Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Part 1. 1-100

1. ‘When they (my elders) named some object, 

and accordingly moved towards something. I saw 

this and grasped that the thing was called by the 

sound they uttered when they meant to point it 

out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily 

movements, as it were the natural language of 

all peoples: the expression of the face, the play 

of the eyes, the movement by other parts of the 

body, and the tone of voice which expresses 

our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, 

or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words 

repeatedly used in their proper places in various 

sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what 

objects they signified; and  after I had trained 

my mouth to form these signs, I used them to 

express my own desires.’

(Augustine, Confessions, I. 8.).

in response to this Wittgenstein says –

‘These words, it seems to me, give a 

particular picture of the essence of human 

language. It is this: the individual words 

in language name objects – sentences are 

combinations of such names. – In this 

picture of language we find the roots of the 

following idea: Every word has a meaning. 

The meaning is correlated with the word. 

It is the object for which the word stands.’

it is fair enough for Wittgenstein to say that ‘These words, it seems to me, give a particular picture of the essence of human language.’

but this is not Augustine’s claim – he does not propose a theory of the essence of human language

what he does is describe – or propose – an account of how we learn to name –

that is he puts forward an account of how we learn a specific language function – a specific language use –

the specific language use – of naming –

Augustine does not propose that learning to name – is the ‘essence’ of language –

learning to name is a function of language use

further he just does not say that ‘the individual words in a language name objects’

he talks about the act of naming –

Augustine is not saying that every language act is a naming act – or that every word is a name

or that sentences ‘are combinations of such names’ –

he does not make these claims

and as to ‘every word has a meaning’ –

Augustine does not refer to ‘meaning’ – or address any question of meaning

in explaining naming – he refers to words as signs –

signs that signify objects

‘the object for which the word stands’ –  is the object signified –

the object signified is the object named

you might want to argue that to signify is to mean –

Augustine does not say this or argue this

in the above quote Augustine puts forward a behavioural account of how we learn to name

a behavioural account of how one learns to use words to name objects

and it should also be noted that he thinks that language is broader than just the use of words

in the above he refers here to bodily movement – what is heard – what is seen – the expression of the face – the play of the eyes – the movement of other parts of the body – the tone of voice as expressing seeking – rejecting – and avoiding

and he says – ‘bodily movement is the natural language of all peoples’ –

his theory of language one could say – is a theory of bodily movement –

bodily movement performed – bodily moved – observed

and so it is a ‘bodily movement’ or a series of bodily movements – that is the action of naming

‘Augustine does not speak of there being any 

difference between kinds of words. If you describe 

the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, 

thinking primarily of nouns like “table”, “chair”, 

“bread”, and of people’s names, and only secondarily 

of the names of certain actions and properties; and of 

the renaming kinds of words as something that will 

take care of itself.’

Augustine does not speak of their being any difference between kinds of words – and that’s really the end of the matter –

he doesn’t address the issue of the difference between kinds of words

Augustine is concerned here with names and naming

he does not propose a theory of language as such – or a philosophy of language –

he gives us an account of naming

to suggest otherwise is to verbal him

‘Now think of the following use of 

language: I send someone shopping. I give 

him a slip marked “five red apples”. He 

takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens 

the drawer marked “apples”; then he looks 

up the word “red” in a table and finds 

a colour sample opposite it; then he says 

the series of cardinal numbers – I assume 

that he knows them by heart – up to the 

word “five” and for each number he takes 

an apple of the same colour as the sample 

out of the drawer. – It is in this and similar 

ways one operates with words. – “But 

how does  he know where and how he is 

to look up the word “red” and what is he 

to with the word “five”? – Well I assume 

that he acts as have described.  Explanations 

come to an end somewhere. – But what is 

the meaning of the word “five”? No such 

thing was in question here, only how the 

word “five” is used.’

‘But what is the meaning of the word ‘five’? – no such thing was in question here, only how the word ‘five’ is used.’

correct – no such thing was in question –

this so called question of meaning – does not arise as such – here

and yes – we can say that all we are dealing with is the question of how words are used

and if use is all that is in question – we can dispense with the question meaning –

we can dispense with meaning

Wittgenstein says –

‘Explanations come to an end somewhere’ –

well do they?

if the issue is the use of words – surely any ‘explanation’ of use – any account of use – logically speaking – is open to question

and what of the ‘explanation’?

is it not a usage – and open to question?

and does usage come to an end somewhere?

only where you have nothing to say – or nothing is said to you

2. ‘That philosophical concept of meaning has its place 

in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But 

one can also say that it is the idea of a language more 

primitive than ours. Let us imagine a language for which 

the description given by Augustine is right. The language 

is meant to serve for communication between a builder 

A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: 

there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass 

the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. 

For this purpose they use a language consisting of the 

words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out;

—B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-

and-such a call.——Conceive this as a complete primitive language’

‘that philosophical concept of meaning’?

first up – Augustine does not refer to meaning or address any question of meaning –

and furthermore Wittgenstein simply assumes here that we all know what he is talking about when he says ‘that philosophical concept of meaning’

Augustine speaks of words signifying objects in the act of naming

now you might want to argue from this – that signification – that naming – amounts to a theory of meaning

all very well – but this is not Augustine’s argument

Augustine advances an account of naming – and of how one learns to name

and yes – you can construct – a primitive language – and line it up with Augustine’s account of naming –

however Augustine is not proposing ‘the idea of a language more primitive than ours’

he is putting forward an account of a particular language behaviour – the act of naming – in natural languages

3. ‘Augustine, we might say, does describe a system 

of communication; only not everything that we call a 

language is this system. And one has to say this in many

cases where the question arises “Is this an appropriate 

description or not?” The answer is: “Yes, it is appropriate, 

but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for 

the whole of what you are claiming to describe.”

It is as if someone where to say: “A game consists of 

moving objects about on a surface according to certain 

rules …” – and we replied: you seem to be thinking of 

board games, but there are others. You can make you 

definition correct by restricting it to those games.’

Wittgenstein’s response here to Augustine is misdirected

Augustine in the relevant quote – outlines a behavioural account of how we learn to name

you can call that a ‘system of communication’ – but it is better described as an account of naming

it is Augustine who narrowly circumscribes his region of discourse –

it is Wittgenstein who is suggesting that he doesn’t – and that therefore he is at fault

Wittgenstein’s argument here is a straw man

Augustine was no straw man – and he was no push over

as to the game analogy –

yes – ‘you can make your definition correct by restricting it to those games’

or – you can propose a definition of games – that only applies to board games

and in terms of such a definition – other so called ‘games’ – are no longer regarded or described as 'games' – by those who use this definition

the point being that logically speaking – any term is open to question – open to definition – open to different definitions

and what determines how a term will be used – is open to question

we operate with and in contingency – with and in – uncertainty

where a use of a term is non-standard – is different – all you can say is – so be it

we use language – and any analysis – or description of any use – is another use of language – and as with any use – open to question

4. ‘Imagine a script in which the letters were used to 

stand for sounds, and also as signs of emphasis and 

punctuation. (A script can be conceived as a language 

for describing sound-patterns.) Now imagine someone 

interpreting that script as if there were simply a 

correspondence of letters to sounds and as if the letters 

had not also completely different functions. Augustine's 

conception of language is like such an over-simple 

conception of the script.’

yes you can imagine someone interpreting that script as if there were simply a correspondence of letters to sounds – as if the letters had not completely different functions

and relative to another interpretation – such an interpretation may well be regarded as an over-simplification of the script

all you have here is two – different interpretations

and presumably if they are to function – they function in different contexts – have different uses

Wittgenstein’s argument here does not bear on Augustine’s account of naming

we can say that naming is not all there is to language use –

and I suspect Augustine would be the first to agree – and would see Wittgenstein’s argument in relation to what he has said regarding naming – as amateurish and misconstrued

the more general point is this –

we will have – and do have – different accounts of the nature of language – and these different accounts serve different purposes – have different functions – different uses

5. ‘If we look at the example in §1, we may perhaps 

get an inkling how much this general notion of the 

meaning of a word surrounds the working of language 

with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. It 

disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language 

in primitive kinds of application in which one can 

command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words.

A child uses such primitive forms of language when 

it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not 

explanation, but training.’

 

 

Augustine’s account of naming – is not a ‘primitive kind of application’ of language

it is a focus on – an account of – and description of – a particular function of language – the function of naming

Augustine does not present his account of naming and learning to name – as ‘primitive’

he presents it as a natural phenomenon – ‘as it were the natural phenomenon of all peoples’

this notion of ‘primitive’ – is Wittgenstein’s – and that’s fair enough – but it is not Augustine’s

does a child use ‘primitive forms’ when it learns to talk?

what are these forms – and what makes them ‘primitive’?

Wittgenstein doesn’t have anything to say here – he assumes you will just accept his

pronouncement

it strikes me that Augustine’s account of learning to talk has more going for it –

‘When they (my elders) named some object, and 

accordingly moved towards something. I saw this 

and grasped that the thing was called by the sound 

they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their 

intention was shewn by their bodily movements, 

as it were the natural language of all peoples: the 

expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the 

movement by other parts of the body, and the tone 

of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, 

having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as 

I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places 

in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand 

what objects they signified; and after I had trained my 

mouth to form these signs, I used them to express 

my own desires.’

 

the child learns to talk by observing and listening to others and copying their behaviour

6. ‘We could imagine that the language of §2 was the 

whole language of A and B; even the whole language 

of a tribe. The children are brought up to perform these 

actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react 

in this way to the words of others. An important part 

of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to 

the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and 

at the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word 

"slab" as he points to that shape. (I do not want to call 

this "ostensive definition", because the child cannot as 

yet ask what the name is. I will call it "ostensive teaching 

of words".——I say that it will form an important part 

of the training, because it is so with human beings; not 

because it could not be imagined otherwise.) This 

ostensive teaching of words can be said to establish an 

association between the word and the thing. But what 

does this mean? Well, it may mean various things; but 

one very likely thinks first of all that a picture of the 

object comes before the child's mind when it hears the 

word. But now, if this does happen—is it the purpose 

of the word?—Yes, it may be the purpose.—I can 

imagine such a use of words (of series of sounds). 

(Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard 

of the imagination.) But in the language of §2 it is not 

the purpose of the words to evoke images. (It may, of 

course, be discovered that that helps to attain the actual

purpose.)

But if the ostensive teaching has this effect,—am I to say 

that it effects an understanding of the word? Don't you 

understand the call "Slab!" if you act upon it in such-and-

such a way?—Doubtless the ostensive teaching helped to 

bring this about; but only together with a particular training. 

With different training the same ostensive teaching of these 

words would have effected a quite different understanding. 

"I set the brake up by connecting up rod and lever."—Yes, 

given the whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in 

conjunction with that is it a brake-lever, and separated 

from its support it is not even a lever; it may be anything, 

or nothing.’

‘With different training the same ostensive teaching of these words would have effected a quite different understanding’ –

not all learning to understand will be a result of ‘training’ – as such

and in any case any so called ‘training’ needs to be seen in a broader context of observation and imitation

Augustine proposes a broader – less defined context – where we learn from observation

‘I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called 

by the sound …Their intention was shown by their 

bodily movements … Thus I heard words used in 

their proper places in various sentences, I gradually 

learnt to understand what they signified; and after 

that I trained my mouth to form these signs, I used 

them to express my own desires’

Augustine is not proposing here that this learning results in a definitive or final understanding –

no doubt he would agree with Wittgenstein sentiments in –

‘With different training the same ostensive teaching of these words would have effected a quite different understanding’

though I think Augustine would say something like – in different circumstances – with different observations – we will have different understandings

so there may well be training in the learning of words –

but that training is only one context – and one set of observations

we have different understandings in different contexts

and our understandings – as with our language use – is on-going 

                                                                                                                                         

7. ‘In the practice of the use of language (2) one 

party calls out the words, the other acts on them. 

In instruction in the language the following process 

will occur: the learner names the objects; that is, 

he utters the word when the teacher points to the 

stone.—And there will be this still simpler exercise: 

the pupil repeats the words after the teacher——

both of these being processes resembling language. 

We can also think of the whole process of using 

words in (2) as one of those games by means of 

which children learn their native language. I will 

call these games "language-games" and will 

sometimes speak of a primitive language as a 

language-game. And the processes of naming the

 stones and of repeating words after someone 

might also be called language-games. Think of 

much of the use of words in games like ring-a-

ring-a-roses. I shall also call the whole, consisting 

of language and the actions into which it is woven, 

the "language-game".’

what we have here is a characterization – an account – a theory of language acquisition – the game theory

can you be playing a game without knowing it is a game?

can you be playing a game without knowing the rules of the game?

apparently you can according to Wittgenstein –

I find this a bit of stretch

I would agree that some language behaviour can profitably be termed ‘game playing’

however it strikes me that this model is way too simplistic to account for much of our language behaviour

for one it takes no account of genuine critical language use –  where i.e. – so called ‘language-games’ – are put to question put to doubt –

or where the very idea of the language-game – is critically evaluated

‘one party calls out the words, the other acts on them’ –

well that does fit the general notion of game playing – however there are other ways of interpreting such behaviour

i.e. you could well regard it in terms of a stimulus response model – or you could see it in Augustine’s terms – as learning the language of bodily movement – the expression of the face – the play of the eyes – the movement of other parts of the body – the tone of voice etc

or you might even say – it is just learning to give instruction – and follow instruction

you can decide to view language acquisition in terms of Wittgenstein’s game model –

just as you can interpret it in terms of Augustine’s perspective

however the epistemological reality is that the phenomenon of language behaviour –

as with any phenomenon – is open to interpretation

and any interpretation – any account – any theory – is open to question

in the absence of interpretation – the phenomenon – is an unknown

to interpret – is to make known

the issue then – broadly speaking I think must be – which interpretation – which account – which theory – serves which purpose?

8. ‘Let us now look at an expansion of language (2). 

Besides the four words "block", "pillar", etc., let it 

contain a series of words used as the shopkeeper in 

(i) used the numerals (it can be the series of letters 

of the alphabet); further, let there be two words, 

which may as well be "there" and "this" (because 

this roughly indicates their purpose), that are used 

in connexion with a pointing gesture; and finally 

a number of colour samples. A gives an order like: 

"d—slab—there". At the same time he shews the 

ssistant a colour sample, and when he says "there" 

he points to a place on the building site. From the 

stock of slabs B takes one for each letter of the 

alphabet up to "d", of the same colour as the sample, 

and brings them to the place indicated by A.—On 

other occasions A gives the order "this—there". At 

"this" he points to a building stone. And so on.’

what we have here is an analysis of an instruction given and the instruction received and executed – similar to the one put in language (2) but with the addition of  the words ‘this’ and ‘there’

Wittgenstein in this model he is developing is putting the view that to understand language behaviour we must begin with some form of so called primitive usage – and  from that build up to more complex formulations

the problem with such an approach – such an analytical approach – for one – is that the choice of primitive must be arbitrary

and if that is so – if it is arbitrary – and how else can it be? – it will have no general application

which is fine – if you understand that no theoretical construct will suit all purposes –

but I get the impression that Wittgenstein imagines he is developing a model that will apply to all language use –

and if indeed that is what he thinks – his approach to language is rigid and narrow minded

the idea of building up a language from scratch might suit the purposes of a linguist – or a grammarian – but even these practitioners I am sure would understand the limitations of such exercise as a general account of language use

from the point of view of language use in general – it comes off as artificial –

9. ‘When a child learns this language, it has to 

learn the series, of 'numerals' a, b, c, . . . by heart. 

And it has to learn their use.—Will this training 

include ostensive teaching of the words?—Well, 

people will, for example, point to slabs and count: 

"a, b, c slabs".— Something more like the ostensive 

teaching of the words "block", "pillar", etc. would 

be the ostensive teaching of numerals that serve 

not to count but to refer to groups of objects that 

can be taken in at a glance. Children do learn the 

use of the first five or six cardinal numerals in this way.

Are "there" and "this" also taught ostensively?—

Imagine how one might perhaps teach their use. 

One will point to places and things— but in this 

case the pointing occurs in the use of the words 

too and not merely in learning the use.— ’

                                   

yes – children – people – can be – and are – trained – to use a language

what Wittgenstein outlines above is a method of teaching and learning language

however just how people learn language – wherever and whenever – is actually an empirical question –

we need to keep an open mind on the matter – and be prepared to study the way language is taught and learnt –

and to consider different theories – different perspectives

I would think any worthwhile theory will be solidly based in observation

and any empirical theory will be open to question

what we get from Augustine is a different theory to that advanced by Wittgenstein

and Augustine puts his behavioural account as a report from his observation – of learning by observation –

he does not mention or consider training

‘I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered ….’

it’s a fair enough argument and a sensible perspective

nevertheless Augustine’s theory too – is open to question

in any case I think we can say that not all language acquisition is a result of training

that I think is fairly obvious

as to ‘there’ and ‘this’ – and ostensive learning – where the pointing occurs in the use of these words –

as Augustine argues we learn by observing bodily movements – which includes both the use of the words – that is – the vocalisation and the sounds made – and the physical act of pointing

10. ‘Now what do the words of this language signify?— 

What is supposed to shew what they signify, if not the 

kind of use they have? And we have already described 

that. So we are asking for the expression "This word 

signifies this" to be made a part of the description. 

In other words the description ought to take the form: 

"The word ....signifies . . . .".

Of course, one can reduce the description of the use of  

 the word "slab" to the statement that this word signifies 

this object. This will be done when, for example, it is 

merely a matter of removing the mistaken idea that the 

word "slab" refers to the shape of building-stone that we 

in fact  call a "block"—but the kind of 'referring this is, 

that is to say the use of these words for the rest, is already 

known.

Equally one can say that the signs "a", "b", etc. signify 

numbers; when for example this removes the mistaken 

idea that "a", "b", "c", play the part actually played in 

language by "block", "slab", "pillar". And one can also 

say that "c" means this number and not that one; when 

for example this serves to explain that the letters are to 

be used in the order a, b, c, d, etc. and not in the order 

a, b, d, c.

But assimilating the descriptions of the uses of words 

in this way cannot make the uses themselves any more 

like one another. For, as we see, they are absolutely unlike.’

‘Now what do the words of this language signify?—

logically speaking what they signify is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘What is supposed to shew what they signify, if not the kind of use they have?’

well even here the ‘kind of use they have’ – is not set in stone –

what use they have will depend on the circumstances in which they are used

and even then – any proposal of use will be open to question

this idea that we are to understand language in terms of its use – really tells us nothing

it is straight out obvious that language is used

well you can leave it there – and say – nothing more to say

or you can recognise that use is open to question – open to doubt –

and logically speaking – uncertain

the task then – if there is a task – is to keep an open mind – and not fall into the trap of dogmatism – even if it is over a word

11. ‘Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws.—The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.)

Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy.’

‘The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects’ –

I don’t know that we can legislate this –

might it not be the case that there is a word that has only one function –

i.e. the conjunction ‘and’?

my point here is that use determines function – and if a word was to have only one use – in practise – then in practice it has only one function

be that as it may – the issue can only be properly addressed as an empirical matter –

and this I might add was Augustine’s view

the logical point however is just that any use – any function – is open to question –

and we can say from this that the use or function of a term – logically speaking – is uncertain

‘Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly.’

when we hear them spoken or meet them in script or print –

we hear them and meet them in a context – a language context

and it will be in terms of such context that their application will be proposed –

and within this context there will be to varying degrees – questions – and uncertainties

in any language use we operate with uncertainty – and we proceed with uncertainty

and by the way – doing philosophy is no different to any other propositional activity

the propositions of philosophy – are open to question –

and are logically speaking – uncertain

12. ‘It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. We see handles all looking more or less alike. (Naturally, since they are all supposed to be handled.) But one is the handle of a crank which can be moved continuously (it regulates the opening of a valve); another is the handle of a switch, which has only two effective positions, it is either off or on; a third is the handle of a brake-lever, the harder one pulls on it, the harder it brakes; a fourth, the handle of a pump: it has an effect only

so long as it is moved to and fro.’

handles in a locomotive cabin – only look more or less alike – until you know what they are used for –

and their use is defined – i.e. a crank is not a valve

as to words – they don’t look more or less alike – unless you have the same word repeated –

they look different – because they are different

and furthermore they function differently – in different contexts – different language contexts –

contexts that are ever changing

the levers in the locomotive cabin – have one function or set of functions –

and the context of the locomotive cabin is set

language use is not ‘mechanical’ –

this mechanical analogy is really just the old Wittgenstein – the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus – remixed and rebooted

13. ‘When we say: "Every word in language signifies something" we have so far said nothing whatever; unless we have explained exactly what distinction we wish to make. (It might be, of course, that we wanted to distinguish the words of language (8) from words 'with-out meaning' such as occur in Lewis Carroll’s poems, or words like "Lilliburlero" in songs.)’

any statement is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

as to –‘Every word in language signifies something’ –

this statement – will need to be subjected to critical analysis – if it is to be functional

the kind of questions we will ask here are i.e. –

what is to count as a ‘language’ here?

what is it to ‘signify’?

and what is to count as ‘something’?

unless these questions are given some kind of answer or answers –

and the statement can be placed in a context or contexts –

it will not be functional

and any ‘distinctions’ to  be made will be made in this critical phase

perhaps the above statement is meant as a philosophical proposal – the very point of which is to initiate a critical discussion of language – signification – and ontology?

as to ‘words without meaning’ such as occur in Lewis Carroll’s poems or a word like

‘Lilliburlero’ –

exactly the same applies – they need to be critically examined

we need to ask what function these terms have – in the contexts in which they appear – in the contexts in which they are used?

perhaps their value lies in the fact that they do not conform to standard grammatical practice – and for that reason they delight?

14. ‘Imagine someone's saying: "All tools serve to modify some- thing. Thus the hammer modifies the position of the nail, the saw the shape of the board, and so on."—And what is modified by the rule, the glue-pot, the nails?—"Our knowledge of a thing's length, the temperature of the glue, and the solidity of the box."——Would anything be gained by this assimilation of expressions?— ’

we can’t answer this question – in a propositional / contextual void

we would need to know why the first statement was made – and then why the supplementary statements were made –

if the point of the making of the supplementary statements – was to show that they unnecessary – that is a philosophical point is being made – as would seem to be the case here – then perhaps something is gained by assimilating the expressions to make this point?

again it all depends on context

15. ‘The word "to signify" is perhaps used in the most straight-forward way when the object signified is marked with the sign. Suppose that the tools A uses in building bear certain marks. When A shews his assistant such a mark, he brings the tool that has that mark on it. It is in this and more or less similar ways that a name means and is given to a thing.—It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to ourselves: naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.’

yes – naming as labelling –

I don’t think Augustine would argue with this – but what we get from Augustine is a more sophisticated analysis of the naming process

it is worthwhile repeating the opening quote from Augustine that Wittgenstein uses at the very start of this discussion

‘When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something. I saw this and grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement by other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.’

(Augustine, Confessions, I. 8.).

yes – naming may well be a labelling – but learning the business of labelling involves observation – hypotheses regarding intention – analysis of bodily movement – and imitation –

from Wittgenstein we just get the end result – labelling –

he provides no account of how we get there –

Augustine on the other hand proposes a detailed and comprehensive account of the processes involved

16. ‘What about the colour samples that A shews to B: are they part of the language? Well, it is as you please. They do not belong among the words; yet when I say to someone: "Pronounce the word 'the' ", you will count the second "the" as part of the sentence. Yet it has a role just like that of a colour-sample in language-game (8); that is, it is a sample of what the other is meant to say.

It is most natural, and causes least confusion, to reckon the samples among the instruments of the language.

((Remark on the reflexive pronoun "this sentence".))’

we are best to speak of propositions – instead of words or sentences –

and propositional complexes – instead of languages

colour samples – as with the words in a language – are proposals – that is propositions – in a propositional complex

and yes a proposition can function as a ‘sample’ – ‘of what the other is meant to say’

or even be regarded as a direction – in the sense of a command

it is not so much that the sample is an instrument of the language –

it is rather a propositional use – within a propositional complex

and as to the reflexive pronoun – a propositional function

17. ‘It will be possible to say: In language (8) we have different kinds of word. For the functions of the word "slab" and the word "block" are more alike than those of "slab" and "d". But how we group words into kinds will depend on the aim of the classification,—and on our own inclination.

Think of the different points of view from which one can classify tools or chess-men.’

the aim of the classification?

and so classification is just a game with words

language is a phenomena – and worthy of study – hence –  classification –

but really all we are talking about here is different usages –

so classification games – are no more than a generation of different usages –

which will be relevant for different purposes –

purposes – such as the philosophical analysis of language use

18. ‘Do not be troubled by the fact that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If you want to say that this shews them to be incomplete, ask yourself whether our language is complete;—whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new

houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.’

‘language’ – is proposition – and proposition – proposal –

proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

is this uncertainty – that is the ground and basis of the indeterminacy of language –

the ground and basis of its complexity and it creativity

19. ‘It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle.—Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others.——And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.

But what about this: is the call "Slab!" in example (2) a sentence or a word?—If a word, surely it has not the same meaning as the like~sounding word of our ordinary language, for in §2 it is a call. But if a sentence, it is surely not the elliptical sentence: "Slab!" of our language.——As far as the first question goes you can call "Slab!" a word and also a sentence; perhaps it could be appropriately called a

'degenerate sentence' (as one speaks of a degenerate hyperbola); in fact it is our 'elliptical' sentence.—But that is surely only a shortened form of the sentence "Bring me a slab", and there is no such sentence in example (2).—But why should I not on the contrary have called the sentence "Bring me a slab" a lengthening of the sentence "Slab!"?—Because if you shout "Slab!" you really mean: "Bring me a slab".— But how do you do this: how do you mean that while you say "Slab!"? Do you say the unshortened sentence to yourself? And why should I translate the call "Slab!" into a different expression in order to say what someone means by it? And if they mean the same thing—why should I not say: "When he says 'Slab!' he means 'Slab!'"? Again, if you can mean "Bring me the slab", why should you not be able to mean "Slab!"?——But when I call "Slab!", then what I want is, that he should bring me a slab! ——Certainly, but does 'wanting this' consist in thinking

in some form or other a different sentence from the one you utter?— ’

language is proposal – of whatever kind –

and any proposal – any proposition – any propositional complex – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

it is the logical uncertainty of the proposal – that is the ground of its action – its flexibility – and the creativity inherent in its use and practise

different languages – different ‘forms of life’?

the idea of form here – suggests a defined – even an un-changing – practice

if that is what Wittgenstein has in mind here – he is not talking about language –

or his notion of language – is not a form of life – rather a form of the absence of life

any so called form of language – of life – is open to question – is open to doubt – and is essentially – uncertain

the life of language – rests in its uncertainty –

the life of ‘forms’ rests in their uncertainty

forms and formulations have real function in language use –

but they are not to be mistaken for the ground of language

forms and formulations – are propositional utilities

the call "Slab!" – is a logically speaking – a proposal –

and a proposal – as indeed Wittgenstein’s discussion here demonstrates – that is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

the point being any conception of the term  – or any use of the term – any formulation of the term – will – logically speaking be open to question

this not to say that we don’t proceed with a use –

only that we recognise that our use of this term – is open to question

20. ‘But now it looks as if when someone says "Bring me a slab" he could mean this expression as one long word corresponding to the single word "Slabl"——Then can one mean it sometimes as one word and sometimes as four? And how does one usually mean it?——I think we shall be inclined to say: we mean the sentence as four words when we use it in contrast with other sentences such as "Hand me a slab",

"Bring him a slab", "Bring two slabs", etc.; that is, in contrast with sentences containing the separate words of our command in other combinations.——But what does using one sentence in contrast with others consist in? Do the others, perhaps, hover before one's mind? All of them? And while one is saying the one sentence, or before, or afterwards?—No. Even if such an explanation rather tempts us, we need only think for a moment of what actually happens in order to see that we are going astray here. We say that we use the command in contrast with other sentences because our language contains the possibility

of those other sentences. Someone who did not understand our language, a foreigner, who had fairly often heard someone giving the order: "Bring me a slab!", might believe that this whole series of sounds was one word corresponding perhaps to the word for "building-stone" in his language. If he himself had then given this order perhaps he would have pronounced it differently, and we should say: he pronounces it so oddly because he takes it for a single word.—— But then, is there not also something different going on in him when he pronounces it,—something corresponding to the fact that he conceives the sentence as a single word?——Either the same thing may go on in him, or something different. For what goes on in you when you give such an order? Are you conscious of its consisting of four words while you are uttering it? Of course you have a mastery of this language —which contains those other sentences as well—but is this having a mastery something that happens while you are uttering the sentence?— And I have admitted that the foreigner will probably pronounce a sentence differently if he conceives it differently; but what we call his wrong conception need not lie in anything that accompanies the utterance of the command.

The sentence is 'elliptical', not because it leaves out something that we think when we utter it, but because it is shortened—in comparison with a particular paradigm of our grammar.—Of course one might object here: "You grant that the shortened and the unshortened sentence have the same sense.—What is this sense, then? Isn't there a verbal expression for this sense?"——But doesn't the fact that sentences have the same sense consist in their having the same use?— (In Russian one says "stone red" instead of "the stone is red"; do they feel the copula to be missing in the sense, or attach it in thought?)’

‘And I have admitted that the foreigner will probably pronounce a sentence differently if he conceives it differently; but what we call his wrong conception need not lie in anything that accompanies the utterance of the command.’

there is no right or wrong conception – no right or wrong use for that matter –

there is only different conceptions – different uses

yes – you can – as I think Wittgenstein does here – say ‘we have the utterance – nothing to see here’

and in a sense he is right –

but he is right so long as questions are not asked – doubts not raised – and uncertainties are not explored

"You grant that the shortened and the unshortened sentence have the same sense.—What is this sense, then? Isn't there a verbal expression for this sense?"——But doesn't the fact that sentences have the same sense consist in their having the same use?’

what is this sense? –

well there could be any number of answers to this question

and the ‘same use’?

any language use – is open to interpretation – open to question

you can decide – for whatever reason – that sentences you believe have the same sense – have the same use –

no big deal –

but as with any proposal – this decision – is open to question

21. ‘Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports the number of slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colours and shapes of the building-stones that are stacked in such-and-such a place.—Such a report might run: "Five slabs". Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?—Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language-game. No doubt the tone of voice and the look with which they are uttered, and much else besides, will also be different. But we could also imagine the tone's being the same—for an order and a report can be spoken in a variety of tones of voice and with various expressions of face—the difference being only in the application. (Of course, we might use the words "statement" and "command" to stand for grammatical forms of sentence and intonations; we do in fact call "Isn't the weather glorious to-day?" a question, although it is used as a statement.) We could imagine a language in which all statements had the form and tone of rhetorical questions; or every command the form of the question "Would you like to . . .?". Perhaps it will then be said: "What he says has the form of a question but is really a command",—that is, has the function of a command in the technique of using the language. (Similarly one says "You will do this" not as a prophecybut as a command. What makes it the one or the other?)’

‘Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?— Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language-game.’ –

the real issue here is that ‘five slabs’ – out of context – has no significance –

it is only in terms of a propositional context that ‘five slabs’ – will have significance and only in terms of a propositional context that the two occurrences of ‘five slabs’ will be distinguished

calling this ‘playing a language-game’ – is ok – but it is simplistic and naïve –

and Wittgenstein uses simplistic and naïve language behaviour to this end

the real action of any language use is critical –

we make assessments and decisions about how we understand what is proposed

and if we operate rationally – with an open mind – we are live to the fact that our assessments and decisions are open to question – are provisional

‘(Similarly one says "You will do this" not as a prophecy but as a command. What makes it the one or the other?)’ –

well the point really is that we can’t speak objectively here –

that is to say we can’t make a pronouncement that will apply universally – i.e. – in all circumstances

           

in any situation – our assessment – can only be regarded as imperfect – as uncertain

22. ‘Frege's idea that every assertion contains an assumption, which is the thing that is asserted, really rests on the possibility found in our language of writing every statement in the form: "It is asserted that such-and-such is the case."—But "that such-and-such is the case" is not a sentence in our language—so far it is not a move in the language-game. And if I write, not "It is asserted that . . . .", but "It is asserted:such-and-such is the case", the words "It is asserted" simply become superfluous.

We might very well also write every statement in the form of a

question followed by a "Yes"; for instance: "Is it raining? Yes!"

Would this shew that every statement contained a question?

Of course we have the right to use an assertion sign in contrast with a question-mark, for example, or if we want to distinguish an assertion from a fiction or a supposition. It is only a mistake if one thinks that the assertion consists of two actions, entertaining and asserting (assigning the truth-value, or something of the kind), and that in performing these actions we follow the prepositional sign roughly as we sing from the musical score. Reading the written sentence loud or soft is indeed comparable with singing from a musical score, but 'meaning (thinking) the sentence that is read is not. Frege's assertion sign marks the beginning of the sentence. Thus its function is like that of the full-stop. It distinguishes the whole period from a clause within the period. If I hear someone say "it's raining" but do not know whether I have heard the beginning and end of the period, so far this sentence does not serve to tell me anything.’

a proposition is a proposal – a proposal of a state of affairs –

the state of affairs proposed – is not the ‘assumption’ of the proposition – it is the proposal –

you may argue that a proposition is based on an assumption –

but the assumption is not the proposition

and any proposed assumption – is a separate proposal – a proposal in relation to the subject proposal

as I see it what we deal with – what we work with is the proposal – is the proposition

and any response to a proposition – to a proposal – including any analysis of a proposition – is another proposal – another proposition

‘It is asserted that’ –

                                                                                                                                   you could say reports the event of the assertion – of the proposal –

we can imagine a circumstance where among those involved – it was not known that the assertion has been made –

and in that case ‘It is asserted that’ might well be relevant

however if whether or not the assertion has been made – is not at issue – where all that we are interested in is the assertion –

‘it is asserted that’ – would be superfluous – and no more than a figure of speech

an assertion – at base is a proposal –

any proposal put is – to use Wittgenstein’s phrase – ‘entertained’ –

which is to say logically speaking – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘assigning the truth value or something of the kind’ – is to propose in relation to the subject proposition –

it is to put a supplementary proposal

this ‘pre-positional sign’ – is logically irrelevant

and yes – the best you can say for Frege’s assertion sign – is that it is a punctuation mark

and the question is where might it have function?

perhaps in some artificial language – not I think in any natural language –

in any case it has no logical value

23. ‘But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)

Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following

examples, and in others:

Giving orders, and obeying them—

Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements-

Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—

Reporting an event—

Speculating about an event—

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Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a particular stance. Now, this picture can be used to tell someone how he should stand, should hold himself; or how he should not hold himself; or how a particular man did stand in such-and-such a place; and so on. One might (using the language of chemistry) call this picture a proposition-radical. This will be how Frege thought of the "assumption".

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Forming and testing a hypothesis—

Presenting the results of an experiment in tables

and diagrams—

Making up a story; and reading it—

Play-acting—

Singing catches—

Guessing riddles—

Making a joke; telling it—

Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—

Translating from one language into another—

Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)’

how many kinds of proposals – of propositions are there?

there are as many as are proposed – and so the question of how many is rather pointless

I don’t think that the notion of ‘language-game’ is an apt description of propositional reality

we may play games – with language – but game playing is of secondary importance and significance in propositional life

the engine – if you like of propositional reality is the critical process

propositions are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it is this uncertainty that drives change and creativity –

it is the logical force and power of propositional life

Wittgenstein’s example of a picture of boxer in a particular stance – well illustrates my point –

we can interpret this picture – this proposal – it an any number of ways –

and any proposal put in relation to this picture / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

Wittgenstein suggests that this is how Frege thought of ‘assumption’

from this I take it that Frege thought that all the different interpretations that could be given to such a picture / proposition – are assumptions of the picture / proposition –

that the proposition in some sense ‘contains’ all possible views of it –

this is just rubbish

any view of a proposition – of a proposal – is a proposal – a proposition put – in relation to it

we put forward interpretations – and we put forward proposals in relation to our interpretation –

we question – we doubt – we explore propositional uncertainty

propositional life is an on-going critical activity

what logicians have to say – about the structure of language –

is as with what anyone has to say about anything –

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

24. ‘If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: "What is a question?" —Is it the statement that I do not know such-and-such, or the statement that I wish the other person would tell me . . . .? Or is it the description of my mental state of uncertainty?—And is the cry "Help!" such a description?

Think how many different kinds of thing are called "description": description of a body's position by means of its co-ordinates; description of a facial expression; description of a sensation of touch; of a mood.

Of course it is possible to substitute the form of statement or

description for the usual form of question: "I want to know whether . . . ." or "I am in doubt whether . . . ."—but this does not bring the different language-games any closer together.

The significance of such possibilities of transformation, for example of turning all statements into sentences beginning "I think" or "I believe" (and thus, as it were, into descriptions of my inner life) will become clearer in another place. (Solipsism.)’

 

to define all language activity in terms of the language-game – is to restrict the understanding of language to one form – to one formula –

and this approach to language is reminiscent of the approach taken in the Tractatus

propositional activity – propositional reality – is open –

open to question – to doubt – to interpretation

there is nothing wrong with the notion of the language-game – but it is just one way of seeing – of interpreting language use

no doubt it has its uses – but these uses do not exhaust the possibilities of interpretation of language behaviour – the possibilities of understanding language use

the language-game is a proposal – and as with any proposal – any proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

Wittgenstein in illustrating his concept of the language-game – puts the question – ‘what is a question? – and he puts a number of questions that can be asked – about this question 

and he goes on to  say ‘Think of how many different kinds of thing are called “description”.’

these questions here – are critical questions –

the point is that the question – can be looked at from a number of different points of view – and that that there are any number of different ways of approaching the notion of description

you don’t need the framework of ‘language-games’ to do this – you don’t need any framework to do this –

all you need to do is put these notions to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty –

it is this exploration that opens up any issue – and leads to new and interesting proposals

proposals – that like the subjects proposals – are open to question

as to – ‘I want to know whether …’ – or ‘I am in doubt whether’ – ‘I think’ – ‘I believe’

the basic point is that it is the proposition – whatever that may be – that is put –

the proposition is open – open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

regardless of who puts the proposition

logically speaking the ‘I’ does not exist

25. ‘It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: "they do not think, and that is why they do not talk." But—they simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use language—if we except the most primitive forms of language.—Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing’

just what is to count as language – is in fact – an open question

clearly any sounds made by non-human animals – is not human language

do some animals communicate with us? –

yes – in very basic ways

do animals of the same species communicate with each other?

it seems so

do animals think?

I am pretty sure my cat lily does –

I see her working out cat problems – like how to get outside – how to make known she wants food

and in solving these and other problems she will make sounds –

which I take to be using a language – as the sounds very according to the circumstances she finds herself in

and yes – our use of language – is as natural as anything else we do

26. ‘One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to moods, to numbers, etc. . To repeat—naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the use of a word. But what is it a preparation for?’

it is not preparatory –

it is the use of the word –

it is language usage

27. ‘"We name things and then we can talk about them: can refer to them in talk."—As if what we did next were given with the mere act of naming. As if there were only one thing called "talking about a thing". Whereas in fact we do the most various things with our sentences. Think of exclamations alone, with their completely different functions.

Water!

Away!

Ow!

Help!

Fine!

No!

Are you inclined still to call these words "names of objects"?

In languages (2) and (8) there was no such thing as asking

something's name. This, with its correlate, ostensive definition, is, we might say, a language-game on its own. That is really to say: we are brought up, trained, to ask: "What is that called?"—upon which the name is given. And there is also a language-game of inventing a name for something, and hence of saying, "This is ... ." and then using the new name. (Thus, for example, children give names to their dolls and then talk about them and to them. Think in this connexion how singular is the use of a person's name to call him!)’

to name is to identify a propositional place – to which any further proposal  – is to be directed

identification here – like the propositional place – is a proposal

and we can say that the act of naming – gives us propositional focus

an exclamation is at base an undefined proposal –

just how it is interpreted is really a question of context

attaching the exclamation mark to a word – gives us a hint at context – but only a hint

and of course any name can be exclaimed

as to the words Wittgenstein lists above with exclamation marks

I really don’t think attaching exclamation marks to them is relevant to the question of naming

the question is – could these words be seen as names?

I think – yes –

but I am not saying that these words are the names of objects –

I am saying they could be regarded as – identifying propositional places – for further  propositional action

naming as ‘a language-game on its own’?

I would say naming is a propositional action – one among many –

a propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

28. ‘Now one can ostensively define a proper name, the name of a colour, the name of a material, a numeral, the name of a point of the compass and so on. The definition of the number two, "That is called 'two' "—pointing to two nuts— is perfectly exact.—But how can two be defined like that? The person one gives the definition to doesn't know what one wants to call "two"; he will suppose that "two" is the name given to this group of nuts!——He may suppose this; but perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite mistake; when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts, he might understand it as a numeral. And he might equally well take the name of a person, of which I give an ostensive definition, as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a point of the compass. That is to say: an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case.’

yes – an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case –

but this is not peculiar to the ostensive definition –

such is the case with any definition

the ostensive definition – as with a verbal definition is a proposal – a proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

29. ‘Perhaps you say: two can only be ostensively defined in this way: "This number is called 'two'". For the word "number" here shews what place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word. But this means that the word "number" must be explained before the ostensive definition can be understood.—The word "number" in the definition does indeed shew this place; does shew the post at which we station the word. And we can prevent misunderstandings by saying: "This colour is called so-and-so", "This length is called so-and-so", and so on. That is to say: misunderstandings are sometimes averted in this way. But is there only one way of taking the word "colour" or "length"?—Well, they just need defining.—Defining, then, by means of other words! And what about the last definition in this chain? (Do not say: "There isn't a 'last' definition". That is just as if you chose to say: "There isn't a last house in this road; one can always build an additional one".)

Whether the word "number" is necessary in the ostensive definition depends on whether without it the other person takes the definition otherwise than I wish. And that will depend on the circumstances under which it is given, and on the person I give it to.

And how he 'takes' the definition is seen in the use that he makes of the word defined.’

‘one can always build an additional one’ –

that is the very point –

any definition – is open – open to question – open to doubt –and is uncertain

and if a definition is not put to question – not put to doubt – if its uncertainty is not explored –  then presumably it will be the definition you proceed with –

however whether you proceed with it or not – logically speaking it is open to question

and as to – ‘how he takes the definition’ –

the logical reality is that however he takes the definition – it is open to question

and ‘whatever use he makes of the word defined’ –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

30. ‘So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the use— the meaning—of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear. Thus if I know that someone means to explain a colour-word to me the ostensive definition "That is called 'sepia' " will help me to understand the word.—And you can say this, so long as

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Could one define the word "red" by pointing to something that was not red? That would be as if one were supposed to explain the word "modest" to someone whose English was weak, and one pointed to an arrogant man and said "That man is not modest". That it is ambiguous is no argument against such a method of definition. Any definition can be misunderstood.

But it might well be asked: are we still to call this "definition"?— For, of course, even if it has the same practical consequences, the same effect on the learner, it plays a different part in the calculus from what we ordinarily call "ostensive definition" of the word "red".

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you do not forget that all sorts of problems attach to the words "to know" or "to be clear".

One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?’

we learn language practises – like definition – like the use of words – in language communities –

it is all about working out how to function – how to function where you are – in the propositional world you operate in – you live in –

but what does one have to know?

knowledge is proposal – to know is to be able to operate with proposals in propositional complexes – in propositional structures –

and to be able to do this one must recognize that what is put – to us and by us – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

we operate with uncertainty – in uncertainty

could one define the word ‘red’ by pointing to something that is not red?

yes – it’s the definition you have – when in fact you don’t have a definition –

I can’t see that it would have the same effect on the learner –

seeing red – would be quite a different experience – to not seeing red

31. ‘When one shews someone the king in chess and says: "This is the king", this does not tell him the use of this piece—unless he already knows the rules of the game up to this last point: the shape of the king. You could imagine his having learnt the rules of the game without ever having been shewn an actual piece. The shape of the chessman corresponds here to the sound or shape of a word.

One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without

ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and more complicated ones. He too might be given the explanation "This is the king",—if, for instance, he were being shewn chessmen of a shape he was not used to. This explanation again only tells him the use of the piece because, as we might say, the place for it was already prepared. Or even: we shall only say that it tells him the use, if the place is already prepared. And in this case it is so, not because the person to whom we give the explanation already knows rules, but because in another sense he is already master of a game.

Consider this further case: I am explaining chess to someone; and I begin by pointing to a chessman and saying: "This is the king; it can move like this, .... and so on."—In this case we shall say: the words "This is the king" (or "This is called the 'king' ") are a definition only if the learner already 'knows what a piece in a game is'. That is, if he has already played other games, or has watched other people playing 'and understood'—and similar things. Further, only under these conditions will he be able to ask relevantly in the course of learning the game: "What do you call this?"—that is, this piece in a game.

We may say: only someone who already knows how to do something with it can significantly ask a name.

And we can imagine the person who is asked replying: "Settle the name yourself"—and now the one who asked would have to manage everything for himself.’

‘this is the king’ –

may well be the first thing said – as introduction to the game – to its practice – to its rules

‘One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without ever learning or formulating rules’ –

if you were to ‘learn the game’ – by i.e. watching games in play – you learn what does and does not count as a move in the game for the different pieces in play

here you are learning the rules

and this learning of the rules is a consequence of learning the practise –

the point being the practice is rule-governed 

if you have learnt other board games – you have learnt that such games are rule- governed –

you have learnt propositional game playing

‘We may say: only someone who already knows how to do something with it can significantly ask a name.’ –

well yes – but what if the piece that is the king – comes from a set that is of  radically different design – one the chess player has not come across –

he might ask – what is that piece called? – and when told – he then knows what to do with it

‘settle the matter yourself’ – is giving someone the brush-off –

if you are going to play the game – you need to be introduced to its language

for here – the name determines the function –

and the name is a rule

32. ‘Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to guess the meaning of these definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong.

And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning

of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to itself".’

coming into a strange country and not understanding the language of that county?

in Augustine’s account – the country is not strange – the language is not strange

what we get from Augustine is a view of how one learns to name –

in whatever country – with whatever language

it is clear from Augustine’s account  that the child has a language capacity –

a capacity to learn language

and in his account of how one learns naming – it is clear that the child can think –

‘I saw this and grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out.’ –

and it is because he can think – he can learn to name –

being able to think – for Augustine – is a  far more complex and interesting affair than Wittgenstein’s – ‘something like ‘talk to itself’ –

in Augustine’s account to ‘think’ means to be able to interpret bodily movements –

i.e. – the expression of the face – the play of the eyes – the movement of other parts of the body – the tone of voice –

and to understand that these movements express a state of mind – in the actions of seeking – having – rejecting – or avoiding –

in short it means being able to understand the logical action of naming –

and being able to replicate it –

‘I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.’

33. ‘Suppose, however, someone were to object: "It is not true that you must already be master of a language in order to understand an ostensive definition: all you need—of course!—is to know or guess what the person giving the explanation is pointing to. That is, whether for example to the shape of the object, or to its colour, or to its number, and so on."——And what does 'pointing to the shape', 'pointing to the colour' consist in? Point to a piece of paper.—And now point to its shape—now to its colour—now to its number (that sounds queer).—How did you do it?—You will say that you 'meant' a different

thing each time you pointed. And if I ask how that is done, you will say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the shape, etc. But I ask again: how is that done?

Suppose someone points to a vase and says "Look at that marvellous blue—the shape isn't the point."—Or: "Look at the marvellous shape— the colour doesn't matter." Without doubt you will do something different when you act upon these two invitations. But do you always do the same thing when you direct your attention to the colour? Imagine various different cases. To indicate a few:

"Is this blue the same as the blue over there? Do you see any difference?"— You are mixing paint and you say "It's hard to get the blue of this sky." "It's turning fine, you can already see blue sky again." "Look what different effects these two blues have." "Do you see the blue book over there? Bring it here."

"This blue signal-light means . . . ." "What's this blue called?—Is it 'indigo'?"

You sometimes attend to the colour by putting your hand up to keep the outline from view; or by not looking at the outline of the thing; sometimes by staring at the object and trying to remember where you saw that colour before.

You attend to the shape, sometimes by tracing it, sometimes by

screwing up your eyes so as not to see the colour clearly, and in many other ways. I want to say: This is the sort of thing that happens while one 'directs one's attention to this or that'. But it isn't these things by themselves that make us say someone is attending to the shape, the colour, and so on. Just as a move in chess doesn't consist simply in moving a piece in such-and-such a way on the board—nor yet in one's thoughts and feelings as one makes the move: but in the circumstances that we call "playing a game of chess", "solving a chess problem", and so on.’

the question – how is that done?

well the ‘answer’ – if you can call it that – is whatever is proposed in explanation –

and of course there may be any number of proposals put –

any such proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

perhaps you walk away from this and say ‘well – we don’t know how it is done – all we know is that it is done’

and yes it is interesting to speculate on how – but there will be no final resolution here

there will only be proposals – which will be of use – if they serve some proposed purpose –

and even then – they can be put to question – to doubt – and their uncertainty explored

on the other hand – where we are dealing with propositional games – i.e. chess – the question ‘how is it done’ – effectively doesn’t arise

games are rule-governed propositional actions

if you play a game – you play in accordance with the rules –

it is as simple as that

the rules – are not put to question – to doubt – or regarded as uncertain – if you play the game

if you question the rules – you are not playing the game  – you are engaged in a logical exercise

in our propositional lives – we play propositional games – that is rule-governed propositional actions

however much of what we deal with in our propositional lives is not rule-governed

and in our non-rule-governed propositional lives – the logical and rational response to propositions put – is to put them to question – put them to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty

this is the logical reality – it is our reality – it is how we live –

uncertainty is the engine of our propositional reality

it strikes me that propositional game playing – in whatever form that it takes – provides something of a relief from the uncertainty we deal with in most of our propositional activities

and – with too much game playing – you might be relieved to get back to question – to doubt – to uncertainty – and to creativity

the problem with using the idea of the game in philosophical discussions – is just that there are no rules –

and any rules proposed will fail – because philosophical issues demand to be explored

and there is no logical end to their exploration

                                                                                                        

34. ‘But suppose someone said: "I always do the same thing when I attend to the shape: my eye follows the outline and I feel . . . .". And suppose this person to give someone else the ostensive definition "That is called a 'circle' ", pointing to a circular object and having all these experiences——cannot his hearer still interpret the definition differently, even though he sees the other's eyes following the outline, and even though he feels what the other feels? That is to say: this 'interpretation' may also consist in how he now makes use of the word; in what he points to, for example, when told: "Point to a circle".—For neither the expression "to intend the definition in such-and-such a way" nor the expression "to interpret the definition in such-and-such a way" stands for a process which accompanies the giving and hearing of the definition.’

the ostensive definition as such – is quite straightforward

it is a standard propositional practise –

you either understand that – or you don’t –

you might question the value of such a definition – i.e. – does pointing and naming – give us a good enough definition? –

or indeed you  might take a hard line – and argue that such definitions – are of no use

this though is not to put to question the fact of the propositional practise of ostensive definition

intention – is neither here nor there – as far as the ostensive action is concerned –

you can argue the point there – but it is a different argument –

the same applies to ‘having all these experiences’

as to interpretation – it is not the ostensive act that is interpreted – if you understand this propositional practice

rather any questioning will be in regard to what is proposed in the action

the proposal ‘that is called a brick’ – can be put to question – to doubt – and as with any proposal – logically speaking – is uncertain –

in that someone could say – ‘I wouldn’t call that a brick’ – etc

35. ‘There are, of course, what can be called "characteristic experiences" of pointing to (e.g.) the shape. For example, following the outline with one's finger or with one's eyes as one points.— But this does not happen in all cases in which I 'mean the shape', and no more does any other one characteristic process occur in all these cases.— Besides, even if something of the sort did recur in all cases, it would still depend on the circumstances—that is, on what happened before and after the pointing—whether we should say "He pointed to the shape and not to the colour".

For the words "to point to the shape", "to mean the shape", and so on, are not used in the same way as these', "to point to this book (not to that one), "to point to the chair, not to the table", and so on.— Only think how differently we learn the use of the words "to point to this thing", "to point to that thing", and on the other hand "to point to the colour, not the shape", "to mean the colour", and so on.

To repeat: in certain cases, especially when one points 'to the shape' or 'to the number' there are characteristic experiences and ways of pointing—'characteristic' because they recur often (not always) when shape or number are 'meant'. But do you also know of an experience characteristic of pointing to a piece in a game as a piece in a game?

All the same one can say: "I mean that this piece is called the 'king', not this particular bit of wood I am pointing to". (Recognizing, wishing, remembering, etc. .)’

we can and do propose in relation to our propositional actions –

Wittgenstein in his discussion of pointing to shape – describes a characteristic process

but makes the point that –  ‘But this does not happen in all cases in which I 'mean the shape', and no more does any other one characteristic process occur in all these cases’

in so doing he gives an illustration of the logic of propositional use – the exploration of propositional uncertainty

any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and this is the case whatever propositional activity is being discussed –

it is the critical process that reveals difference – be that different contexts – different understandings – different explanations –

the reality of rational propositional activity – is the reality of question – of doubt – of uncertainty –

and the point of analysis – of any analysis is not reduction – or atomization – rather propositional exploration – and propositional diversity

36. ‘And we do here what we do in a host of similar cases: because we cannot specify any one bodily action which we call pointing to the shape (as opposed, for example, to the colour), we say that a spiritual [mental, intellectual] activity corresponds to these words.

Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there,

we should like to say, is a spirit.’

we can put whatever proposal suits our purpose –

and if we are rational about the matter – we recognize that our proposal / explanation – or any other proposal / explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

this is what we deal with – this is how we go about our propositional lives

37. ‘What is the relation between name and thing named?—Well, what is it? Look at language-game (2) or at another one: there you can see the sort of thing this relation consists in. This relation may also consist, among many other things, in the fact that hearing the name calls before our mind the picture of what is named; and it also consists, among other things, in the name's being written on the thing named or being pronounced when that thing is pointed at.’

the relation is a propositional relation –

that is a relation between proposals

it is a proposed relation between – the proposed thing (un-named) – and a proposed name of the thing – a proposed identification of the thing

these proposals – the thing in question – the name given – the proposed relation –

logically speaking are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the hearing of the name – what this calls to mind of what is named –  the name being written on the thing – or being pronounced when that thing is pointed out – are expressions of the relation

38. ‘But what, for example, is the word "this" the name of in language-game (8) or the word "that" in the ostensive definition "that is called . . . ."?—If you do not want to produce confusion you will do best not to call these words names at all.—Yet, strange to say, the word "this" has been called the only genuine name; so that anything else we call a name was one only in an inexact, approximate sense.

This queer conception springs from a tendency to sublime the logic of our language—as one might put it. The proper answer to it is: we call very different things "names"; the word "name" is used to

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What is it to mean the words "That is blue" at one time as a statement about the object one is pointing to—at another as an explanation of the word "blue"? Well, in the second case one really means "That is called 'blue' ".—Then can one at one time mean the word "is" as "is called" and the word "blue" as " 'blue' ", and another time mean "is" really as "is"?

It is also possible for someone to get an explanation of the words out of what was intended as a piece of information. [Marginal note: Here lurks a crucial superstition.]

Can I say "bububu" and mean "If it doesn't rain I shall go for a

walk"?—It is only in a language that I can mean something by something. This shews clearly that the grammar of "to mean" is not like that of the expression "to imagine" and the like

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characterize many different kinds of use of a word, related to one another in many different ways;—but the kind of use that "this" has is not among them.

It is quite true that, in giving an ostensive definition for instance, we often point to the object named and say the name. And similarly, in giving an ostensive definition for instance, we say the word "this" while pointing to a thing. And also the word "this" and a name often occupy the same position in a sentence. But it is precisely characteristic of a name that it is defined by means of the demonstrative expression "That is N" (or "That is called 'N' "). But do we also give the definitions: "That is called 'this' ", or "This is called 'this' "?

This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.—And you really get such a queer connexion when the philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object. And we can also say the word "this" to the object, as it were

address the object as "this"—a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy.’

‘That is called “this” ’ –

I could imagine a character in a Lewis Carroll poem or story – saying this – or is it ‘that’? (joke)

the point being it comes down to a question of context

we understand the action of naming – and we tend to stick to standard contexts – when we speak of naming – but non-standard contexts are possible –

and the propositional action of naming is not determined by context – it is a logical action

‘And you really get such a queer connexion when the philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times.’

if I am not mistake G. E. Moore’s whole philosophical career was based on doing just that (or this)

repeating a name or ‘this’ innumerable times – is overdoing it – once is enough –

and doing it once is standard practise – hardly ‘queer’

‘For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.’ –

language does not ‘go on holidays’ –

what you get from the best of the philosophers’ is critical analysis of language use

philosophical problems don’t ‘arise’ – we face philosophical problems at every turn –

to live is to deal with philosophical problems –

you might ‘address’ the object as “this” – when you don’t yet have a more specific or useful name for it –

and I would suggest that this can occur in any propositional context

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‘Then can one at one time mean the word "is" as "is called" and the word "blue" as “ 'blue' ", and another time mean "is" really as "is"?’

yes – any word – from a logical point of view is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and for this reason it can have any number of functions in any number of propositional contexts – in any number of uses

‘It is also possible for someone to get an explanation of the words out of what was intended as a piece of information.’

why not?

logically speaking – any explanation – is as good as any other

as to the grammar of ‘to mean’ – or this so called ‘grammar’ of any word or phrase –

grammar is a theory or description of language use –

and as with any theory or description – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

39. ‘But why does it occur to one to want to make precisely this word into a name, when it evidently is not a name?—That is just the reason. For one is tempted to make an objection against what is ordinarily called a name. It can be put like this: a name ought really to signify a simple. And for this one might perhaps give the following reasons: The word "Excalibur", say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. But it is clear that the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" makes sense whether Excalibur is still whole or is broken up. But if "Excalibur" is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But then the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" would contain a word that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists. So the word "Excalibur" must disappear when the sense is analysed and its place be taken by words which name simples. It will be reasonable to call these words the real names.’

‘But why does it occur to one to want to make precisely this word into a name, when it evidently is not a name?—

well the point is you can’t say in advance how any word is going to be used – or is going to function

there just may be a context – where is seems useful – and sensible to ‘make precisely this word into a name’

‘For one is tempted to make an objection against what is ordinarily called a name. It can be put like this: a name ought really to signify a simple.’

why? – if you go with this notion of ‘simple’ – and it’s counterpart ‘complex’ –

you make no distinction when it comes to naming

we give names to so called ‘simples’ – and to so called ‘complexes’ – and to simples in named complexes

‘The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. …But then the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" would contain a word that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists.’

that it can be said that the sword ‘Excalibur’ – does not exist  – does not make the sentence nonsense –

the reality is we refer to and name things that it can be said do not exist

basically what happens here is that we propose existence – and we name that proposed

the real point here is that what a name signifies – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

nevertheless – and despite the uncertainties involved – the practice of naming is essential to our propositional practises – and we use it in all facets of our propositional lives

40. ‘Let us first discuss this point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.—It is important to note that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N. N. is dead."’

‘that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it’?

if ‘something’ corresponds to a word –

what you have is a proposed relation between – the word / proposal – and the proposed correspondent –

and once this is stated – you have a proposed correspondence – between words – between proposals

the proposed relation – is – as with the proposals involved – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there are words too – that have no correspondent – but have propositional function

the bearer of a name may ‘exist’ – in the normal sense of that term –

and where the bearer of the name does not so exist – the name functions as a proposal of existence

and just what that proposal amounts to – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

41. ‘In §15 we introduced proper names into language (8). Now suppose that the tool with the name "N" is broken. Not knowing this, A gives B the sign "N". Has this sign meaning now or not?— What is B to do when he is given it?—We have not settled anything about this. One might ask: what will he do? Well, perhaps he will stand there at a loss, or shew A the pieces. Here one might say: "N" has become meaningless; and this expression would mean that the sign "N" no longer had a use in our language-game (unless we gave it a new one). "N" might also become meaningless because, for whatever reason, the tool was given another name and the sign "N" no longer used in the language-game.—But we could also imagine a convention whereby B has to shake his head in reply if A gives him the sign belonging to a tool that is broken.—In this way the command "N" might be said to be given a place in the language-game even when the tool no longer exists, and the sign "N" to have meaning even when its bearer ceases to exist.’

if we were to ask for ‘N’ – and the object that corresponds to N – is broken – or no longer functions – or there is no ‘N’ in the tool box –

what we are dealing with is a proposal – ‘N’ – that is in question – that is in doubt

the proposal ‘N’ – is logically speaking – uncertain

42. ‘But has for instance a name which has never been used for a tool also got a meaning in that game?——Let us assume that "X" is such a sign and that A gives this sign to B—well, even such signs could be given a place in the language-game, and B might have, say, to answer them too with a shake of the head. (One could imagine this as a sort of joke between them.)’

yes – a shake of the head –

the proposal ‘X’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

43. ‘For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we

employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.’

as to the word ‘meaning’ – how it can be defined – how it is defined – is how it can be used – how it is used

this word – as with any – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

yes – we can and do sometimes explain a name – by pointing to its bearer –

but even this action – this proposal – of pointing is to a bearer – as an explanation of the meaning of a name – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

44. ‘We said that the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" made sense even when Excalibur was broken in pieces. Now this is so  because in this language-game a name is also used in the absence of its bearer. But we can imagine a language-game with names (that is, with signs which we should certainly include among names) in which they are used only in the presence of the bearer; and so could always be replaced by a demonstrative pronoun and the gesture of pointing.’

yes – such may be – or become a common propositional practice –

but it will only be so as long as it is –

any language practice is a contingency – and logically speaking – never fixed

45. ‘The demonstrative "this" can never be without a bearer. It might be said: "so long as there is a this, the word 'this' has a meaning too, whether this is simple or complex."——But that does not make the word into a name. On the contrary: for a name is not used with, but only explained by means of, the gesture of pointing.’

‘so long as there is a this, the word 'this' has a meaning too, whether this is simple or complex.’

so long as there is a this?

there is only a this – if a ‘this’ is proposed

and if it is proposed – it will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘but that does not make the word into a name’

well it could be a name – i.e. – ‘this is what I am talking about’ – and here ‘this’ – functions as the name – of a subject in discussion –

a name is not used with the gesture of pointing?

what if a name is used with a gesture of pointing?

someone asks ‘where is George?’

and in reply – another points to a man  – saying ‘George’

‘but only explained by means of, the gesture of pointing.’ –

is a name explained by the gesture of pointing?

I wouldn’t use the term ‘explain’ here – I would say the gesture proposes a reference point for the name

and say that this gesture / proposal – as with the name / proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

                                                                                                                                          

46. ‘What lies behind the idea that names really signify simples?— Socrates says in the Theaetetus: "If I make no mistake, I have heard some people say this: there is no definition of the primary elements— so to speak—out of which we and everything else are composed; for everything that exists in its own right can only be named, no other determination is possible, neither that it is nor that it is not . . . . . But what exists in its own right has to be ..... named without any other determination. In consequence it is impossible to give an account of any primary element; for it, nothing is possible but the bare name; its name is all it has. But just as what consists of these primary elements is itself complex, so the names of the elements become descriptive language by being compounded together. For the essence of speech is the composition of names.”

Both Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (Tractates Logico-

Philosophicus) were such primary elements.’

logically speaking that which is ‘primary’– is the proposal – the proposition

and the proposal – the proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to ‘primary elements’ – any such proposal is open to question – the notion of a ‘primary element’ – is at best the decision – perhaps pragmatic – to stop the action of question – of doubt – and to stop the exploration of propositional uncertainty

‘everything that exists in its own right’ – is what is proposed

and what is proposed can be named – that is propositions can be / are named –

and the naming here is a propositional act

naming anything – that is naming a proposition – is to give it identification –

identification in some propositional construct – or context

a name / proposal can identify a proposed ‘simple’ – a proposed ‘complex’ –

any such identification – that is any such name – as with the proposal identified – simple / complex –

is open to question – open to doubt – and from a logical point of view – uncertain

the ‘essence of speech’ – if you want to use this terminology – is the proposal

both Russell’s ‘individuals’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘objects’ – are proposals –

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if they are regarded – as not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain –

they are not proposals – not propositions – but prejudices –

philosophical prejudices

47. ‘But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed?—What are the simple constituent parts of a chair?—The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms?— "Simple" means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of a chair'.

Again: Does my visual image of this tree, of this chair, consist of parts? And what are its simple component parts? Multi-colouredness is one kind of complexity; another is, for example, that of a broken outline composed of straight bits. And a curve can be said to be composed of an ascending and a descending segment.

If I tell someone without any further explanation: "What I see before me now is composite", he will have the right to ask: "What do you mean by 'composite'? For there are all sorts of things that that can mean!"—The question "Is what you see composite?" makes good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity—that is, which particular use of the word—is in question. If it had been laid down that the visual image of a tree was to be called "composite" if one saw not just a single trunk, but also branches, then the question "Is the visual image of this tree simple or composite?", and the question "What are its simple component parts?", would have a clear sense—a clear use. And of course the answer to the second question is not "The branches" (that would be an answer to the grammatical question: "What are here called 'simple component parts'?") but rather a description of the individual branches.

But isn't a chessboard, for instance, obviously, and absolutely, composite?—You are probably thinking of the composition out of thirty-two white and thirty-two black squares. But could we not also say, for instance, that it was composed of the colours black and white and the schema of squares? And if there are quite different ways of looking at it, do you still want to say that the chessboard is absolutely 'composite'?—Asking "Is this object composite?" outside a particular language-game is like what a boy once did, who had to say whether the verbs in certain sentences were in the active or passive voice, and who racked his brains over the question whether the verb "to sleep" meant something active or passive.

We use the word "composite" (and therefore the word "simple") in an enormous number of different and differently related ways. (Is the colour of a square on a chessboard simple, or does it consist of pure white and pure yellow? And is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow?—Is this length of 2 cm. simple, or does it consist of two parts, each 1 cm. long? But why not of one bit 3 cm. long, and one bit 1 cm. long measured in the opposite direction?)

To the philosophical question: "Is the visual image of this tree composite, and what are its component parts?" the correct answer is:  "That depends on what you understand by 'composite'." (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question.)’

‘It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of a chair'.’

the point here is that it is illogical to ‘speak absolutely’ – in any propositional context

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

the propositional categories of ‘simple’ and ‘composite’ – can be and are functional in terms of propositional organization

however use of these propositional categories – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘"What do you mean by 'composite'? For there are all sorts of things that that can mean!"—’

that is the logical point in a nutshell

‘And of course the answer to the second question is not "The branches" (that would be an answer to the grammatical question: "What are here called 'simple component parts'?") but rather a description of the individual branches.’

and any description – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the chessboard is a proposal – and as with any proposal – of any form – open to interpretation –

you will use whatever interpretation suits your purpose

‘We use the word "composite" (and therefore the word "simple") in an enormous number of different and differently related ways. –’

yes – the propositional categories of ‘simple’ and ‘composite’ have proven to be useful in any number of propositional contexts

‘To the philosophical question: "Is the visual image of this tree composite, and what are its component parts?" the correct answer is: "That depends on what you understand by 'composite'." (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question.)’

it is not a rejection of the question –

how you understand ‘composite’ – will lead to further proposals – to further questions

at some point you will decide on an answer – and this decision will be pragmatic –

you will decide to get on with it –

however this decision – as with any decision – from a logical point of view –

is open to question

48. ‘Let us apply the method of §2 to the account in the Theaetetus. Let us consider a language-game for which this account is really valid. The language serves to describe combinations of coloured squares on a surface. The squares form a complex like a chessboard. There are red, green, white and black squares. The words of the language are(correspondingly) "R", "G", "W", "B", and a sentence is a series of these words. They describe an arrangement of squares in the order:

And so for instance the sentence "RRBGGGRWW" describes an arrangement of this sort:

Here the sentence is a complex of names, to which corresponds a complex of elements. The primary elements are the coloured squares. "But are these simple?"—I do not know what else you would have me call "the simples", what would be more natural in this language-game. But under other circumstances I should call a monochrome square "composite", consisting perhaps of two rectangles, or of the elements colour and shape. But the concept of complexity might also be so extended that a smaller area was said to be 'composed' of a greater area and another one subtracted from it. Compare the 'composition of forces', the 'division' of a line by a point outside it; these expressions shew that we are sometimes even inclined to conceive the smaller as the result of a composition of greater parts, and the greater as the result of a division of the smaller.

But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?’

‘But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our sentence consists of four or of nine elements!’ –

what we ‘know’ is what is proposed –

and any proposal is open to question –

our knowledge – is uncertain

and the reason for the question – four or nine elements? – is primarily logical –

the figure – as with any figure – is a proposal – a proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?’ –

if you are to have a successful propositional action – you need to be clear on your interpretation –

you here have to make a decision –

this is to be pragmatic

and if you are to have a rational approach here – you understand that any decision you make is open  to question –

it is not so much that we proceed with clarity – it is rather that we proceed in uncertainty

49. ‘But what does it mean to say that we cannot define (that is, describe) these elements, but only name them? This might mean, for instance, that when in a limiting case a complex consists of only one square, its description is simply the name of the coloured square.

Here we might say—though this easily leads to all kinds of philosophical superstition—that a sign "R" or "B", etc. may be sometimes a word and sometimes a proposition. But whether it 'is a word or a proposition' depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written. For instance, if A has to describe complexes of coloured squares to B and he uses the word "R" alone, we shall be able to say that the word is a description—a proposition. But if he is memorizing the words and their meanings, or if he is teaching someone else the use of the words and uttering them in the course of ostensive teaching, we shall not say that they are propositions. In this situation the word "R", for instance, is not a description; it names an element——but it would be queer to make that a reason for saying that an element can only be named! For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game—any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except in the language-game. This was what Frege meant too, when he said that a word had meaning only as part of a sentence.’

we can define and we can name –

any definition – any name – is a proposal – open to question

‘when in a limiting case a complex consists of only one square, its description is simply the name of the coloured square.’

it may well be that for whatever purpose it is decided that the description is the name

however the description / name – is a proposal – and logically speaking – open to question

and if no question is raised – the description / name will for practical purposes hold

words – are proposals – propositions – are proposals

regardless of context and use – the word ‘R’ – is a proposal –  is a proposition

names are proposals – propositions –

names are identifying proposals – identifying propositions

‘For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for description.’

I would say the name is a description – to which other descriptions are put

any proposal – can be regarded as a description

‘Naming is so far not a move in the language-game—any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except in the language-game.’

this ‘language-game’ notion – is more of an obstacle than a help to understanding the logic of language – and the practice of language use – 

we don’t need this notion of ‘language-game’ to understand language

to say that nothing has been done when a thing is named – makes no sense

of course something as been done – a name / proposal has been put –

naming really has nothing to do with this artificial notion of the language-game

we put name / proposals – in our natural use of language –

or as Augustine put it – what we are dealing with here is ‘the natural language of all peoples’

and as for Frege’s view that – ‘a word had meaning only as part of a sentence.’ –

a word is a proposal – open to question – open doubt – and uncertain –

whether it is in a sentence or not

50. ‘What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-being to elements?—One might say: if everything that we call "being" and "non-being" consists in the existence and non-existence of connexions between elements, it makes no sense to speak of an element's being (non-being); just as when everything that we call "destruction" lies in the separation of elements, it makes no sense to speak of the

destruction of an element.

One would, however, like to say: existence cannot be attributed to an element, for if it did not exist, one could not even name it and so one could say nothing at all of it.—But let us consider an analogous case. There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.—But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule.—Let us imagine samples of colour being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: "sepia" means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept hermetically

sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this colour or that it is not.

We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language used in ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation.—And just this goes for an element in language-game (48) when we name it by uttering the word "R": this gives this object a role in our language-game; it is now a means of representation. And to say "If it did not exist, it could have no name" is to say as much and as little as: if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-game.—What

looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made. And this may be an important observation; but it is none the less an observation concerning our language-game—our method of representation’

if the element is proposed – the element exists – has being

that which is proposed – is that which exists – that which has being

that which is not proposed – does not exist – is ‘non-being’ –

we have to tolerate this phrase ‘non-being’ – for there are those fools who have proposed that what is not proposed – has being – but straight thinking should result in the elimination of the phrase – as a matter of basic logic

if the element is proposed – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

existence – being – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

as to the destruction of an element –

here the proposal is that what once was – is no longer –

and this proposal – as with any proposal – is open to question

‘for if it did not exist, one could not even name it and so one could say nothing at all of it.’

correct – if it is not proposed – in some manner – it does not exist –

to name – is to propose existence –

naming is an existential proposal –

‘We define: "sepia" means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept hermetically sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this colour or that it is not.’

if it is proposed that by ‘sepia’ we mean the colour of the proposed standard sepia –

then we are proposing that the standard is the colour –

and – the standard is proposed as ‘something with which comparison is made’

the important thing to understand here is that we are talking about proposals – different – though related proposals – not language-games

the notion of the ‘language-game’ – is here irrelevant

51. ‘In describing language-game (48) I said that the words "R",

"B", etc. corresponded to the colours of the squares. But what does

this correspondence consist in; in what sense can one say that certain

colours of squares correspond to these signs? For the account in (48)

merely set up a connexion between those signs and certain words of

our language (the names of colours).—Well, it was presupposed that

the use of the signs in the language-game would be taught in a different

way, in particular by pointing to paradigms. Very well; but what

does it mean to say that in the technique of using the language certain

elements correspond to the signs?—Is it that the person who is describing

the complexes of coloured squares always says "R" where there is a

red square; "B" when there is a black one, and so on? But what if he

goes wrong in the description and mistakenly says "R" where he sees a

black square——what is the criterion by which this is a mistake?—

Or does "R"s standing for a red square consist in this, that when the

people whose language it is use the sign "R" a red square always comes

before their minds?

In order to see more clearly, here as in countless similar cases, we

must focus on the details of what goes on; must look at them from

close to.’

‘But what does this correspondence consist in; in what sense can one say that certain

colours of squares correspond to these signs?’

we have the proposal of signs – and the proposal of the coloured squares

to propose that they correspond – is to propose a relation between these proposals –

it is to put a relational proposal

how we explain what the correspondence consists in – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

however this relational proposal – is a natural propositional action –

and there is a sense in which ‘what it consists in’ – is irrelevant

what it consists in is an analytical issue – which though of interest – does not bear on the use of this relational proposal –

we make these relational proposals – and work we with them

‘But what if he goes wrong in the description and mistakenly says "R" where he sees a black square——what is the criterion by which this is a mistake?—’

all we are dealing with ultimately here – is accepted practise –

‘Or does "R’s standing for a red square consist in this, that when the people whose language it is use the sign "R" a red square always comes before their minds?’

‘comes before their minds’ – would be an explanation –  but again it makes no difference to the action – how it is explained

explanation here – interesting – and fascinating as it is – is an ancillary propositional activity

‘In order to see more clearly, here as in countless similar cases, we must focus on the details of what goes on; must look at them from close to.’

this sounds good but it doesn’t amount to much –

‘focusing on details’ – and ‘looking at them from close to’ – might give you an idea of

how correspondence can be explained –

however – any proposal put – that is the outcome of this action of focusing and looking – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

52. ‘If I am inclined to suppose that a mouse has come into being

by spontaneous generation out of grey rags and dust, I shall do well

to examine those rags very closely to see how a mouse may have

hidden in them, how it may have got there and so on. But if I am

convinced that a mouse cannot come into being from these things,

then this investigation will perhaps be superfluous.

But first we must learn to understand what it is that opposes such

an examination of details in philosophy.’

there is nothing to oppose such an ‘examination’ – but prejudice

‘philosophy’ – is proposal

philosophical proposals – are propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

any philosophical proposition – is open – open to critical examination

‘philosophical details’ – are proposals – open to critical examination

53. ‘Our language-game (48) has various possibilities; there is a

variety of cases in which we should say that a sign in the game was

the name of a square of such-and-such a colour. We should say so

if, for instance, we knew that the people who used the language were

taught the use of the signs in such-and-such a way. Or if it were set

down in writing, say in the form of a table, that this element corresponded

to this sign, and if the table were used in teaching the language

and were appealed to in certain disputed cases.

We can also imagine such a table's being a tool in the use of the

language. Describing a complex is then done like this: the person who

describes the complex has a table with him and looks up each element

of the complex in it and passes from this to the sign (and the one who

is given the description may also use a table to translate it into a

picture of coloured squares). This table might be said to take over here

the role of memory and association in other cases. (We do not usually

carry out the order "Bring me a red flower" by looking up the colour

red in a table of colours and then bringing a flower of the colour that

we find in the table; but when it is a question of choosing or mixing

a particular shade of red, we do sometimes make use of a sample or

table.)

If we call such a table the expression of a rule of the language-game,

it can be said that what we call a rule of a language-game may have

very different roles in the game.’

the table is a proposal –

and as a proposal it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it is this logical uncertainty of the proposal – that is reason that it can be said that this proposal – or for that matter any proposal – may have very different roles in language use

54. ‘Let us recall the kinds of case where we say that a game is

played according to a definite rule.

The rule may be an aid in teaching the game. The learner is told it

and given practice in applying it.—Or it is an instrument of the game

itself.—Or a rule is employed neither in the teaching nor in the game

itself; nor is it set down in a list of rules. One learns the game by

watching how others play. But we say that it is played according to

such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from

the practice of the game—like a natural law governing the play.——

But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players'

mistakes and correct play?—There are characteristic signs of it in the

players' behaviour. Think of the behaviour characteristic of correcting

a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone

was doing so even  without knowing his language.’

Wittgenstein here gives examples of where a game is played according to a definite rule

in a genuine game – if the there is to be a game – the rules are adhered to – without question

as applied to language – to propositional behaviour – this model has no value

any so called rule in propositional action – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the point being that propositional behaviour is a critical activity

and this applies to the learning of language – through instruction – or through observation

any instruction / proposal should introduce the learner to the fact that any so called ‘rule’ – will have exceptions – and is open to question –

if the learner is not shown the critical dimension of language use – they are not learning a language – they are just learning a propositional game

learning through observation –

if there is no question of what is observed – no doubt regarding what is observed – or no recognition of the uncertainty of what is observed –

the learner will not learn anything about language – though they might learn to play a simple language-game

what we have above from Wittgenstein is an attempt to strip propositional action of its critical dimension – and reduce all language behaviour to a quasi-mechanical model –

a useful model for robotics – but of no use in understanding the propositional lives of human beings

and Wittgenstein gives his ‘game’ away in the last two sentences above –

‘Think of the behaviour characteristic of correcting a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even without knowing his language.’

that it is possible to recognize someone correcting a slip of the tongue – requires a critical assessment of that action –

Wittgenstein’s so called ‘rule’ doesn’t tell you what’s going on

55. ‘"What the names in language signify must be indestructible; for it must be possible to describe the state of affairs in which everything destructible is destroyed. And this description will contain words; and what corresponds to these cannot then be destroyed, for otherwise the words would have no meaning." I must not saw off the branch on which I am sitting.

One might, of course, object at once that this description would have to except itself from the destruction.—But what corresponds to the separate words of the description and so cannot be destroyed if it is true, is what gives the words their meaning—is that without which they would have no meaning.——In a sense, however, this man is surely what corresponds to his name. But he is destructible, and his name does not lose its meaning when the bearer is destroyed.—An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game.’

names are proposals – words are proposals

proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

language use is not a matter of destructible vs. indestructible –

such a characterization might work for a computer game –

it has no baring at all on language use

a name or a word may fall out of use – or fall into use –

and whether a name or a word has a use – will be open to question – open to doubt –

and will be uncertain

‘In a sense, however, this man is surely what corresponds to his name. But he is destructible, and his name does not lose its meaning when the bearer is destroyed.’

taking this destruction idea a step further – to the end of days no less –

if there is no one to propose a name – there is no name

again it is not a matter of destructibility vs. indestructibility –

rather it is matter of proposal – or the absence of proposal

and where we have proposal – be it a name or a word – or a language use of any other form – the proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

56. ‘But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we

bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word stands for?——"And

if we bear it in mind then it comes before our mind's eye when we

utter the word. So, if it is always supposed to be possible for us to

remember it, it must be in itself indestructible."——But what do we

regard as the criterion for remembering it right?—When we work

with a sample instead of our memory there are circumstances in which

we say that the sample has changed colour and we judge of this by

memory. But can we not sometimes speak of a darkening (for

example) of our memory-image? Aren't we as much at the mercy of

memory as of a sample? (For someone might feel like saying: "If we

had no memory we should be at the mercy of a sample".)—Or perhaps

of some chemical reaction. Imagine that you were supposed to paint

a particular colour "C", which was the colour that appeared when the

chemical substances X and Y combined.—Suppose that the colour

struck you as brighter on one day than on another; would you not

sometimes say: "I must be wrong, the colour is certainly the same as

yesterday"? This shews that we do not always resort to what memory

tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.’

‘But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word stands for?’

what we have is a usage that functions – and where and when it does not function – the usage changes or is dropped –

‘and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word stands for?’

this ‘bearing in mind’ – is an explanation of usage –

and as with any explanation – is a proposal – open to question

‘But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right?—

we have whatever criterion we propose – and whatever criterion we believe functions

and any such criterion adopted will be open to question

‘Suppose that the colour struck you as brighter on one day than on another; would you not sometimes say: "I must be wrong, the colour is certainly the same as yesterday"? This shews that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.’

what this shows – is that the propositions we work with – and the propositions we use to explain those we work with – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

57. ‘"Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed,

and that is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the

existence of a red thing."—Certainly it makes no sense to say that the

colour red is torn up or pounded to bits. But don't we say "The red is

vanishing"? And don't clutch at the idea of our always being able to

bring red before our mind's eye even when there is nothing red any

more. That is just as if you chose to say that there would still always

be a chemical reaction producing a red flame.—For suppose you cannot

remember the colour any more?—When we forget which colour

this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer

able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then

is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an

instrument of our language.’

‘"Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed, and that is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing."—

the word ‘red’ – the proposal ‘red’ – does not exist independent of use

if it is not put – not proposed – it is not there

‘For suppose you cannot remember the colour any more?’

the colour ‘red’ – is a proposal –

if you cannot remember the use of this proposal –

and the proposal is put to you – you will not be able to use it

‘And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language.’

a paradigm – is not lost or found – it is either in use – or it is not –

a paradigm – is a proposal

58. ‘"I want to restrict the term 'name’ to what cannot occur in

the combination 'X exists'.—Thus one cannot say 'Red exists', because

if there were no red it could not be spoken of at all."—Better: If "X

exists" is meant simply to say: "X" has a meaning,—then it is not a

proposition which treats of X, but a proposition about our use of

language, that is, about the use of the word "X".

It looks to us as if we were saying something about the nature of

red in saying that the words "Red exists" do not yield a sense. Namely

that red does exist 'in its own right'. The same idea—that this is a

metaphysical statement about red—finds expression again when we say

such a thing as that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly

in the word "indestructible".

But what we really want is simply to take "Red exists" as the statement:

the word "red" has a meaning. Or perhaps better: "Red does

not exist" as " 'Red' has no meaning". Only we do not want to say

that that expression says this, but that this is what it would have to be

saying if it meant anything. But that it contradicts itself in the attempt

to say it—just because red exists 'in its own right'. Whereas the only

contradiction lies in something like this: the proposition looks as if it

were about the colour, while it is supposed to be saying something

about the use of the word "red".—In reality, however, we quite

readily say that a particular colour exists; and that is as much as to say

that something exists that has that colour. And the first expression is

no less accurate than the second; particularly where 'what has the

colour' is not a physical object.’

‘red’ – is all you need – for ‘red exists’ –

in saying that ‘X exists’ – ‘exists’ – is logically unnecessary – if ‘X’  is proposed

saying ‘X does not exist’ – is simply making the point that the proposal ‘X’ has not been put

one might have occasion to say ‘X exists’ – as in the ‘proposition has been put’ – i.e. if in an argument – the fact that proposition has been put – has been lost in the discussion – and its currency needs to be reaffirmed

and the opposite might apply with ‘X does not exist’ – that is to say – the proposal was not put – and therefore is not relevant to the current discussion

the meaning of any proposition put  – is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain

red – is a proposal – red exists – if ‘red’ is proposed –

and any explanation of ‘red’ – any philosophical account of ‘red’ – i.e. an explanation in terms of an idealist propositional construct – or an explanation in terms of realist propositional construct – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

no proposal – no proposition – is timeless – a proposal – a proposition – is put – or it is not put –

propositional reality is a contingent reality 

59. ‘"A name signifies only what is an element of reality. What cannot

be destroyed; what remains the same in all changes."—But what is

that?—Why, it swam before our minds as we said the sentence!

This was the very expression of a quite particular image: of a particular

picture which we want to use. For certainly experience does not shew

us these elements. We see component parts of something composite (of

a chair, for instance). We say that the back is part of the chair, but

is in turn itself composed of several bits of wood; while a leg is as

simple component part. We also see a whole which changes (is

destroyed) while its component parts remain unchanged. These are

the materials from which we construct that picture of reality.’

what we see – is what we propose – and how we interpret what we see is what we propose – what we construct – is what we propose –

our constructions are propositional constructions

and what we propose – whatever that may be – however that is described – is open to

question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

a name is proposal

60. ‘When I say: "My broom is in the corner",—is this really a

statement about the broomstick and the brush? Well, it could at any

rate be replaced by a statement giving the position of the stick and the

position of the brush. And this statement is surely a further analysed

form of the first one.—But why do I call it "further analysed"?—

Well, if the broom is there, that surely means that the stick and brush

must be there, and in a particular relation to one another; and this

was as it were hidden in the sense of the first sentence, and is expressed

in the analysed sentence. Then does someone who says that the broom

is in the corner really mean: the broomstick is there, and so is the brush,

and the broomstick is fixed in the brush?—If we were to ask anyone

if he meant this he would probably say that he had not thought

specially of the broomstick or specially of the brush at all. And that

would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick

nor of the brush in particular. Suppose that, instead of saying "Bring

me the broom", you said "Bring me the broomstick and the brush

which is fitted on to it."!—Isn't the answer: "Do you want the broom?

Why do you put it so oddly?"——Is he going to understand the further

analysed sentence better?—This sentence, one might say, achieves

the same as the ordinary one, but in a more roundabout way.—

Imagine a language-game in which someone is ordered to bring

certain objects which are composed of several parts, to move them

about, or something else of the kind. And two ways of playing it:

in one (a) the composite objects (brooms, chairs, tables, etc.) have

names, as in (15); in the other (b) only the parts are given names and

the wholes are described by means of them.—In what sense is an order

in the second game an analysed form of an order in the first? Does the

former lie concealed in the latter, and is it now brought out by analysis?—

True, the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick and

brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists

of corresponding parts?’

‘In what sense is an order in the second game an analysed form of an order in the first?

either order could be seen as an analysed form of the other

in practise – it’s likely to be a question of which proposal is put first – as to which is an analysis of the other

‘Does the former lie concealed in the latter, and is it now brought out by analysis?

no –

proposals – propositions – are not ‘concealed’ in each other

the two proposals are separate and distinct –

however they can be related to each other in such a manner that the former proposal is represented as a construction of the latter

‘True, the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick and brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists of corresponding parts?’

the order like the brush can be deconstructed –

this could occur if there was a call to give the order in terms of the parts of the broom

separate orders – for separate parts

61. ‘"But all the same you will not deny that a particular order in

(a) means the same as one in (b); and what would you call the second

one, if not an analysed form of the first?"—Certainly I too should say

that an order in (a) had the same meaning as one in (b); or, as I

expressed it earlier: they achieve the same. And this means that if I

were shewn an order in (a) and asked: "Which order in (b) means the

same as this?" or again "Which order in (b) does this contradict?" I

should give such-and-such an answer. But that is not to say that we

have come to a general agreement about the use of the expression "to

have the same meaning" or "to achieve the same". For it can be asked

in what cases we say: "These are merely two forms of the same game."’

‘But that is not to say that we have come to a general agreement about the use of the expression "to have the same meaning" or "to achieve the same"’ –

correct

the fact is we can never be sure –

the best we can have at any time is propositional assent

and that is open to question – i.e. – just what are people assenting to?

and can we be sure that their answers to this question – in fact line up?

there can always be doubt here –

but this is the reality of propositional use

we don’t have – and we don’t need – certainty – to proceed –

we proceed in uncertainty

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to ‘two forms of the same game’ –

well –  is it the same game?

perhaps it is two different games – that have a similar result?

in propositional life –we don’t need 100% agreement – to get on with it

62. ‘Suppose for instance that the person who is given the orders in

(a) and (b) has to look up a table co-ordinating names and pictures

before bringing what is required. Does he do the same when he carries

out an order in (a) and the corresponding one in (b)?—Yes and no.

You may say: "The point of the two orders is the same". I should say

so too.—But it is not everywhere clear what should be called the 'point'

of an order. (Similarly one may say of certain objects that they have

this or that purpose. The essential thing is that this is a lamp, that it

serves to give light;——that it is an ornament to the room, fills an

empty space, etc., is not essential. But there is not always a sharp

distinction between essential and inessential.)’

‘Does he do the same when he carries out an order in (a) and the corresponding one in (b)?—Yes and no. You may say: "The point of the two orders is the same". I should say so too.—

the real point here is that you don’t know –

‘But it is not everywhere clear what should be called the 'point' of an order’

well what is the point of the order?

it is quite possible that – if that question was put to the one giving the order – and to the one receiving the order – that we would – or at least could – get different – perhaps very different responses – even where the order is carried out to everyone’s satisfaction

‘The essential thing is that this is a lamp, that it serves to give light; - that it is an ornament to the room, fills an empty space, etc., is not essential. But there is not always a sharp distinction between essential and inessential.’

any distinction in any propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

what is to count as ‘sharp’?

and as for ‘essential’ and ‘inessential’ –

it becomes no more than a question of custom – of customary use –

and if that doesn’t suit your purpose – you take a different view

63. ‘To say, however, that a sentence in (b) is an 'analysed' form

of one in (a) readily seduces us into thinking that the former is the

more fundamental form; that it alone shews what is meant by the other,

and so on. For example, we think: If you have only the unanalysed

form you miss the analysis; but if you know the analysed form that

gives you everything.—But can I not say that an aspect of the matter is

lost on you in the latter case as well as the former?’

what you can say is that these sentences – the sentence in (a) and the sentence in (b) –

are proposals –

and that each of these proposals is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain

from a logical point of view – it is not that something gets lost –

it is rather that there is always something more to find

64. ‘Let us imagine language-game (48) altered so that names signify

not monochrome squares but rectangles each consisting of two such

squares. Let such a rectangle, which is half red half green, be called

"U"; a half green half white one, "V"; and so on. Could we not

imagine people who had names for such combinations of colour, but

not for the individual colours? Think of the cases where we say:"

This arrangement of colours (say the French tricolour) has a quite

special character."

In what sense do the symbols of this language-game stand in need of

analysis? How far is it even possible to replace this language-game by

(48)?—It is just another language-game; even though it is related to (48).’

yes – if you go down this path what becomes clear is that the notion of the language-game falls apart –

another language-game – even though it is related – and why not another – and yet another – etc. etc. –

until we just face the propositional reality – that any proposed use – is open to variation –

and realise that we are not playing a game – a rule-governed proposition exercise –

rather what we are involved in is an on-going propositional exploration – the engine of which – is propositional uncertainty

as for ‘analysis’ –

analysis is not an action outside of language use or in some way separate to it – though the idea of the language-game – might suggest this

analysis is a language use –

and as with any language use – logically speaking – open

open to criticism – interpretation – variation –

our propositional reality – is uncertain – and I would say beautifully uncertain –

for it is an ever changing masterpiece of creativity

65. ‘Here we come up against the great question that lies behind

all these considerations.—For someone might object against me:

"You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of language-

games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game,

and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities,

and what makes them into language or parts of language. So you

let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you

yourself most headache, the part about the general form of propositions

and of language."

And this is true.—Instead of producing something common to

all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no

one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,—

but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it

is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them

all "language". I will try to explain this.’

language is proposal – proposals are propositions –

a proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

our reality – our living – breathing reality – in whatever propositional context we are operating in – is the reality of propositional uncertainty

and it is the logical uncertainty of the proposal – of the proposition – that is the source of our possibilities as human beings

66. ‘Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games".

I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and

so on. What is common to them all?—Don't say: "There must be

something common, or they would not be called 'games' "—but

look and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look

at them you will not see something that is common to all, but

similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To

repeat: don't think, but look!—Look for example at board-games,

with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here

you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common

features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games,

much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are they

all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there

always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think

of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a

child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has

disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the

difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of

games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement,

but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And

we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same

way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network

of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall

similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.’

a game – is a rule-governed propositional exercise or activity

what is common to games – of different kinds – is that they are rule-governed

what is common to non-game propositional activities – is that these propositional activities – are not rule-governed

these non-game propositional activities – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

with propositional games – on the other hand – if you play the game – the rules of the game are not open to question – not open to doubt – and not uncertain

you can put the rules of a game to question – this is a critical activity

putting the rules of a game to question – is all very well – but it is not playing the game

67. ‘I can think of no better expression to characterize these

similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances

between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait,

temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—

And I shall say: 'games' form a family.

And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way.

Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it

has a—direct—relationship with several things that have hitherto

been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship

to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept

of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And

the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one

fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many

fibres.

But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all

these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their common

properties"—I should reply: Now you are only playing with words.

One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread—

namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres".’

‘similarities’ – is all you need

so called ‘family resemblances’ – just are proposed similarities

‘family resemblance’ – is redundant

and in any case – any proposed similarity – or so called ‘family resemblance’ is not – so to speak – set in concrete –

a similarity is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and the other problem with this notion of family resemblances – is that it is just another form of categorization –

a ‘family of games’ – a ‘family of numbers’ –

and referring to games – as a ‘family’ – or numbers as a ‘family’ – or whatever else – as a ‘family’ – is totally unnecessary –

‘games’ – will do the job – and ‘numbers’ – will do the job – or if you want to get fancy – ‘number systems’

‘family’ is just an unnecessary overlay –

and it is hard to see how such a ‘concept’ – adds anything at all to any matter that requires categorization

the other point here is – we are really back at square one – for the question can always be asked – what constitutes a ‘family’?

the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and again – is uncertain

further –

do all the different kinds of families in Wittgenstein’s family of families – share a family resemblance?

i.e.  is there a family resemblance between the family of games – and the family of numbers?

perhaps the answer here can only be – ‘well they are all families’ –

so back to having ‘something in common’ – which if I am not wrong – was what Wittgenstein was determined to argue against – with his idea of ‘family resemblance’

look – we say that various things have something in common – it is no sin

and this proposal of ‘having x in common’ – is – as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

it is a proposal – nothing more

68. ‘"All right: the concept of number is defined for you as the

logical sum of these individual interrelated concepts: cardinal numbers,

rational numbers, real numbers, etc.; and in the same way the concept

of a game as the logical sum of a corresponding set of sub-concepts."——

It need not be so. For I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits.

in this way, that is, use the word "number" for a rigidly limited concept,

but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not

closed by a frontier. And this is how we do use the word "game".

For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a

game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No.

You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that never

troubled you before when you used the word "game".)

"But then the use of the word is unregulated, the 'game' we play

with it is unregulated."——It is not everywhere circumscribed by

rules; but no more are there any rules for how high one throws the

ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has

rules too.’

as to number –

the concept of number – as with any concept – is open to question – open to doubt – and is in fact – uncertain –

the point being – there are – and can be –  different accounts of ‘number’

as to ‘game’ –

yes – there are different games – and there are similarities between different games –

and different accounts of the nature of different games –

and the use of the word ‘game’ – as with the use of any word is ‘unregulated’ –

who or what ‘regulates’ usage?

not every aspect of every game is rule-governed

however any rule-governed propositional action is a game

that there is no rule for how high one throws the ball in tennis – or how hard –

is because in the game as constructed – as played – there is no need for such rules –

and further – such rules would probably make the game – as we know it  – unplayable

nevertheless – tennis is a rule-governed propositional action –

if it was not rule-governed – it would not be a game

69. ‘How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine

that we should describe games to him, and we might add: "This and

similar things are called 'games' ". And do we know any more about

it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what

a game is?—But this is not. ignorance. We do not know the boundaries

because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—

for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable?

Not at all! (Except for that special purpose.) No more than it took

the definition: i pace = 75 cm. to make the measure of length 'one

pace' usable. And if you want to say "But still, before that it wasn't

an exact measure", then I reply: very well, it was an inexact one.—

Though you still owe me a definition of exactness.’

‘How should we explain to someone what a game is?’

what we tell them is that logically speaking there are two propositional modes – the critical mode – and the rule-governed mode –

in the critical mode a proposition – that is a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

that in the rule-governed mode – a propositional complex is rule-governed – and is a game

if you play the game – you play in accordance with its rules –

you can put the notion of ‘game’ to question – you can put the rules of a game to question – but this is a critical propositional activity – it is not playing the game

70. ‘"But if the concept 'game' is uncircumscribed like that, you

don't really know what you mean by a 'game'."——When I give the

description: "The ground was quite covered with plants"—do you

want to say I don't know what I am talking about until I can give a

definition of a plant?

My meaning would be explained by, say, a drawing and the words

"The ground looked roughly like this". Perhaps I even say "it looked

exactly like this."—Then were just this grass and these leaves there,

arranged just like this? No, that is not what it means. And I should

not accept any picture as exact, in this sense.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Someone says to me: "Shew the children a game." I teach them

gaming with dice, and the other says "I didn't mean that sort of

game." Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come before

his mind when he gave me the order?’

‘do you want to say I don't know what I am talking about until I can give a

definition of a plant?’

no – you don’t need a definition of plant to see and to know how the term ‘plant’ is used

but if you do want a definition of plant – then description of plants misses the point

and yes – you could illustrate use by drawing a picture –

as to ‘exactness’ – the notion is more rhetorical than logical

any claim of ‘exactness’ – is open to question – and thus shown to be uncertain –

or if you like – inexact

‘must the exclusion of dice have come before his mind when he gave the order?’ –

it might have – it might not have

if it had – then to exclude dice from the type of games he had in mind – and to give a clear order he would have been wise to have said –

‘show the children a game – and I don’t mean the game of dice’

71. ‘One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred

edges.—"But is a blurred concept a concept at all?"—Is an indistinct

photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage

to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one

often exactly what we need?

Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area with

vague boundaries cannot be called an area at all. This presumably

means that we cannot do anything with it.—But is it senseless to say:

"Stand roughly there"? Suppose that I were standing with someone

in a city square and said that. As I say it I do not draw any kind of

boundary, but perhaps point with my hand—as if I were indicating a

particular spot. And this is just how one might explain to someone

what a game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken

in a particular way.—I do not, however, mean by this that he is

supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I—for

some reason—was unable to express; but that he is now to employ

those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is not an

indirect means of explaining—in default of a better. For any general

definition can be misunderstood too. The point is that this is how we

play the game. (I mean the language-game with the word "game".)’

it is not about blurred concepts and indistinct photographs –

what we are dealing with is proposals – propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

uncertain – that is whether the concept is blurred or not – whether the picture is indistinct or not –

as to Frege – whether an ‘area’ is given vague boundaries – or distinct boundaries –

the proposal – however it is put – is open to question

examples – propositional examples –

any ‘example’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and logically speaking uncertain

playing the game – with the word ‘game’?

yes – you can point to an activity and say ‘that is a game’ – or go on give examples of games –

this is not playing a game –

a game is a rule-governed propositional exercise –

playing a game is playing according to the rules of the game –

pointing – and giving examples – is what it is – but is not playing a game –

it is proposing

72. ‘Seeing what is common. Suppose I shew someone various multi-

coloured pictures, and say: "The colour you see in all these is called

'yellow ochre' ".—This is a definition, and the other will get to under-

stand it by looking for and seeing what is common to the pictures.

Then he can look at., can point to, the common thing.

Compare with this a case in which I shew him figures of different

shapes all painted the same colour, and say: "What these have in

common is called 'yellow ochre' ".

And compare this case: I shew him samples of different shades of

blue and say: "The colour that is common to all these is what I call

'blue' ".’

if the question is ‘what is common to these pictures? – one answer maybe –

the colour – yellow ochre –

this will likely not be the only answer

let us say i.e. – that in the multi-coloured pictures there is no orange –

then the response might be – ‘all the pictures lack the colour orange’ –

so the ‘common thing’ is up for question – up for doubt – and is – regardless of what answer one gives – uncertain

in the case of the different shaped figures –

could not an answer to the question – ‘what is common to the figures?’ – be –

‘they are all geometrical figures’ – or –‘they are all drawn with black ink’ – or not mentioning yellow ochre – ‘they are all coloured’ –

again what is ‘common’ here – is open to question

and with the samples of different shades of  blue –

in saying that – ‘The colour that is common to all these is what I call 'blue' –

could it not be argued for instance that ‘blue’ is a particular – a definite colour – that sample 1 is blue – and the others are not?

any proposal of commonality is a  propositional classification –

we put these proposals as a way of organizing different proposals

different classifications will suit different purposes –

i.e. –  ‘The colour that is common to all these is what I call 'blue'’ – might suit to explaining colour to someone who is just learning about colour – but not be of use to an artist painting a landscape picture

 

and any propositional classification – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

73. ‘But might there not be such 'general' samples? Say a schematic

leaf, or a sample of pure green?"—Certainly there might. But for

such a schema to be understood as a schema, and not as the shape of a

particular leaf, and for a slip of pure green to be understood as a

sample of all that is greenish and not as a sample of pure green—this

in turn resides in the way the samples are used.

Ask yourself: what shape must the sample of the colour green be?

Should it be rectangular? Or would it then be the sample of a green

rectangle?—So should it be 'irregular' in shape? And what is to

prevent us then from regarding it—that is, from using it—only as a

sample of irregularity of shape?’

‘to have understood the definition means to have in one's mind an idea of the thing defined, and that is a sample or picture.’ –

understanding?

we may say that understanding a definition is having in one’s mind the idea of the thing defined –

but as Wittgenstein points out – what exactly does this amount to?

we might also say that understanding a definition – is knowing how to use the word –

but this too has limits –

in understanding the definition do I know how it is used in all contexts?

clearly not

and so we come to the basic question here – how do we define – ‘understanding’ –

can we say with any definitiveness what understanding is – what understanding amounts to?

I say no

this word ‘understanding’ – or the concept of understanding – is in fact – uncertain

understanding – is open to question – whenever we  propose it

it is always open to doubt

one might say that understanding this – is to understand?

74. ‘‘Here also belongs the idea that if you see this leaf as a sample

of 'leaf shape in general' you see it differently from someone who

regards it as, say, a sample of this particular shape. Now this might

well be so—though it is not so—for it would only be to say that, as a

matter of experience, if you see the leaf in a particular way, you use it

in such-and-such a way or according to such-and-such rules. Of course,

there is such a thing as seeing in this way or that; and there are also

cases where whoever sees a sample like this will in general use it in

this way, and whoever sees it otherwise in another way. For example,

if you see the schematic drawing of a cube as a plane figure consisting

of a square and two rhombi you will, perhaps, carry out the order

"Bring me something like this" differently from someone who sees

the picture three-dimensionally.’

yes – how you ‘see’ what is put to you – what is proposed –  and how you propose in relation to what is proposed –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

75. ‘What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it

mean, to know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge some-

how equivalent to an unformulated definition? So that if it were

formulated I should be able to recognize it as the expression of my

knowledge? Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely

expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my

describing examples of various kinds of game; shewing how all sorts

of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these; saying

that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and so on.’

‘What does it mean to know what a game is?’ –

to know what a game is – is to play it –

and to play it – is to recognise it as a rule-governed action – a rule-governed propositional action

you can describe examples of various kinds of game – this is all very well – but it doesn’t get to the heart of the matter

from a logical point of  view – there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode – and the rule-governed mode –

this is to say that in our propositional lives we critically evaluate the proposals we put and the proposals put to us –

and that we construct and play propositional games – rule-governed propositional actions

we question – and we play  

76. ‘If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknow-

ledge it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in

my mind. For I did not want to draw one at all. His concept can then

be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it. The kinship is

that of two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with

vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped and dis-

tributed, but with clear contours. The kinship is just as undeniable as

the difference.’

we have two different picture / proposals –

one described as having vague contours  – the other described as having clear contours

Wittgenstein speaks of ‘kinship’ here – which amounts to similarities –

and he says the ‘kinship’ is just as undeniable as the difference

the fact is though – there is only a ‘kinship’ – a similarity – if such is proposed

if it is not proposed – it is not there

in any case this notion of ‘kinship’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

as indeed are the notions – or descriptions – ‘vague’ and ‘clear’

77. ‘And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the

degree to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred one depends

on the latter's degree of vagueness. For imagine having to sketch a

sharply defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one. In the latter

there is a blurred red rectangle: for it you put down a sharply defined

one. Of course—several such sharply defined rectangles can be drawn

to correspond to the indefinite one.—But if the colours in the original

merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a hopeless task

to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one? Won't

you then have to say: "Here I might just as well draw a circle or heart

as a rectangle, for all the colours merge. Anything—and nothing—is

right."——And this is the position you are in if you look for definitions

corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics.

In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the mean-

ing of this word ("good" for instance)? From what sort of examples?

in what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the

word must have a family of meanings.’

the blurred picture – and the sharp picture – are different proposals – different propositions –

so there will be no correspondence – end of story

our concepts in ethics and aesthetics – are no different to any other concept – in any other propositional context

they are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘How did we learn the meaning of this word ("good" for instance)?

how we learn the meaning (whatever that might be said to be) of any word – is really an open question

different proposals will be put – and they will serve different purposes –

but any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings.’ –

(who or what decides the boundary of this family – what’s in – what’s out?

and if there is no boundary – sharp or vague – in what sense do you have a ‘family’?)

a ‘family of meanings’ – is just different meanings – different uses of a word – in different propositional contexts

different uses – and different contexts – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

78. ‘Compare knowing and saying:

how many feet high Mont Blanc is—

how the word "game" is used—

how a clarinet sounds.

If you are surprised that one can know something and not be able

to say it, you are perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not

of one like the third.’

our knowledge is proposal –

to know is to propose

our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

our knowledge is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

saying is one form of proposing – saying is one form of knowing

knowing and not be able to say it?

can you propose something and not be able to say it?

yes – there may be impediments to putting a proposal into words – to saying it – to expressing it –

the proposal then is not made public

the knowing is not made public –

as to how may feet high Mont Blank is?

if you have an answer – why not propose it?

how the word ‘game’ is used?

really – here any example of use – might do the trick

and how the clarinet sounds?

proposals can be put here – and they will likely be poetic –

any proposal put in response to these questions – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

79. ‘Consider this example. If one says "Moses did not exist",

this may mean various things. It may mean: the Israelites did not

have a single leader when they withdrew from Egypt——or: their

leader was not called Moses——-or: there cannot have been anyone

who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses——or: etc. etc.—

We may say, following Russell: the name "Moses" can be defined by

means of various descriptions. For example, as "the man who led the

Israelites through the wilderness", "the man who lived at that time

and place and was then called 'Moses' ", "the man who as a child was

taken out of the Nile by Pharaoh's daughter" and so on. And according

as we assume one definition or another the proposition "Moses

did not exist" acquires a different sense, and so does every other

proposition about Moses.—And if we are told "N did not exist", we do

ask: "What do you mean? Do you want to say ...... or ...... etc.?

"But when I make a statement about Moses,—am I always ready to

substitute some one of these descriptions for "Moses"? I shall perhaps

say: By "Moses" I understand the man who did what the Bible relates

of Moses, or at any rate a good deal of it. But how much? Have I

decided how much must be proved false for me to give up my proposition

as false? Has the name "Moses" got a fixed and unequivocal use

for me in all possible cases?—Is it not the case that I have, so to speak,

a whole series of props in readiness, and am ready to lean on one if

another should be taken from under me and vice versa?——Consider

another case. When I say "N is dead", then something like the following

may hold for the meaning of the name "N": I believe that a human

being has lived, whom I (i) have seen in such-and-such places, who

(2) looked like this (pictures), (3) has done such-and-such things, and

(4) bore the name "N" in social life.—Asked what I understand by

"N", I should enumerate all or some of these points, and different ones

on different occasions. So my definition of "N" would perhaps be

"the man of whom all this is true".—But if some point now proves

false?—Shall I be prepared to declare the proposition "N is dead"

false—even if it is only something which strikes me as incidental

that has turned out false? But where are the bounds of the incidental?—

If I had given a definition of the name in such a case, I should now be

ready to alter it.

And this can be expressed like this: I use the name "N" without a

fixed meaning. (But that detracts as little from its usefulness, as it

detracts from that of a table that it stands on four legs instead of three

and so sometimes wobbles.)

Should it be said that I am using a word whose meaning I don't

know, and so am talking nonsense?—Say what you choose, so long

as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts. (And when you see

them there is a good deal that you will not say.)

(The fluctuation of scientific definitions: what to-day counts as an

observed concomitant of a phenomenon will to-morrow be used to

define it.)’

the statement ‘Moses did not exist’ – is a proposal –

a proposal – that as with any other – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

as Wittgenstein notes – it can mean various things – and he gives examples of what might be proposed here

from a logical point of view this proposal – as indeed with any proposal – if it is to be pursued – is in fact an on-going argument – and an argument in every direction –

and Wittgenstein provides examples of such argument

any proposal put to define the original proposal  – is – as with the original proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – and  uncertain –

logically speaking – this process of question – or doubt – of the exploration of uncertainty – is on-going

which amounts to saying – we cannot be sure – of what we are proposing – and we cannot be sure of how – what we are proposing – is received – is understood

in practice – at some point in the argument – we assume that we know what we are talking about –

and we assume that we are understood – or not –

we make these assumptions in order to proceed –

these are pragmatic assumptions –

and when we make these assumptions – we suspend – question – doubt – and uncertainty

nevertheless – from a logical point of view –

we operate in and with uncertainty – and we proceed in and with uncertainty

any notion of certainty here – or the absence of doubt – is pretence –

and the world is full of it

80. ‘I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to

fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight?——"So it wasn't a chair,

but some kind of illusion".——But in a few moments we see it again

and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all

and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that

after a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we

to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases—rules saying

whether one may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing?

But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; and are we to

say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we

are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?’

‘there is a chair’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

its disappearance – or seeming disappearance – and re-appearance – only speaks to the uncertainty of the proposal –

and any rules proposed to govern the use of the proposition – are like the proposition itself – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

81. ‘F. P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me that

logic was a 'normative science'. I do not know exactly what he had

in mind, but it was doubtless closely related to what only dawned on

me later: namely, that in philosophy we often compare the use of words

with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say

that someone who is using language must be playing such a game.——

But if you say that our languages only approximate to such calculi

you are standing on the very brink of a misunderstanding. For then

it may look as if what we were talking about were an ideal language.

As if our logic were, so to speak, a logic for a vacuum.—Where

as logic does not treat of language—or of thought—in the sense in which a

natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can

be said is that we construct ideal languages. But here the word "ideal"

is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more

perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the logician

to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like.

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has

attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning,

and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and

did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or

understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.’

‘that in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language must be playing such a game.  – ’

in logic what we deal with is proposals – propositions –

propositions – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

comparing the ‘use of words’ with games and calculi – may serve some interest –

but from a logical point of view there is nothing in it

our use of words – and the games and calculi – (another use of words) – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

games are rule-governed propositional exercises – if you play propositional games – you play according to the rules – otherwise – there is no game

and to play according to the rules you must recognise – that you are doing so

you can’t play a game if you don’t know – in some sense – the rules of the game –

and that you are playing the game

if others construct your propositional activity as game playing –

then as with any other proposal – this game proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘Whereas logic does not treat of language—or of thought—in the sense in which a

natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we construct ideal languages.’

the proposals of natural science – as with any proposal – are open to question – open to doubt and are uncertain

constructing so called ideal languages might be an interesting exercise – that serves some kind of purpose –

but an ‘ideal language’ – as with any other language – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the logician

to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like.’

if the logician is worth his or her salt – the logician demonstrates – through question –and through doubt – the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

‘For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.’

if anyone puts a proposal – a proposition – that proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain –

this is what needs to become clear

if by ‘normative’ Ramsey meant ‘exhibiting a norm’ – Ramsey failed to understand logic

any propositional behaviour can be constructed as ‘exhibiting a norm’ –

this is what we begin with in logic

the proper logical response to any propositional norm – is to put it to question – put it to doubt – and explore its uncertainty

logic is not a ‘normative science’ –

logic is the critical activity

the critical activity of the exploration propositional uncertainty

82. ‘What do I call 'the rule by which he proceeds'?—The hypothesis that

satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe; or the rule

which he looks up when he uses signs; or the one which he gives us in

reply if we ask him what his rule is?—But what if observation  does not

enable us to see any clear rule, and the question brings none to light?—

For he did indeed give me a definition when I asked him what he understood

by "N", but he was prepared to withdraw and alter it.—So how am I to

determine the rule according to which he is playing? He does not know it

himself.—Or, to ask a better question: What meaning is the expression

"the rule by which he proceeds" supposed to have left to it here?’

as with any hypothesis – ‘the rule by which he proceeds’ – may be useful – may serve a purpose –

to be frank this notion suits Wittgenstein’s view of language and language use – it suits his purposes –

his hypothesis here is one among many in the philosophy of language –

and of no greater logical value than any other –

it is as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

the problem here – with this view – and any proposed all encompassing view of language – or for that matter – of anything at all –

is that no one view will capture all perspectives –

and any claim that one view does – limits one’s propositional reality – one’s understanding

by all means develop a theory – be it philosophical – scientific – or whatever – to the best of your ability – see where it goes – what it can do – what use it has –

but bear in mind there are any number of other perspectives that are just as valid

if you do this – you do not arrive at a definitive position

but at the same time you do not box yourself in to some logical and epistemological illusion –

what it comes to in the end – is genuinely – keeping an open mind –

and enjoying the logical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

83. ‘Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light

here? We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by

playing with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing

many without finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly

into the air, chasing one another with the ball and bombarding

one another for a joke and so on. And now someone says: The whole

time they are playing a ball-game and following definite rules at every

throw. And is there not also the case where we play and—make up the rules

as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them—as we go

along.’

‘Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light here?’

yes – it throws a light on languages games

and yes – we can and do play language-games – rule-governed propositional actions –

however not all language use is a rule-governed game – that’s the point –

the primary activity in language use is logical  – is critical

we question – doubt – and we explore propositional uncertainty

and the reason for this is that the proposition – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

language-games – are in effect a relief from the critical activity that dominates our propositional use – that dominates our lives

playing language-games – is a joyful use of language –

but it is not the main game

84. ‘I said that the application of a word is not everywhere bounded

by rules. But what does a game look like that is everywhere bounded

by rules? whose rules never let a doubt creep in, but stop up all

the cracks where it might?—Can't we imagine a rule determining the

application of a rule, and a doubt which // removes—and so on?

But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for

us to imagine a doubt. I can easily imagine someone always doubting

before he opened his front door whether an abyss did not yawn behind

it, and making sure about it before he went through the door (and

he might on some occasion prove to be right)—but that does not

make me doubt in the same case.’

‘But what does a game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? whose rules never let a doubt creep in, but stop up all the cracks where it might?’

a rule is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

however – if you play a game – you play in accordance with the rules

if you don’t play in accordance with the rules – there is no game

you can put the rules to question – but this is not playing the game –

it is subjecting the rules / proposals – to critical analysis

85. ‘A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign-post leave

no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which

direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road

or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I

am to follow it; whether in the direction of its ringer or (e.g.) in the

opposite one?—And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain

of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground—is there only one

way of interpreting them?—So I can say, the sign-post does after all

leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for

doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical

proposition, but an empirical one.’

‘A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go?’

not if you decide that you will go in the direction of the sign post – that you will follow the rule –

if – for whatever reason – you question whether the sign post points in the right direction – then the sign-post is a focus of doubt

‘So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one.’

call it what you will – ‘philosophical’ – ‘empirical’ – the fact is – the matter is a logical issue –

a rule – in whatever form – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

86. ‘Imagine a language-game like (2) played with the help of a

table. The signs given to B by A are now written ones. B has a

table; in the first column are the signs used in the game, in the second

pictures of building stones. A shews B such a written sign; B looks it

up in the table, looks at the picture opposite, and so on. So the table is a

rule which he follows in executing orders.—One learns to look the

picture up in the table by receiving a training, and part of this training

consists perhaps in the pupil's learning to pass with his finger

horizontally from left to right; and so, as it were, to draw a series of

horizontal lines on the table.

Suppose different ways of reading a table were now introduced;

one time, as above, according to the schema:

another time like this:

or in some other way.—Such a schema is supplied with the table as

the rule for its use.

Can we not now imagine further rules to explain this one? And, on

the other hand, was that first table incomplete without the schema of

arrows? And are other tables incomplete without their schemata?’

any proposal – rule – schemata – rule for schemata – etc. etc. – is open to question – open to doubt – and therefore logically speaking – incomplete

what we deal with – with any proposal – any proposition – is uncertainty –

there is no ‘logical completion’

87. ‘Suppose I give this explanation: "I take 'Moses' to mean the

man, if there was such a man, who led the Israelites out of Egypt,

whatever he was called then and whatever he may or may not have

done besides."—But similar doubts to those about "Moses" are

possible about the words of this explanation (what are you calling

"Egypt", whom the "Israelites" etc.?). Nor would these questions

come to an end when we got down to words like "red", "dark",

"sweet".—"But then how does an explanation help me to understand,

if after all it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is

never completed; so I still don't understand what he means, and never

shall!"—As though an explanation as it were hung in the air unless

supported by another one. Whereas an explanation may indeed rest

on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another—

unless we require it to prevent a misunderstanding. One might

say: an explanation serves to remove or to avert a misunderstanding —

one, that is, that would occur but for the explanation; not every

one that I can imagine.

It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap

in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we

first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these

doubts.

The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils

its purpose.’

‘"But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if after all it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don't understand what he means, and never shall!"’

what you understand – is what is proposed – and what is proposed is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

as to a ‘final explanation’ –

the only ‘final explanation’ – is the ‘explanation’ – that one does not put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty not explored

‘As though an explanation as it were hung in the air unless supported by another one. Whereas an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another—unless we require it to prevent a misunderstanding.’

yes – any proposal – any explanation – as it were – ‘hangs in the air’ –

whether an explanation stands in need of another – depends on whether it is put to question – or not

there are no ‘misunderstandings’ – only different explanations –

different proposals – proposals that work – or satisfy – explanations that work – or don’t satisfy

‘It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts.’

logically speaking – there is no foundation –

any proposed foundation is a proposal – open to question

there is no ‘logically secure’ – understanding –

any proposed understanding – is open to question –

logically speaking – there is no removing of all doubt

the idea that you can is a philosophical fantasy – and illogical

we do stop putting propositions to question – to doubt – and we do stop exploring propositional uncertainty

we may do this to pretend – we have a final explanation – a final understanding –

this is just ignorance –

or we may stop questioning –  in order to proceed – such is a pragmatic decision –

we can make such a decision while recognizing that any such decision is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the sign-post – is a proposal

88. ‘If I tell someone "Stand roughly here"—may not this explanation

work perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too?

‘But isn't it an inexact explanation?—Yes; why shouldn't we call it"

inexact"? Only let us understand what "inexact" means. For it does

not mean "unusable". And let us consider what we call an "exact"

explanation in contrast with this one. Perhaps something like drawing

a chalk line round an area? Here it strikes us at once that the line has

breadth. So a colour-edge would be more exact. But has this exactnesss

till got a function here: isn't the engine idling? And remember too that

we have not yet defined what is to count as overstepping this exact

boundary; how, with what instruments, it is to be established. And

so on.

We understand what it means to set a pocket watch to the exact time

or to regulate it to be exact. But what if it were asked: is this exactness

ideal exactness, or how nearly does it approach the ideal?—Of course,

we can speak of measurements of time in which there is a different,

and as we should say a greater, exactness than in the measurement of

time by a pocket-watch; in which the words "to set the clock to the

exact time" have a different, though related meaning, and 'to tell the

time' is a different process and so on.—Now, if I tell someone: "You

should come to dinner more punctually; you know it begins at one

o'clock exactly"—is there really no question of exactness here? because

it is possible to say: "Think of the determination of time in the

laboratory or the observatory; there you see what 'exactness' means"?

"Inexact" is really a reproach, and "exact" is praise. And that is to

say that what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than what is more

exact. Thus the point here is what we call "the goal". Am I inexact

when I do not give our distance from the sun to the nearest foot, or

tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of an inch?

No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know

what we should be supposed to imagine under this head—unless you

yourself lay down what is to be so called. But you will find it difficult

to hit upon such a convention; at least any that satisfies you.’

‘If I tell someone "Stand roughly here"—may not this explanation work perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too?’

yes – you have to see what happens – the matter is uncertain –

uncertain whether the proposal is ‘stand roughly there’ – or ‘stand exactly there’

‘But isn't it an inexact explanation?—Yes; why shouldn't we call it" inexact"?

well it’s a proposal – and whether ‘inexact’ or ‘exact’ – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘We understand what it means to set a pocket watch to the exact time or to regulate it to be exact. But what if it were asked: is this exactness ideal exactness, or how nearly does it approach the ideal?’

yes the matter is open to question

‘No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know what we should be supposed to imagine under this head—unless you yourself lay down what is to be so called. But you will find it difficult to hit upon such a convention; at least any that satisfies you.’

so called ‘ideal’ or not – any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and logically speaking – uncertain –

you will be satisfied – as much as you can be – if what you propose is accepted by those involved – and if what you propose – on the face of it – works

89. ‘These considerations bring us up to the problem: In what sense

is logic something sublime?

For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth—a universal

significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences.—

For logical investigation explores the nature of all things. It seeks to

see to the bottom of things and is not meant to concern itself whether

what actually happens is this or that.——It takes its rise, not from

an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal

connexions: but from an urge to understand the basis, or essence,, of

everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out

new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do

not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something

that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense

not to understand.

Augustine says in the Confessions "quid est ergo tempus? si nemo

ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio".— ("What

therefore is time?  If you  don't ask me, I know – if you ask me, I don't

know.")  This could not be said about a question of natural science ("What

is the specific gravity of hydrogen?" for instance). Something that we know

when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an

account of it, is something that we need to remind ourselves of. (And

it is obviously something of which for some reason it is difficult to remind

oneself.)’

logic is propositional method –

a proposition is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

logic is this critical method –

the method of question – of doubt – of the exploration of propositional uncertainty

this critical methodology – can be applied to any proposal – any proposition – in any context

‘We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand.’

in the absence of proposal – what is in plain view – is what we don’t know –

our propositional response – in whatever form that takes – to the unknown –

is how we transform the unknown – into the known

‘("What therefore is time?  If you don't ask me, I know – if you ask me, I don't know.")’

if you ask me and I put forward a proposal in response to your question – it can be said that I know

our knowledge is proposal –

and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

if I have no proposal to put – then it cannot be said that ‘I know’

I may have a proposal  regarding the nature of time that I could put – if asked the question – ‘What therefore is time?’ –

or I may have a proposal on the matter – and decide not to put it – for whatever reason

such proposals – as with any proposal – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

90. ‘We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation,

however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say,

towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that

is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena.

Thus Augustine recalls to mind the different statements that are made

about the duration, past present or future, of events. (These are, of

course, not philosophical statements about time, the past, the present

and the future.)

Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation

sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away.

Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other

things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different

regions of language.—Some of them can be removed by substituting

one form of expression for another; this may be called an "analysis"

of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of

taking a thing apart.’

‘We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena.’

the only phenomena here are proposals – propositions –

and we don’t deal with the ‘possibilities’ of propositions –

we deal with what is proposed

‘We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena.’

the kinds of statements we make about phenomena –

are the kinds of proposals we put in relation to – proposals – in relation to propositions –

and any proposition – of any ‘kind’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

                                                                                                                                       

‘Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one.’

the investigation is therefore a critical one

‘Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away.’

there are no misunderstandings – there are only different proposals – different propositions

and as for ‘clearing away’ –

decisions are made regarding which proposals to work with –

and these decisions are open to question

as to analysis – analysis is propositional argument – argument as to how to interpret

subject proposals –

any argument / analysis here – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there is no ‘taking apart’ – there is only different proposals put – different interpretations advanced

and these different proposals – different interpretations – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

91. ‘But now it may come to look as if there were something like a

final analysis of our forms of language, and so a single completely

resolved form of every expression. That is, as if our usual forms of

expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if there were something

hidden in them that had to be brought to light. When this is done

the expression is completely clarified and our problem solved.

It can also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by

making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were

moving towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and

as if this were the real goal of our investigation.’

there is no final analysis of propositions –

propositions are open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

our usual form of expression – our only form of expression – is the proposal –

the proposal – in whatever form that takes

and there is no logical distinction between the proposal – and analysis of the proposal

any analysis – is a proposal –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

logically speaking – nothing is hidden

what there is – is what is proposed – if it is not proposed – it is not there

‘making a proposal more exact’ – is putting a new proposal –

the ‘more exact’ proposal – like the less exact proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

logically speaking – there is no goal

the idea that there is a goal – is really just the notion of foundation reconfigured

or if you like – given a new direction –

a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if we behave logically we explore propositional uncertainty

if we behave illogically – we deny it

92. ‘This finds expression in questions as to the essence of language,

of propositions, of thought.—For if we too in these investigations are

trying to understand the essence of language—its function, its

structure,—yet this is not what those questions have in view. For they

see in the essence, not something that already lies open to view and that

becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that lies

beneath the surface. Something that lies within, which we see when we

look into the thing, and which an analysis digs out.

'The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our problem now

assumes. We ask: "What is language?", "What is a proposition?"

And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all; and

independently of any future experience.’

our reality is propositional reality

there is no essence to this reality – there is only what is proposed – and what is proposed – is open – open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

there is no hidden reality – there is only the reality that is put – that is proposed

‘We ask: "What is language?", "What is a proposition?"’ –

language is proposal –

a proposition is a proposal

93. ‘One person might say "A proposition is the most ordinary

thing in the world" and another: "A proposition—that's something

very queer!"——And the latter is unable simply to look and see how

propositions really work. The forms that we use in expressing

ourselves about propositions and thought stand in his way.

Why do we say a proposition is something remarkable? On the

one hand, because of the enormous importance attaching to it. (And

that is correct). On the other hand this, together with a

misunderstanding of the logic of language, seduces us into thinking

that something extraordinary, something unique, must be achieved

by propositions.—A misunderstanding makes it look to us as if a

proposition did something queer.’

our world is the world of propositions –

‘ordinary’ or ‘queer’ has nothing to do with the logic of propositions

such terms only function iN a rhetorical context

the ‘forms’ that we use to express ourselves about propositions and thoughts – are propositions

and these propositions of form – as with the propositions they are used in relation to –

are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

I do not say the proposition is something ‘remarkable’ – and I do not attach ‘enormous importance’ to it

what is achieved by propositions – is proposal –

proposal is neither ‘extraordinary’ or ‘unique’ – or ‘queer’ –

to suggest such is to confuse logic with rhetoric

94. 'A proposition is a queer thing!' Here we have in germ the

subliming of our whole account of logic. The tendency to assume a

pure intermediary between the propositional signs and the facts. Or

even to try to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves.—For our forms

of expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing

out of the ordinary is involved, by sending us in pursuit of chimeras.’

the proposition is a proposal –

signs are proposals – facts are proposals –

our forms of expression – are proposals –

proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

95. ‘"Thought must be something unique". When we say, and

mean, that such-and-such is the case, we—and our meaning—do not

stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this—is—so. But this

paradox (which has the form of a truism) can also be expressed in this

way: Thought can be of what is not the case.’

what is not the case – is only the case – if what is the case – is denied

96. ‘Other illusions come from various quarters to attach themselves

to the special one spoken of here. Thought, language, now appear to

us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world. These concepts:

proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the

other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used

for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is

missing.)’

thought – language – the world – are proposals – propositional constructions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘But what are these words to be used for now?’ –

no great mystery here –  they are used as they are used –

and logically speaking their use is open to question

there is no ‘missing language-game’ – you can play with these words if you want to – construct a language-game – if you want to –

but the real issue – the issue we all face – if we are not playing games – is the critical evaluation of these words – of these proposals –

and there is no ‘final’ evaluation here –

every proposed use – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

97. ‘Thought is surrounded by a halo.—Its essence, logic, presents

an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of

possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought.

But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all

experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness

or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it——It must rather be of the

purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction;

but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the

hardest thing there is (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus No. 5.5563).

We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential,

in our investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable

essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts

of proposition, word, proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order

is a super-order between—so to speak—super-concepts. Whereas, of

course, if the words "language", "experience", "world", have a use, it

must be as humble a one as that of the words "table", "lamp", "door".’

you can propose a propositional structure – and propose that this structure is ‘the order of possibilities which must be common to both world and thought’ – and name this propositional structure – this propositional complex – ‘logic’ –

and you can give it a kick along – with rhetoric – dress it up with halos and the purest crystal – and revel in its beauty – if you like –

what you have though – when the lights go down and the house is empty – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘logic’ is not any particular proposal – or set of proposals –

logic – is the critical action – of question – of doubt – in the exploration of propositional uncertainty

there is no essential difference between Wittgenstein’s view of things in the Tractatus – and his view in the Investigations

and the reason I say this is that in both the Tractatus and the Investigations – Wittgenstein holds to the view that logic presents order –

he drops from the heights of crystal purity to the notion of the language-game –

but still he believes in strait-jacketing propositional reality –

it is just that in the language-game order – there is more room to move

I understand why Wittgenstein had the idea of publishing the Tractatus and the Investigations together in one volume –

for the Investigations might best be seen as a development on the central theses of the Tractatus

perhaps in the Investigations we have the development of a philosophical framework  designed to show the application of the ideas of the Tractaus beyond logic and mathematics?

In any case the view that the Investigations is a refutation of the Tractatus just doesn’t stack up

‘trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language’ – is entirely misguided

you can actually forget about ‘essence’ altogether –

but if you find it too hard to renounce this ‘incomparable’ – you must face the logical fact – that any proposal of essence – any proposed essence – is as with any other proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

understanding this should enable you to give up your weakness for ‘essence’

the words – ‘language’ – ‘experience’ – ‘world’ – as with ‘table’ – ‘lamp’ and ‘door’ – are proposals – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

98. ‘On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language

'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,

as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable

sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the

other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect

order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.’

as to sense –

sense is not a given – sense is a proposal

any proposal of sense – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

order is not a given – order is a proposal

any proposal of order – ‘perfect’ or otherwise – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

a proposal – is a proposal – and any proposal can be variously described

any description of a proposal – i.e. ‘vague’ – is – as with the subject proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

99. ‘The sense of a sentence—one would like to say—may, of

course, leave this or that open, but the sentence must nevertheless

have a definite sense. An indefinite sense—that would really not be a

sense at all.—This is like: An indefinite boundary is not really a

boundary at all. Here one thinks perhaps: if I say "I have locked the

man up fast in the room—there is only one door left open"—then I

simply haven't locked him in at all; his being locked in is a sham.

One would be inclined to say here: "You haven't done anything at all".

An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none.—But is that true?’

there is no definite sense –

any sense is indefinite – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

but in the face of this uncertainty – we do have – we still have – we can have –

an operational sense

a sense in short – that though – uncertain – we decide to operate with –

this decision – is open to question –

an operational sense enables us to proceed – to proceed in the face of propositional uncertainty

as to boundaries – definite or indefinite –

it is really a question of what you are doing –

you can proposes definite boundaries –

but these can be put to question – to doubt – can be seen as – indefinite – uncertain –

as any escaped prisoner will testify

it is really a question of what you are doing – what kind of propositional activity you are involved in

if you are playing a game – a rule-governed propositional action –

the boundaries are definite – or there is no game –

or in the example given by Wittgenstein – there is no prison ‘cell’ –

for here the ‘rules’ were not applied

on the other hand – if you are involved in propositional discovery – the boundaries – will be in question –

and here any proposed boundary will function as a proposal – a boundary – to go beyond

100. ‘"But still, it isn't a game, if there is some vagueness in the

rules".—But does this prevent its being a game?—"Perhaps you'll call

it a game, but at any rate it certainly isn't a perfect game." This means:

it has impurities, and what I am interested in at present is the pure

article.—But I want to say: we misunderstand the role of the ideal

in our language. That is to say: we too should call it a game, only we

are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to see the actual use of the

word "game" clearly.’

‘"But still, it isn't a game, if there is some vagueness in the rules".—But does this prevent its being a game?—"’

yes –

a ‘vague’ rule – is no rule

forget ‘perfect’ – games – are rule-governed

rules – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

however if you play a game – you play in accordance with the rules – or you are not playing a game

any so called ‘ideal’ – is a proposal – open to question

and best understood as a structural proposal – as an organisational proposal

there is no ‘ideal of our language’ – as such –

‘ideals’ can be proposed and worked with –

but as with any proposal – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain



(c) killer press. 2020.