Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Part 1. 101-200

101. ‘We want to say that there can't be any vagueness in logic.

The idea now absorbs us, that the ideal 'must' be found in reality.

Meanwhile we do not as yet see how it occurs there, nor do we

understand the nature of this "must". We think it must be in reality;

for we think we already see it there.’

‘vagueness in logic’?

any so called ‘logic’ – any theory of ‘logic’ – is when all is said and done – a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to the nature of this ‘must’ –

it’s nature is not logical – but rhetorical –

there is no logical ‘must” –

the only authority is authorship –

and authorship – the authorship of a proposal – is logically irrelevant

‘Meanwhile we do not as yet see how it occurs there, nor do we understand the nature of this "must". We think it must be in reality; for we think we already see it there.’

 this is Wittgenstein sinking back into the mysticism of the Tractatus –

and just in general – mysticism of any kind is a denial of propositional reality

mystics propose a hidden reality –

there is no hidden reality – there is only what is proposed – and what is proposed – is in your face –

sometimes hard to face – I know –

and I don’t blame anyone for turning away –

but it is what is –

and open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

102. ‘The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions

appear to us as something in the background—hidden in the

medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though

through a medium): for I understand the propositional sign, I use it

to say something.’

you can propose rules for the logical structure of propositions

doing so is proposing a game –

a rule-governed propositional action – and calling this game – ‘logic’

and if you play this game – you play it according to its rules –

the rules that are put and are accepted by those who play the game

there is no ‘hidden’ propositional reality –

no hidden propositional games –

the playing of propositional games – is apparent –

there is no hidden reality behind the appearance –

and to suggest that there is – is illogical and pretentious

and it is to suggest that the ground of propositional activity – is mystical –

which to my mind amounts to giving the game away

a game is a play – it is not a proposal –

playing a game is not proposing – it is not saying anything – it is engaging in play

a game as played is not open to question – is not open to doubt – and is not uncertain

in so far as we use propositional signs ‘to say something’ – we are proposing –

when I use a propositional sign ‘to say something’ – I propose –

and whatever I propose – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

103. ‘The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get

outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside

you cannot breathe.—Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair

of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It

never occurs to us to take them off.’

if the ideal is ‘unshakeable’ – it’s useless

you can always get ‘outside’ it – outside of any proposal – by putting it to question – by putting it to doubt – by exploring its uncertainty –

for to explore its uncertainty is not just to look at it critically – but to consider – to bring into consideration other – alternative – proposals –

alternative ways of proceeding

the outside of any proposal is logical / propositional space –

it is there to be explored

if you want to ‘breathe’ – in a logical sense – keep an open mind – don’t fall into the trap of certainty – that is where you will suffocate

this unshakeable ideal – ‘where does it come from?’

it comes from ignorance

104. ‘We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it.

Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think

we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality.’

be that as it may – any proposal of generality – is ripe for question and for doubt

a proposal of generality – is a field of uncertainty

105. ‘When we believe that we must find that order, must find the

ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are

ordinarily called "propositions", "words", "signs".

The proposition and the word that logic deals with are supposed

to be something pure and clear-cut. And we rack our brains over the

nature of the real sign.—It is perhaps the idea of the sign? or the idea at

the present moment?’

you can propose an order and determine it with rules –

if you do this you create a propositional game

our actual language – our normal propositional use – is not a rule-governed game –

our actual language is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there should be no ‘dissatisfaction’ – here we have two different modes of propositional activity – the game mode – and the critical mode –

both have a place and function in our propositional lives

the point is not to confuse one for the other

who says the proposals that logic deals with are supposed to be pure and clear-cut?

you might apply ‘pure’ and ‘clear-cut’ to games – but in truth – ‘rule-governed’ – should be enough

our proposals – our signs – from a logical point of view – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

106. ‘Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up,—to see

that we must stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not

go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties,

which in turn we are after all quite unable to describe with the

means at our disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's

web with our fingers.’

there is no difficulty here –

you can stick to your everyday thinking – or you can propose extreme subtleties –

whatever proposal is put – that proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there is nothing to repair

whatever is proposed is open to question

107. ‘The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper

becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline

purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a

requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is

now in danger of becoming empty.—We have got on to slippery ice

where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are

ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to

walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!’

the crystalline purity of logic – a requirement?

first up – if by ‘the crystalline purity’ – is meant that ‘logic’ – whatever this is supposed to mean here – is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain –

then this ‘logic’ has nothing to do with propositions

propositions are proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The requirement is in danger of becoming empty’ –

this requirement that Wittgenstein is on about – his ‘crystalline purity’ – has absolutely nothing at all to do with logic –

logically speaking it is not in the picture –

‘empty’ – gives it too much status –

the only logical requirement – is to put any proposal – any proposition – to question – to doubt – and to explore its uncertainty

the ‘friction’ Wittgenstein is looking for is always there –

the friction  just is uncertainty – propositional uncertainty

and it is not a matter of getting back to ‘the rough ground’ –

there is no ground but propositional ground – no ground but the proposal

and the ground of any proposal – of any proposition – is uncertainty

108. ‘We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has

not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures

more or less related to one another.——But what becomes of logic

now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here.—But in that case doesn't

logic altogether disappear?—For how can it lose its rigour? Of course

not by our bargaining any of its rigour out of it.—The preconceived idea

of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole

examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our

examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of

our real need.)

The philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in exactly the

sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life when we say e.g.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Faraday in The Chemical History of a Candle: "Water is one individual

thing—it never changes.

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"Here is a Chinese sentence", or "No, that only looks like writing; it is

actually just an ornament" and so on.

We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of

language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm. [Note

in margin: Only it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a

variety of ways]. But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in

chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their

physical properties.

The question "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?’

for Wittgenstein – the ‘crystalline purity of logic’ – is to be replaced with ‘the rules of the game’

I can understand that he saw this as a step forward –

what he doesn’t understand is that – this model of ‘rules of the game’ – that he is proposing – is a proposal – like any other – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

that is to say – these ‘rules of the game’ have no special logical status

yes – you can view language in terms of this model –

but it is only one view – and one view among many –

if you understand this – then you are logically sound

the question then becomes – just how useful is this model?

now there will be no knock down answer here –

any answer will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

perhaps this model is a big success in terms of Wittgenstein’s program –

but then his view of the logical situation – is just one view – and open to question

does he hold his philosophy of language open to question?

I don’t know – but I think there is a case for saying that he does – certainly his method of philosophy – his style – suggests an open approach –

though it must be said – he never explicitly states that this is his view – and indeed any view is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

perhaps what we have with the Investigations – is a step in the way to this understanding

just back on the ‘rules of the game’ model –

the real problem is that it just does not fit all propositional activity

yes – there are propositional games – but not all propositional activity is a rule-governed game

there is only so far you can push this model –

and I would suggest – it just does not fit well – with propositional activity in general –

much – in fact – most – of what goes on propositionally – is not rule-governed – is not playing some game

and in saying this I am making the point that there is no hidden – subterranean – realm of rules – that are operating – that we are not aware of –

if there are rules – they are on the board – they are apparent – they are known –

to think otherwise – is to give up the game altogether – and fall in to the mysticism hole

‘The question "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?’ –

a word – is a proposal – a piece in chess – is a proposal –

a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

109. ‘It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific

ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically

'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-

and-such'—whatever that may mean. (The conception of thought as a

gaseous medium.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There

must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do

away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.

And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from

the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical

problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our

language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings:

in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are

solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we

have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment

of our intelligence by means of language.’

our propositions are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

whether these propositions are described as philosophical – or scientific – or indeed – ‘preconceived’

a theory is a proposal – to say ‘we must not advance any kind of theory’ – is effectively to say we must not advance any kind of proposal –

this would bring the whole shebang to a grinding halt

‘there must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations’ – is effectively to say

no proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – or uncertain –

if this was implemented – there would be no growth of knowledge

‘we must do away with explanation’ –

again a stupid proposal – and one that limits propositional activity – if not kills it off altogether –

talk about a logical death wish

an explanation – is a proposal – a proposal in relation to a subject proposal – and as with the subject proposal – open to question

‘description alone must take its place’

‘explanation’ and ‘description’ – are just different propositional uses

as for ‘philosophical problems’ –

what we have with a ‘philosophical problem’ is the conflict of different proposals – in response to a subject proposal –

rational philosophical activity – is the activity of question – of doubt –  the exploration of propositional uncertainty

‘These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them.’

looking into the workings of our language – can be regarded as an empirical activity –

and whether described as an empirical activity or not – the ‘workings of our language’ – is a matter open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

Wittgenstein here wants to suggest that there is a ‘workings of language’ – that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain –

and that somehow or another – if we look hard enough – we will see the light

he put the same argument in the Tractatus

furthermore and most importantly – there is no misunderstanding –

what you will have is different proposals regarding the ‘workings of our language’ – different explanations of the ‘workings of language’– different descriptions of the ‘workings of our language’

different proposals – not mistaken proposals – different proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we

have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.’

let’s be clear – no problems are solved – any so called ‘solution’ to a problem is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and for that matter –  any so called ‘problem’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

not by giving new information – but by arranging what we have always known?

firstly – arranging what we have always known – is an empirical activity – and further any arranging will result in a different understanding – a new understanding 

the logical point is that any proposal that may come from such an arranging – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.’

philosophy is the battle against certainty – dogmatism – prejudice – and pretence

and the battle is fought with question – with doubt – and with the exploration of propositional uncertainty

110. ‘"Language (or thought) is something unique"—this proves to

be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions.

And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to the

problems.’

‘Language (or thought) is something unique’ –

if Joe Blow wants to put up this proposal – so be it –

and if the response is –

‘this proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions. And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to the

problems’ – so be it –

what we have here is two proposals – two proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

111. ‘The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms

of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes;

their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their

significance is as great as the importance of our language.——Let us

ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that

is what the depth of philosophy is.)’

our forms of language – the different propositional constructions that we are presented with – that we deal with –

these constructions are proposals – and entrenched as they may be in our culture – or any culture – they are not beyond question – they are not beyond doubt –

they are as with any proposal – from a logical point of view – uncertain –

there is no misinterpretation of propositional forms – there is only different proposals put in relation to these constructions – and their relations

what Wittgenstein calls ‘deep disquietude’ – is logical uncertainty

if you understand that propositional uncertainty – is the ground of all and any propositional activity –

you are likely to see it as simply the way of propositional life –

I would think there is only ‘deep disquietude’ – if you think – or imagine – or want –

our propositional reality to be otherwise –

and if you don’t face propositional reality – if you don’t face reality – yes – you are likely to be deeply disquieted

as for grammatical jokes – puerile

I do not mean to belittle Wittgenstein here – I understand his depth of feeling –

I just think he is on the wrong track

112. ‘A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language

produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us. "But this

isn't how it is!"—we say. "Yet this is how it has to be!"’

a simile doesn’t produce a false appearance – if it produces an appearance at all – it produces a different appearance –

this doesn’t disquiet us – it delights us –

or it leaves us with a propositional structure which we can use when it suits us

we don’t say ‘But this isn’t how it is’ – we consider the possibility of seeing it in such a way

and it is not the case that ‘Yet this is how it has to be!’ –

there is no necessity in any comparison

114. ‘(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): "The general form of

propositions is: This is how things are."——That is the kind of proposition

that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is

tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is

merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.’

one is merely putting a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

113. ‘"But this is how it is————" I say to myself over and over

again. I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply

on this fact, get it in focus, I must grasp the essence of the matter.’

‘But this is how it is –’ – and saying this ‘over and over again’ – fixing one’s gaze ‘absolutely sharply on this fact’ – getting it in focus –

all this strikes me as the futile attempt at certainty

there is no ‘essence’ of the matter –

what there is – is propositional uncertainty

115. ‘A. picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for

it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.’

inexorably? – perhaps it’s time to get yourself checked

a picture is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

116. ‘‘When philosophers use a word—"knowledge", "being",

"object", "I", "proposition", "name"—and try to grasp the essence

of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually

used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?—

What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their

everyday use.’

there is no ‘original home’ – of any word – no essence

a word has various uses in various propositional contexts –

a metaphysical use – is just one use – an ‘everyday use’ – another

any use – any word – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

117. ‘You say to me: "You understand this expression, don't

you? Well then—I am using it in the sense you are familiar with."—

As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it

carried with it into every kind of application.

If, for example, someone says that the sentence "This is here"

(saying which he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to

him, then he should ask himself in what special circumstances this

sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.’

‘You say to me: "You understand this expression, don't you? Well then—I am using it in the sense you are familiar with."’

here ‘understanding’ – is assumed – ‘familiar sense’ is assumed – and that is what happens all the time – we run with these assumptions

the point is we don’t know for sure – if there is understanding – or if the expression has a sense that is familiar –

these assumptions are open to question – open to doubt – and are indeed – uncertain –

still we make them – and we operate with them –

that is to say we operate in and with uncertainty

and as for ‘special circumstances’ – what is this supposed to mean?

if a proposal ‘makes sense’ to someone – so be it –

as to what this amounts to – well that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

118. ‘Where does our investigation get its importance from, since

it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great

and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits

of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of

cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they

stand.’

‘all that is great and important? – says who?

‘the buildings’ – by this I assume Wittgenstein means various propositional constructions

a genuine investigation – is a critical investigation

and a genuine critical investigation – is not a destructive act – it is an exploratory action

‘the ground of language on which they stand’ –

any propositional construction – doesn’t ‘stand’ on language – it is a construction of  language

and as I see it – any propositional construction has a place

and any propositional construction – including the ones Wittgenstein wants to destroy – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

119. ‘The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another

piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding

has got by running its head up against the limits of language.

These bumps make us see the value of the discovery.’

the philosophical process is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

philosophy has no ‘results’ –

any so called ‘result’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

and by the way – what is plain nonsense to one philosopher is wisdom to another

our understanding – is open to question –

and as for the ‘limits of language’ –

any proposed ‘limit of language’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

so called ‘bumps’ in the understanding – will be those proposals – those propositions – which have not been put to question – put to doubt – and are regarded as certain –

these ‘bumps’ – when put to question – make us see the value of critical thinking –

and this is the discovery we operate with and that we explore in philosophical analysis

120. ‘When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must

speak the language of every day. Is this language somehow too coarse

and material for what we want to say? Then how is another one to be

constructed?—And how strange that we should be able to do anything

at all with the one we have!

In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown

(not some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this by itself shews

that I can adduce only exterior facts about language.

Yes, but then how can these explanations satisfy us?—Well, your

very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed

in this language, if there was anything to ask!

And your scruples are misunderstandings.

Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words.

You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and you think of

the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also

different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The

money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money,

and its use.)’

any language that we use – ‘everyday’ or otherwise – is sound – if put to question – put to doubt – and regarded as logically – uncertain

so called ‘exterior facts about language’ – are proposals – open to question

any explanation of a language use is open to question – and any claim of ‘satisfaction’ – likewise

‘And your scruples are misunderstandings’ –

there are no ‘misunderstandings’ – rather there are different proposals put –

different proposal – open to question

our ‘scruples’ – that is our questions – our doubts – our uncertainties – just are – what makes for understanding

questions refer to proposals – so yes – you have to critically investigate proposals

I say the point is the proposal –

‘Here the word, there the meaning’?

the meaning is the proposed use of the word –

a proposal – open to question

121. ‘One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word

"philosophy" there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not

so: it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word

"orthography" among others without then being second-order.’

philosophy – or the word ‘philosophy’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – that is all there is to it

orthography –  is the study of spelling – especially with reference to its correctness –

and the word ‘orthography’ will of course fall under its purview

I think the notion of ‘second-order’ – philosophy or whatever – is really just a propositional category of focus – which has been proposed – presumably because for some – it is useful –

and as with any proposal – it is open to question

122. ‘A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not

command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in

this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just

that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the

importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.

The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental

significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the

way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)’

‘a clear view of the use of our words’ –

logically speaking – the use of our words is not clear –

and yes – you can command a clear view – by imposing some standard – and somehow or another enforcing it –

but doing this is superficial – and illogical –

grammar – is just such an imposition –

and any ‘grammar’ – as with the use it is designed to order and control – is proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

perspicuity – is superficiality

and any ‘understanding’ produced by a ‘perspicuous representation’ – is open to question

you see connections when you critically investigate the use of words

the invention of ‘intermediate cases’ – is proposal – if it is useful for some purpose – fair enough –

but any such propositional invention – is open to question

a ‘perspicuous representation’ – that gives us some propositional structure – may well be useful

but we shouldn’t get too excited here –

‘the way we look at things’ – will be propositionally complex – and at every point – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

we can propose 'Weltanschauung' – a world view – really on the basis of anything

and any such proposal – is open to question – open to open to doubt – and uncertain

                                                                                                                                        123. ‘A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about".’

where we have proposal – we have knowledge

and if I say ‘I don’t know my way about’ – I have put a proposal –

this proposal – is something to work with – to put to question – to put to doubt –

it’s uncertainty is there to be explored

124. ‘Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of

language; it can in the end only describe it.

For it cannot give it any foundation either.

It leaves everything as it is.

It also leaves mathematics as it is, and no mathematical discovery

can advance it. A "leading problem of mathematical logic" is for us

a problem of mathematics like any other.’

philosophy is a critical activity – the critical activity of question – of doubt – of the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

philosophy is not description –

I mean how genuine is Wittgenstein?

his own work in philosophy – is not description

and by the way description – if is enlightened – involves – question – doubt – and dealing with uncertainty

any critical approach to language will interfere with it –

when we use language critically in any propositional context – we interfere with it –

critical activity leaves nothing as it is

philosophy leaves nothing as it is

a critical approach to the propositions of mathematics – a philosophical approach to mathematics 

will open the propositions of mathematics – to question – to doubt – to uncertainty

this is not leaving mathematics as it is

and no mathematical discovery can advance it? –

any discovery – that is any proposal – in any propositional context – can be a basis for the advance of critical thinking

a ‘leading problem of mathematical logic’ is for us a problem of mathematics like any other.’ –

here we have a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

125. ‘It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction

by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but

to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics

that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.

(And this does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.)

The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique,

for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not

turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled

in our own rules.

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e.

get a clear view of).

It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those

cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is

just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't

mean it like that."

The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is

the philosophical problem.’

the business of ‘philosophy’ – if you want to give the name ‘philosophy’ to it  – is critical analysis –

critical analysis can take place in any propositional context – and can be given any name

we can call it ‘philosophy’ – ‘science’ – ‘history’ – ‘politics’ – ‘literary criticism ’ –

etc. etc –

or in the case of everyday propositional exchange – something like – ‘intelligent discussion’ – will do the trick

there will not be this ‘clear view’ – of anything – if by clear view is meant a single view

what we can get is a critical view – a view that takes into account different and conflicting views in a propositional situation –

a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us – will be a critical view –

a view that takes into account the different propositional approaches to a problem in question–

and this will involve the critical propositional activities of question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainties

any resolution of a contradiction will be the result of critical activity –

you can call that ‘mathematical’ – you can call it ‘philosophical’ –

a critical activity – by any other name

mathematics is a form of rule-governed propositional action – mathematics is a propositional game

and yes – where there is an entanglement of rules – the only way to resolve this is to critically examine the rules in question – this will be complex and involved –

decisions will have to be made – i.e. decisions as to which rule models need to be modified – perhaps even dropped from consideration – but here consequences beyond a specific problem will have to be assessed –

it is likely that new rules or new variations of rules – will be proposed

and it may well be that the situation – is not readily resolved –

and if so – how the unresolved  state of affairs is to be interpreted will be a critical issue – open to question

yes – the entanglement in our rules – is what we want to understand – and we can only understand this critically – by subjecting our rules – and rule models – to question and to doubt – and thus by exploring the propositional uncertainty that is at the base of this (or any) rule-governed propositional action

when we have rules that ‘work’ – and what this will mean – is open to question –

we can play the game –  and play without question – doubt or uncertainty –

establishing those rules though is a critical activity

‘our concept of meaning something’?

we can forget about ‘meaning’ – and instead focus on – what is proposed

if what you proposes is a contradiction – then logically speaking you haven’t proposed anything at all –

to say ‘I didn’t mean it like that’ – is to say ‘I didn’t propose that’ –

well in fact you did –

if in the case of a contradiction ‘I didn’t mean it like that’ is to make any sense –

it has to be seen as the recognition that what was proposed – is logically speaking – not a genuine proposal –

a contradiction – is not a genuine proposal – it is a fake proposal – a dummy proposition

‘The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem.’

the logical reality is that with a contradiction – nothing is proposed – there is no proposal

that there is no proposal – is not ‘the philosophical problem’ –

you only have a ‘philosophical problem’ – a critical problem – if a proposal is put – and it is put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty is explored –

where there is no proposal – as in the case of a contradiction – there is no problem

126. ‘Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither

explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view

there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no

interest to us.

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible

before all new discoveries and inventions.’

what is before us – is what is proposed –

and what is proposed is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain

philosophy – or critical thing – puts what is proposed to question – to doubt –

philosophy or critical thinking is the exploration of propositional uncertainty

deduction and explanation are forms of proposal – open to question

since what is proposed is open to view – it is open to question – it is open to doubt – and is uncertain

what is – is what is proposed – there is nothing hidden

what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions – is proposal

new discoveries – new inventions – are new proposals

there is nothing before that which is proposed

127. ‘The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders

for a particular purpose.’

this a is really scraping the bottom of the barrel –

the fridge-magnet approach to philosophy

and if Wittgenstein really believed this – believed that this is what he does as a philosopher – I think he would have given the game away – a second time – or should have

I know he is big on the concept of the game – but philosophy is not a game –

when you do philosophy – that is just when the games stop –

and if you don’t stop playing games – and you call what you do ‘philosophy’ – you get found out – quick smart

‘assembling reminders for a particular purpose’ –

here’s a reminder –

philosophy is the critical activity of question – of doubt –  the exploration of propositional uncertainty

this critical activity is the source of our creativity –

this critical activity is the logic of our lives –

and the purpose of this critical activity – is knowledge – the growth of knowledge –

for it is only through knowledge that we have a critical stake in this world –

and we all need that

128. ‘If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never

be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.’

the history of philosophy defies this stupid statement –

as does any working philosophy department –

on empirical grounds you can toss this one

129. ‘The aspects of things that are most important for us are

hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to

notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real

foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact

has at some time struck him.—And this means: we fail to be struck

by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.’

Wittgenstein’s argument is that ‘the aspects of things that are most important’ – are hidden –

and that one is unable to notice what is before one’s eyes –

he goes on to say – the real foundations of his enquiry – do not strike a man at all –

unless the fact has struck him –

so what’s important is what is hidden and you can’t see what is in front of you –

and this means we fail to be struck – by what is most striking

this is just obscurantist rubbish  –

cut from the same cloth as the mysticism of the Tractatus

130.  ‘Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies

for a future regularization of language—as it were first approximations,

ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set

up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of

our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.’

as for language-games as ‘objects of comparison’ which ‘throw light’ on our language by way of similarities and dissimilarities –

this is just vague waffle

games – ‘language-games’ – or games of any other description – are rule-governed propositional exercises –

to know a game is to know its rules – to play a game is to play in accordance with its rules

all that you learn from a language-game is its rules – is rule-governed behaviour

and if the rules are not established – or are in dispute – there is no game –

the establishment of a game – of its rules – can only be dealt with critically –

and dealing with any dispute regarding the rules of a game – or the relationship between the rules of different games – can only be dealt with critically

that is to say – through question – through doubt – and the critical exploration of the propositional uncertainty involved

games are a logical product – they are not the logical process

and while we do play propositional games in many propositional contexts – the critical issues in our propositional lives – are not addressed by language-games

the real work of propositional logic – is proposal – and its critical evaluation –

games are not proposals – games are plays

131. ‘For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions

only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison—

as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to

which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so

easily in doing philosophy.)’

yes – you can present your model – for comparison –

and your model – and the comparison – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

132. ‘We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use

of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many

possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be

giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of

language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we

saw it as our task to reform language.

Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in

our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice,

is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.

The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine

idling, not when it is doing work.’

its not as if you can legislate language practise – language practise occurs as it does –

to suggest that you can legislate is misguided and pretentious

any knowledge of language use – is proposal –

proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

changes in language practice can come from any quarter –

and some changes may be initiated with a particular end in view –

just how any such changes actually fare – will depend on whether and to what extent they are put to use –

as to any proposed distinctions that it is claimed our ordinary forms of language overlook

you have to ask – if our ordinary language forms ‘overlook’ these distinctions – how relevant are they – how valid are they – how useful are they?

and whether any such proposed distinctions prove to be of value – to be of use – only time will tell

proposed changes in terminology may suit certain propositional contexts and endeavours

and whether such changes are taken up – again – only time will tell

in language use – we are not dealing with ‘misunderstandings’ – what we deal with is different usages

there are no ‘confusions’ in languages use –

what we deal with are propositional uncertainties

language idling?

any propositional action is language at work –

there is no idling

133. ‘It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for

the use of our words in unheard-of ways.

For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But

this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely

disappear.

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping

doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy

peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself

in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;

and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved

(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.

There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed

methods, like different therapies.’

‘It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways.’

firstly – a system of rules – is a rule-governed propositional system – a game –

you can turn any propositional activity into a game – just set up whatever rules you want for the game – this is an arbitrary matter –

so yes you can and will have games with words in unheard of ways – it’s a matter of invention

Wittgenstein wants the game model to be the logical model for the investigation of language use

any investigation – is a critical evaluation of language use –

the game model is not a critical model

when you play games – you play in accordance with the rules – and in play the rules are not up for question –

a critical investigation of language use – of any propositional action – involves putting whatever is proposed – to question – to doubt – and exploring its uncertainty

the critical investigation – is the logical investigation

game playing is not in the picture

game playing is what you might do – as relief from the critical investigation –

game playing is about having fun – not critically investigating propositional use

Wittgenstein misapplies the game model – and in so doing attempts to neuter logical investigation

‘For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.’

for a start there is no ‘complete clarity’ in any propositional use –

any proposal of clarity – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain – not complete

the idea that philosophical problems ‘should completely disappear’ – is an argument for nihilism –

philosophical problems occur as a result of propositional conflict –

propositional conflict is the natural human state

philosophical problems are not solved – they are explored –

we explore with question and with doubt –

and what we explore is propositional uncertainty

if philosophical problems disappear – human beings disappear

‘The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question’

you can attempt to turn your back on question – on doubt – and uncertainty –

that is you can attempt to turn your back on life –

you can attempt to find refuge in ignorance

it doesn’t work

‘Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.’

a method of examples –

examples are fine – but any example is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

a series of examples can be broken off – yes – and the result is – the end of the series

problems are not solved –

                                                                                                                                        logically speaking the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty – is on-going

if the critical process is stopped – the problem is stopped – not solved

difficulties are not eliminated –

you can stop the process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty –

but stopping this process does not ‘eliminate’ a difficulty – it disregards it – it avoids it

as to the claim of somehow solving problems (plural) – not a single problem –

it suggests we cannot make sense of a problem (singular) –

and if so the notion of problems – plural – doesn’t get off the ground

different therapies – are different ‘cures’ –

and every age has its charlatans

134. ‘Let us examine the proposition: "This is how things are."—

How can I say that this is the general form of propositions?—It is

first and foremost itself a proposition, an English sentence, for it has

a subject and a predicate. But how is this sentence applied—that is,

in our everyday language? For I got it from there and nowhere else.

We may say, e.g.: "He explained his position to me, said that this

was how things were, and that therefore he needed an advance".

So far, then, one can say that that sentence stands for any statement.

It is employed as a prepositional schema, but only because it has the

construction of an English sentence. It would be possible to say instead

"such and such is the case", "this is the situation", and so on. It would

also be possible here simply to use a letter, a variable, as in symbolic

logic. But no one is going to call the letter "p" the general form of

propositions. To repeat: "This is how things are" had that position

only because it is itself what one calls an English sentence. But though

it is a proposition, still it gets employed as a propositional variable.

To say that this proposition agrees (or does not agree) with reality

would be obvious nonsense. Thus it illustrates the fact that one feature

of our concept of a proposition is, sounding like a proposition.’

‘This is how things are’ –

is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

I might put this proposition – this proposal – and you might say – ‘it is not how things are’ – or ‘perhaps it is how things’

my point is – the proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and therefore – uncertain

and as for the general form of propositions –

the general for of the proposition – is the proposal –

which is to say any proposition – is a proposal

"He explained his position to me, said that this was how things were, and that therefore he needed an advance". So far, then, one can say that that sentence stands for any statement.’

the sentence is a proposal –

the sentence stands for itself – it doesn’t stand for ‘any statement’ – it is not any statement – it is a particular statement – a particular proposal

‘such and such is the case’ – ‘this is the situation’ – are proposals

‘It would also be possible here simply to use a letter, a variable, as in symbolic

logic. But no one is going to call the letter "p" the general form of propositions.’

symbolic logic is a rule-governed propositional game –

propositions in symbolic logic – i.e. – ‘p’ – are tokens in the game

the rules of the game are the rules of truth functional analysis –

you play the game in terms of truth values and their combinations –

‘true’ and ‘false’ – in such a game – are game plays

propositional games – neither agree or disagree with reality – they are simply games played

tokens in propositions i.e. – ‘p’ – are not proposals – they do not propose –

their function is play

‘Thus it illustrates the fact that one feature of our concept of a proposition is, sounding like a proposition.’ –

what does a proposition sound like?

135. ‘But haven't we got a concept of what a proposition is, of what

we take "proposition" to mean?—Yes; just as we also have a concept

of what we mean by "game". Asked what a proposition is—whether

it is another person or ourselves that we have to answer—we shall

give examples and these will include what one may call inductively

defined series of propositions. This is the kind of way in which we

have such a concept as 'proposition'. (Compare the concept of a

proposition with the concept of number.)’

the ‘concept’ of a proposition – examples – inductively defined –

any concept put – is a proposal – any example given – is a proposal – induction – is a proposal – definition – a proposal –

the real point here is that any definition of the proposition – including this one given by Wittgenstein –

is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the same applies to number –

any definition of the number is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

136. ‘At bottom, giving "This is how things are" as the general

form of propositions is the same as giving the definition: a proposition

is whatever can be true or false. For instead of "This is how things

are" I could have said "This is true". (Or again "This is false".)

But we have

'p' is true = p

'p' is false = not-p.

And to say that a proposition is whatever can be true or false

amounts to saying: we call something a proposition when in our

language we apply the calculus of truth functions to it.

Now it looks as if the definition—a proposition is whatever can be

true or false—determined what a proposition was, by saying: what fits

the concept 'true', or what the concept 'true' fits, is a proposition.

So it is as if we had a concept of true and false, which we could use

to determine what is and what is not a proposition. What engages with

the concept of truth (as with a cogwheel), is a proposition.

But this is a bad picture. It is as if one were to say "The king in

chess is the piece that one can check." But this can mean no more than

that in our game of chess we only check the king. Just as the proposition

that only a proposition can be true or false can say no more than

that we only predicate "true" and "false" of what we call a proposition.

And what a proposition is is in one sense determined by the

rules of sentence formation (in English for example), and in another

sense by the use of the sign in the language-game. And the use of the

words "true" and "false" may be among the constituent parts of this

game; and if so it belongs to our concept 'proposition' but does not

'fit’ it. As we might also say, check belongs to our concept of the king

in chess (as so to speak a constituent part of it). To say that check did

not fit our concept of the pawns, would mean that a game in which

pawns were checked, in which, say, the players who lost their pawns

lost, would be uninteresting or stupid or too complicated or something

of the kind.’

a proposition is a proposal – whether true or false – or undecided

a proposition is true if affirmed –

a proposition is false – if denied –

affirmation and denial are propositional actions – in relation to a proposition

any propositional action of affirmation – or denial – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

just as the action of withholding assent or dissent – of regarding the proposition as undecided – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and by proposition here I mean any kind of proposal – be that a proposal in our spoken or written language – or a proposal of some other form –

i.e. – we can regard a physical object as a proposal – a proposal open to question

we can regard a piece of music – or any other artistic creation – as a proposal – as open to question –

whatever is proposed – however it is proposed – is a proposition

formal logic is a rule-governed propositional game

the ‘propositions’ so called in formal logic – are game tokens

the rules of the game are the rules of truth functional analysis –

‘true’ and ‘false’ – in such a game – are moves in the game – game plays

to have a game where pawns are checked – would be to have a different game to what is known as chess – it would be to operate with different rules

137. ‘What about learning to determine the subject of a sentence by

means of the question "Who or what . . . .?"—Here, surely, there is

such a thing as the subject's 'fitting' this question; for otherwise how

should we find out what the subject was by means of the question?

We find it out much as we find out which letter of the alphabet comes

after 'K' by saying the alphabet up to 'K' to ourselves. Now in what

sense does 'L' fit on to this series of letters?—In that sense "true" and

"false" could be said to fit propositions; and a child might be taught

to distinguish between propositions and other expressions by being

told "Ask yourself if you can say 'is true' after it. If these words fit,

it's a proposition." (And in the same way one might have said: Ask

yourself if you can put the words “This is how things are:" in front

of it.)’

if a state of affairs is proposed – you have a proposition

and yes you can respond to any proposal – with ‘is true’ – ‘is false’ – or not respond –

which is effectively to say – ‘I don’t know if it is true or if it is false’

as to – ‘this is how things stand’ –

if a state of affairs is proposed – ‘this is how things stand’ – will be to effectively restate – or reformulate the proposal –

‘this is how things stand’ – is a proposal – and one that needs a bit of filling out

any proposal be it a primary proposal – or a response to a primary proposal (‘true’ ‘false’ ‘undecided’) – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and a proposal can be put – of course – without any response to it –

how we respond – or can respond to a proposal – does not determine whether it is a proposal – whether it is a proposition

138. ‘But can't the meaning of a word that I understand fit the

sense of a sentence that I understand? Or the meaning of one word

fit the meaning of another?——Of course, if the meaning is the use we

make of the word, it makes no sense to speak of such 'fitting.' But

we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp

it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different

from the 'use' which is extended in time!’

‘we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different

from the 'use' which is extended in time!’

let us say we grasp a meaning in a flash

the ‘flash’ here is what causes the problem – the immediacy

meaning – is never settled – meaning is uncertain –

‘meaning’ – a flash – or extended in time – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

‘Must I know whether I understand a word? Don't I also sometimes

imagine myself to understand a word (as I may imagine I understand

a kind of calculation) and then realize that I did not understand it?

("I thought I knew what 'relative' and 'absolute' motion meant, but

I see that I don’t know’)’

knowledge is proposal –

any claim of knowledge – is open to question – open to doubt –

knowledge is uncertain

139. ‘When someone says the word "cube" to me, for example,

I know what it means. But can the whole use of the word come before

my mind, when I understand it in this way?

Well, but on the other hand isn't the meaning of the word also

determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning

conflict? Can what we grasp in a flash accord with a use, fit or fail to

fit it? And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes

before our mind in an instant, fit a use"?

What really comes before our mind when we understand a word?—

Isn't it something like a picture? Can't it be a picture?

Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you

hear the word "cube", say the drawing of a cube. In what sense can

this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word "cube"?—Perhaps you

say: "It's quite simple;—if that picture occurs to me and I point to

a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the

word doesn't fit the picture."—But doesn't it fit? I have purposely

so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a method of

projection according to which the picture does fit after all.

The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but

it was possible for me to use it differently.’

‘But can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I understand it in this way?’

if by ‘whole use’ – you mean every way the word has been and is used – unless you are a lexicographer – no – and even a lexicographer – could not be sure

and if by whole use you mean every way the word might be used in the future – obviously no

if we had to know the whole use of word in order to use it – no word would be used –

‘Well, but on the other hand isn't the meaning of the word also determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict?’

different uses – different meanings

‘Can what we grasp in a flash accord with a use, fit or fail to fit it? And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a use"?’

what we grasp in a flash might be right on the money in terms of a proposed use –

or it may miss the mark

here we are talking context – and what fits a propositional context

and also – a proposed meaning may not fit a propositional context – it may alter or change the context – and it is possible that such a change of context – as a result of the change of meaning – proves more useful?

in any case – any proposed meaning – flash or otherwise – is up for grabs – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘What really comes before our mind when we understand a word?— Isn't it something like a picture? Can't it be a picture?’

any understanding is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

can it be a picture?

a picture is a proposal.

‘The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently.’

yes – and any use – different or otherwise – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

______________________________________________________________

‘(a) "I believe the right word in this case is ... .". Doesn't this

shew that the meaning of a word is a something that comes before our

mind, and which is, as it were, the exact picture we want to use here?

Suppose I were choosing between the words "imposing", "dignified",

"proud", "venerable"; isn't it as though I were choosing between

drawings in a portfolio?—No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate

word does not shew the existence of a something that etc.. One is

inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because

one can find a word appropriate; because one often chooses between

words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures

are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words; and so on.

(b) I see a picture; it represents an old man walking up a steep

path leaning on a stick.—How? Might it not have looked just the same

if he had been sliding downhill in that position? Perhaps a Martian

would describe the picture so. I do not need to explain why we do not

describe it so.’

"I believe the right word in this case is ... ." – is a proposal –

what propositional packaging you give this proposal – will be a matter of custom – a matter of linguistic fashion

‘comes before our mind’ – is an example of one such propositional packaging

the proposal – and any propositional packaging proposed for it –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

a picture is a proposal – and as with any proposal – open to question – that is the point – being open to question

so if the question is put – why don’t you describe it this way?

you can give an answer if you want – or you can decline to give an answer

140. ‘Then what sort of mistake did I make; was it what we should

like to express by saying: I should have thought the picture forced a

particular use on me? How could I think that? What did I think? Is

there such a thing as a picture, or something like a picture, that forces

a particular application on us; so that my mistake lay in confusing one

picture with another?—For we might also be inclined to express

ourselves like this: we are at most under a psychological, not a logical,

compulsion. And now it looks quite as if we knew of two kinds of

case.

What was the effect of my argument? It called our attention to

(reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one

we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to

call "applying the picture of a cube". So our 'belief that the picture

forced a particular application upon us' consisted in the fact that only

the one case and no other occurred to us. "There is another solution

as well" means: there is something else that I am also prepared to call

a "solution"; to which I am prepared to apply such-and-such a picture,

such-and-such an analogy, and so on.

What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our

minds when we hear the word and the application still be different.

Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not.’

there is no compulsion – psychological or logical

a picture doesn’t force a particular application on us

a picture is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

you can accept the proposal – or not –

and any decision of acceptance or rejection – is open to question

you can compare it with other pictures – other proposals –

and any decision regarding which proposal to accept – or to reject –

is like the proposals in question – logically speaking uncertain 

and if it is logically uncertain – it is psychologically uncertain

there are no logical solutions –

and any pragmatic solution – that is the decision to proceed with a particular picture / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and is – even as you proceed with it – uncertain

any proposal is open to question –

has it the same meaning at different times?

any answer to this question  – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

141. ‘Suppose, however, that not merely the picture of the cube,

but also the method of projection comes before our mind?——How

am I to imagine this?—Perhaps I see before me a schema shewing the

method of projection: say a picture of two cubes connected by lines

of projection.—But does this really get me any further? Can't I now

imagine different applications of this schema too?——Well, yes, but

then can't an application come before my mind?—It can: only we need to

get clearer about our application of this expression. Suppose I explain

various methods of projection to someone so that he may go on to

apply them; let us ask ourselves when we should say that the method

that I intend comes before his mind.

Now clearly we accept two different kinds of criteria for this:

on the one hand the picture (of whatever kind) that at some time or

other comes before his mind; on the other, the application which—in

the course of time—he makes of what he imagines. (And can't it be

clearly seen here that it is absolutely inessential for the picture to exist

in his imagination rather than as a drawing or model in front of him;

or again as something that he himself constructs as a model?)

Can there be a collision between picture and application? There can,

inasmuch as the picture makes us expect a different use, because people

in general apply this picture like this.

I want to say: we have here a normal case, and abnormal cases.’

‘Suppose I explain various methods of projection to someone so that he may go on to

apply them; let us ask ourselves when we should say that the method that I intend comes before his mind.’

when he says it does – when he proposes it – otherwise – we don’t know

‘(And can't it be clearly seen here that it is absolutely inessential for the picture to exist

in his imagination rather than as a drawing or model in front of him; or again as something that he himself constructs as a model?)’

however the proposal – the proposition – is put – if it is put – is all that concerns us

‘Can there be a collision between picture and application? There can, inasmuch as the picture makes us expect a different use, because people in general apply this picture like this.

I want to say: we have here a normal case, and abnormal cases.’

what we have is different proposals – different kinds of proposals – and different expectations in relation to the different proposals

142. ‘It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly

prescribed; we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case.

The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what

we are to say. And if things were quite different from what they

actually are——if there were for instance no characteristic expression

of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception and exception rule;

or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency——this would

make our normal language-games lose their point.—The procedure of

putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the

turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened for

such lumps to suddenly grow or shrink for no obvious reason.

This remark will become clearer when we discuss such things as the

relation of expression to feeling, and similar topics.’

‘It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed; we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case.’

we are in no doubt – if we do not question – if we do not explore the propositional uncertainty in what is prescribed

what we know – is open to question – open to doubt –

our knowledge is uncertain

we can pretend there is no question – no doubt – no uncertainty

this pretence is illogical – and ignorant

‘The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say.’

we are not dealing with the abnormal – what we deal with here – is propositional difference –

different proposals

‘And if things were quite different from what they actually are’

how things actually are – is what is proposed – and what is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt –

‘how things actually are’ – is uncertain

‘if there were for instance no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency——this would make our normal language-games lose their point’

if there is no characteristic expression – all this means is that the state of affairs has been proposed in an uncharacteristic manner

it is not that our ‘language-games’ lose their point

it is rather that alternative proposal are required – or come into play –

and in any case there are no language-games here –

what we have is proposal – not rule-governed propositional action – proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the

turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened for such lumps to suddenly grow or shrink for no obvious reason.’

if lumps of cheese frequently grew and shrank for no obvious reason – and we wanted to weigh them and determine their price – when this occurred – we would have to devise – we would have to propose – a different method of determining their value –

however when they didn’t grow or shrink – the method of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the scale – would still be of use – it would not lose its point –

how we do what we do – is always a matter of question – of doubt – of uncertainty – even when what we do is – or has become – common practise

so called ‘normality’ – does render logic invalid

143. ‘Let us now examine the following kind of language-game:

when A gives an order B has to write down series of signs according

to a certain formation rule.

The first of these series is meant to be that of the natural numbers in

decimal notation.—How does he get to understand this notation?—

First of all series of numbers will be written down for him and he will

be required to copy them. (Do not balk at the expression "series of

numbers"; it is not being used wrongly here.) And here already there

is a normal and an abnormal learner's reaction.—At first perhaps we

guide his hand in writing out the series 0 to 9; but then the possibility

of getting him to understand will depend on his going on to write

it down independently.—And here we can imagine, e.g., that he

does copy the figures independently, but not in the right order:

he writes sometimes one sometimes another at random. And then

communication stops at that point.—Or again, he makes 'mistakes’

in the order.—The difference between this and the first case will of

course be one of frequency.—Or he makes a systematic mistake; for

example, he copies every other number, or he copies the series 0, 1, 2,

3, 4, 5, .... like this: 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4, ..... Here we shall almost be

tempted to say that he has understood wrong.

Notice, however, that there is no sharp distinction between a random

mistake and a systematic one. That is, between what you are inclined

to call "random" and what "systematic".

Perhaps it is possible to wean him from the systematic mistake (as

from a bad habit). Or perhaps one accepts his way of copying and

tries to teach him ours as an offshoot, a variant of his.—And here too

our pupil's capacity to learn may come to an end.’

‘Let us now examine the following kind of language-game: when A gives an order B has to write down series of signs according to a certain formation rule.’

yes – what we have here is a rule-governed propositional game –

and in order to play the game – you follow the rule –

the rule is not up for question

you either follow the rule – or there is no game

‘And here we can imagine, e.g., that he does copy the figures independently, but not in the right order: he writes sometimes one sometimes another at random. And then

communication stops at that point.—Or again, he makes 'mistakes’ in the order.’

communication – doesn’t stop –

what would be communicated is that he is not playing the game

there are no ‘mistakes’ in a rule-governed propositional game –

you play the game – or you don’t

‘The difference between this and the first case will of course be one of frequency.—Or he makes a systematic mistake; for example, he copies every other number, or he copies the series 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, .... like this: 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4, ..... Here we shall almost be tempted to say that he has understood wrong.’

what he has not understood is the game – the logic of the game –

‘Perhaps it is possible to wean him from the systematic mistake (as from a bad habit). Or perhaps one accepts his way of copying and tries to teach him ours as an offshoot, a variant of his.—And here too our pupil's capacity to learn may come to an end.’

there is no mistake – systematic or otherwise – and no ‘bad habit’ –

the fact is he doesn’t understand what a game means – or for some reason or another – he can’t follow rules

‘What we have to mention in order to explain the significance,

I mean the importance, of a concept, are often extremely general facts

of nature: such facts as are hardly ever mentioned because of their

great generality.’

                                                                                                                                       

if ‘extremely general facts of nature’ are not mentioned where they are relevant – then any explanation that involves them – is no explanation at all –

and it is not just a matter of ‘mentioning’ them – any genuine investigation of a concept – that is of a proposal – will involve putting it to question – to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty

proposals of ‘great generality’ – are a field of propositional uncertainty

144. ‘What do I mean when I say "the pupil's capacity to learn may

come to an end here"? Do I say this from my own experience? Of

course not. (Even if I have had such experience.) Then what am I

doing with that proposition? Well, I should like you to say: "Yes,

it's true, you can imagine that too, that might happen too!"—But was

I trying to draw someone's attention to the fact that he is capable of

imagining that?——I wanted to put that picture before him, and his

acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a

given case differently: that is, to compare it with this rather than that

set of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things. (Indian

mathematicians: "Look at this.")’

this is not about ‘changing his way of looking at things’ –

‘look at this’ – is not the point –

the question is – does the pupil understand the concept of the game?

does he understand the concept of the rule?

can he follow a rule – and thus play a game?

145. ‘Suppose the pupil now writes the series 0 to 9 to our satisfaction.—

And this will only be the case when he is often successful, not if

he does it right once in a hundred attempts. Now I continue the series

and draw his attention to the recurrence of the first series in the units;

and then to its recurrence in the tens. (Which only means that I use

particular emphases, underline figures, write them one under another

in such-and-such ways, and similar things.)—And now at some

point he continues the series independently—or he does not.—But

why do you say that? so much is obvious!—Of course; I only

wished to say: the effect of any further explanation depends on his

reaction.

Now, however, let us suppose that after some efforts on the teacher's

part he continues the series correctly, that is, as we do it. So now we

can say he has mastered the system.—But how far need he continue

the series for us to have the right to say that? Clearly you cannot state

a limit here.’

if he learns to play the game – he learns to play the game

146. ‘Suppose I now ask: "Has he understood the system when he

continues the series to the hundredth place?" Or—if I should not

speak of 'understanding' in connection with our primitive language-

game: Has he got the system, if he continues the series correctly so

far?—Perhaps you will say here: to have got the system (or, again, to

understand it) can't consist in continuing the series up to this or that

number: that is only applying one's understanding. The understanding

itself is a state which is the source of the correct use.

What is one really thinking of here? Isn't one thinking of the

derivation of a series from its algebraic formula? Or at least of

something analogous?—But this is where we were before. The point is,

we can think of more than one application of an algebraic formula;

and every type of application can in turn be formulated algebraically;

but naturally this does not get us any further.—The application is still

a criterion of understanding.’

‘Suppose I now ask: "Has he understood the system when he continues the series to the hundredth place?" Or—if I should not speak of 'understanding' in connection with our primitive language-game: Has he got the system, if he continues the series correctly so far?’

what ‘understanding it’ amounts to here – is really open to question –

what we can say is that he can play the game – and that’s all we need to say

‘What is one really thinking of here?’ –

again any answer to this question is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

and I would say logically irrelevant

what is logically relevant is that he demonstrates that he can perform this rule-governed action –

how you account for that – is neither here nor there – it’s a philosophical sideshow

147. ‘"But how can it be? When I say I understand the rule of a

series, I am surely not saying so because I have found out that up to now

I have applied the algebraic formula in such-and-such a way! In my

own case at all events I surely know that I mean such-and-such a

series; it doesn't matter how far I have actually developed it."—

Your idea, then, is that you know the application of the rule of the

series quite apart from remembering actual applications to particular

numbers. And you will perhaps say: "Of course! For the series is

infinite and the bit of it that I can have developed finite."’

the rule is the series – played out

and another way of saying ‘it doesn’t matter how far I have actually developed it’ –

is to say –

 ‘"Of course! For the series is infinite and the bit of it that I can have developed finite."’

here you have to be clear on just what the rule is

if the rule of the series is that the series as played out is finite – and finite to a specific number – then the series is finite – the game is not on-going – it has an end point

if the rule of the series is that the series as played out is infinite – then the series is infinite – the game is on-going – it has no end point

148. ‘But what does this knowledge consist in? Let me ask: When

do you know that application? Always? day and night? or only

when you are actually thinking of the rule? do you know it, that is,

in the same way as you know the alphabet and the multiplication table?

Or is what you call "knowledge" a state of consciousness or a process—

say a thought of something, or the like?’

the rule is a proposal –

a proposal for a propositional game

you know the application of the rule – when you see how it is applied

being able to recite the alphabet and being able to multiply – are rule-governed propositional actions

you know how to perform these actions when you see how the rules governing them are applied

knowledge is proposal –

any explanation of  proposal – of knowledge –

i.e. – knowledge as a state of consciousness – or knowledge as a process – or knowledge as a thought – etc. etc. –

is a proposal

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

we propose in relation to proposals

our proposals are uncertain

our knowledge is uncertain   

149. ‘If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind,

one is thinking of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain)

by means of which we explain the manifestations of that knowledge.

Such a state is called a disposition. But there are objections to speaking

of a state of the mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two different

criteria for such a state: a knowledge of the construction of the apparatus,

quite apart from what it does. (Nothing would be more confusing

here than to use the words "conscious" and "unconscious" for the

contrast between states of consciousness and dispositions. For this

pair of terms covers up a grammatical difference.)’

knowing the ABC is playing the alphabet game –

it is the action of this propositional game that is the knowing

explanation of being able to play the game – is not a rule-governed propositional game – it is a critical issue

and here what you will have is different proposal put – to account for being able to play the game –

these proposals will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

exploring the critical issues here – is logically a different matter to playing the game

150. ‘‘The grammar of the word "knows" is evidently closely

related to that of "can", "is able to". But also closely related to that

of "understands". ('Mastery' of a technique,)’’

what we have with the word ‘knows’ – is a proposal –

a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it the propositional uncertainty of the word – that is it logical grammar

and it is the propositional uncertainty of the word – that enables – or accounts for Wittgenstein’s proposal here –  that the word ‘knows’ is ‘evidently closely related to’ that of ‘can’ – ‘is able to’ – and ‘understands’

the ‘technique’ that we need to master – is critical thinking

151. ‘But there is also this use of the word "to know": we say

'"Now I know!"—and similarly "Now I can do it!" and "Now I

understand!"

‘Let us imagine the following example: A writes series of numbers

down; B watches him and tries to find a law for the sequence of

numbers. lf he succeeds he exclaims: "Now I can go on!"——So this

capacity, this understanding, is something that makes its appearance in

a moment. So let us try and see what it is that makes its appearance

here.—A has written down the numbers 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; at this point

B says he knows how to go on. What happened here? Various things

may have happened; for example, while A was slowly putting one

number after another, B was occupied with trying various algebraic

formulae on the numbers which had been written down. After A had

written the number 19 B tried the formula an — an  = n² + n - 1; and the

next number confirmed his hypothesis.

(a) "Understanding a word": a state. But a mental state?—Depression,

excitement, pain, are called mental states. Carry out a grammatical

investigation as follows: we say

"He was depressed the whole day".

"He was in great excitement the whole day"."

He has been in continuous pain since yesterday".—

We also say "Since yesterday I have understood this word". "Continuously", though?—To be sure, one can speak of an interruption of understanding.

But in what cases? Compare: "When did your pains get less?" and "When

did you stop understanding that word?"

(b) Suppose it were asked: "When do you know how to play chess?

All the time? or just while you are making a move? And the whole of

chess during each move?—How queer that knowing how to play

chess should take such a short time, and a game so much longer!

Or again, B does not think of formulae. He watches A writing his

numbers down with a certain feeling of tension, and all sorts of vague

thoughts go through his head. Finally he asks himself: "What is the

series of differences?" He finds the series 4, 6, 8, 10 and says: Now I

can go on.

Or he watches and says "Yes, I know that series"—and continues it,

just as he would have done if A had written down the series 1, 3, 5, 7, 9.

—Or he says nothing at all and simply continues the series. Perhaps

he had what may be called the sensation "that's easy!". (Such a sensation

 is, for example, that of a light quick intake of breath, as when

one is slightly startled.)’

‘to know’ – is to propose

saying ‘now I know’ – ‘now I can do it!’ – ‘now I understand!’ – are proposals –

and as with any proposal –  open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘So this capacity, this understanding, is something that makes its appearance in

a moment. So let us try and see what it is that makes its appearance here’

what makes its appearance is a rule –

and how we account for the rule – for ‘the appearance’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘(a) "Understanding a word": a state. But a mental state?— …

"He was depressed the whole day".

"He was in great excitement the whole day"."

He has been in continuous pain since yesterday".’

a mental state is a proposal – open to question – ask any working psychologist

‘continuously’ – is open to question – open to interpretation – it is a question of how the word is used

‘(b) Suppose it were asked: "When do you know how to play chess?’

knowing the rule of a game – is as with any knowing – is a contingency

you know how to play chess when you are making a move – but you know how to play chess so long as you know the rules of the game –

you can forget – you can get rusty – or you might need to improve your knowledge of the rules

‘Or again, B does not think of formulae’ –

ok – he sees the rule of the game –

and how we account for this is open to question –

also it is important to realise that we may not be able to account for it to our satisfaction

however if we keep and open mind and employ a critical intelligence – we can explore the issues involved –

proposals will be forthcoming  –

and we will work with whatever we think best suits our purpose –

recognizing that any decision here – is open to question

152. ‘But are the processes which I have described here understanding!"

“B understands the principle of the series" surely doesn't mean

simply: the formula "an =...." occurs to B. For it is perfectly

imaginable that the formula should occur to him and that he should

nevertheless not understand. "He understands" must have more in it

than: the formula occurs to him. And equally, more than any of those

more or less characteristic accompaniments or manifestations of

understanding.’

what is relevant is that B recognizes the rule – and can follow it – and thus play the game

how we account for this is strictly speaking – a side issue

the question of B’s understanding – and more generally the question of the nature of understanding – is an interesting matter – a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

but logically speaking – it is not actually relevant to whether he plays the game

153. ‘We are trying to get hold of the mental process of understanding

which seems to be hidden behind those coarser and therefore

more readily visible accompaniments. But we do not succeed; or,

rather, it does not get as far as a real attempt. For even supposing I had

found something that happened in all those cases of understanding,—

why should it be the understanding? And how can the process of

understanding have been hidden, when I said "Now I understand"

because I understood?! And if I say it is hidden—then how do I know

what I have to look for? I am in a muddle.’

nothing is hidden –

what we have is proposal – and proposal in relation to proposal

‘understanding’ – is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the question here though – is what does it matter?

we have a rule-governed propositional game

to play the game you have to recognise the rule

how you explain – or account for this recognition  –

may well be of interest –

however what is important – is not the explanation of the recognition – but the fact of the recognition –

any explanation – is open to question

and you are likely to adopt whatever explanation – that best suits your purpose – or indeed your philosophical perspective

however no explanation changes the fact that what we are dealing with here is a rule-governed propositional action – a game

154. ‘But wait—if "Now I understand the principle" does not mean

the same as "The formula .... occurs to me" (or "I say the formula",

"I write it down", etc.) —does it follow from this that I employ the

sentence "Now I understand ....." or "Now I can go on" as a

description of a process occurring behind or side by side with that of

saying the formula?

If there has to be anything 'behind the utterance of the formula' it is

particular circumstances', which justify me in saying I can go on—when

the formula occurs to me

Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.—

For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in

what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I

know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?—

In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes)

which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a

mental process.

(A pain's growing more and less; the hearing of a tune or a sentence:

these are mental processes.)’

‘Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.— For that is the expression which confuses you’

I have no problem thinking of the understanding as a mental process – or of thinking of it as not as a mental process –

any account of the proposal ‘understanding’ – is valid –

any account of ‘understanding’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

155. ‘Thus what I wanted to say was: when he suddenly knew

how to go on, when he understood the principle, then possibly he

had a special experience—and if he is asked: "What was it? What took

place when you suddenly grasped the principle?" perhaps he will

describe it much as we described it above——but for us it is the

circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify

him in saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows

how to go on.’

‘perhaps he will describe it much as we described it above’

yes – and perhaps he won’t

how he – or anyone else describes it – is to put forward a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and logically speaking – uncertain

and however it is described – is really just a back story to the fact – of recognizing the rule that is the game

the circumstances under which he had the experience – are neither here nor there

if you recognize the rule that determines the play of the game –

it makes no difference what the circumstances are –

if he says he understands – if he says he know how to go on – all he is doing is underwriting the fact

and any such underwriting – is open to question

156. ‘This will become clearer if we interpolate the consideration

of another word, namely "reading". First I need to remark that I am

not counting the understanding of what is read as part of 'reading' for

purposes of this investigation: reading is here the activity of rendering

out loud what is written or printed; and also of writing from dictation,

writing out something printed, playing from a score, and so on.

The use of this word in the ordinary circumstances of our life is of

course extremely familiar to us. But the part the word plays in our life,

and therewith the language-game in which we employ it, would be

difficult to describe even in rough outline. A person, let us say an

Englishman, has received at school or at home one of the kinds of

education usual among us, and in the course of it has learned to read

his native language. Later he reads books, letters, newspapers, and

other things.

Now what takes place when, say, he reads a newspaper?——His

eye passes—as we say—along the printed words, he says them out

loud—or only to himself; in particular he reads certain words by taking

in their printed shapes as wholes; others when his eye has taken in

the first syllables; others again he reads syllable by syllable, and an

occasional one perhaps letter by letter.—We should also say that he

had read a sentence if he spoke neither aloud nor to himself during

the reading but was afterwards able to repeat the sentence word for

word or nearly so.—He may attend to what he reads, or again—as we

might put it—function as a mere reading-machine: I mean, read aloud

and correctly without attending to what he is reading; perhaps with his

attention on something quite different (so that he is unable to say what

he has been reading if he is asked about it immediately afterwards).

Now compare a beginner with this reader. The beginner reads the

words by laboriously spelling them out.—Some however he guesses

from the context, or perhaps he already partly knows the passage by

heart. Then his teacher says that he is not really reading the words

(and in certain cases that he is only pretending to read them).

If we think of this sort of reading, the reading of a beginner, and

ask ourselves what reading consists in, we shall be inclined to say: it is a

special conscious activity of mind.

We also say of the pupil: "Of course he alone knows if he is really

reading or merely saying the words off by heart". (We have yet to

discuss these propositions: "He alone knows .... ".)

But I want to say: we have to admit that—as far as concerns

uttering any one of the printed words—the same thing may take place

in the consciousness of the pupil who is 'pretending' to read, as in

that of the practised reader who is 'reading' it. The word "to read"

is applied differently when we are speaking of the beginner and of the

practised reader.——Now we should of course like to say: What goes

on in that practised reader and in the beginner when they utter the

word can't be the same. And if there is no difference in what they

happen to be conscious of there must be one in the unconscious

workings of their minds, or, again, in the brain.—So we should like

to say: There are at all events two different mechanisms at work here.

And what goes on in them must distinguish reading from not reading.

—But these mechanisms are only hypotheses, models designed to

explain, to sum up, what you observe.’

these ‘mechanisms’ are hypotheses – and these hypotheses are proposals –

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and that – ‘there are two different mechanisms at work here’ – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

157. ‘Consider the following case. Human beings or creatures of

some other kind are used by us as reading-machines. They are trained

for this purpose. The trainer says of some that they can already read,

of others that they cannot yet do so. Take the case of a pupil who has

so far not taken part in the training: if he is shewn a written word

he will sometimes produce some sort of sound, and here and there it

happens 'accidentally' to be roughly right. A third person hears this

pupil on such an occasion and says: "He is reading". But the teacher

says: "No, he isn't reading; that was just an accident".—But let us

suppose that this pupil continues to react correctly to further words

that are put before him. After a while the teacher says: "Now he can

read!"—But what of that first word? Is the teacher to say: "I was

wrong, and he did read it"—or: "He only began really to read later

on"?—When did he begin to read? Which was the first word that he

read? This question makes no sense here. Unless, indeed, we give a

definition: "The first word that a person 'reads' is the first word of the

first series of 50 words that he reads correctly" (or something of the sort).

If on the other hand we use "reading" to stand for a certain

experience of transition from marks to spoken sounds, then it certainly

makes sense to speak of the first word that he really read. He can then

say, e.g. "At this word for the first time I had the feeling: 'now I am

reading'.

"Or again, in the different case of a reading machine which translated

marks into sounds, perhaps as a pianola does, it would be possible

to say: "The machine read only after such-and-such had happened to

it—after such-and-such parts had been connected by wires; the first

word that it read was ....".

But in the case of the living reading-machine "reading" meant

reacting to written signs in such-and-such ways. This concept was

therefore quite independent of that of a mental or other mechanism.—

Nor can the teacher here say of the pupil: "Perhaps he was already

reading when he said that word". For there is no doubt about what

he did.—The change when the pupil began to read was a change in

his behaviour, and it makes no sense here to speak of 'a first word in

his new state'.’

‘When did he begin to read? Which was the first word that he read? This question makes no sense here. Unless, indeed, we give a definition: "The first word that a person 'reads' is the first word of the first series of 50 words that he reads correctly" (or something of the sort).’

it is not that the question makes no sense – it is rather that any answer to the question – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

you give a definition – and all you do is put another proposal – open to question

‘"The machine read only after such-and-such had happened to it—after such-and-such parts had been connected by wires; the first word that it read was ....".’

yes – you can define reading in this manner – however logically speaking the definition – is open to question

‘The change when the pupil began to read was a change in his behaviour, and it makes no sense here to speak of 'a first word in his new state'.’

again – a fair enough proposal – and one open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

158. ‘But isn't that only because of our too slight acquaintance

with what goes on in the brain and the nervous system? If we had

a more accurate knowledge of these things we should see what

connexions were established by the training, and then we should be

able to say when we looked into his brain: "Now he has read this

word, now the reading connexion has been set up".——And it

presumably must be like that—for otherwise how could we be so

sure that there was such a connexion? That it is so is presumably

a priori—or is it only probable? And how probable is it? Now, ask

yourself: what do you know about these things?——But if it is

a priori, that means that it is a form of account which is very

convincing to us.’

seeing connections in the brain and the nervous system – is what?

it is dealing with proposals – proposals that even the scientists will tell you are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and even after seeing these connections – still the question would remain – when does he learn to read?

my point is – there is no answer to this question – that is not open to question – that is not open to doubt – that is not – uncertain

‘for otherwise how would we be sure there was such a connection”

well that is just the point – anyone who is ‘sure’ there is a connection – is epistemologically deluded

by all means put the proposal and run with it if it suits your outlook –

but don’t pretend certainty –

pretending certainty is the defining characteristic of the ignorant

‘That it is so is presumably a priori—or is it only probable? And how probable is it? Now, ask yourself: what do you know about these things?——But if it is a priori, that means that it is a form of account which is very convincing to us.’

if by an ‘a priori’ proposition – is meant that a proposition is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain – then there is no a priori proposition

what you have is not a proposition but a prejudice

as to probable –

if by a ‘probable’ proposition  is meant a proposition that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – then any proposition is probable

‘But if it is a priori, that means that it is a form of account which is very convincing to us. –‘

if the issue is what is ‘convincing’ – then you have left logic and moved into rhetoric

and as for being convinced by the a priori con – well some poor bastards will fall for anything

159. ‘But when we think the matter over we are tempted to say:

the one real criterion for anybody's reading is the conscious act of

reading, the act of reading the sounds off from the letters. "A man

surely knows whether he is reading or only pretending to read!"—

Suppose A wants to make B believe he can read Cyrillic script. He

learns a Russian sentence by heart and says it while looking at the

printed words as if he were reading them. Here we shall certainly

say that A knows he is not reading, and has a sense of just this while

pretending to read. For there are of course many more or less

characteristic sensations in reading a printed sentence; it is not

difficult to call such sensations to mind: think of sensations of

hesitating, of looking closer, of misreading, of words following on

one another more or less smoothly, and so on. And equally there are

characteristic sensations in reciting something one has learnt by

heart. In our example A will have none of the sensations that are

characteristic of reading, and will perhaps have a set of sensations

characteristic of cheating.’

if I say – ‘I know am reading’ – and I am not deceiving in making this statement –

still the statement ‘I know I am reading’ – is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain –

just what does this knowledge consist in?

presumably it has been put to me somewhere along the line – that this behaviour I am engaged is called ‘reading’ –

and if so – this means that my ‘knowledge’ – is based on a proposition – a proposal – put to me –

and yes we can ask well what then does this ‘reading’ amount to – what is it?

there can be various proposals put here – various explanatory proposals –

Wittgenstein refers to ‘characteristic sensations’ – to account for reading – ok – but this is vague – and clearly open to question –

the nature of reading – as with the nature of any human activity – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and the best we can do here is involve ourselves in the critical investigation of all explanatory proposals put forward

and perhaps as a result of such an investigation new proposals will be advanced –

new proposals to be critically investigated –

our knowledge is this critical investigation

160. ‘But imagine the following case: We give someone who can

read fluently a text that he never saw before. He reads it to us—but

with the sensation of saying something he has learnt by heart (this

might be the effect of some drug). Should we say in such a case that

he was not really reading the passage? Should we here allow his

sensations to count as the criterion for his reading or not reading?

Or again: Suppose that a man who is under the influence of a

certain drug is presented with a series of characters (which need not

belong to any existing alphabet). He utters words corresponding to

the number of the characters, as if they were letters, and does so with

all the outward signs, and with the sensations, of reading. (We have

experiences like this in dreams; after waking up in such a case one says

perhaps: "It seemed to me as if I were reading a script, though it was

not writing at all.") In such a case some people would be inclined to

say the man was reading those marks. Others, that he was not.—

Suppose he has in this way read (or interpreted) a set of five marks as

A B O V E—and now we shew him the same marks in the reverse

order and he reads E VO B A; and in further tests he always retains

the same interpretation of the marks: here we should certainly be

inclined to say he was making up an alphabet for himself ad hoc and

then reading accordingly.’

‘He reads it to us—but with the sensation of saying something he has learnt by heart (this might be the effect of some drug). Should we say in such a case that he was not really reading the passage? Should we here allow his sensations to count as the criterion for his reading or not reading’

whether he is reading or not – is open to question –

a sensation is an explanatory proposal

whether such a proposal explains reading or not reading – is open to question –

‘("It seemed to me as if I were reading a script, though it was not writing at all.") –

he recognizes that what he was doing is reading – but can’t say what he was reading –

if you regard reading as simply a learned behaviour that doesn’t necessarily relate to a text – you might say –  yes – strictly speaking he was reading

on the other hand if you take the view that reading is a process in relation to text – then the answer would be – no – he is not reading

‘Suppose he has in this way read (or interpreted) a set of five marks as A B O V E—and now we shew him the same marks in the reverse order and he reads E VO B A; and in further tests he always retains the same interpretation of the marks: here we should certainly be inclined to say he was making up an alphabet for himself ad hoc and then reading accordingly.’

yes – and why not?

161. ‘And remember too that there is a continuous series of transitional

cases between that in which a person repeats from memory

what he is supposed to be reading, and that in which he spells out every

word without being helped at all by guessing from the context or

knowing by heart.

Try this experiment: say the numbers from 1 to 12. Now look at

the dial of your watch and read them.—What was it that you called

"reading" in the latter case? That is to say: what did you do, to make

it into reading?’

the point is this that any proposal of reading – is open to question –

and that includes what Wittgenstein refers to as these ‘transitional cases’

in relation to his proposed experiment  he asks –

‘What was it that you called "reading" in the latter case? That is to say: what did you do, to make it into reading?’

what you did to make it into reading – was propose it as reading –

and that proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

162. ‘Let us try the following definition: You are reading when

you derive the reproduction from the original. And by "the original" I

mean the text which you read or copy; the dictation from which you

write; the score from which you play; etc. etc.—Now suppose we have,

for example, taught someone the Cyrillic alphabet, and told him how

to pronounce each letter. Next we put a passage before him and he

reads it, pronouncing every letter as we have taught him. In this case

we shall very likely say that he derives the sound of a word from

the written pattern by the rule that we have given him. And this

is also a clear case of reading. (We might say that we had taught him

the 'rule of the alphabet'.)

But why do we say that he has derived the spoken from the printed

words? Do we know anything more than that we taught him how each

letter should be pronounced, and that he then read the words out

loud? Perhaps our reply will be: the pupil shews that he is using the

rule we have given him to pass from the printed to the spoken words.—

How this can be shewn becomes clearer if we change our example to

one in which the pupil has to write out the text instead of reading it

to us, has to make the transition from print to handwriting. For in

this case we can give him the rule in the form of a table with printed

letters in one column and cursive letters in the other. And he shews

that he is deriving his script from the printed words by consulting the

table.’

‘Let us try the following definition: You are reading when you derive the reproduction from the original. And by "the original" I mean the text which you read or copy; the dictation from which you write; the score from which you play; etc. etc.—‘

ok – ‘deriving’ here?

‘deriving’ – is proposing in relation to the original –

and is reading always a game – a rule-governed propositional action in relation to text?

what about when we say we ‘read a face’ – ‘read a situation’?

or when someone says he is ‘reading the skies’ to get an idea of the weather that is coming?

there are no rules in these uses of ‘read’ and ‘reading’ here – and no text

reading is whatever it is proposed to be –

and any such proposal is open to question

if I use the terms ‘read’ or ‘reading’ in a way that no one has heard before – that is if I create a new meaning – a new use of the term – then others will likely say they don’t know what I am talking about –

I will need to argue my case for the new usage – for its acceptance –

and I might be successful here or I might not

163. ‘But suppose that when he did this he always wrote b for A,

c for B, d for C, and so on, and a for Z?—Surely we should call this too

a derivation by means of the table.—He is using it now, we might say,

according to the second schema in §86 instead of the first.

It would still be a perfectly good case of derivation according to the

table, even if it were represented by a schema of arrows without

any simple regularity.

Suppose, however, that he does not stick to a single method of

transcribing, but alters his method according to a simple rule: if he

has once written n for A, then he writes o for the next A, p for the next,

and so on.—-But where is the dividing line between this procedure and

a random one?

But does this mean that the word "to derive" really has no meaning,

since the meaning seems to disintegrate when we follow it up?’

the point is that his ‘language’ – is open to question

a derivative explanation sheds some light –

or such an approach might prove limited – and so of little use

Wittgenstein assumes that there is a rule governing this language use –

that is fair enough

however such a proposal is open to question

even a so called ‘random’ procedure – is open to question

how we explain this use of letters – this language – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

it is not that ‘derive’ here has no meaning – it is one explanatory approach – one among many – and as uncertain as any other

meaning may disintegrate –

but if disintegration is proposed – disintegration is open to question

164. ‘In case (162) the meaning of the word "to derive" stood out

clearly. But we told ourselves that this was only a quite special case

of deriving; deriving in a quite special garb, which had to be stripped

from it if we wanted to see the essence of deriving. So we stripped

those particular coverings off; but then deriving itself disappeared.—

In order to find the real artichoke, we divested it of its leaves. For

certainly (162) was a special case of deriving; what is essential to

deriving, however, was not hidden beneath the surface of this case, but

his 'surface' was one case out of the family of cases of deriving.

And in the same way we also use the word "to read" for a family

of cases. And in different circumstances we apply different criteria for

a person's reading.’

‘to derive’ – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and what this proposal amounts to is open to question

therefore if the proposal is explored – different accounts of it will be proposed –

different accounts – open to question

what connects these proposals – is the subject proposal – and its critical analysis –

and yes – the same applies to the proposal – ‘reading’

and it should also be noted that this proposed ‘category’ of ‘family’ – this proposal – ‘family’ –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

165. ‘But surely—we should like to say—reading is a quite particular

process! Read a page of print and you can see that something special

is going on, something highly characteristic.——Well, what does go on

when I read the page? I see printed words and I say words out loud.

But, of course, that is not all, for I might see printed words and say

words out loud and still not be reading. Even if the words which I say

are those which, going by an existing alphabet, are supposed to be read

off from the printed ones.—And if you say that reading is a particular

experience, then it becomes quite unimportant whether or not you read

according to some generally recognized alphabetical rule.—And what

does the characteristic thing about the experience of reading consist

in?—Here I should like to say: "The words that I utter come in a special

way." That is, they do not come as they would if I were for example

making them up.—They come of themselves.—But even that is not

enough; for the sounds of words may occur to me while I am looking at

printed words, but that does not mean that I have read them.—In

addition I might say here, neither do the spoken words occur to me

as if, say, something reminded me of them. I should for example not

wish to say: the printed word "nothing" always reminds me of the

sound "nothing"—but the spoken words as it were slip in as one

reads. And if I so much as look at a German printed word, there

occurs a peculiar process, that of hearing the sound inwardly.’

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

‘The grammar of the expression "a quite particular" (atmosphere).

One says "This face has a quite particular expression," and maybe

looks for words to characterize it.’

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if we are looking at a particular propositional activity – we will likely begin by considering what makes it ‘particular’

what we have from Wittgenstein above – is an excellent example of such an approach and analysis

however this is only one way of considering the issue – we might – alternatively take the view that the activity appears particular – but in fact is not

that would be to argue that reading shares essential propositional characteristics with other propositional activities – and that from such a point of view – in reality – is not propositionally distinctive

whether the argument is that reading is a particular propositional activity – or the argument is that it is not a particular propositional activity – the logical reality is that any approach and argument regarding the matter – is open to question –

when you put your argument on this matter – or any matter – if your object in doing so is to convince or persuade  – i.e. –‘But surely—we should like to say—reading is a quite particular process!’ – then what you are engaged in is not logic – but rhetoric –

if on the other hand you concern is the logical analysis of a proposal – of a proposition – of a propositional activity – your focus will not be on just one approach to the issue – but rather it will be a focus on the different approaches to the matter

 in logical analysis – yes – you develop a particular argument – but you should also develop and consider opposing or different propositional perspectives –

the point is to explore – explore and map out  the propositional landscape – and to always have in mind that whatever is proposed and considered – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

166. ‘I said that when one reads the spoken words come 'in a

special way': but in what way? Isn't this a fiction? Let us look at

individual letters and attend to the way the sound of the letter comes.

Read the letter A. — Now, how did the sound come? — We have no

idea what to say about it. —— Now write a small Roman a. — How

did the movement of the hand come as you wrote? Differently from

the way the sound came in the previous experiment? — All I know is,

I looked at the printed letter and wrote the cursive letter. —— Now look

at the mark an (^ let a sound occur to you as you do so; utter it.

The sound 'U' occurred to me; but I could not say that there was any

essential difference in the kind of way that sound came. The difference

lay in the difference of situation. I had told myself beforehand that I

was to let a sound occur to me; there was a certain tension present

before the sound came. And I did not say 'U' automatically as I do

when I look at the letter U. Further, that mark was not familiar to

me in the way the letters of the alphabet are. I looked at it rather

intently and with a certain interest in its shape; as I looked I thought

of a reversed sigma.——Imagine having to use this mark regularly as

a letter; so that you got used to uttering a particular sound at the sight

of it, say the sound "sh". Can we say anything but that after a while

this sound comes automatically when we look at the mark? That is

to say: I no longer ask myself on seeing it "What sort of letter is that?"

—nor, of course, do I tell myself "This mark makes me want to utter

the sound 'sh' ", nor yet "This mark somehow reminds me of the

sound 'sh' ".

(Compare with this the idea that memory images are distinguished

from other mental images by some special characteristic.)’

‘I said that when one reads the spoken words come 'in a special way': but in what way? Isn't this a fiction?

it is ok to put the proposal that the spoken words come ‘in a special way’ –

but to make this a useful proposal – you have to give some account of what you mean by ‘special’ here

you have to put some meat on the bone – otherwise ‘special’ here is rhetorical –

and perhaps it is a ‘fiction’ – even so you still have to give the proposal some substance – otherwise – fiction or not – it is just a proposal – hanging in the air – going nowhere

how did the sound come? – I don’t know – but I am interested in any proposal as to how the sound came –

and I would regard any such proposal – as open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

Wittgenstein goes on to consider different situations in which sounds of signs occur – and proposes that regular use of what is an unfamiliar sound in relation to a mark –

will become automatic –

perhaps so

the logical point though is that the production of the sound – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and even when proposed as ‘automatic’ – open to question

and if you are going to propose that memory images are distinguished from other mental images by some special characteristic – or argue that they are not so distinguished  –

the same issue arises – you need to give some substance to ‘special characteristic’ –

and then begin the argument

Wittgenstein does not do this –

his whole approach here seems to be one of suggestion –

and clever suggestion has its place in rhetoric – but not in logic

Wittgenstein began with –

‘I said that when one reads the spoken words come 'in a special way': but in what way? Isn't this a fiction?’

here Wittgenstein has set up a straw man – and has then gone on to ‘argue’ that it is a straw man –

really what was the point?

167. ‘Now what is there in the proposition that reading is 'a quite

particular process'? It presumably means that when we read one

particular process takes place, which we recognize.—But suppose

that I at one time read a sentence in print and at another write it in

Morse code—is the mental process really the same?——On the other

hand, however, there is certainly some uniformity in the experience

of reading a page of print. For the process is a uniform one. And

it is quite easy to understand that there is a difference between this

process and one of, say, letting words occur to one at the sight of

arbitrary marks.—For the mere look of a printed line is itself extremely

characteristic—it presents, that is, a quite special appearance, the letters

all roughly the same size, akin in shape too, and always recurring;

most of the words constantly repeated and enormously familiar to us,

like well-known faces.—Think of the uneasiness we feel when the

spelling of a word is changed. (And of the still stronger feelings that

questions about the spelling of words have aroused.) Of course, not

all signs have impressed themselves on us so strongly. A sign in the

algebra of logic for instance can be replaced by any other one without

exciting a strong reaction in us.—

Remember that the look of a word is familiar to us in the same kind

of way as its sound.’

all this amounts to is that the proposal that reading is ‘quite a particular process’ – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain –

just as is any propositional response to this proposal

168. ‘Again, our eye passes over printed lines differently from the

way it passes over arbitrary pothooks and flourishes. (I am not

speaking here of what can be established by observing the movement

of the eyes of a reader.) The eye passes, one would like to say, with

particular ease, without being held up; and yet it doesn't skid. And at the

same time involuntary speech goes on in the imagination. That is how

it is when I read German and other languages, printed or written,

and in various styles.—But what in all this is essential to reading as

such? Not any one feature that occurs in all cases of reading. (Compare

reading ordinary print with reading words which are printed entirely

in capital letters, as solutions of puzzles sometimes are. How different

it is!—Or reading our script from right to left.)’

‘But what in all this is essential to reading as such? Not any one feature that occurs in all cases of reading’

I am not against anyone proposing that there is something essential to reading – the proposal is valid

however as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in the same way in which the proposal that there is nothing essential to reading – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

169. ‘But when we read don't we feel the word-shapes somehow

causing our utterance?——Read a sentence.—And now look along the

following line

&8 § ¹  §¹?B +% 8§*

and say a sentence as you do so. Can't one feel that in the first case

the utterance was connected with seeing the signs and in the second

went on side by side with the seeing without any connexion?

But why do you say that we felt a causal connexion? Causation is

surely something established by experiments, by observing a regular

concomitance of events for example. So how could I say that I felt

something which is established by experiment? (It is indeed true

that observation of regular concomitances is not the only way we

establish causation.) One might rather say, I feel that the letters are

the reason why I read such-and-such. For if someone asks me "Why

do you read such-and-such?"—I justify my reading by the letters which

are there.

This justification, however, was something that I said, or thought:

what does it mean to say that I feel it? I should like to say: when I

read I feel a kind of influence of the letters working on me——but I

feel no influence from that series of arbitrary flourishes on what I

say.—Let us once more compare an individual letter with such a

flourish. Should I also say I feel the influence of "i" when I read it?

It does of course make a difference whether I say "i" when I see "i"

or when I see "§". The difference is, for instance, that when I see the

letter it is automatic for me to hear the sound "i" inwardly, it happens

even against my will; and I pronounce the letter more effortlessly

when I read it than when I am looking at "§". That is to say: this is

how it is when I make the experiment; but of course it is not so if I

happen to be looking at the mark "§" and at the same time pronounce

a word in which the sound "i" occurs.’

‘But when we read don't we feel the word-shapes somehow causing our utterance?’

that word-shapes ‘cause’ utterance – is a proposal – and one open to question –

‘But why do you say that we felt a causal connexion?’ –

saying this may just be a way of explaining the connection between word and utterance –

as Wittgenstein shows – this proposal is open to question –

‘when I read I feel a kind of influence of the letters working on me – but I feel no influence from that series of arbitrary flourishes on what I say’ –

comparing a normal sentence with an arbitrary flourish – is as they say – like comparing apples and oranges –

it is comparing a sentence – which is a known form in a language – with a series of marks or signs that do not constitute a sentence – do not constitute a recognized form

one is a sentence – the other is not – so no surprise that you would ‘feel’ different about the arbitrary flourish

as to the comparison of i and § –

that you might hear the sound of i ‘inwardly’ but not that of § – is likely to be because you have been trained to sound i  – but not trained to sound § –

so in general it is a question of usage –

what we have here is accounts of propositional usage –

any account of usage – is a proposal – open to question –

I see no real problem with the causal account – or the ‘influence’ account – if these accounts suit your purpose – and in a lot of contexts they would – they would go unremarked –

however as Wittgenstein demonstrates in a philosophical context such accounts – throw up red flags –

so the issue you might say is not explanation per se – rather context – the propositional context of an explanation –

in what propositional context does a particular explanation fit?

and any proposal here – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

170. ‘It would never have occurred to us to think that we felt the

influence of the letters on us when reading, if we had not compared the

case of letters with that of arbitrary marks. And here we are indeed

noticing a difference. And we interpret it as the difference between being

influenced and not being influenced.

In particular, this interpretation appeals to us especially when we

make a point of reading slowly—perhaps in order to see what does

happen when we read. When we, so to speak, quite intentionally let

ourselves be guided by the letters. But this 'letting myself be guided' in

turn only consists in my looking carefully at the letters—and perhaps

excluding certain other thoughts.

We imagine that a feeling enables us to perceive as it were a connecting

mechanism between the look of the word and the sound that

we utter. For when I speak of the experiences of being influenced,

of causal connexion, of being guided, that is really meant to imply that

I as it were feel the movement of the lever which connects seeing the

letters with speaking.’

‘It would never have occurred to us to think that we felt the influence of the letters on us when reading, …’

it would never have occurred to us – until it was proposed – that is the point

‘In particular, this interpretation appeals to us especially when we make a point of reading slowly…’

another proposal – open to question –

‘For when I speak of the experiences of being influenced, of causal connexion, of being guided, that is really meant to imply that I as it were feel the movement of the lever which connects seeing the letters with speaking.’

is it really meant to imply that?

perhaps proposing a causal connection – is an analogy – or speaking metaphorically?

as to being influenced –

the matter is propositional –

that is to say you yourself – propose – or someone else proposes – a relation between seeing the letters and speaking –

and if you ‘feel’ this relation – this ‘feel’ – is a proposal –

and a proposal – logically speaking – that can be put to question – put to doubt – and is uncertain

171. ‘I might have used other words to hit off the experience I have

when I read a word. Thus I might say that the written word intimates

the sound to me.—Or again, that when one reads, letter and sound

form a unity—as it were an alloy. (In the same way e.g. the faces of

famous men and the sound of their names are fused together. This

name strikes me as the only right one for this face.) When I feel this

unity, I might say, I see or hear the sound in the written word.—

But now just read a few sentences in print as you usually do when

you are not thinking about the concept of reading; and ask yourself

whether you had such experiences of unity, of being influenced and

the rest, as you read.—Don't say you had them unconsciously! Nor

should we be misled by the picture which suggests that these

phenomena came in sight 'on closer inspection'. If I am supposed to

describe how an object looks from far off, I don't make the description

more accurate by saying what can be noticed about the object on

closer inspection.’

the sound of a written word – is like the written word – a proposal

logically it is a proposal put in relation to a proposal

the sound you make or hear could well be different – and most likely will be in different language groups

there is nothing definite about sound

that the letter and the sound ‘form a unity’ – is a contingent fact – if it is a fact

a fact to do with context and practise – but there is no necessity in this

a deaf person may never know the sound of a written word – a blind person – only the sound

the relation of the sound of a word to the written word  – is a propositional relation – a relation open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

172. ‘Let us consider the experience of being guided, and ask

ourselves: what does this experience consist in when for instance our

course is guided?—Imagine the following cases:

You are in a playing field with your eyes bandaged, and someone

leads you by the hand, sometimes left, sometimes right; you have

constantly to be ready for the tug of his hand, and must also take care

not to stumble when he gives an unexpected tug.

Or again: someone leads you by the hand where you are unwilling

to go, by force.

Or: you are guided by a partner in a dance; you make yourself as

receptive as possible, in order to guess his intention and obey the

slightest pressure.

Or: someone takes you for a walk; you are having a conversation;

you go wherever he does.

Or: you walk along a field-track, simply following it.

All these situations are similar to one another; but what is common

to all the experiences?’

what is common here?

Wittgenstein himself proposes that what is common is the experience of being guided

this proposal though is open to question

are you being guided on the playing field with your eyes bandaged etc?

how do you know that the person leading you by the hand is guiding you – perhaps they are playing with you?

are you being guided – when taken by force?

perhaps a better description is that you are being abused?

guessing someone’s intention and being prepared to obey them – might be more like being imprisoned than guided

you go where he goes – is not necessarily being ‘guided’ – it could be a case of the blind leading the blind

simply following a line in a field-track – strikes me as just a case of following

look you can propose commonality – there is no problem in doing this – but any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

173. ‘"But being guided is surely a particular experience!"—The

answer to this is: you are now thinking of a particular experience of

being guided.

If I want to realize the experience of the person in one of the earlier

examples, whose writing is guided by the printed text and the table,

I imagine 'conscientious' looking-up, and so on. As I do this I assume

a particular expression of face (say that of a conscientious bookkeeper).

Carefulness is a most essential part of this picture; in another

the exclusion of every volition of one's own would be essential. (But

take something normal people do quite unconcernedly and imagine

someone accompanying it with the expression—and why not the

feelings?—of great carefulness.—Does that mean he is careful?

Imagine a servant dropping the tea-tray and everything on it with all

the outward signs of carefulness.) If I imagine such a particular

experience, it seems to me to be the experience of being guided (or of

reading). But now I ask myself: what are you doing?—You are

looking at every letter, you are making this face, you are writing the

letters with deliberation (and so on).—So that is the experience of

being guided?——Here I should like to say: "No, it isn't that; it is

something more inward, more essential."—It is as if at first all these

more or less inessential processes were shrouded in a particular

atmosphere, which dissipates when I look closely at them.’

‘"But being guided is surely a particular experience!"—The answer to this is: you are now thinking of a particular experience of being guided.’

you are now proposing a particular experience of being guided –

and just what the ‘particularity’ here amounts to – and what the ‘experience’ of being guided amounts to – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it is not as if when proposals are made – the proposer has in mind just what is being proposed – with any certainty

you make a proposal – you put it to question – you put it to doubt – you explore its uncertainty – in order to know – what you are proposing

it is the critical investigation of the proposal that gives substance to the proposal –

and the ‘substance’ here is a critical understanding

Wittgenstein in considering this ‘experience of being guided’ – does conduct a critical investigation – and he comes to the conclusion –

‘So that is the experience of being guided?——Here I should like to say: "No, it isn't that; it is something more inward, more essential."’

Wittgenstein has put up this proposal – and that is good – it is interesting –

the thing is though – logically speaking – it has no greater or lesser value than any other proposal –

as with any proposal – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

run with it if you will – but know you are running with uncertainty

174. ‘Ask yourself how you draw a line parallel to a given one 'with

deliberation'—and another time, with deliberation, one at an angle

to it. What is the experience of deliberation? Here a particular look,

a gesture, at once occur to you—and then you would like to say:

"And it just is a particular inner experience". (And that is, of course,

to add nothing).

(This is connected with the problem of the nature of intention, of willing.’

drawing a line parallel to a given one – is a proposal –

describing this propositional act as an act of deliberation – is a proposal –

both proposals – in different ways – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

i.e. – is it really a ‘parallel’ line? – there can be genuine questions here –

and just how do we understand ‘deliberation’? – there are any number of options here

‘What is the experience of deliberation? Here a particular look a gesture, at once occur to you’ –

and it should be noted that this proposal of deliberation – is a proposal designed to explain the proposal of particularity

‘"And it just is a particular inner experience". (And that is, of course, to add nothing).’ –

well it doesn’t add ‘nothing’ –

if this proposal is entertained – it adds a new propositional dimension and context to the issue – to its understanding –

as indeed Wittgenstein is well aware – and as his reference to the question of the nature of intention and willing clearly indicates –

it is a propositional addition – and one that is open to question – open to doubt – open to question – and uncertain

175. ‘Make some arbitrary doodle on a bit of paper.——And now

make a copy next to it, let yourself be guided by it.——I should like

to say: "Sure enough, I was guided here. But as for what was characteristic

in what happened—if I say what happened, I no longer find it

characteristic.

"But now notice this: while I am being guided everything is quite

simple, I notice nothing special; but afterwards, when I ask myself

what it was that happened, it seems to have been something indescribable.

Afterwards no description satisfies me. It's as if I couldn't believe

that I merely looked, made such-and-such a face, and drew a line.—

But don't I remember anything else? No; and yet I feel as if there must

have been something else; in particular when I say "guidance'',

"influence", and other such words to myself. "For surely," I tell myself,

"I was being guided."—Only then does the idea of that ethereal,

intangible influence arise.’

perhaps you could propose that what is ‘characteristic’ here – is that the propositional action is guided?

you can go around in circles here

the logical point is that the proposal that the action is guided – is open to question –

i.e. – you could just as easily describe the action – as one of ‘copying’

and as for ‘characteristic’ – if it is indeed an issue at all – again – just what that is to amount to is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘"For surely," I tell myself, "I was being guided."—Only then does the idea of that ethereal, intangible influence arise.’ –

you can tell yourself whatever you like – and that can lead wherever it does

whatever the case – you are dealing with proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

176. ‘When I look back on the experience I have the feeling that

what is essential about it is an 'experience of being influenced', of a

connexion—as opposed to any mere simultaneity of phenomena: but

at the same time I should not be willing to call any experienced

phenomenon the "experience of being influenced". (This contains

the germ of the idea that the will is not a phenomenon.") I should like

to say that I had experienced the 'because', and yet I do not want to call

any phenomenon the "experience of the because".’

looking back on the experience and having the feeling that what is essential about it is an experience of being influenced – is to propose in relation to the experience –

is to propose in relation to the proposal of experience

‘the experience of being influenced’?

well if you don’t want to describe it that way – fair enough

and the ‘idea’ that the will is not a phenomenon – is again a fair enough proposal

if you do not want to describe the experience – as the ‘experience of because’ – then don’t put that proposal

what we have here is a series of inter-related proposals – and as Wittgenstein is suggesting – conflicting proposals

conflicting or not – these proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

177. ‘I should like to say: "I experience the because". Not because

I remember such an experience, but because when I reflect on what I

experience in such a case I look at it through the medium of the concept

'because' (or 'influence' or 'cause' or 'connexion').—For of course it

is correct to say I drew the line under the influence of the original:

this, however, does not consist simply in my feelings as I drew the

line—under certain circumstances, it may consist in my drawing it

parallel to the other—even though this in turn is not in general essential

to being guided. –’

what counts as ‘experience’ – is open to question –

i.e. – is reflection on experience – ‘experience’? – or is ‘experience’ the direct experience – and reflection on it something other than experience?

still could it not be said that you experience the reflection?

and as for ‘because’ – do you experience ‘because’ – or is it better seen as ‘making a connection’ –

on the other hand – do you not experience ‘making a connection’?

and as Wittgenstein has noted – we make decisions  (‘I drew the line’) in response to the critical issues involved

these decisions though are really just steps in propositional uncertainty –

and as with any proposition – or propositional decision – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in the absence of proposal – of propositions – what we face is the unknown –

and the unknown is silent

we propose in response to the unknown –

proposing is making known – is making knowledge

our world is proposed – our worlds are proposed

our proposals – our propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

our knowledge is uncertain –

our propositional worlds are uncertain

178. ‘We also say: "You can see that I am guided by it"—and

what do you see, if you see this?

When I say to myself: "But I am guided"—I make perhaps a

movement with my hand, which expresses guiding.—Make such a

movement of the hand as if you were guiding someone along, and then ask

yourself what the guiding character of this movement consisted in. For

you were not guiding anyone. But you still want to call the movement

one of 'guiding'. This movement and feeling did not contain the

essence of guiding, but still this word forces itself upon you. It is just

a single form of guiding which forces the expression on us.’

what you ‘see’ – is what is proposed – and what is proposed is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

when you say to yourself ‘I am guided’ – you put a proposal – and interpret your actions in terms of that proposal –

and what this proposal amounts to is open to question

when you ask yourself what the guiding character of this movement consists in –

you put your proposal to question

as to the ‘essence’ of guiding – if it is proposed as guiding – it is guiding – whatever that comes to

and the word ‘guiding’ does not force itself upon you – you propose it –

a ‘single form of guiding’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

179. ‘Let us return to our case (151). It is clear that we should not

say B had the right to say the words "Now I know how to go on",

just because he thought of the formula—unless experience shewed

that there was a connexion between thinking of the formula—saying it,

writing it down—and actually continuing the series. And obviously

such a connexion does exist.—And now one might think that the

sentence "I can go on" meant "I have an experience which I know

empirically to lead to the continuation of the series." But does B mean

that when he says he can go on? Does that sentence come to his mind,

or is he ready to produce it in explanation of what he meant?

No. The words "Now I know how to go on" were correctly used

when he thought of the formula: that is, given such circumstances as

that he had learnt algebra, had used such formulae before.—But that

does not mean that his statement is only short for a description of all

the circumstances which constitute the scene for our language-game.—

Think how we learn to use the expressions "Now I know how to go

on", "Now I can go on" and others; in what family of language-games

we learn their use.

We can also imagine the case where nothing at all occurred in B's

mind except that he suddenly said "Now I know how to go on"—

perhaps with a feeling of relief; and that he did in fact go on working

out the series without using the formula. And in this case too we

should say—in certain circumstances—that he did know how to go on.’

‘now I can go on’ – is a proposal

all very well to put an explanation of this proposal – i.e. it indicates the use of an algebraic formula – or the having of an experience – etc. etc. –

and if you are in the business of explanation – this is what you do –

and if your explanation suits your purpose – then you are likely to stick with it –

however any ‘explanation’ – as with that to be explained – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

Wittgenstein says –

‘Think how we learn to use the expressions "Now I know how to go on", "Now I can go on" and others; in what family of language-games we learn their use.’

this notion of a ‘family of language-games’ – is a proposal – open to question

as to what B had in mind when he said ‘now I can go on’ – all you can do there is ask B – and probably best to accept his answer – if he has one –

what’s going on in your mind when B says ‘now I can go on’ – is another matter

however the logical issue – has nothing to do with B’s mind – your mind – or anyone else’s so called ‘mind’ –

the logical issue is that any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt –

and is uncertain

180. ‘This is how these words are used. It would be quite misleading,

in this last case, for instance, to call the words a "description of a

mental state".—One might rather call them a "signal"; and we judge

whether it was rightly employed by what he goes on to do.’

saying – ‘this is how these words are used’ – is a proposal regarding use

‘a description of a mental state’ – is not a proposal of how the words are used –

it is an a proposal regarding how we are to understand the words –

we can say the words are used in this way – whatever that amounts to –

while offering different accounts of how we are to understand them – one of which could be that they describe a mental state –

stating use – is not stating understanding –

use – and understanding – are two different things –

nevertheless any proposal regarding how words are used is open to question – and any proposal as to how they are understood is open to question

‘One might rather call them a "signal"; and we judge whether it was rightly employed by what he goes on to do.’ –

call them a signal – if you like – if that suits your purpose –

and yes we judge – and any judgment – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

181. ‘In order to understand this, we need also to consider the

following: suppose B says he knows how to go on—but when he

wants to go on he hesitates and can't do it: are we to say that he was

wrong when he said he could go on, or rather that he was able to go on

then, only now is not?—Clearly we shall say different things in different

cases. (Consider both kinds of case.)’

his proposal – ‘I know how to go on’ – is open to question –

‘but when he wants to go on he hesitates and can’t go on’ –

his action here is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

perhaps his hesitation indicates that he is putting his proposal to question – that he has doubts – and is uncertain?

182. ‘The grammar of "to fit", "to be able", and "to understand".

(Exercises: (1) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H?

Only while C is stuck into H? (2) Sometimes we say that C ceased to

fit into H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a

case for its having happened at that time? (3) What does one regard as

criteria for a body's having changed its weight at a particular time if it

was not actually on the balance at that time? (4) Yesterday I knew the

poem by heart; today I no longer know it. In what kind of case does it

make sense to ask: "When did I stop knowing it?" (5) Someone asks

me "Can you lift this weight?" I answer "Yes". Now he says "Do

it!"—and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would it count as a

justification to say "When I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I

can't"?

The criteria which we accept for 'fitting', 'being able to', 'understanding',

are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is,

the game with these words, their employment in the linguistic

intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved—

the role of these words in our language other—than we are tempted

to think.

(This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical

paradoxes. And hence definitions usually fail to resolve them; and so,

a fortiori does the assertion that a word is 'indefinable'.)’

                                                                                                                                        ‘(1) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only while C is stuck into H?’

a cylinder C is said to fit into a hollow cylinder H – when it is said that it does

when it is proposed that it does

now as with any proposal – this ‘fit’ proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

any criteria adopted for determining ‘fit’ – will be open to question

decisions get made as to what ‘fit’ amounts to – and these decisions might well be different at different times and in different places –

these decisions are proposals – open to question –

‘(5) Someone asks me "Can you lift this weight?" I answer "Yes". Now he says "Do

it!"—and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would it count as a justification to say "When I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I can't"?’

‘yes’ here – despite its apparent decisiveness – is a proposal –

that this proposal turns out not to function – is just the way of things –

that is to say in the circumstances – it turns out that it is not a useful proposal

what ‘yes’ meant when it was spoken – is open to question

‘The criteria which we accept for 'fitting', 'being able to', 'understanding',

are much more complicated than might appear at first sight.’

yes indeed – because ‘fitting’ – ‘being able to’ – and ‘understanding’ – are proposals

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any criteria proposed for these words – are open to question

here we are talking about the critical use of language –

language-games are rule-governed –

there are no ‘rules’ as such in the critical evaluation of language use –

any rules proposed – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘(This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes. And hence definitions usually fail to resolve them; and so, a fortiori does the assertion that a word is 'indefinable'.)’

philosophical paradoxes – result from a non-critical use of language

they occur when the terms involved are seen to have fixed meanings –

a paradoxical use of language – is the sign of non-critical – irrational language practise –

paradoxes occur as a failure of critical thinking

definitions are only of any use – if they are held open to question

the assertion that a word is ‘indefinable’ – is the last stand for ignorance as a pretence for wisdom

any word – is open –  open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

183. ‘But did "Now I can go on" in case (151) mean the same as

"Now the formula has occurred to me" or something different?

We may say that, in those circumstances, the two sentences have the

same sense, achieve the same thing. But also that in general these two

sentences do not have the same sense. We do say: "Now I can go on,

I mean I know the formula", as we say "I can walk, I mean I have

time"; but also "I can walk, I mean I am already strong enough";

or: "I can walk, as far as the state of my legs is concerned", that is,

when we are contrasting this condition for walking with others. But

here we must be on our guard against thinking that there is some

totality of conditions corresponding to the nature of each case (e.g.

for a person's walking) so that, as it were, he could not but walk if

they were all fulfilled.’

‘a totality of conditions’ –

any such proposal – is fair enough –

so long as you understand that it can only be a stop (perhaps a resting place) in the logical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of  propositional uncertainty

184. ‘I want to remember a tune and it escapes me; suddenly I say

"Now I know it" and I sing it. What was it like to suddenly know it?

Surely it can't have occurred to me in its entirety in that moment'!—

Perhaps you will say: "It's a particular feeling, as if it were there"—

but is it there? Suppose I now begin to sing it and get stuck?——

But may I not have been certain at that moment that I knew it? So in

some sense or other it was there after all!——But in what sense?

You would say that the tune was there, if, say, someone sang it through,

or heard it mentally from beginning to end. I am not, of course, denying

that the statement that the tune is there can also be given a quite

different meaning—for example, that I have a bit of paper on which it is

written.—And what does his being 'certain', his knowing it, consist in?

—Of course we can say: if someone says with conviction that now he

knows the tune, then it is (somehow) present to his mind in its entirety

at that moment——and this is a definition of the expression "the tune is

present to his mind in its entirety".’

‘"Now I know it" and I sing it. What was it like to suddenly know it?’

here we are talking about proposals –

‘now I know it’ – is to report the proposal (of the tune) –

‘and I sing it’ – is to give voice to the proposal – to make it public

the ‘knowing it’ – the ‘knowledge’ – is the proposal – whether made public or not –

‘What was it like to suddenly know it?’ – is a question that can be asked here

and this knowing – this knowledge – this proposal – as Wittgenstein goes on to show – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

to know is to propose –

and to give account of proposal – of ‘knowledge’ – is to propose –

logically speaking – any proposal – any claim of knowledge – is open to question –

open to proposal –

and there is no logical end point to a critical investigation of any proposal – of any claim to knowledge

in practice we make decisions about what propositions we use – and we proceed –

we proceed in and with uncertainty

‘But may I not have been certain at that moment that I knew it?’

to be certain is to not put a proposal to question – to doubt – it is to not explore its uncertainty

to be certain – is unreflective – it is uncritical –

to be certain – is to be logically lazy – it is to be logically neglectful –

to be certain – is to bask in ignorance

185. ‘Let us return to our example (143). Now—judged by the

usual criteria—the pupil has mastered the series of natural numbers.

Next we teach him to write down other series of cardinal numbers and

get him to the point of writing down series of the form

o, n, 2n, 3n, etc.

at an order of the form "+n"; so at the order "+i" he writes

down the series of natural numbers. — Let us suppose we have done

exercises and given him tests up to 1000.

Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1000 —

and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.

We say to him: "Look what you've done!" – He doesn't understand.

We say: "You were meant to add two: look how you began the series!" –

He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was

meant to do it." – Or suppose he pointed to the series and said:

"But I went on in the same way." – It would now be no use to say:

"But can't you see .... ?" – and repeat the old examples and explanations. –

In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this

person to understand our order with our explanations as we should –

understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000

and so on.

"Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person

naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking

in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to

finger-tip.’

the point here is that rules – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

rules are open to interpretation

now if a player does not understand the interpretation of the rule that determines the game – he can’t play it –

saying ‘can’t you see?’ – doesn’t help – if someone can’t see

I don’t think the trick is to give up

you can always have another crack at explaining the rule – come at it from a different point of view perhaps

however if the end he still doesn’t get it – so be it –

time for a break – time for Kit Kat

186. ‘"What you are saying, then, comes to this: a new insight —

intuition — is needed at every step to carry out the order '+n' correctly." —

To carry it out correctly! How is it decided what is the right

step to take at any particular stage? — "The right step is the one that

accords with the order — as it was meant" — So when you gave the

order +2 meant that he was to write 1002 after 1000 — and did

you also mean that he should write 1868 after 1866, and 100036

after 100034, and so on — an infinite number of such propositions? —

"No: what I meant was, that he should write the next but one number

after every number that he wrote; and from this all those propositions

follow in turn." — But that is just what is in question: what, at any stage,

does follow from that sentence. Or, again, what, at any stage we are to

call "being in accord" with that sentence (and with the meaning you

then put into the sentence — whatever that may have consisted in). It

would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed

at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage.’

"What you are saying, then, comes to this: a new insight — intuition — is needed at every step to carry out the order '+n' correctly."’

in a rule-governed propositional exercise – in a game – what is required is that the player can and does follow the rule of the game

‘intuition’ – whatever this is supposed to mean – just doesn’t come into it

‘"No: what I meant was, that he should write the next but one number after every number that he wrote; and from this all those propositions follow in turn." — But that is just what is in question: what, at any stage, does follow from that sentence.’

whatever follows from that sentence – is whatever it is proposed follows from it

without a proposal of ‘follows from’ –  nothing does follow from the sentence –

and any proposal of ‘follow from’ – will be open to question

on the other hand – if the game is a ‘follows from’ game – then the rules of that game will determine what follows from the sentence in question

‘It would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage.’

in a rule-governed propositional action – there is no ‘decision at every stage’

following the rule is the only decision – and if you play the game – that decision only needs to be made once

187. ‘"But I already knew, at the time when I gave the order, that

he ought to write 1002 after 1000." — Certainly; and you can also say

you meant it then; only you should not let yourself be misled by the

grammar of the words "know" and "mean". For you don't want

to say that you thought of the step from 1000 to 1002 at that time—

and even if you did think of this step, still you did not think of other

ones. When you said "I already knew at the time ....." that meant

something like: "If I had then been asked what number should be

written after 1000, I should have replied '1002'." And that I don't

doubt. This assumption is rather of the same kind as: "If he had fallen

into the water then, I should have jumped in after him".—Now, what

was wrong with your idea?’

what’s wrong here is the analogy –

the +2 game – is a rule-governed propositional action

saying – "If he had fallen into the water then, I should have jumped in after him" –

is not a rule-governed propositional action – it is not to play a game –

 it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if you play a propositional game you follow the rule or rules set out –

and if you don’t follow the rules – you don’t play the game

questioning the rules  – is not playing the game – it is engaging in a critical exercise –

a propositional game is not a critical propositional exercise – it is a rule-governed exercise

if you are speculating on what you might do in a proposed circumstance – you are putting a proposal –  you are not following a rule

there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode – and the game mode

our propositional lives involve both modes –

they are logically different propositional activities –

they should not be confused

188. ‘Here I should first of all like to say: your idea was that that

act of meaning the order had in its own way already traversed all

those steps: that when you meant it your mind as it were flew ahead

and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that

one.

Thus you were inclined to use such expressions as: "The steps are

really already taken, even before I take them in writing or orally or in

thought." And it seemed as if they were in some unique way

pre-determined, anticipated—as only the act of meaning can anticipate

reality.’

what we have here is a description – an explanation – of rule-governed propositional action

that’s all to the good –

and any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

I think ‘following the rule’ – is really all we need

following rules – is no great mystery –

however if you want to explore what ‘following the rule’ amounts to – fair enough – go for it

the ‘act of meaning’ – is the act of proposing

and the act of proposing doesn’t anticipate reality –

the act of proposing makes reality

reality is proposal

189. ‘"But are the steps then not determined by the algebraic formula?"—

The question contains a mistake.

We use the expression: "The steps are determined by the formula.....".

How is it used?—We may perhaps refer to the fact that people are

brought by their education (training) so to use the formula y = x²,

that they all work out the same value for y when they substitute the

same number for x. Or we may say: "These people are so trained that

they all take the same step at the same point when they receive the

order 'add 3' ". We might express this by saying: for these people the

order "add 3" completely determines every step from one number

to the next. (In contrast with other people who do not know what

they are to do on receiving this order, or who react to it with perfect

certainty, but each one in a different way.)

On the other hand we can contrast different kinds of formula,

and the different kinds of use (different kinds of training) appropriate

to them. Then we call formulae of a particular kind (with the appropriate

methods of use) "formulae which determine a number y for a

given value of x", and formulae of another kind, ones which "do not

determine the number y for a given value of x". (y = x² would be

of the first kind, y ¹ x² of the second.) The proposition "The

formula .... determines a number y" will then be a statement about

the form of the formula—and now we must distinguish such a

proposition as "The formula which I have written down determines y",

or "Here is a formula which determines y", from one of the following

kind: "The formula y = x²  determines the number y for a given

value of x". The question "Is the formula written down there one

that determines y?" will then mean the same as "Is what is there a

formula of this kind or that?"—but it is not clear off-hand what we

are to make of the question "Is y = x² a formula which determines y

for a given value of x?" One might address this question to a pupil

in order to test whether he understands the use of the word "to determine";

or it might be a mathematical problem to prove in a particular system

that x has only one square.’

‘"But are the steps then not determined by the algebraic formula?"—

The question contains a mistake.

y = x² – is a substitution rule – a substitution game

there are no steps (plural) involved – y is substituted for x²

there is the playing out of the rule –

and that is the case in even more complex algebraic formulae

‘(In contrast with other people who do not know what

they are to do on receiving this order, or who react to it with perfect

certainty, but each one in a different way.)’

I don’t see that there is any room for interpretation – any indeterminacy in – y = x²

if you do not understand the signs and the rule of their relation – in short – if you don’t understand the rule of this game – you don’t play it –

                                                                                                                                      

how you ‘react’ to it – is logically irrelevant –

what is relevant – is that you follow the rule

‘On the other hand we can contrast different kinds of formula,

and the different kinds of use (different kinds of training) appropriate

to them.’

there is no ‘other hand’ here

different formulae – are different rules – different games

as to different uses –

with y = x² – there is only one use – substitution –

y = x² – is a substitution rule

where the rule is applied – what propositional context it is used in – is nothing more than setting for the application of the rule

‘Then we call formulae of a particular kind (with the appropriate

methods of use) "formulae which determine a number y for a

given value of x", and formulae of another kind, ones which "do not

determine the number y for a given value of x". (y = x² would be

of the first kind, y ¹ x² of the second.)’

this is just a case of different rules

‘The proposition "The formula .... determines a number y" will then

be a statement about the form of the formula—and now we must

distinguish such a proposition as "The formula which I have written

down determines y", or "Here is a formula which determines y",

from one of the following kind: "The formula y = x² determines

the number y for a given value of x". The question "Is the formula

written down there one that determines y?" will then mean the same

as "Is what is there a formula of this kind or that?"—but it is not

clear off-hand what we are to make of the question "Is y = x² a

formula which determines y for a given value of x?"’

here is much ado about nothing

the rule is the rule – however it is expressed

‘"Is y = x² a formula which determines y for a given value of x?"

One might address this question to a pupil in order to test whether

he understands the use of the word "to determine"; or it might be a

mathematical problem to prove in a particular system that x has only

one square.’

‘"Is y = x² a formula which determines y for a given value of x?" –

the answer is – yes

if in a particular system x has only one square – in that system, y ¹ x²

190. ‘It may now be said: "The way the formula is meant determines

which steps are to be taken". What is the criterion for the way the

formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it,

the way we are taught to use it.

We say, for instance, to someone who uses a sign unknown to us:

"If by 'x!2' you mean x², then you get this value for y, if you mean

x², that one."—Now ask yourself: how does one mean the one thing or

the other by"x!2"?

That will be how meaning it can determine the steps in advance.’

‘It may now be said: "The way the formula is meant determines

which steps are to be taken".’

a propositional game determines its rules

a formula – a rule – is a determination of the game –

there just is no question of ‘meaning’ here

if someone uses a sign unknown to us – then the question is what is the rule of that sign – what is the game of that sign?

if 'x!2' is put as a substitute for x² – you would say – ok – but why – what is the point?

and the argument would be put that 'x!2' – will not function in the mathematical games that x² does

‘Now ask yourself: how does one mean the one thing or the other by"x!2’

one decides what will function and what won’t

‘That will be how meaning it can determine the steps in advance.’

what is actually decided in the toss-up between x² and 'x!2' – is whether you have a functional sign for a mathematical game –

and the answer with respect to 'x!2' – is quite clear

191. ‘"It is as if we could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash."

Like what e.g.?—Can't the use—in a certain sense—be grasped

in a flash? And in what sense can it not?—The point is, that it is as if

we could ‘grasp it in a flash' in yet another and much more direct sense

than that.—But have you a model for this? No. It is just that this

expression suggests itself to us. As the result of the crossing of

different pictures.’

‘"It is as if we could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash."’

this is a bit ridiculous –

what we can grasp is what we know –

we don’t – we can’t – know – the ‘whole’ use of a word –

we know what we know – not every use the word has been put to – or will be put to

‘Can't the use—in a certain sense—be grasped in a flash? And in what sense can it not?’

yes we can identify a use – immediately –

and when can we not identify a use immediately?

when we have never come across it before –

or when we know the use of the word in a context or contexts – but not in the context now proposed

the expression ‘grasp it in a flash' –

whether the image here is a flash of lightning – or the flash of camera – or whatever –

the point is that the image conveys immediacy

yes – we have immediate recognition in certain circumstances

this however has no bearing on the logical status of the proposal – of the proposition –

any use of a word – whether grasped immediately or not – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The point is, that it is as if we could ‘grasp it in a flash' in yet another and much more direct sense than that.—But have you a model for this? No.’

what we ‘grasp in a flash’ – if we do – is use – use we that we are familiar with

another much more direct sense?

I don’t know that there can be another more direct sense than the use we are familiar with –

but if you have something else in mind – put some meat on the bone –

otherwise all you have is idle speculation – going nowhere

‘crossing different pictures’?

yes you can play with different pictures – but I don’t see that this has anything to do with propositional logic 

192. ‘You have no model of this superlative fact, but you are

seduced into using a super-expression. (It might be called a

philosophical superlative.)’

the ‘superlative fact’ I take it is that the whole use of a word can be grasped immediately (#191)

and the expression – ‘grasped in a flash’ – is the supper-expression used – in the absence of a model for the superlative fact –

as I argued above in #191 – the idea that one can know the whole use of a word – is ridiculous – and really is anybody seriously arguing this?

the expression – ‘grasped in a flash’ – makes sense if what you are talking about – is an immediate recognition of a use – not every possible use

there is no super-expression here –

what Wittgenstein is on about here ‘might be called’ – a ‘superlative thought-bubble’

193. ‘The machine as symbolizing its action: the action of a

machine—I might say at first—seems to be there in it from the start.

What does that mean?—If we know the machine, everything else, that

is its movement, seems to be already completely determined.

We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they

could not do anything else. How is this—do we forget the possibility

of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases

we don't think of that at all. We use a machine, or the drawing of a

machine, to symbolize a particular action of the machine. For instance,

we give someone such a drawing and assume that he will derive the

movement of the parts from it. (Just as we can give someone a number

by telling him that it is the twenty-fifth in the series 1, 4, 9, 16, . . . .)

"The machine's action seems to be in it from the start" means:

we are inclined to compare the future movements of the machine

in their definiteness to objects which are already lying in a drawer

and which we then take out.——But we do not say this kind of thing

when we are concerned with predicting the actual behaviour of a

machine. Then we do not in general forget the possibility of a distortion

of the parts and so on.——We do talk like that, however, when

we are wondering at the way we can use a machine to symbolize a

given way of moving—since it can also move in quite different ways.

We might say that a machine, or the picture of it, is the first of a

series of pictures which we have learnt to derive from this one.

But when we reflect that the machine could also have moved differently

it may look as if the way it moves must be contained in the machine-

as-symbol far more determinately than in the actual machine. As if it

were not enough for the movements in question to be empirically

determined in advance, but they had to be really—in a mysterious

sense—already present. And it is quite true: the movement of the

machine-as-symbol is predetermined in a different sense from that in

which the movement of any given actual machine is predetermined.’

‘The machine as symbolizing its action: the action of a machine—I might say at first—seems to be there in it from the start. What does that mean?—If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems to be already completely determined.’

the machine is a proposal – a rule-governed proposal – a propositional game

if you know the rule of this game – you know the machine – and yes everything else – that is its movement – seems to be completely determined

‘We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they could not do anything else. How is this—do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on?’

what makes the game – the machine – is the rule – the mechanism –

yes – as in any game – tokens – that which you play the game with – can malfunction

and when that happens the game – the machine – the rule – the mechanism – is affected

any rule-governed propositional action – any game of whatever kind – of whatever form – is subject to contingencies – you might say –  ‘subject to the elements’

‘We do talk like that, however, when we are wondering at the way we can use a machine to symbolize a given way of moving—since it can also move in quite different ways.’

how this machine moves – how this propositional game is played – is rule-governed – whether that be a simple rule – a complex rule

‘As if it were not enough for the movements in question to be empirically determined in advance, but they had to be really—in a mysterious sense—already present.’

the machine is a propositional construction – a rule-governed propositional construction – a game

if you play the game – if you turn on the machine – you play in accordance with the rule – the machine functions in accordance with its mechanism –

and if it doesn’t so function – it is defective – and strictly speaking not a ‘machine’

a ‘game’ where the rule cannot be applied – for whatever reason – is not a game

194. ‘When does one have the thought: the possible movements of

a machine are already there in it in some mysterious way?—Well,

when one is doing philosophy. And what leads us into thinking that?

The kind of way in which we talk about machines. We say, for example,

that a machine has (possesses) such-and-such possibilities of movement;

we speak of the ideally rigid machine which can only move in

such-and-such a way.——What is this possibility of movement? It is

not the movement., but it does not seem to be the mere physical conditions

for moving either—as, that there is play between socket and pin,

the pin not fitting too tight in the socket. For while this is the empirical

condition for movement, one could also imagine it to be otherwise.

The possibility of a movement is, rather, supposed to be like a shadow

of the movement itself. But do you know of such a shadow? And

by a shadow I do not mean some picture of the movement—for such a

picture would not have to be a picture of just this movement. But the

possibility of this movement must be the possibility of just this

movement. (See how high the seas of language run here!)

The waves subside as soon as we ask ourselves: how do we use

the phrase "possibility of movement" when we are talking about a

given machine?——But then where did our queer ideas come from?

Well, I shew you the possibility of a movement, say by means of a

picture of the movement: 'so possibility is something which is like

reality'. We say: "It isn't moving yet, but it already has the possibility

of moving"——'so possibility is something very near reality'. Though

we may doubt whether such-and-such physical conditions make this

movement possible, we never discuss whether this is the possibility

of this or of that movement: 'so the possibility of the movement

stands in a unique relation to the movement itself; closer than that of a

picture to its subject'; for it can be doubted whether a picture is the

picture of this thing or that. We say "Experience will shew whether

this gives the pin this possibility of movement", but we do not say"

Experience will shew whether this is the possibility of this movement":

'so it is not an empirical fact that this possibility is the possibility

of precisely this movement'.

We mind about the kind of expressions we use concerning these

things; we do not understand them, however, but misinterpret them.

When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who

hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on

them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it.’

‘the possibility of movement in a machine’?

the machine is a propositional construct – a rule-governed construct – logically speaking – a game

the possibility of movement in such a construct – in such a game – is the possibility of play

if we understand that the machine is a rule-governed propositional construct –

and we understand how a rule functions

we understand that the possibility of movement – is the possibility of the play of the machine in accordance with its rule –

you can turn on the machine – and watch the rule play out – watch the possibility of movement play out

‘When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the

expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it.’

‘the expressions of civilized men’ – and the expressions of philosophers – logically speaking – are in the same boat – they are proposals –

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

there is no false interpretation – there is only different interpretations

different proposals – open to question –

you will use whatever expression – best suits your purpose at the time

195. ‘But I don't mean that what I do now (in grasping a sense)

determines the future use causally and as a matter of experience, but

that in a queer way, the use itself is in some sense present."—But of

course it is, 'in some sense'! Really the only thing wrong with what you

say is the expression "in a queer way". The rest is all right; and the

sentence only seems queer when one imagines a different language-game

for it from the one in which we actually use it. (Someone once told

me that as a child he had been surprised that a tailor could 'sew a

dress'—he thought this meant that a dress was produced by sewing

alone, by sewing one thread on to another.)’

‘But I don't mean that what I do now (in grasping a sense) determines the future use causally and as a matter of experience, but that in a queer way, the use itself is in some sense present."— ’

‘in some sense present’ –

it is not the use that is ‘in some sense present’ when one gasps a use

what is present is the proposal of use

a ‘queer sense’ – is only a different sense –

and here we are not talking about language-games –

for a language-game is a rule-governed propositional action –

sense is not rule-governed – a proposal of sense is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

sense is a critical propositional issue – not a rule-governed game

‘that a tailor could sew a dress’ – is a proposal –  open to question – open to interpretation

different interpretations – different uses – for different propositional contexts

196. ‘In our failure to understand the use of a word we take it as

the expression of a queer process. (As we think of time as a

queer medium, of the mind as a queer kind of being.)’

understanding a word is not a ‘queer process’ –

understanding the use of a word is engaging in the logical process of question – of doubt – and the exploring of propositional uncertainty –

where you engage in this process there is no failure to understand the use of a word –

the failure to understand is the failure to engage in the logical process of question – of doubt – and the failure to explore propositional uncertainty

time is not a queer medium – time is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

mind is not a queer kind of being – mind is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it is time Wittgenstein dropped this ‘queer’ argument –

it is really a piece of rhetorical disparagement –  disparagement of the logical process

it is anti-logical

it is a smear against the logical action of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

it suggests that anyone who thinks logically – who acts logically – who behaves logically – is queer

well those who do proceed logically will not be bothered by this smear

those who don’t operate logically will have their ignorance sanctioned and reinforced by this smear

197. ‘"It's as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash."—

And that is just what we say we do. That is to say: we sometimes

describe what we do in these words. But there is nothing astonishing,

nothing queer, about what happens. It becomes queer when we are

led to think that the future development must in some way already be

present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn't present.—For we say

that there isn't any doubt that we understand the word, and on the

other hand its meaning lies in its use. There is no doubt that I now

want to play chess, but chess is the game it is in virtue of all its rules

(and so on). Don't I know, then, which game I want to play until I

have played it? or are all the rules contained in my act of intending?

Is it experience that tells me that this sort of game is the usual

consequence of such an act of intending? so is it impossible for me to

be certain what I am intending to do? And if that is nonsense—what

kind of super-strong connexion exists between the act of intending

and the thing intended?——Where is the connexion effected between

the sense of the expression "Let's play a game of chess" and all the

rules of the game?—Well, in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching

of it, in the day-to-day practice of playing.’

‘It becomes queer when we are led to think that the future development must in some way already be present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn't present.—For we say that there isn't any doubt that we understand the word, and on the other hand its meaning lies in its use.’

 

what you have here is a proposal of use –

and this proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if you imagine that it is any other way – you are not thinking logically –

putting it plainly – what the use turns out to be – may not be what you expected –

or it may

the thing is – you don’t know – with any certainty –

there is no propositional certainty

what you know is uncertain

what you know – is what you have proposed – and that is – uncertain

‘Don't I know, then, which game I want to play until I have played it? or are all the rules contained in my act of intending? Is it experience that tells me that this sort of game is the usual consequence of such an act of intending? so is it impossible for me to be certain what I am intending to do?’

if you propose to play chess – and you understand that chess is a rule-governed propositional action – you understand that you will play in accordance with the rules of the game –

‘Don't I know, then, which game I want to play until I have played it? or are all the rules contained in my act of intending?’

the rules are contained in the play

it is not that I am certain about what I am intending to do –

it is that I am simply proposing to play the game –

and that proposal – the proposal to play – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

nevertheless it is what I am intending

‘Where is the connexion effected between the sense of the expression "Let's play a game of chess" and all the rules of the game’

‘let’s play a game of chess’ – is a proposal to play

the rules of the game – determine the play –

if you play – you play in accordance with the rules

the connection between the proposal to play – and the rules of the game –

is the action of the play

 

198. ‘"But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point?

Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule."

—That is not what we ought to say, but rather: any interpretation still

hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it

any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine

meaning.

"Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?"—

Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule—say a sign-post—

got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here?—

Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a

particular way, and now I do so react to it.

But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come

about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-

sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have further indicated that

a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use

of sign-posts, a custom.’

if you engage in a rule-governed proposition action – that is if you play a game –

you play in accordance with the rule of the game

if you don’t play in accordance with the rule – there is no game

the very point of the game is that its rule is not open to question – not open to doubt – or uncertain

if you wish to put the ‘rule’ to question – to doubt – to explore its uncertainty – you are engaged in a critical process –

in this critical  propositional mode – you are not playing a game – you are not dealing with a rule – you are dealing with a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘"But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule."’ –

the very  point of  a rule  – is to put an end to interpretation –

to say – ‘Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.’ –

is to play lip service to the idea of the rule – but to actually entirely disregard it

rules determine action – rules determine what you do – not what you mean

in the context of a rule-governed propositional action – meaning is irrelevant

‘Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?’

a rule determines what you do – and the rule determines – what you don’t do –

otherwise – we are not talking about a rule –

if there is no determination there is no rule

if whatever I do can be brought into accord with the rule – there is no rule

‘Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule—say a sign-post— got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here?’

what has the expression of a rule got to do with my actions?

you can choose to follow the rule – to act in accordance with the rule – or not

‘But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in’

this going by the sign-post consists in going in the direction that the sign-post indicates

‘On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.’

yes – you have to understand the rule – and you have to know that it will only be of use as a rule – if you follow it

199. ‘Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it would be

possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life?—

This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression "to obey

a rule".

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on

which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have

been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or

understood; and so on.—To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an

order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).

To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To

understand a language means to be master of a technique.’

‘Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life?—

obeying a rule is game-play – human beings play propositional games –

‘It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule.’

obeying rules – playing propositional games – is integral to the propositional lives of human beings

‘It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on.—To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).’

the rule-governed propositional mode – the game mode – is ever present in our propositional life and behaviour –

the proposal that there should only have been one occasion when this mode was active

defies propositional reality

‘To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.’

well just what ‘understanding a language’ amounts to – will be open to question – open to doubt – and will be an uncertain matter –

I would be more modest here – and say to understand a sentence – is to understand how it is used – how it can be used –

as for technique – is understanding a technique?

200. ‘It is, of course, imaginable that two people belonging to a

tribe unacquainted with games should sit at a chess-board and go

through the moves of a game of chess; and even with all the appropriate

mental accompaniments. And if we were to see it we should say they

were playing chess. But now imagine a game of chess translated

according to certain rules into a series of actions which we do not

ordinarily associate with a game—say into yells and stamping of feet.

And now suppose those two people to yell and stamp instead of playing

the form of chess that we are used to; and this in such a way

that their procedure is translatable by suitable rules into a game of

chess. Should we still be inclined to say they were playing a game?

What right would one have to say so?’

‘It is, of course, imaginable that two people belonging to a tribe unacquainted with games should sit at a chess-board and go through the moves of a game of chess; and even with all the appropriate mental accompaniments. And if we were to see it we should say they were playing chess.’

any propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any propositional action can be interpreted – or read – as rule-governed – as a game

just as any propositional action or set of actions can be interpreted as not rule-governed – 

‘And now suppose those two people to yell and stamp instead of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and this in such a way that their procedure is translatable by suitable rules into a game of chess. Should we still be inclined to say they were playing a game?’

their actions can be interpreted as rule-governed –

and it can be proposed that they are playing a different from of chess

this interpretation is valid –

but as with any interpretation of any propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain


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