding the

word right. In the second case one might speak of a subjective

understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but

which I 'appear to understand' might be called a "private language"’

sounds that no else understands – are just that –

and that I might appear to understand them – does not I think make them a ‘language’ – ‘private’ or otherwise

they are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

not all proposal is language –

but all language is proposal

270. ‘Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign "S" in my

diary. I discover that whenever I have a particular sensation a mano-

meter shews that my blood-pressure rises. So I shall be able to say

that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is

a useful result. And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have

recognized the sensation right or not. Let us suppose I regularly

identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews

that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. (We as it were

turned a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part

of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the

mechanism at all.)

And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here?

Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,—

And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time?

Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?’

in this example the sign ‘S’ begins as a mark for a particular sensation –

in its use it is noticed that it also marks a rise in blood pressure

the sign ‘S’ as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any propositional use – is open to question

‘Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least’

there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ here –

any ‘identification’ – is open to question –

‘right’ and ‘wrong’ – have no logical function – their function is rhetorical

there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in propositional use –

we say a propositional action is ‘right’ – in order to persuade ourselves or others to adopt it –

and we say a propositional action is ‘wrong’ – in order to persuade ourselves or others not proceed with it

‘(We as it were turned a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part

of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the mechanism at all.)’

what we have here is a useless knob –

and it is only useless because we have now given  the sign ‘S’ a different function – to the one it was initially proposed for – or because we have given up on the initial use

‘And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here?’

there could be any number of reasons – it is not the point –

the point is the proposal – is put –

the proposal that ‘S’ marks the occurrence of a particular sensation  

this proposal – as Wittgenstein’s discussion here has illustrated  – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

271. ‘"Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the

word 'pain' meant—so that he constantly called different things by

that name—but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the

usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain"—in short he uses it as we

all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though

nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.’

‘Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ meant —so that he constantly called different things by that name— but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain’

what is relevant  here is proposal –  and in this case the proposal of the word ‘pain’ –

and the logical point is that however this word / proposal  is used –  and in whatever context this word / proposal is put –

it is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘in short he uses it as we all do’ –

yes – in various ways – in various contexts

‘Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.’

you can propose that language use is determined by some ‘mechanism’ –

this ‘mechanism’ proposal – might suit a certain view of how language works –

all to the good –

however this proposal has the same logical status as any other proposal –

it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

272. ‘The essential thing about private experience is really not that

each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows

whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption

would thus be possible—though unverifiable—that one section of

mankind had one sensation of red and another section another.’

the proposal of private / subjective experience – and all that goes with it – is logically speaking – no different than the proposal of public / objective experience – and all that goes with it –

these proposals and propositional structures are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another.’ – is – as with any proposal – open to question –

we critically explore the proposals and propositional constructions that we put and that are put to us–

that is the rational life

273. ‘What am I to say about the word "red"?—that it means something

 'confronting us all' and that everyone should really have another

word, besides this one, to mean his own sensation of red? Or is it like

this: the word "red" means something known to everyone; and in

addition, for each person, it means something known only to him? (Or

perhaps rather: it refers to something known only to him.)’

‘‘What am I to say about the word "red"?’ –

you can say whatever you like about the word ‘red’ –

whatever you say – whatever you propose – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

274. ‘Of course, saying that the word "red" "refers to" instead of "means"

something private does not help us in the least to grasp its function;

but it is the more psychologically apt expression for a particular

experience in doing philosophy. It is as if when I uttered the word I

cast a sidelong glance at the private sensation, as it were in order

to say to myself: I know all right what I mean by it.’

‘saying that the word "red" "refers to" instead of "means"

something private does not help us in the least to grasp its function’ –

is a matter open to question –

perhaps in certain contexts ‘refers to’ is a better fit?

‘a sidelong glance at a private sensation’ –

is proposing an explanation of the subject proposal –

an explanation – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

275. ‘Look at the blue of the sky and say to yourself "How blue

the sky is!"—When you do it spontaneously—without philosophical

intentions—the idea never crosses your mind that this impression of

colour belongs only to you. And you have no hesitation in exclaiming

that to someone else. And if you point at anything as you say the

words you point at the sky. I am saying: you have not the feeling of

pointing-into-yourself, which often accompanies 'naming the sensation'

when one is thinking about 'private language'. Nor do you think

that really you ought not to point to the colour with your hand, but

with your attention. (Consider what it means "to point to something’

with the attention".)’

proposing can be a public act  or a private act –

‘Look at the blue of the sky and say to yourself "How blue the sky is!"’

this is a private act –

if you verbally express it – beyond yourself – it is a public act

‘the idea never crosses your mind that this impression of colour belongs only to you.’

and this is because you know the proposal can be put publicly

the only private proposal is one that is not given public expression

there is nothing in this private / public issue – but a bit of common sense

the logic of it is that the proposal – whether privately put – or put publicly – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

as to ‘private language’ – I think the notion should be dropped altogether – that is if anyone actually holds to it

language is a form of propositional action

and we have propositional action in private and public contexts – private and public theatres

‘(Consider what it means "to point to something’ with the attention".)’

well I think it is a metaphorical expression –

which basically means ‘paying attention to’

and how you might further explain ‘paying attention to’ – I couldn’t say

however I am sure that there are any number of theories / proposals that could be put to further explain this proposal –

and any such theory / proposal is open to question

276. ‘But don't we at least mean something quite definite when we

look at a colour and name our colour-impression? It is as if we

detached the colour-impression from the object, like a membrane.

(This ought to arouse our suspicions.)’

‘But don't we at least mean something quite definite when we look at a colour and name our colour-impression?’

whether people mean something quite definite – or not – it is really an empirical question

in any case – the logical issue is that the proposal of colour – and the naming proposal – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘It is as if we detached the colour-impression from the object, like a membrane’

I don’t know about that –

this ‘detaching’ – is an analytical proposal – a proposal open to question –

‘(This ought to arouse our suspicions.)’

our suspicions should always be aroused

277. ‘But how is [it] even possible for us to be tempted to think that

we use a word to mean at one time the colour known to everyone—and

at another the 'visual impression' which I am getting now"? How can

there be so much as a temptation here?——I don't turn the same kind

of attention on the colour in the two cases. When I mean the colour

impression that (as I should like to say) belongs to me alone I immerse

myself in the colour—rather like when I 'cannot get my fill of a

colour'. Hence it is easier to produce this experience when one is

looking at a bright colour, or at an impressive colour-scheme.’

‘But how is [it] even possible for us to be tempted to think that we use a word to mean at one time the colour known to everyone—and at another the 'visual impression' which I am getting now"? How can there be so much as a temptation here?’

‘the colour known to everyone’ and ‘the ‘visual impression’ which I am getting now’

are two proposals – put in relation to the initial proposal

if it is a temptation – it is a logical temptation –

it is a case of putting the original proposal to question – to doubt – and exploring its uncertainty –

and coming up with different interpretations

278. ‘"I know how the colour green looks to me"—surely that makes

sense!—Certainly: what use of the proposition are you thinking of?’

well you can imagine that this statement could be made in response to someone else saying something like –

‘you obviously don’t know the colour green this colour is blue – not green’

so the statement ‘I know how the colour green looks to me’— could be a response to this proposal

now you might say that all the respondent really had to say was ‘I know the colour green’ – and that that should suffice

I would suggest – and it looks like Wittgenstein might agree – for he put ‘me’ in italics –

which is to say that the ‘to me’ – is really a form of emphasis

it is as if the respondent by using the ‘to me’ – is having a red hot go at persuasion –

and so – ‘to me’ – is best understood as rhetoric

and so therefore –

the use of the proposition is rhetorical

279. ‘Imagine someone saying: "But I know how tall I am!" and

laying his hand on top of his head to prove it.’

a rhetorical gesture

280. ‘Someone paints a picture in order to shew how he imagines

a theatre scene. And now I say: "This picture has a double function:

it informs others, as pictures or words inform——but for the one

who gives the information it is a representation (or piece of

information?) of another kind: for him it is the picture of his image,

as it can't be for anyone else. To him his private impression of the picture

means what he has imagined, in a sense in which the picture cannot

mean this to others."—And what right have I to speak in this

second case of a representation or piece of information—if these

words were rightly used in the first case?’

a picture is a proposal –

and as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – open to interpretation – and is – logically speaking – uncertain –

that it is interpreted as ‘a representation (or piece of information?) of another kind:’ –

is fair enough –

that it is interpreted as what the painter ‘has imagined’ – is likewise quite valid

these interpretations – as with the picture / proposal  they are interpretations of – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘And what right have I to speak in this second case of a representation or piece of information—if these words were rightly used in the first case?’

it is not a question of ‘right’ –

it is a matter of logic – of recognising – of understanding –  the logic of a proposal

281. "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain,

for example, without pain-behaviour?"—It comes to this: only of a living

human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being

can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious

or unconscious.’

what it comes to is – without pain-behaviour – without propositional action – without proposal – there is no knowledge

282.‘"But in a fairy tale the pot too can see and hear!" (Certainly;

but it can also talk.)

"But the fairy tale only invents what is not the case: it does not talk

nonsense"—It is not as simple as that. Is it false or nonsensical to say

that a pot talks? Have we a clear picture of the circumstances in which

we should say of a pot that it talked? (Even a nonsense-poem is not

nonsense in the same way as the babbling of a child.)

We do indeed say of an inanimate thing that it is in pain: when playing

with dolls for example. But this use of the concept of pain is a

secondary one. Imagine a case in which people ascribed pain only to

inanimate things; pitied only dolls! (When children play at trains their

game is connected with their knowledge of trains. It would nevertheless

be possible for the children of a tribe unacquainted with trains to

learn this game from others, and to play it without knowing that it was

copied from anything. One might say that the game did not make

the same sense to them as to us.)’

that the pot talked – is a proposal –

the question is where to place this proposal – in what propositional context does it function?

as to ascribing pain to dolls – this – like the pot that talked – is just engaging in fantasy

‘One might say that the game did not make the same sense to them as to us.’

a game is a rule propositional activity – that is all that is relevant logically

as to the so called ‘sense’ of a game – that could mean anything – to anyone

283. ‘What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things,

can feel?

Is it that my education has led me to it by drawing my attention

to feelings in myself, and now I transfer the idea to objects outside

myself? That I recognize that there is something there (in me) which

I can call "pain" without getting into conflict with the way other people

use this word?—I do not transfer my idea to stones, plants, etc.

Couldn't I imagine having frightful pains and turning to stone while

they lasted? Well, how do I know, if I shut my eyes, whether I have

not turned into a stone? And if that has happened, in what sense will

the stone have the pains? In what sense will they be ascribable to the

stone? And why need the pain have a bearer at all here?!

And can one say of the stone that it has a soul and that is what has

the pain? What has a soul, or pain, to do with a stone?

Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has

pains.

For one has to say it of a body, or, if you like of a soul which some

body has. And how can a body have a soul?’

‘What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel?

we get the idea from what living beings propose

feelings in myself – are proposals I put – to myself – or to others –

proposals I expect others to recognize – if not understand

‘That I recognize that there is something there (in me) which I can call "pain" without getting into conflict with the way other people use this word?’

I propose ‘pain’ – when I propose it –

you will only get into conflict with the way others use this word – if you put their use to question

‘I do not transfer my idea to stones, plants etc.’

I have heard of people who argue that plants experience pain –

stones are holding out – as far as I know

once you get to this level of consideration  – what are dealing with is metaphysics –

the logical point is that any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘Couldn't I imagine having frightful pains and turning to stone while they lasted?’

you can imagine whatever you like – that is the beauty of imagination

‘Well, how do I know, if I shut my eyes, whether I have not turned into a stone?’

good question –

if you are serious here – there are arguments both ways –

the proposal – is open to question –

and any proposals that come out of any propositional argument here –

are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains.’

what behaving like a human being amounts to – is not straight forward – it is open to question –

and likewise – who or what has pains – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

‘For one has to say it of a body, or, if you like of a soul which some body has. And how can a body have a soul?’

look – you can drop all this propositional baggage – body – soul – and what has what – etc. –

and leave it on the platform

all you need to take with you – is  the proposal put –

do yourself a logical favour –

travel light and explore

284. ‘Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations.—One says

to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a

sensation to a thing? One might as well ascribe it to a number!—And

now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and

pain seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything was,

so to speak, too smooth for it.

And so, too, a corpse seems to us quite inaccessible to pain.—Our

attitude to what is alive and to what is dead, is not the same. All our

reactions are different.—If anyone says: "That cannot simply come

from the fact that a living thing moves about in such-and-such a way

and a dead one not", then I want to intimate to him that this is a

case of the transition 'from quantity to quality'.

any proposal put – is open to question –

and another consideration is –

in what propositional context does a proposal fit – does it function?

perhaps someone creates an animated cartoon – where a stone feels pain – or where even a number feels pain?

in such a context the propositions functions

as to a corpse feeling pain –

this proposal – as with any –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and again – a question of where such a proposal might function?

is there any scientific context / argument for such a proposal?

or is the proposal that corpse feels pain – best understood in the context of imaginative horror stories and movies?

a ‘transition form quantity to quality’ –

is a proposal – that does require critical investigation

285. ‘Think of the recognition of facial expressions. Or of the

description of facial expressions—which does not consist in giving the

measurements of the face! Think, too, how one can imitate a man's

face without seeing one's own in a mirror.’

any recognition is a proposal in relation to a proposal –

a description of facial features – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

imitating a man’s face – with or without seeing one’s own face in a mirror –

is a proposal in relation to a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

286. ‘But isn't it absurd to say of a body that it has pain?——And

why does one feel an absurdity in that? In what sense is it true that

my hand does not feel pain, but I in my hand?

What sort of issue is: Is it the body that feels pain?—How is it to be

decided? What makes it plausible to say that it is not the body?—

Well, something like this: if someone has a pain in his hand, then the

hand does not say so (unless it writes it) and one does not comfort

the hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his face.’

‘But isn't it absurd to say of a body that it has pain?’

no – it’s not absurd – just unusual – perhaps clunky – given normal propositional practise

and there may well be occasion – when in some propositional context – this unusual usage might well be appropriate

the proposition – the proposal – is open to question

‘In what sense is it true that my hand does not feel pain, but I in my hand?’

perhaps in just this context – a philosophical context?

‘What sort of issue is: Is it the body that feels pain?—How is it to be decided? What makes it plausible to say that it is not the body?’

the issue is one of usage - 

that is to say – where do these proposals have currency – in what contexts are they used – or can be used?

and if you can’t find a context – and a use for the proposal – then it is of no use to you

no great mystery

‘Well, something like this: if someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand does not say so (unless it writes it) and one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his face.’

really where the pain is – where it is proposed that it is located – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and if you need any empirical evidence for this –

just check the history of human biology and medicine

287. ‘How am I filled with pity for this man? How does it come

out what the object of my pity is? (Pity, one may say, is a

form of conviction that someone else is in pain.)’

‘How am I filled with pity for this man?’

I am filled with pity for this man – firstly because I relate to him – and secondly because I see that he is in pain – and I wish he wasn’t

‘How does it come out what the object of my pity is?’

it comes out in however you propose it

and however you propose it – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

the object of pity I think is clearly  – uncertain –

i.e. – is it the man himself – the circumstance that led to his pain – the pain itself – the fact of human suffering?

or indeed all other above – and more?

‘the object of pity’ as something of a logical shape-shifter

‘Pity, one may say, is a form of conviction that someone else is in pain’ –

this is not a good definition –

you could be convinced that someone else is in pain –

but feel no pity

288. ‘I turn to stone and my pain goes on.—Suppose I were in

error and it was no longer pain?——But I can't be in error here;

it means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain!—That means: if

anyone said "I do not know if what I have got is a pain or something

else", we should think something like, he does not know what the

English word "pain" means; and we should explain it to him.—How?

Perhaps by means of gestures, or by pricking him with a pin and saying:

"See, that's what pain is!" This explanation, like any other, he might

understand right, wrong, or not at all. And he will shew which he does

by his use of the word, in this as in other cases.

If he now said, for example: "Oh, I know what 'pain' means;

what I don't know is whether this, that I have now, is pain"—we should

merely shake our heads and be forced to regard his words as a queer

reaction which we have no idea what to do with. (It would be rather

as if we heard someone say seriously: "I distinctly remember that some

time before I was born I believed .....".)

That expression of doubt has no place in the language-game; but

if we cut out human behaviour, which is the expression of sensation, it

looks as if I might legitimately begin to doubt afresh. My temptation to

say that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is

arises from this: if I assume the abrogation of the normal language-

game with the expression of a sensation, I need a criterion of identity

for the sensation; and then the possibility of error also exists.’

‘"See, that's what pain is!"’ –

is this exclamation – an explanation?

if so –  it is a very thin explanation – and clearly one open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘"Oh, I know what 'pain' means; what I don't know is whether this, that I have now, is pain"’

well – who knows what this amounts to?

perhaps he has some kind of specialized definition of pain –

i.e. he has a pain scale – and only calls pain – the high end of the scale

Wittgenstein’s example here is a proposal – a proposition – without any propositional context –

or it is a statement looking for a context?

this is a very disingenuous way of dealing with language use –

language is never context free – so why the pretence that it is?

and really it is a bit of a con – you pretend a statement has no context – and then put that its meaning is in question

well without propositional context – there is no meaning –

or put it this way – without context – you are working in the dark

‘That expression of doubt has no place in the language-game’ –

in this statement Wittgenstein demonstrates that he has no knowledge of propositional behaviour – and has completely missed the point in propositional logic

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

you only have to listen to people talking to beware of propositional uncertainty –

all our propositional behaviour – even as we behave – is uncertain

and any ‘expression of doubt’ – is logic in action

‘but if we cut out human behaviour, which is the expression of sensation, it looks as if I might legitimately begin to doubt afresh.’

a very strange – worrying – statement

for philosophers – let alone anyone else – there is no ‘cutting out of human behaviour’

human behaviour – propositional behaviour – of which language is a form – is the basis and focus of all that we deal with –

and as for sensation –

sensation is what we put to question – what we put to doubt

it is the uncertainty of sensation – that we explore in our propositional lives

the really odd thing about this statement from Wittgenstein – is that in the absence of human behaviour – of any form of propositional action – the notion of doubt – has no significance –

we only doubt because we are human

to doubt is to be human –

there is no doubt in the absence of humanity –

so for Wittgenstein to suggest that in some sense you can only doubt if you ‘cut out human behaviour’

is just plainly ridiculous –

quite bizarre

289. ‘"When I say 'I am in pain' I am at any rate justified before

myself:”—What does that mean? Does it mean: "If someone else could

know what I am calling 'pain', he would admit that I was using the

word  correctly"?

To use a word without a justification does not mean to use it without

right.’

‘I am in pain’ – is a proposal –

it is logically irrelevant who puts the proposal –

the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘justification’ – doesn’t come in to it – it’s not in the picture –

‘justification’ –  is not a logical concept – it is a rhetorical concept

any claim of ‘justification’ – is really the attempt – to close down – question and doubt – and to deny propositional uncertainty

claims of justification are illogical

and ‘rights’ do not come into it either –

in the words of Jeremy Bentham – talk of rights is – nonsense on stilts – rhetorical rubbish

proposals are put –

that is where we begin –

and it is where we end

290. ‘What I do is not, of course, to identify my sensation by criteria:

but to repeat an expression. But this is not the end of the

language-game: it is the beginning.

But isn't the beginning the sensation—which I describe?—Perhaps

this word "describe" tricks us here. I say "I describe my state of mind

"and "I describe my room". You need to call to mind the differences

between the language-games.’

‘What I do is not, of course, to identify my sensation by criteria: but to repeat an expression’

a ‘sensation’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

when you ‘identify’ a sensation / proposal – you propose in relation to it

‘But isn't the beginning the sensation—which I describe?—Perhaps this word "describe" tricks us here. I say "I describe my state of mind "and "I describe my room". You need to call to mind the differences between the language-games.’

firstly – what Wittgenstein calls a language-game here – is not a game

a game – is a rule-governed propositional action

description – is a critical propositional activity

yes – we use the word ‘describe’ – in different ways –

any use of the word – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

I get the impression that Wittgenstein would love all propositional action to be rule- governed –

this is what is behind his concept of the language-game –

and it really is no more than the idea he had in the Tractatus –

in the Investigations he pretends a propositional flexibility by proposing that there are different language-games –

but they are not games

he is trying to hang on to his idea of rule-governed language use – or pretending that you can with ‘language-games’

there are propositional games – but not all language use is rule-governed

rule-governed propositional action is a mode of propositional action –

we play propositional games – but outside of game-playing – or along side of game playing – our propositional use – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the different uses of the proposal – ‘description’ – are not different games –

they are different critical uses of the proposal

291. ‘What we call "descriptions" are instruments for particular

uses. Think of a machine-drawing, a cross-section, an elevation with

measurements, which an engineer has before him. Thinking of a

description as a word-picture of the facts has something misleading

about it: one tends to think only of such pictures as hang on our walls:

which seem simply to portray how a thing looks, what it is like. (These

pictures are as it were idle.)’

what we call ‘description’ are proposals –

yes – we have different descriptions – different kinds of descriptions

any description / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

292. ‘Don't always think that you read off what you say from the

facts; that you portray these in words according to rules. For even so

you would have to apply the rule in the particular case without

guidance.’

‘Don't always think that you read off what you say from the facts; that you portray these in words according to rules.

reading off what you say from the facts?

the ‘facts’ are proposals – proposals – open to question –

any proposal you put in relation to the facts / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

as for rules –

rules are the basis of propositional games –

putting a proposal – in relation to a proposal – is not a game – it is a critical propositional action –

there are no rules here

‘For even so you would have to apply the rule in the particular case without guidance.’

there is no applying the rule here

a proposals put in relation to a proposal – or what Wittgenstein calls ‘reading off what you say from the facts’ –

is not rule-governed –

it is a critical activity – grounded in question – doubt – and uncertainty

and yes – we do this – without guidance

293. ‘If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know

what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people

too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own

case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it

a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says

he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would

be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But

suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If

so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box

has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something:

for the box might even be empty.—No, one can 'divide through' by

the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of

sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops

out of consideration as irrelevant.’

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means – must I not say the same of other people too?’

if I am putting that my proposal – is not open to question – not open to doubt – and not – uncertain

then my proposal is illogical –

‘Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own

case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it

a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says

he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would

be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.’

yes – and here the word ‘beetle’ – would have to mean this possibility of different things

‘But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If

so it would not be used as the name of a thing.’

only if it is held that the word ‘beetle’ – cannot or does not also mean ‘the thing in the box’

‘The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty’

if there were nothing in the box – then there would be no reference to what is in the box

nothing to be said

my point here is this –

why couldn’t I recognise that the word ‘pain’ has a use in our language –

and still refer to what I experience as ‘pain’ –

recognizing that any use of the word ‘pain’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

isn’t this just what we do?

‘That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.’

all that is really being said here – is that one proposal (the object) is replaced by another (the designation) – the description –

we move from one proposal to another

and if we deal with the description proposal logically – we recognize that it is open to question – open to doubt – and is – uncertain

294. ‘If you say he sees a private picture before him, which he is

describing, you have still made an assumption about what he has

before him. And that means that you can describe it or do describe it

more closely. If you admit that you haven't any notion what kind of

thing it might be that he has before him—then what leads you into

saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn't it

as if I were to say of someone: "He has something. But I don't know

whether it is money, or debts, or an empty till."’

yes – unless he proposes that he has something –

and if then goes on to describe it –

whatever his description – it is open – open to question – open  to doubt – open to interpretation –

his proposal / description – is uncertain –

just as any proposal you put – in relation to his proposal / description –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

295. ‘"I know .... only from my own case"—what kind of proposition

is this meant to be at all? An experiential one? No.—A grammatical

one?

Suppose everyone does say about himself that he knows what pain

is only from his own pain.—Not that people really say that, or are even

prepared to say it. But if everybody said it——it might be a kind of

exclamation. And even if it gives no information, still it is a picture,

and why should we not want to call up such a picture? Imagine an

allegorical painting take the place of those words.

When we look into ourselves as we do philosophy, we often get to

see just such a picture. A full-blown pictorial representation of our

grammar. Not facts; but as it were illustrated turns of speech.’

"I know .... only from my own case"—what kind of proposition is this meant to be at all? An experiential one? No.—A grammatical one?

it’s a proposal – open to question

if it is not held open to question – it is held illogically

‘When we look into ourselves as we do philosophy, we often get to see just such a picture. A full-blown pictorial representation of our grammar. Not facts; but as it were illustrated turns of speech.’

we might use the phrase – ‘looking into one’s self’ – but what does it mean?

I think it is a phrase looking for a proposal – a proposal that can be critically examined

it is something of a propositional fishing expedition –

and there is nothing wrong with that

do we get a picture?

it is not enough – to just say we do –

the idea of a picture here – needs to be explained –

a picture of what?

296. ‘"Yes, but there is something there all the same accompanying

my cry of pain. And it is on account of that that I utter it. And this

something is what is important—and frightful."—Only whom are we

informing of this? And on what occasion?’

‘"Yes, but there is something there all the same accompanying my cry of pain.’

is there?

this ‘something’ – is what? – do we have an advance on ‘something’ here?

‘something’ doesn’t tell us much –

‘something’ – is a good stand in for ‘unknown’

what you actually have is the cry – that is what is on the table –

how you account for this cry proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

Wittgenstein refers to it – as a ‘cry of pain’

and just what this proposal of ‘pain’ – amounts to –

is open to further propositional exploration –

and any proposals put here –

are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Only whom are we informing of this? And on what occasion?’

we are informing anyone who hears the cry – 

and whenever its occurs

297. ‘Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot

and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one

insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the

picture of the pot?’

this statement would raise questions – doubts – and uncertainties –

i.e. – is he putting an imaginative proposal – is he making a joke – is he mentally ill?

298. ‘The very fact that we should so much like to say: "This is

the important thing"—while we point privately to the sensation—

is enough to shew how much we are inclined to say something which

gives no information.’

‘The very fact that we should so much like to say: "This is the important thing” –

while we point privately to the sensation—

does any one actually do this – does anyone actually say this?

to me this is an odd proposal –

however the question is – do we say things that give no information?

I don’t think so – any proposal – informs –

even if what is put – is bare  – and even if the information is thin –

anyone who witnesses the proposal – is informed of it – and by it –

and just what they are informed of – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any proposal is open to further elaboration

299. ‘Being unable—when we surrender ourselves to philosophical

thought—to help saying such-and-such; being irresistibly inclined to say

it—does not mean being forced into an assumption, or having an

immediate perception or knowledge of a state of affairs.’

‘philosophical thought’ – is proposal

there is no ‘surrendering’ or being ‘forced into an assumption’ – if you think critically

any assumption is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

having an ‘immediate perception’ or ‘knowledge of a state of affairs’ –

is putting proposals

any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

300. ‘It is—we should like to say—not merely the picture of the

behaviour that plays a part in the language-game with the words

"he is in pain", but also the picture of the pain. Or, not merely the

paradigm of the behaviour, but also that of the pain.—It is a

misunderstanding to say "The picture of pain enters into the

language-game with the word 'pain'." The image of pain is not a

picture and this image is not replaceable in the language-game

by anything that we should call a picture.—The image of pain

certainly enters into the language-game in a sense; only not

as a picture.’

‘The image of pain is not a  picture and this image is not replaceable in the language-game by anything that we should call a picture.—The image of pain certainly enters into the language-game in a sense; only not  as a picture.’

firstly – an image of pain could well be replaced by a picture of pain – i.e. – a painting of someone in pain – or if you want to drop the ‘someone’ – a painting of pain – an  abstract representations of pain

is not a picture a representation of an image?

secondly – any image – or any picture – or any behaviour – from a logical perspective – is a proposal –

 that you might wish to describe the proposal – as an ‘image’ – as ‘picture’ – as ‘behaviour’ – is fair enough –

but what you are dealing with is proposal –

what Wittgenstein here calls the ‘language-game’ – is propositional action – in whatever form that takes

and any propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain


(c) killer press. 2020.