A1
‘Can a logical
product be hidden in a proposition? And if so, how does one tell, and what
methods do we have of bringing the hidden element of a proposition to light? If
we haven’t yet got a method, then we can’t speak of something being hidden or
possibly hidden. And if we do have a method of discovery then the only way in
which something like a logical product can be hidden in a proposition is the
way in which a quotient like 755 /3 is hidden until the division has been
carried out.
The question
whether a logical product is hidden in a sentence is a mathematical problem.’
‘Can a logical
product be hidden in a proposition?’
no
reason being – that
logically speaking nothing is hidden
so this distinction
between hidden and not hidden – is not valid
what you see is
what you get –
how you interpret
what you see – is open to question – open to doubt –
but any proposal
you make – in the way of interpretation –
is – what you see
what we have – is
the proposal – the proposition –
in the absence of
proposal – in the absence of description – what we face is not something
‘hidden’ – what we face – as plain as day – is what we don’t know – is the
unknown –
and the unknown is
not hidden –
it is as they say ‘in
your face’
a quotient is not
‘hidden’ in a division – it is a way of describing the propositional operation
that is division
mathematics is a
sign-game
the ‘rules’ of
mathematics –‘determine’ –what is possible in the use of signs –
mathematics – is a
game of propositional discovery
you play the game
in accordance with the rules to see what the rules-play can generate
the rules – are proposals – and as with any set of
proposals – are open to question – open to doubt
however when you play – when you play the game – the very
point of it is to play in accordance with the rules –
questioning the
rules – is not playing the game – is not doing
mathematics
to question the
rules – is the business of meta-mathematics – the philosophy of mathematics
‘So an elementary
proposition which, in the calculus as I am now using it, is not represented as
a truth-function of other sentences.
The idea of
constructing elementary propositions (as e.g. Carnap has tried to do) rests on
a false notion of logical analysis. It is not the task of that analysis to
discover a theory of elementary
propositions, like discovering principles of mechanics.
My notion in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus was
wrong: 1) because I wasn’t clear about the sense of the words “a logical product
is hidden in a sentence” (and suchlike), 2) because I too thought that logical
analysis had to bring to light what was hidden (as chemical and physical
analysis does).
the proposition “this place is now red” (or “this circle is
now red) can be called an elementary proposition if this means that it is
neither a truth-function of other propositions nor defined as such. (Here I am
disregarding combinations such as p. : qv –q and the like.)
But from “a is now red” there follows “a is not now green”
and so elementary propositions in this sense aren’t independent of each other
like the elementary propositions in the calculus I once described – a calculus
to which, misled as I was by a false notion of reduction. I thought that the
whole use of propositions must be reducible.’
there is no
elementary proposition
any so called
‘analysis’ of a proposition – is no more than the description of the
proposition – in terms of other propositions
we have a proposals
– and we go on to describe that proposal etc. etc. –
there is no logical
end to this
when you stop – presumably it is because you have
no need to proceed
presumably you have
described your proposal – in a manner that suits you –
the point is your
propositional description (of the proposal) – like any description – any
proposal –
is open to question
– open to doubt
is uncertain
the so called
‘elementary proposition’ – is not ‘a logical product’ – it is a rhetorical
devise –
the point of which
is to establish some propositional or philosophical ‘authority’ –
to cut right to the
chase here –
the only authority
is the authority of authorship –
beyond authorship –
any claim to an authority – is logically false –
any such claim is
simply pretentious –
more to the point –
this so called
‘elementary proposition’ – of Russell and of the Tractatus –
as with any
proposition – any proposal –
is open to question
– open to doubt –
it is a proposal – and as such – uncertain
‘elementary
proposition’ –
if this term is to
have any further use –
it is – I would
suggest – the proposition – you start with –
and that can be any proposition
‘truth-functional
analysis’ – is a logical game
yes – you can
formalize a proposition –
but this is nothing
but another description of the
proposition
the point of a proposition
is what is proposed –
restating the
proposal in formal terms –
is effectively
repeating or simply rewriting the proposition –
it does not bear on
what is proposed
‘analysis’ is
rubbish –
it’s rubbish in
logic – and it’s rubbish in life
there is no going
deeper – to find the ‘hidden’ truth or essence
what you have is
what is proposed – and yes you can propose in relation to that
forget the ‘hidden’
– there is only surface –
and once you
understand that –
the surface – goes
B1
‘If you want to use the appellation “elementary proposition” as I did in
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and
as Russell used “atomic proposition”, you may call the sentence “Here there is
a red rose” an elementary proposition. That is to say, it doesn’t contain a
truth-function and it isn’t defined by an expression that contains one.’
truth-functional analysis – is a language-game
the idea of the elementary or atomic proposition is that it refers to an
elemental or atomic fact – that can’t be further analyzed – and therefore is a
foundation for knowledge
so the idea is break a sentence up into it’s grammatical/logical
elements – and you can discover the foundations of knowledge
yes – this logical-analysis is elegant in its simplicity –
but just plain stupid in its naivety – (or should that be – pretension?)
it is to turn the problem of knowledge into a language-game
when in fact language – and language-games – express the problem
any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
this goes for atomic sentences – molecular sentences – or any other way
you want to carve it up
there is no foundation to knowledge –
any proposed ‘foundation’ – is like any other proposal – open to question
this idea of a foundation – is really the result of fear –
fear of the unknown
and that has spawned deception and delusion – and the language-game –
rhetoric
our proposals are uncertain –
and it’s not an epistemological crisis –
it is in fact the source of our freedom and creativity
and to be frank – the program it’s not that hard to get with
as to analysis –
once you understand that there is no foundation –
then there is no going from the surface – to the foundation – there is
no going deeper
there is no logical depth – there is no depth
no ‘hidden logical product’ – no hidden reality –
what there is – is what is proposed
we put forward proposals – propositions – and we propose – in relation
to the propositions before us – etc. – etc. –
this is the action of language – propositions in relation to propositions
this is our world – this is how it is made
it is all on the surface –
……..
‘What gives us the idea that there is a kind of agreement between
thought and reality? – instead of ‘agreement’ here one might say with a clear
conscience “pictorial character”
this idea of agreement –
presumes a reality – a reality –
with all the features we think it has – independent of our thinking
how could we know such a reality
is there – independent of thinking it?
and if we accept that the
features that it has – are features – we think it has –
then what must it be –
independent of our thinking?
the answer is – unknown
and in that case there is no
agreement –
all we have is a proposed reality
–
what we face in the absence of any proposal – is the unknown –
we propose – to make known
attached as we might be to our propositional constructs – i.e. ‘thought’
– ‘reality’ – etc.
what we have here – what we are dealing with – is proposals – propositions
my point really is – there is no non-propositional reality –
we never leave the proposal
here Wittgenstein has put forward a proposal for understanding reality –
for dealing with the unknown
a proposal that puts that there is an independent reality – and that the
proposition pictures this reality
further he looks at problems with this proposal – and comes to this
conclusion –
‘So I am imagining that the difference between proposition and reality
is ironed out by the lines of projection belong to the picture, the thought,
and that no further room is left for a method of application, but only for
agreement and disagreement’
‘only for agreement and disagreement’ –
yes – the proposal is open to question
and as with any proposal – you can assent to it – or dissent from it –
and your assent – or your dissent – like the proposition itself –
is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
some proposals have a longer half life than others
it is I think a question of circumstance and utility
be that as it may –
any proposal – we make – or operate with – regardless of whether it is
entrenched or not –
is open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
© greg t. charlton. 2015.
